

Research Briefing

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Gaza 2026: Board of Peace and National Transitional Committee

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Summary

In January 2026 the US special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, announced the beginning of stage two of the October 2025 framework between Israel and Hamas. This 20-point framework had been endorsed by the UN Security Council in November 2025, with the UK backing the measure.

This briefing describes the establishment of the Board of Peace, and the temporary transitional committee for Gaza that it will supervise. Like many European states, the UK has not confirmed it will join the board, citing concerns about Russia's potential membership and the board's remit going beyond Gaza.

Section 2 of the [Library briefing on the UK response to the conflict in 2025](#) sets out the October framework, international responses to it, and developments in Gaza and the West Bank to November 2025.

What progress was made under stage 1?

[Stage 1 of the October 2025 framework](#) provided for an immediate end to fighting, for the release of all hostages held in Gaza in exchange for some Palestinian prisoners, an increase in humanitarian aid and withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces to a set line ([the "yellow line"](#)).

The [body of the last hostage taken by Hamas on 7 October 2023 was recovered](#) in late January 2026.

[UN data](#) and [Israeli data](#) both show an increase in aid since October 2025. However, significant concerns for the [humanitarian situation](#) remain, with [Israeli action against the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees \(UNRWA\) and international NGOs](#) restricting or ending their access to Gaza. The Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza also reopened in February, but [for only a limited number of people](#) rather than goods. [The UK Government](#) and others have requested that Israel [revise its banned list of "dual use" items](#) to allow more goods and aid to enter Gaza and to fully re-open Rafah.

[Israeli forces currently control just over half of Gaza](#), and [Hamas retains its weapons in the Strip](#). There have been continued reports of [violence and violations of the ceasefire](#) in Gaza into 2026.

The 2025 framework does not cover the West Bank. In 2025 and 2026, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has [recorded continuing violence](#) between Israeli settlers, Palestinians and the Israel Defence Forces. [Israeli settlement activity on the E1 West Bank plan](#) (involving houses to the east of Jerusalem), which the responsible Israeli minister [Smotrich says would "bury" the idea of a Palestinian state](#), continues in 2026. A new scheme

to [register areas in the West Bank as open for Israeli development](#) has also been announced. The Palestinian Authority says [this is de-facto annexation](#).

What was announced in January 2026?

On 14 January 2026 US envoy [Steve Witkoff said that stage 2 had begun](#). He said this would involve forming a transitional committee to govern Gaza and the “full demilitarisation and reconstruction” of the Strip. To date:

- The [Board of Peace](#), intended to oversee post-conflict Gaza, has been established. Chaired by President Trump, [up to 35 states have agreed to join, but not any other G7 state](#). A US-appointed Gaza executive board, [including Sir Tony Blair and Jared Kushner](#), is in place.
- A [Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of Gaza](#), intended to lead on reconstruction and humanitarian relief, has been announced. Supervised by the Board of Peace, it is led by [former Palestinian Minister Ali Shaath](#) and does not include members from Hamas or the Palestinian Authority (and its dominant faction, [Fatah](#)). [The committee is based in Egypt](#) and has not entered Gaza. [Hamas has said it is willing to cede governance](#) to the transitional committee.

What other aspects of stage 2 remain?

Many other [aspects of the October 2025 framework](#) remain unresolved and open to negotiation. These include:

- Disarming Hamas. Hamas, which is proscribed in the UK as a terrorist group, has signalled it is willing to disarm if [Israeli forces withdraw](#) and [progress is made on Palestinian statehood](#). Recent statements suggest it wants to [retain its small-arms](#) or [participate in Gaza’s police](#). [President Trump](#) and [Prime Minister Netanyahu](#) have said military action remains an option. The 2025 framework proposes an [amnesty for Hamas fighters](#).
- Creating an international stabilisation force, intended to secure demilitarisation. This has not yet been formed, though [a US General was appointed leader](#) in January 2026. Israel continues to [oppose Turkish and Qatari participation](#) in any force. [Contributing states are not confirmed](#).
- Role of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Israeli laws in 2024 and 2025 banned state engagement with UNRWA, restricting its ability to send some staff and goods into Gaza. The [Library briefing on UNRWA](#) has more on this topic.
- Reconstruction. There is [extensive damage to infrastructure, services and homes across Gaza](#). However, [donors are reportedly concerned about](#)

[committing funds](#) before Hamas is disarmed and uncertain about funding through the Board of Peace rather than the UN.

- Reforms to the Palestinian Authority and whether it will assume governance in Gaza as well as the West Bank. Expected reforms include to its education and welfare system. Section 2.5 of the [Library briefing on the conflict in 2025](#) has more on these commitments.

Israeli parliamentary elections, due by October 2026, and [planned elections for the Palestinian Authority](#), may also influence international action on Gaza.

What's been the response to the US plans?

UK Government

In 2026 the UK Government has welcomed the transitional committee, [describing it as more “important” than the board](#). It says that the committee must take the lead in increasing aid, which [the UK says remains too low](#). Like many European states, the UK has [expressed concern at the broad mandate of the Board of Peace](#) and [decision to invite President Putin](#). The UK has not joined. In March 2026 the [UK is hosting a conference on the International Peace Fund for Israel and Palestine](#). Details are to be confirmed.

Israel, Hamas and Palestinian Authority

[Palestinian groups, including Hamas, have said they support the transitional committee](#) and are prepared to cede governance to it. However, Hamas is critical of the board, [arguing it constitutes “international guardianship”](#). The Palestinian Authority says [it remains committed to carrying out its reforms](#).

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said [Steve Witkoff’s January announcement was a “declarative move”](#). He has been critical of Qatar and Turkey joining the board; both states having been critical of Israeli conduct in Gaza in the 2023 to 2025 conflict. Nonetheless, [Israel has joined the Board of Peace](#).

