

Consolidating Ukraine's recovery architecture

Where it stands and next steps

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Abstract

Since the start of Russia's war of aggression in February 2022, Ukraine has resisted the invasion, although at the cost of profound human, economic, infrastructural and environmental damage. Recovery and reconstruction needs over the next decade are estimated at around USD 524 billion, creating an urgent requirement for coherent institutional arrangements that can translate large-scale external support into effective, place-based outcomes.

Ukraine's institutions and society have shown remarkable resilience, and an unprecedented array of foreign partners have mobilised resources and expertise. A comprehensive recovery architecture is in place. Nevertheless, fragmentation, co-ordination gaps and acute human capacity constraints persist, limiting policy coherence and implementation. This paper assesses domestic institutional dynamics – governance, public investment management and subnational capacity – and evaluates roles and co-ordination mechanisms of foreign partners. Drawing on extensive stakeholder consultations, it presents actionable and time-bound recommendations to strengthen the existing recovery architecture to improve the whole-of-government co-ordination and enhance donor alignment.

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Foreword

The scale and complexity of Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction challenge are unprecedented in recent European history. Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, the country has endured immense human suffering and extensive damage to lives, livelihoods and critical infrastructure. At the same time, Ukraine's public institutions, civil society and communities have demonstrated extraordinary resilience and determination. The international community has responded with remarkable solidarity, mobilising large volumes of financial, technical and humanitarian support. Foreign partners have provided approx. USD 180 billion in military assistance, USD 174 billion in financial assistance and USD 26 billion in humanitarian assistance between 24 January 2022 and 31 October 2025 according to the Kiel Institute's Ukraine Support Tracker. Translating that commitment into effective, sustained reconstruction support, however, requires an institutional architecture capable of co-ordinating resources, prioritising needs and strengthening domestic absorptive capacity.

This policy paper aims to respond to that imperative. Prepared in the wider context of the OECD-Ukraine Country Programme (2023-27), it synthesises extensive consultations – both oral and written – conducted between August and December 2025 with representatives from over 40 organisations, including Ukrainian officials, multilateral organisations, international financial institutions, and bilateral donors. The paper examines both the domestic institutional dynamics alongside the broad array of co-ordination mechanisms with foreign partners.

This paper is offered as a contribution to ongoing policy dialogue and implementation and intends to aid both Ukrainian decisionmakers and the diverse community of international partners who stand ready to support the country's recovery. In particular, it aims to inform deliberations around the Ukraine Donor Platform. Strategic co-ordination, sustained political backing and a shared focus on transparency and capacity building will be essential to ensure that reconstruction not only restores what was lost, but helps build a more prosperous, equitable and sustainable future of Ukraine.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

BDF	Business Development Fund
CEB	Council of Europe Development Bank
CEMR	Council of European Municipalities and Regions
CoR	European Committee of the Regions
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DPM	Deputy Prime Minister
DREAM	Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EFF	IMF Extended Fund Facility
EIB	European Investment Bank
ERA	Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans for Ukraine
EU	European Union
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Development Agency)
HoC	Heads of Co-operation (Group)
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ICC	Inter-Departmental Co-ordination Commission for Regional Development
IO	International Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank)
MESU	Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MDCT	Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
MinDigit	Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine
MinEner	Ministry of Energy of Ukraine
MinJust	Ministry of Justice of Ukraine
MinSoc	Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine
MoE	Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine
MoF	Ministry of Finance of Ukraine
MoV	Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine
NABU	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine

NAUCS	National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service
NBU	National Bank of Ukraine
NEFCO	Nordic Environment Finance Corporation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PCGF	Partial Credit Guarantee Fund in Agriculture
PIM	Public Investment Management
RDO	Recovery and Reform Delivery Office at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
ROG	Recovery Operational Group
RRCC	Regional Recovery Co-ordination Centre
RST	Recovery and Reform Support Team
SAPO	Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office
SARDI	State Agency for Reconstruction and Development of Infrastructure of Ukraine
SCMU	Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
SFRD	State Fund for Regional Development
SME	Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises
SPP	Single Project Pipeline
SSRD	State Strategy for Regional Development
SWG	Sectoral Working Group
UDB	Ukrainian Development Bank
UDP	Ukraine Donor Platform
UESF	Ukraine Energy Support Fund
UGC	Ukrainian Global Community
UIF	Ukraine Investment Framework
UIF SB	Ukraine Investment Framework Steering Board
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
URC	Ukraine Recovery Conference
UCRF	Ukraine Community Recovery Fund
URTF	Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund
USF	Ukrainian Startup Fund