Prime Minister Netanyahu says [reconstruction should not be allowed to begin before Hamas is disarmed](#). He has restated his opposition to a Palestinian state. Israel’s President, Isaac Herzog, has suggested that [Israel could normalise diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia](#). However, Saudi Arabia’s immediate foreign policy priorities have moved [further away from this aim](#).

Response of Arab states

[Arab states, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have backed the transitional committee](#) and joined the Board of Peace. They say the board will progress the reconstruction of Gaza and is a permanent solution to the conflict. [Saudi aid for the Palestinian Authority has been announced](#).

1 Background: the 20-point framework and UN Security Council endorsement

1.1 October 2025 agreement

Pages 29 to 33 of the Library briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2025](#) set out more information on the initial stages.

Initial stages from October 2025 to January 2026

On 8 October 2025 the US announced that Israel and Hamas, a proscribed terrorist group, had reached an agreement on the “first phase” to ending the two-year conflict. It came into effect on 10 October. This phase centred on an end to fighting, the release of all hostages, an increase in humanitarian aid, and withdrawal of Israeli forces to a set line, known as the “yellow line”.

[Israeli forces now control around 53% of Gaza](#) but [Palestinians in Gaza remain concentrated in Hamas-controlled zones](#).

Both Israel and Hamas have reported some fighting and violations of the agreement.¹ Hamas has also fought with some opposing Palestinian groups, some of whom are backed by Israel, as it seeks to retain influence in Gaza.²

From 10 October 2024 to 11 February 2026, the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health reports at least 591 Palestinians have been killed ([it does not differentiate between civilian and combatant deaths](#)). Three members of the Israel Defence Forces have also been killed.³

Section 2 and pages 65 to 78 of the Library briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2025](#) set out reaction and plans for stage 2

Stage 2 from January 2026

The October agreement was described as the first stage of a wider 20-point framework on post-conflict Gaza. This 20-point framework, proposed by the US, includes longer-term objectives such as the disarming of Hamas and Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza, reconstruction, and reforms to the [Palestinian Authority](#) (led by Mahmoud Abbas, in the West Bank).

These initiatives are to be managed by a Board of Peace. Security is to be conducted by an international stabilisation force, and Hamas is to cede governance of Gaza to a transitional Palestinian committee. The committee does not contain representatives of major Palestinian factions or groups.

¹ BBC Monitoring, [Israel, Hamas trade accusations of violating ceasefire](#), 8 December 2025

² BBC Monitoring, [Gaza anti-Hamas militias pledge to follow in Abu Shabab's footsteps](#), 6 December 2025; Wall Street Journal, [Israel quietly backs new Gaza militias fighting Hamas](#), 24 January 2026

³ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian situation update 357: Gaza](#), 13 February 2026; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Swords of Iron](#), accessed 5 February 2026

1.2

Framework backed by the UN Security Council

While the UN Security Council has endorsed the Board of Peace, its oversight and direction is limited

On 17 November 2025 the UN Security Council voted on a US-drafted resolution ([Resolution 2803 \(2025\)](#)). This endorsed the October framework and established the framework for the Board of Peace to manage post-conflict Gaza and an international stabilisation force. All members of the UN Security Council voted in favour, save for China and Russia who abstained.⁴

The resolution “welcomes” the creation of a Board of Peace, and “authorises” the board’s members to make “such arrangements as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of the Comprehensive [October 2025] Plan”. This includes reconstruction, the formation of the international stabilisation force, and establishment of the Palestinian governing committee for Gaza. While the resolution says that the Security Council will remain “seized” with the issue, it has no specific role in oversight or management of the 20-point framework, other than receiving a written report every six months.⁵

The resolution authorises the Board of Peace and related international civil and security presences until 31 December 2027.

As noted at the time by analysts at International Crisis Group, European Journal on International Law, and Chatham House, the resolution is “vague” and “ambiguous” on some questions, including the functioning and membership of the Board of Peace, international stabilisation force and transitional Palestinian governance.⁶

The UK backed the resolution and the framework

The UK voted in favour of the resolution, saying it “takes [the October 2025] plan forward and has the support of Arab and Islamic countries, which has been welcomed by the Palestinian Authority”. It also said that the transitional arrangements “must be implemented in accordance with international law, and respecting Palestinian sovereignty and self-determination”.⁷

⁴ UN, [UN Security Council authorizes temporary international force for Gaza](#), 17 November 2025


⁵ [UN Security Council resolution 2803 \(2025\)](#), paras 2,4,7,8,11

⁶ International Crisis Group, [What to look for as the Gaza peace plan comes to the UN Security Council](#), 14 November 2025; EJIL Talk!, [UN Resolution 2803](#), 28 November 2025; Chatham House, [What is Security Council Resolution 2803. \[...\]](#), 21 November 2025

⁷ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), [The United Kingdom voted in favour of this resolution as a critical step \[...\]](#), 17 November 2025

2 The Board of Peace (BoP)

Structure announced to implement the 20-point framework, January 2026



Source: White House, [Statement on President Trump’s comprehensive plan to end the Gaza conflict](#), 16 January 2026. Additional members are expected to be announced to the boards.

2.1

Launch of the BoP, January 2026

The board will supervise the Palestinian committee and manage funding

Role under the 20-point framework

The October 2025 framework says that the BoP is charged with oversight of the transitional Palestinian governing committee which will be responsible for the day-to-day running of Gaza and its public services.⁸ The BoP is also responsible for “set[ting] the framework and handl[ing] the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza” until the Palestinian Authority is judged to have carried out sufficient reforms to assume control of Gaza.⁹

The BoP is to be led by President Trump. Its members will include other heads of government. The 2025 UN Security Council resolution includes no further details or responsibilities on the board, other than only endorsing its role until 2027 and in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

It is reported that the board’s inaugural meeting will be on 19 February 2026.¹⁰ On 15 February, President Trump said that, to date, more than \$5 billion had been pledged by BoP members for reconstruction and “thousands of personnel” have been committed to the stabilisation force and local police.¹¹

Proposed charter

The draft charter does not mention the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Gaza, or Israel

While the BoP was proposed in the context of the 2023 to 2025 conflict, [the board’s draft charter](#), which may be changed before it is finalised, suggests a more extensive role for the body in global affairs. The draft does not mention Gaza, Israel, or the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

The draft says that:¹²

- There is a “need for a more nimble and effective international peace-building body” and creation of a “coalition of willing states committed to practical cooperation and effective action”.
- Membership of the Board of Peace is limited to states invited to participate by the chair (President Trump).
- There is no term limit on the chair and the chair is held personally by President Trump, as opposed to whoever is US President.

⁸ Commons Library, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2025](#), p67

⁹ These reforms are wide ranging: see section of the Commons Library briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2025](#), pp76-7 and sections 2.3 and 2.4

¹⁰ Axios, [White House plans Board of Peace meeting in DC on Gaza reconstruction](#), 6 February 2026

¹¹ Donald Trump on Truth Social, [“The Board of Peace has unlimited potential”](#), 15 February 2026

¹² Times of Israel, [Full text: Charter of Trump’s Board of Peace](#), 18 January 2026

- The chair designates their successor. The replacement of the chair can occur only with a voluntary resignation or as a result of incapacity. Incapacity is determined by a unanimous vote of the Executive Board.
- States can be members for three years, or permanent if US\$1 billion is paid to the board within its first year of operation.
- Decisions are to be taken by majority vote, though subject to the approval of the chair, with each state having one vote. In the event of a tie, the chair has the casting vote.
- An executive board will be selected by the chair and “consist of leaders of global stature”. They are to serve for two years and are tasked with supporting the BoP’s mission. The executive board will take decisions by majority vote, though the chair can veto their decisions.

Some commentators and states (including the UK Government) have raised concerns that the mandate of the board goes beyond that envisaged in the October 2025 framework and overlaps with functions of the UN. Speaking in January 2026 President Trump said that the BoP “might” replace the UN but also that “you’ve got to let the UN continue because the potential is so great”.¹³ For more analysis on the BoP, see the below box.

This briefing focuses on the board’s role in the context of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Further reading on the board’s global role and in Gaza

- Carnegie Endowment, [US peace mediation in the Middle East: Lessons for the Gaza Peace Plan](#), February 2026
- International Crisis Group, [When the Board of Peace meets in Washington, Gaza’s future will be on the line](#), February 2026
- Arab Center Washington DC, [International law and the Trump Board of Peace charter](#), January 2026
- European Council on Foreign Relations, [Trump’s Board of Peace goes global](#), January 2026
- Foreign Policy/International Crisis Group, [The board of discord](#), 22 January 2026
- EU Institute for Strategic Studies, [The Board of Peace, Gaza, and the cost of being inside the room](#), January 2026
- Just Security, [Expert Q&A on the charter of the Board of Peace and the role of \[the US\] Congress](#), January 2026

¹³ Times of Israel, [Trump says Board of Peace ‘might’ replace UN \[...\]](#), 20 January 2026

Current membership, January 2026

Board of Peace

The BoP is chaired by President Trump and consists of invited heads of state. Some 35 member states have reportedly accepted an invitation, though the numbers who have signed its charter are lower. There is no Palestinian representative. Countries that have joined include:

- In the Middle East: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait and Israel.
- Elsewhere: Hungary, Belarus, Bulgaria, Argentina, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia.¹⁴

This means many states important to any future settlement are present:

- Turkey and Qatar have both hosted Hamas leaders and Qatar has played an important role in conflict mediation. Both have been critical of Israeli conduct during the 2023 to 2025 conflict.
- Egypt and [Indonesia](#) have been among the states who have offered to contribute to the International Stabilisation Force. Egypt has long played a mediatory role in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
- Jordan also plays an important role in the conflict, [being responsible for the management of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem](#).¹⁵
- Arab Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, are expected to be significant financial backers for Gaza’s reconstruction, though not without preconditions.¹⁶

BoP executive board

The BoP executive board is intended to “operationalize” the BoP’s “vision”. It currently has seven members, who will be responsible for specific portfolios. These include regional relations, reconstruction and investment.¹⁷

There are seven members, who include the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, the US President’s son-in-law and former advisor, Jared Kushner, and current US Middle East Envoy Steven Witkoff.

¹⁴ CBC, [Here are the countries joining Trump’s “Board of Peace” so far](#), 22 January 2026

¹⁵ See section 5.6 of the Commons Library, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023/24: US, EU and Middle East response](#), December 2024; Al Jazeera, [Indonesia readies Gaza stabilisation force, hosts Jordan’s king for talks](#), 14 November 2025, Ahran Online, [Egypt participation in Gaza force contingent on UN resolution, Palestinian approval: SIS chief](#), 15 January 2026

¹⁶ Tel Aviv University Institute for National Security Studies, [Involvement of the Gulf states in rebuilding the Gaza Strip](#), September 2025

¹⁷ White House, [Statement on President Trump’s Comprehensive Plan \[...\]](#), 16 January 2026

Sir Tony Blair, UK Prime Minister from 1997 to 2007, is also a member. In 2025, media reports had suggested significant opposition from Middle East states to his appointment, citing the UK's participation in the 2003 Iraq invasion. His appointment had reportedly been ruled out.¹⁸ On his appointment, Sir Tony said that the “implementation of the plan will take enormous commitment”. He has declined to endorse the reported \$1 billion requested from states to become permanent members of the Board of Peace.¹⁹

[Nickolay Mladenov](#), an executive board member, will serve as the High Representative for Gaza. He was the UN's Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process from 2015 to 2020.