Executive summary

Since the start of the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has shown remarkable resilience: institutions have sustained core services, advanced key governance reforms and made significant progress on EU accession benchmarks. International partners have mobilised unprecedented financial, technical and political support, creating a credible foundation for recovery and reconstruction.

At the same time, Ukraine's recovery architecture faces bottlenecks that slow implementation and reduce impact. These include acute human capacity shortages and frequent restructuring; institutional fragmentation across central and subnational bodies causing co-ordination gaps; and a proliferation of donor co-ordination formats and funding instruments that are at times insufficiently aligned. These weaknesses raise transaction costs, reduce predictability for Ukraine and partners and make it harder to translate commitments into high-impact, on-the-ground outcomes. To illustrate these challenges and propose remedies, the report first examines institutional dynamics in Ukraine (Chapter 1) and then assesses the foreign partner architecture (Chapter 2). Recommendations follow each sub-chapter.

Strengthening the domestic recovery architecture

Despite significant personnel losses and government shake-ups, Ukrainian institutions have maintained core functions and progressed structural reforms. However, high staff turnover, understaffed government bodies and frequent reorganisations have undermined continuity and institutional memory, complicating policy processes and engagement with foreign partners.

Ukraine currently uses multiple aid tracking tools, limiting the government's ability to obtain a single reliable view of commitments and disbursements. A single holistic aid-tracking system would improve domestic decision-making, increase transparency and strengthen accountability to donors and stakeholders by providing a unified view of commitments. It could also improve visibility into aid flows at the regional and local levels, helping to shape interventions that can better support subnational recovery.

Parallel engagement tracks with foreign partners risk duplication and reduce ability to present consolidated, whole-of-government priorities. To reduce fragmentation in the domestic policy process and to provide international partners with a single-entry point, a steering body under the Prime Minister could focus on a small set of cross-cutting government priorities: (i) high-level co-ordination and integration of key recovery processes; (ii) centralised engagement and liaison with foreign partners and (iii) pragmatic, demand-driven measures to tackle significant capacity constraints at key nodes in the recovery process.

Decentralisation strengthened local governments, increased their fiscal autonomy and enabled them to deliver critical emergency services. Still, ambiguous mandates, weak interlinkages among subnational actors and a lack of qualified staff impede local recovery efforts. Establishing effective vertical and horizontal whole-of-government co-ordination mechanisms and strengthening subnational capacity (e.g. via digital tools, simplified procedures for low-complexity projects) could help, as well as a more systematic engagement of the Ukrainian Global Community, and the creation of region-level co-ordination platforms. Further efforts to enhance the involvement of subnational actors in the creation of regional and local recovery planning as well as the expansion of participatory engagement formats could facilitate the implementation of a place-based recovery approach.

Public Investment Management (PIM) reform has been a major endeavour to driving recovery and reconstruction. Since December 2023, the government has undertaken significant efforts to strengthen project preparation, appraisal, implementation, and reviewed proposals to select a portfolio eligible for state budget funding. However, limited staff capacity, uncertain funding and other structural barriers remain – for example, the lack of appraisal and approval processes that distinguish between different project types. To tackle capacity constraints, foreign partners could further expand their efforts to build capacities for project preparation and play a stronger role in the project appraisal process.

Beyond PIM itself, Ukraine's funding landscape has become more active and diverse, with state development funds, investment promotion agencies and international partners playing catalytic roles. While this broadened ecosystem mobilises resources and expertise, it can also create confusion. A medium-term response could be the creation of a Ukrainian Development Bank to co-ordinate catalytic capital, reduce overlap between instruments and act as a proactive engine of cross-sectoral recovery policy. For such a vehicle to add value, its mandate and scope (sectoral and geographic focus), governance arrangements, talent attraction and retention strategies and the degree of IFI and donor participation must be carefully specified. If designed and capitalised prudently – with strong governance and partner engagement – a development bank could improve co-ordination and scale up finance.