Gaza-specific executive board

The Gaza executive board will support the BoP's High Representative to Gaza and the transitional National Committee for Gaza (see section 3).

There are 11 members, some of whom are also on the general executive board, such as Marco Rubio, Jared Kushner and Tony Blair. It also includes officials and businessmen from several countries, including the US, Qatar, Turkey and the UAE, and the UN's Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process since 2025 and the Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator for Gaza, [Sigrid Kaag](#).²⁰

US proposals for post-conflict Gaza, January 2026

Speaking at the Davos summit in Switzerland in January 2026 [Jared Kushner set out a US\\$30 billion reconstruction plan for Gaza](#).

Mr Kushner said that [reconstruction would be done in stages](#), beginning in Rafah. He estimated that Gaza city could potentially be rebuilt in three years. Areas in which Hamas has not disarmed will not be included and the whole Strip is to be demilitarised. He did not lay out funding for his proposal, which envisages \$25 billion for utilities and public services and the remaining \$5 billion for business, loans and commercial zones and educational and vocational training. He said a US-hosted reconstruction conference would be held soon for pledges (reports suggest [this will be on 19 February 2026](#)).

The plan is [similar to “Project Sunrise”](#) first reported by the Wall Street Journal in December 2025. Under the plan, the US would “anchor” 20% of the estimated \$112 billion reconstruction cost over 10 years, such as through loan guarantees and grants. Reconstruction would begin in Rafah, which would be

¹⁸ The Times, [Tony Blair ruled out of Gaza's 'board of peace'](#), 8 December 2025

¹⁹ Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, [Tony Blair's Statement](#), 17 January 2026; Bloomberg, [UK's Blair distances himself from Trump's \\$1 billion peace board fee](#), 18 January 2026

²⁰ White House, [Statement on President Trump's Comprehensive Plan \[...\]](#), 16 January 2026

a new administrative capital for Gaza, then move towards the north. US officials noted the plan relies on Hamas disarming.

Both [Israeli and Arab press](#) and [diplomatic officials](#) expressed scepticism of the plan, citing challenges such as the continued presence of armed groups, the threat of high-rise buildings for Israeli security, how to address land rights and compensation, and the potential for [population displacement](#) in Gaza.

Israel is critical of Qatari and Turkish membership

Israel's Government has been critical of membership

In January 2026 the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said that the “announcement regarding the composition of the Gaza Executive Board [...] was not coordinated with Israel and runs contrary to its policy”.²¹

He criticised Qatari and Turkish participation on the BoP, following their criticism of Israel during the 2023 to 2025 conflict. Addressing the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) in January, he said the boards “don’t have any authority or any influence or any soldiers” and reiterated neither country should be allowed to contribute to any international stabilisation force.²²

Israeli commentators judge that Israel joined the BoP despite this opposition as its activities involve “Israel’s core interests”, because Israel is closely tied to the US, and that the Israeli Government likely considers it “preferable [...] to UN bodies” which it has long criticised.²³

Palestinian responses

Hamas has criticised Israeli membership

As stated above, there are no Palestinians on the BoP or its subsidiary boards.

Hamas has previously opposed the BoP, describing it in November 2025 as the “impos[ition] [of] an international guardianship mechanism” which it would “reject”.²⁴

However, in January 2026, a Hamas spokesperson said that there was “a certain degree of positivity” towards the board if it can “compel the occupation [Israel] to stop its violations”. The group has criticised Israeli membership.²⁵

²¹ Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, [Prime Minister’s Office statement](#), 17 January 2026

²² Times of Israel, [PM vows no Qatari, Turkish troops in Gaza \[...\]](#), 19 January 2026

²³ Tel Aviv University Institute for National Security Studies, [Trump’s Board of Peace](#), 4 February 2026; Times of Israel, [\[...\] PM’s reliance on Trump left him no choice \[...\]](#), 23 January 2026

²⁴ AA, [Hamas rejects UN Security Council’s adoption of US-drafted Gaza resolution](#), 18 November 2025

²⁵ BBC Monitoring, [Hamas cautiously welcome Peace Board \[...\]](#), 23 January 2026

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, another UK-proscribed terrorist group in Gaza, has described the board as “serv[ing] the interests of the occupation [Israel]”.²⁶

The Palestinian Authority has welcomed the 20-point framework. Its comments have focused on the national committee for Gaza.²⁷

2.2

UK and international reactions

UK and permanent Security Council members

Only Russia has signalled an interest in joining

Aside from the US, none of the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, Russia, UK and France) have confirmed participation. No G7 state aside from the US is participating (these being the UK, [France](#), [Germany](#), [Japan](#) and [Italy](#) – [Canada has been uninvited by the US](#)).

France has said it will not join, saying the board is a threat to the UN-led international system, while China has said it will uphold the UN system.²⁸

However, Russian President Vladimir Putin has signalled he is willing to join and suggested that US\$1 billion of Russian frozen assets in the United States could be used to support the board and fund Gaza’s reconstruction.²⁹

The UK opposes Russian membership and argues the board goes beyond its intended mandate

On 20 and 22 January 2026 Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said that the UK would not be joining at the present time, saying the “legal treaty [...] raises much broader issues” than the Israel– Hamas conflict and what was “previously expected for Gaza”. She said the UK is concerned about President Putin being invited while the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues.³⁰

The Conservative Party has also rejected Russia’s potential membership of the board, and the Liberal Democrats said the board “is not about peace at all”.³¹

On Sir Tony Blair’s participation, in October 2025 Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer said “it is for others to decide what [...] membership will be”.³²

²⁶ BBC Monitoring, [Why the Gaza Board of Peace is raising concerns](#), 22 January 2026

²⁷ WAFA, [State of Palestine welcomes President Trump’s efforts \[...\]](#), 14 January 2026

²⁸ Politico, [France rejects Trump Gaza Board invite \[...\]](#), 20 January 2026; Global Times, [China firmly upholds UN-centered intl system \[...\]](#), 21 January 2026

²⁹ TASS News Agency, [Palestine relations and possibility of contributing \[...\]](#), 22 January 2026

³⁰ BBC News, [UK holds off joining Trump’s Board of Peace over Putin concerns](#), 22 January 2026; HC Deb, [20 January 2026](#), c130

³¹ HC Deb, [20 January 2026](#), cc132-3

³² HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), c241

Responses in the Middle East

Key Middle East states are joining: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Israel

As stated above, most permanent UN Security Council members (as well as [among most European states](#)) have been hesitant about the BoP. The EU High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, said that if the board's role was "limited to the UN Security Council resolution" and Gaza, then "we can work with it".³³

In contrast, several Middle Eastern states have said they will join. They include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain.³⁴

In a joint statement, several of these countries said they support the board as a "transitional administration" for Gaza as a means of achieving a permanent ceasefire, reconstruction and "advancing a just and lasting peace grounded in the Palestinian right to self-determination and statehood".³⁵

³³ Jerusalem Post, [EU can work with Peace Board if it focuses on Gaza, Kallas says](#), 22 January 2026

³⁴ L'Orient Today, [Facing Trump's Board of Peace, Arab states quietly weigh their options](#), 22 January 2026

³⁵ Pakistan Foreign Ministry, [Joint Statement on the Board of Peace](#), 21 January 2026

3

National Transitional Committee

3.1

Announcement and role

The apolitical Palestinian committee is intended to be in place for two years

Responsibilities and intended transition

The October 2025 framework said that Gaza would no longer be governed by Hamas but instead by a temporary transitional committee, constituted of “technocratic [...], apolitical [...] Palestinians and international experts”.³⁶ This is the only one of the three governing institutions to have Palestinian representation. It does not have representation from the Palestinian Authority, Hamas or any other major Palestinian factions.

The committee, known as the National Transitional Committee for the Administration of Gaza, will be responsible for “delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza” and reconstruction.

The committee will be overseen by the Board of Peace. It is intended to be in place for two years.

The Palestinian Authority, led by President Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank, is intended to assume governance in Gaza in the long term under the October 2025 framework, but only once it has made reforms and policy changes.

Assessment of Gaza’s reconstruction needs

In September 2025 the UN Environment Programme estimated that:³⁷

- There are more than 61 million tonnes of debris in Gaza to clear. The largest amounts are in highly populated areas like Rafah, Khan Younis, Gaza City and North Gaza. There are also many unexploded munitions.
- 41% of all structures in the Gaza Strip have been destroyed, and up to 78% destroyed, damaged or possibly damaged.
- Over 90% of cropland is damaged. Before the conflict, in 2022, Gaza already imported about half its food needs.
- There is significant damage to fresh water supplies and wastewater disposal, with a history of over exploitation of local resources.

³⁶ Commons Library briefing, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2025: UK and international response](#), November 2025, p67

³⁷ UN Environment Programme, [Environmental Impact of the escalation of conflict in the Gaza Strip: Second assessment](#), September 2025, chapters 1, 2 and 5

It will take seven to 20 years to clear the debris, according to UN agency estimates. Factors influencing this pace include the security situation and provision of adequate fuel and equipment.³⁸

The economic contraction in the West Bank and Gaza is “among the most severe economic contractions in recent history,” according to the World Bank in April 2025. The World Bank also estimated that “it will take until 2038 for real GDP [gross domestic product] per capita in Gaza to recover to pre-crisis levels, while recovery in the West Bank is expected by 2028”.³⁹

The UN Conference on Trade and Development, [Report warns of economic collapse in the Occupied Palestinian Territory](#), November 2025, provides an overview of other humanitarian and reconstruction needs.

For access of UN agencies and non-governmental organisations to the Strip, see the Commons Library briefing, [UNRWA and UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip 2023 to 2026](#).

Committee priorities are humanitarian relief and reconstruction

Leadership and reconstruction plan

The 15-member National Transitional Committee is led by Ali Shaath, a Palestinian [former deputy planning minister and engineer](#). He has said his priorities are immediate humanitarian relief and temporary housing, followed by urgent infrastructure repairs and reconstruction of buildings and houses. In January 2026, he said that “Gaza will return and be better than it used to be within seven years” (see above box for Gaza’s reconstruction needs).⁴⁰

The [full list of members](#) has not been made public. The European Council on Foreign Relation’s [Mapping Palestinian politics](#) has short biographies of its members.⁴¹

³⁸ UN Development Programme, [Clearing most of the rubble in the Gaza Strip is possible in seven years](#), 20 November 2025

³⁹ World Bank, [Impacts of the conflict in the Middle East \[...\]](#) (PDF), April 2025, p7

⁴⁰ Reuters, [The Trump-backed Palestinian who wants to push Gaza’s rubble into the sea](#), 15 January 2026 and BBC Monitoring, [Head of Gaza governing committee details reconstruction plan](#), 15 January 2026

⁴¹ European Council on Foreign Relations, [National Committee for the Administration of Gaza](#)

3.2

How will the committee work?

Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad and the Palestinian Authority have backed the committee, and Hamas has said it will cede governing responsibilities in Gaza to it.⁴²

Qatar, Egypt and Turkey, who contributed to mediation with Palestinian factions, have all backed the committee's formation.⁴³

The committee's chair does not expect it to have any authority behind the yellow line, where Israel Defence Forces remain.

The Board of Peace's High Representative for Gaza, Nickolay Mladenov, has set out five conditions for the committee to take control in Gaza. These are Hamas ceding control of all civilian institutions to the committee, an end to ceasefire violations, more aid entering Gaza, adequate funding for the committee, and an agreed framework for the decommissioning of weapons.⁴⁴

The committee's success will depend on the security situation, aid access and whether Hamas disarms

Chatham House think tank analysis notes that the committee may be "constrained by the two major sticking points to Phase Two: Hamas's refusal to disarm, and Israel's refusal to withdraw from its current position along the 'Yellow Line'". Israel is unlikely to withdraw further without the establishment of the international stabilisation force and disarmament of Hamas.⁴⁵

Analysis for Carnegie Endowment also sets out four "primary conditions" for the committee to function effectively. These are:

1. Protecting civilian infrastructure in Gaza from attacks.
2. Allowing civil servants and officials who worked under the Hamas administration to remain in place.
3. Allowing the importing of necessary reconstruction material and equipment into Gaza (Israel's "dual list" bans some goods for having a potential military use. In 2025, the UN said [these included solar panels and parts for generators and vehicles](#)).
4. Deploying the international stabilisation force and withdrawing Israel Defence Forces from Gaza.⁴⁶

⁴² BBC Monitoring, [What we know about Gaza's technocratic committee](#), 22 January 2026 and [Palestinian factions reaffirm backing for Gaza governing committee](#), 14 January 2026

⁴³ BBC Monitoring, [Qatar, Turkey, Egypt welcome formation of governing committee](#), 15 January 2026

⁴⁴ Times of Israel, [Board of Peace envoy: Technocrats can't enter Gaza if ceasefire violations persist](#), 13 February 2026

⁴⁵ Chatham House, [Phase Two of Gaza's ceasefire will fail without a political vision for Palestine](#), 20 January 2026

⁴⁶ Carnegie Endowment, [All or Nothing in Gaza](#), 26 January 2026

Foreign Affairs also notes that Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank may “fatally undermine implementation” of the 20-point plan as it requires a reformed Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, which may be undermined by continuing instability.⁴⁷

3.3

UK Government reaction

The UK describes the committee as more important than the Board of Peace

In January 2026 the UK Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, welcomed the announcement of stage 2 and the appointment of the transitional committee.

She said that “the future of Gaza must be Palestinian-led” and “it’s critical we build momentum to sustain the ceasefire” and the wider 20 point framework.⁴⁸ The Foreign Secretary also stated that the “most important organisation or network for the future of Gaza is the Palestinian committee”, rather than the Board of Peace,⁴⁹ and that the committee “should be able to take responsibility for significantly increasing humanitarian aid” into Gaza.⁵⁰

2026 conference on Peace Fund for Israel and Palestine

On 12 March 2026 the UK will host a conference to establish the International Peace Fund for Israel and Palestine. Civil society groups from the region will participate. Further details have not been published.⁵¹

Proposed by the Alliance for Middle East Peace, a coalition of 160 civil society groups, the fund intends to invest in peacebuilding efforts on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, citing the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) as a model.⁵² The IFI was established as an independent organisation by the UK and Irish governments in 1986, funding over 6,000 projects to date.⁵³

Pages 55 to 56 of the Commons Library briefing, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict July 2024 to March 2025](#), has more on the fund. A [Westminster Hall debate](#) was held in March 2025.

⁴⁷ Foreign Affairs, [Israel Is quietly annexing the West Bank](#), 12 February 2026

⁴⁸ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, [Foreign Secretary statement on the Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of Gaza](#), 15 January 2026

⁴⁹ HC Deb, [20 January 2026](#), c132

⁵⁰ HC Deb, [20 January 2026](#), c129

⁵¹ FCDO, [UK to boost peacebuilding efforts for Israel and Palestine](#), 9 December 2025; PQ 98694 [[Development Aid: Staff](#)], 16 December 2025 and PQ HL HL12783 [International], 17 December 2025

⁵² Alliance for Middle East Peace, [IFIPP and Long-term strategy to create conditions for peace](#) (PDF) and [Written evidence from the Alliance to the Foreign Affairs Committee IPC0009](#) (PDF), 2024

⁵³ International Fund for Ireland, [Who we are](#)

Speaking to the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in December 2025, Yvette Cooper also said that the committee should be more closely tied with Palestinian governance in the West Bank to progress a two-state solution:

the establishment of the Palestinian committee needs to be linked into the Palestinian Authority, and we need to have that track to the two-state solution that we have obviously always championed, and which was part of our recognition of the state of Palestine [...] [[in September 2025](#)]

My hope would be that once the next phase around Gaza, with the Board of Peace and the Palestinian committee, is established, that would also become an opportunity to link it more clearly with the issues around the West Bank [such as Israeli settlements and settler violence] and the reforms to the Palestinian Authority that we are also proposing.⁵⁴

The government has also called for the “swift” implementation of other aspects of stage 2, including the deployment of the international stabilisation force, disarming of Hamas and withdrawal of Israel Defence Forces, and a continued increase in humanitarian aid into Gaza.⁵⁵

3.4 Israeli debate and criticism of Palestinian Authority involvement

Israel opposes a transfer to the Palestinian Authority

As of February 2026, Israel is not allowing the committee members to enter Gaza from Egypt via the Rafah Crossing, according to Israeli newspaper Haaretz.⁵⁶

However, the Board of Peace’s High Representative for Gaza Nickolay Mladenov has said: “If you put the committee tomorrow in Gaza and the violations of the ceasefire continue [...] we’re only embarrassing the committee and ultimately making it ineffective”.⁵⁷

[Israel continues to oppose a role for the Palestinian Authority](#) in Gaza, criticising the Authority for not carrying out necessary reforms and for supporting actions against Israel in forums like the [International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court](#).⁵⁸

Some members of the ruling Israeli coalition, including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, continue to oppose the framework plan more generally. In

⁵⁴ Foreign Affairs Committee, [Oral evidence: Work of the FCDO](#), 16 December 2025, Q456

⁵⁵ FCDO, [The UK remains committed to supporting implementation \[...\]](#), 28 January 2026

⁵⁶ Haaretz, [Israel blocks entry of committee meant to run Gaza \[...\]](#), 20 January 2026

⁵⁷ Times of Israel, [Board of Peace envoy: Technocrats can’t enter Gaza if ceasefire violations persist](#), 13 February 2026

⁵⁸ For a discussion of proposed reforms and policy requirements, see Commons Library briefing, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2025: UK and international response](#), November 2025, section 2.4 and p70

January 2026, Minister Smotrich argued that “full Israeli control” in Gaza should be established to disarm Hamas, encourage emigration of Palestinians, and support permanent Israeli settlements.⁵⁹ Security Minister Ben Gvir has also rejected a committee for Gaza and has called for the Israel Defence Forces to resume their attacks “to achieve the central objective of the war: the destruction of Hamas”.⁶⁰

Israel is due to hold parliamentary elections by October 2026 and Gaza’s future is likely to form part of these debates.

4 Disarming Hamas

As noted above, the disarming of Hamas is part of stage 2 of the October 2025 framework. The Israeli Prime Minister has said that disarming Hamas, not reconstruction, must be the next stage of the process.⁶¹

Hamas is not the only group in Gaza to possess arms and since October 2025 there has been some fighting between rival factions.⁶²

4.1 October 2025 framework and US/Israeli statements

Under the October 2025 framework, once Hamas has released all its hostages Hamas is to decommission its weapons. The body of the last hostage taken on 7 October 2023 was recovered in January 2026. Hamas members are to be given amnesty and be allowed to leave for other countries if they surrender their weapons and commit to peaceful co-existence:

6. Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons will be given amnesty. Members of Hamas who wish to leave Gaza will be provided safe passage to receiving countries.

13. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarisation of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally

⁵⁹ Times of Israel, [Smotrich calls to shutter US-led Gaza coordination center, resettle Strip](#), 19 January 2026

⁶⁰ Times of Israel, [Ben Gvir calls for return to war with ‘overwhelming force’](#), 17 January 2026

⁶¹ Times of Israel, [Netanyahu: The next phase of Gaza ceasefire is disarming Hamas](#), 26 January 2026

⁶² Stimson Center, [Gaza’s Armed Fragmentation](#), October 2025 and BBC Monitoring, [Who are the Israeli-backed armed groups challenging Hamas in Gaza?](#), 15 October 2025

funded buy back and reintegration programme all verified by the independent monitors.⁶³

Statements on disarming process

There have been few statements on the process for disarming Hamas or verifying it has taken place, but in January 2026 the US told the UN Security Council that independent international monitors will be involved. It also confirmed the framework's intention for an international "buy back and reintegration programme", though did not provide details on how this would function:

[...] we, along with our partners on the Board of Peace, and in consultation with the [Palestinian] National Committee, will apply pressure to Hamas to honor its commitment and to disarm. Hamas must not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly or indirectly, in any form. [...]

All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt.

Independent international monitors will supervise a process of demilitarization of Gaza to include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded buy back and reintegration program.⁶⁴

Separate documents, unpublished but reported by Reuters in January 2026, suggested that heavy weapons (such as rockets, mortars and missiles) are to be decommissioned immediately. The "personal arms" of Hamas members are to be registered and decommissioned as the National Committee police "become[s] capable of guaranteeing personal security".⁶⁵

In his Davos speech in January 2026, Jared Kushner had also reiterated from the framework that Hamas members will be "rewarded with amnesty and reintegration, or safe passage" if they disarm.⁶⁶

Vice President JD Vance had previously suggested Arab Gulf states will be responsible for confirming Hamas has disarmed.⁶⁷

Agreement for the Palestine Liberation Organisation to leave Lebanon in 1982

One historical parallel has been noted in Israeli media, of the [Palestine Liberation Organisation](#) (PLO) in Lebanon in the early 1980s.

In its invasion of Lebanon in 1981, Israel had sought to target the PLO, which was using Lebanon as its main base of operations to target Israel. In 1982 a

⁶³ Commons Library, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2025](#), pp66-8

⁶⁴ US Mission to the UN, [Remarks at a UN Security Council briefing](#), 28 January 2026

⁶⁵ Reuters, [Hamas seeks role for its police in Gaza ahead of disarmament talks](#), 26 January 2025

⁶⁶ Times of Israel, [Kushner presents vision for Gaza](#), 22 January 2026

⁶⁷ Times of Israel, [Vance downplays renewed violence in Gaza](#), 20 October 2025

[US-mediated agreement](#) was reached for several thousand PLO personnel to leave the country.⁶⁸ The PLO then remained headquartered in Tunis until 1991 but has since been based in the West Bank and sits in the UN as a non-member observer state, under the designation of Palestine.

Following the 1982 agreement, an international force was deployed but it was forced to [withdraw two years later](#) (this followed the two substantial attacks on US and French troops, including the [Beirut Barracks bombing](#)). The Lebanese civil war continued until 1990.

Threats of military action by Israel and the United States

Both the United States and Israel have threatened military action if Hamas does not disarm. In public statements, the Israeli Prime Minister and US President have said the below.

- On 14 October 2025 President Trump said if Hamas does not disarm, “we will disarm them. And it will happen quickly and perhaps violently”. He said he had communicated this to Hamas.⁶⁹ In 2026, the President has restated disarmament can be done the “easy way or the hard way”.⁷⁰
- On 10 October 2025 Prime Minister Netanyahu said Hamas must be disarmed and Gaza demilitarised. He said Israel was prepared to “achieve [this] the hard way” if it could not be achieved otherwise.⁷¹

In late December 2025 and mid-January 2026 there were also unconfirmed media reports that the Israel Defence Forces would take action within the next two months if Hamas did not make progress.⁷²

4.2

Statements by Hamas officials

Since the October 2025 agreement, Hamas has restated its position that it has a “legitimate right” to weapons and suggested it would only surrender them to a future Palestinian state that has been established after Israel

⁶⁸ Times of Israel, [As Hamas pressured to leave Gaza, experts see echoes of 1982 PLO exit from Lebanon](#), 10 October 2025; Jerusalem Post, [Gaza today is repeat of 1982 Beirut](#), 19 November 2025

⁶⁹ Reuters, [Trump suggests Hamas has approval for internal security operations in Gaza](#), 13 October 2025; Reuters, [Trump says Hamas must disarm or be disarmed, perhaps violently](#), 14 October 2025

⁷⁰ Times of Israel, [Trump says US will ink disarmament deal with Hamas](#), 16 January 2026

⁷¹ Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, [Statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu](#), 10 October 2025

⁷² BBC Monitoring, [US, Israel set two month deadline for Hamas disarmament](#), 30 December 2025 and BBC Monitoring, [Israel gives Hamas two-month ultimatum to disarm](#), 17 January 2026

withdraws from Gaza. However, Israel is unlikely to withdraw without Hamas disarming.⁷³

Other reports and Hamas officials have suggested alternative approaches:

- A freeze or storing of arms for a set ceasefire period, of up to 10 years.⁷⁴ This process could include the presence of an international peacekeeping force along Gaza's borders.⁷⁵
- Discussing ways arms could not "pose a threat to Israel".⁷⁶
- To retain their light weapons, such as rifles, which one Hamas official said "pose no real threat" to Israel.⁷⁷
- Hamas continuing to participate in the local police force.⁷⁸
- Hamas disarming in exchange for the group being recognised as a political party, and for some leaders to be allowed to leave Gaza.⁷⁹

4.3 UK support for disarming Hamas

At the UN Security Council the UK has reiterated its position that "Hamas should uphold their commitments under the 20-point plan to disarm and end their governance over Gaza".⁸⁰

Speaking in January 2026, the Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, said "decommissioning Hamas weapons" was one of the UK's three priorities in Gaza (alongside establishing the National Transitional Committee and increasing aid).⁸¹

The Foreign Secretary said that the government had "put forward proposals based on our experience in Northern Ireland and our expertise". Further detail

⁷³ BBC Monitoring, [Hamas says disarmament 'complicated issue', requires consensus](#), 30 October 2025; Reuters, [Hamas aims to keep grip on Gaza security and can't commit to disarm, senior official says](#), 18 October 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Hamas says ready to hand over weapons after ending 'Israeli occupation'](#), 7 December 2025

⁷⁴ AP, [Hamas is ready to discuss freezing or storing its weapons, senior official says](#), 8 December 2025

⁷⁵ BBC Monitoring, [Hamas proposes 'guarantees approach' to regulate Gaza weapons](#), 8 February 2026

⁷⁶ New York Times, [Israel and Hamas were not ready for a comprehensive peace deal, mediator says](#), 12 October 2025

⁷⁷ BBC Monitoring, [Hamas says its light weapons 'pose no real threat' to Israel](#), 3 January 2026

⁷⁸ Reuters, [Hamas seeks role for its police in Gaza ahead of disarmament talk](#), 27 January 2026

⁷⁹ BBC Monitoring, [Report cites 'obstacles' to Hamas leaders' 'safe exit' from Gaza](#), 25 January 2026 and [Report says Hamas, US agree on disarmament terms](#), 22 January 2026

⁸⁰ FCDO, [The UK will continue to work with all partners to implement Resolution 2803 \[...\]](#), 24 November 2025

⁸¹ HC Deb, [20 January 2026](#), c130

has not been provided. The Daily Telegraph has reported that the government's national security adviser, Jonathan Powell, has put forward staged processes, where Hamas could retain its light weapons in the medium term or store its heavy weapons in monitored sites before fully disarming.⁸²

The Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, has said the disarmament process must go beyond heavy weapons and small arms, to also include the network of tunnels under Gaza built by Hamas.⁸³

Shadow Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, has criticised the government's comparisons with weapons decommissioning in Northern Ireland, arguing Hamas in Gaza is a "different set of circumstances" and that "there can be no continuation of Hamas [...] there should be nothing left of them whatsoever".⁸⁴

Further reading on the challenges of disarming Hamas

- Foreign Affairs, [The only way to disarm Hamas](#), January 2026. Argues private contractors are the only alternative to the Israel Defence Forces.
- Atlantic Council, [It's all about Hamas's disarmament](#), December 2025,. On the role of Qatar and Turkey.
- RAND, [Demilitarization in Gaza: Could the Palestinian Authority be part of the solution?](#), November 2025. Discusses potential role of Palestinian Authority policing forces.
- RAND, [Historical parallels highlight the challenges of implementing phase II of the Gaza Peace Plan](#), November 2025. Examples of decommissioning weapons in other contexts.
- Al Monitor, [What will it take to disarm Hamas?](#), October 2025. Discusses a range of outcomes and approaches to disarming.
- European Council on Foreign Relations, [Decommission, not disarm: How Europe can help nudge Gaza toward peace](#), July 2025. Argues progress on a wider political process will be required to fully disarm Hamas.

⁸² Daily Telegraph, [Sturmer's security chief wants Hamas to keep some of its guns](#), 22 January 2026

⁸³ HC Deb, [29 October 2025](#), c320

⁸⁴ Times of Israel, [UK's would-be top diplomat says Sturmer failing Israel \[...\]](#), 27 November 2025

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