Consolidating foreign partner architecture

A wide range of foreign partners have set up diverse co-ordination mechanisms, enabling information exchange and mobilising financial and technical support, while giving Ukrainian stakeholders a strong voice. This variety of formats is undoubtedly a significant indicator of support for Ukraine, but it has created information and co-ordination challenges, compounded by divergent interests and mandates. Consulted stakeholders have highlighted the lack of a single view of programmes, funds and recovery mechanisms. To address this, the Ukraine Donor Platform could be scaled up as the primary digital portal for Ukraine's recovery: its website could be upgraded to provide a consolidated single view of partner activities, funding opportunities and flows, job openings and relevant knowledge outputs, creating a clear entry point for partners and improving alignment across co-ordination formats.

The Heads of Co-operation Group (HoC) and the Ukraine Donor Platform (UDP) have both provided senior level, regular fora – often covering closely related topics – and have successfully engaged senior Ukrainian officials and major international partners. However, given the overlap in discussion topics, there is a risk of duplication, further compounded by the ambiguous division of tasks between these formats. A careful assessment of how to improve the interlinkage between the HoC and UDP is warranted. Remedies could include measures to ensure regular and seamless information exchange between them to improve co-ordination.

In this context, a relocation of the UDP Secretariat to Kyiv, conditional on the security situation, should also be considered. Beyond enhanced interlinkages between the UDP and other in-country co-ordination formats, like the HoC, a relocation could strengthen on-the-ground engagement and strengthen local ownership.

More generally, it could be helpful to convene a benchmarking exercise across major co-ordination formats. Using interactive sessions, the workshop could map existing co-ordination efforts, identify where stronger linkages might add value and surface shared challenges and practical lessons. The workshop should cover secretariats of major co-ordination formats across the international, national and subnational level. Subject to its initial outcomes, it could be considered to implement such a workshop annually.

Apart from better collaboration via multilateral platforms, foreign partner countries could review their engagements with Ukraine, recognising that many governments already provide substantive bilateral support through numerous actors and meetings. A short, systematic stocktake across countries (and other partners) could help identify where a bilateral channel is essential and where a joint, multi-stakeholder approach would be more efficient and less burdensome for Ukrainian counterparts. As a practical example, partners might look to the Nordic-Baltic joint co-ordination experience for inspiration when designing more pooled or harmonised country responses.

1 Institutional recovery and reconstruction architecture within Ukraine

Overarching dynamics at the national level

Ukraine's institutional architecture has demonstrated remarkable resilience and adaptability throughout the ongoing Russian invasion. This is reflected in the country's overall adherence to the IMF's structural benchmarks (IMF, 2025^[1]) and in steady progress on reforms central to advancing EU integration. Remarkably, despite the human and material toll of the war, Ukraine completed the EU screening process more quickly than any other candidate country apart from Moldova (European Commission, 2025^[2]). Such achievements have depended on sustained political commitment and intensive effort across the public administration.

Digitalisation has contributed to this resilience and enhanced institutional performance by facilitating interactions among a broad set of actors. Prominent examples include the e-Government ecosystem Diia (Diia, n.d.^[3]), the national e-procurement platform Prozorro (Prozorro, n.d.^[4]) and the Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management (DREAM), which performs a key role in leveraging public investments (DREAM, n.d.^[5]).

The government has also created inter-ministerial and inter-agency co-ordination formats to facilitate co-operation. Bodies such as the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (SCMU), the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture (MoE), the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry for Development of Territories and Communities (MDCT) have often played key roles within these formats. However, the mere existence of co-ordination mechanisms is an imperfect indicator of their effectiveness. Evidence from policy reviews points to persistent co-ordination gaps and fragmented structures across several policy areas, including housing (OECD, 2025^[6]), veterans (OECD, 2025^[6]), innovation (OECD, 2022^[7]) and EU integration (OECD, 2024^[8]). Stakeholder interviews during the assessment confirm the presence of co-ordination challenges and point to fragmented structures across and within government bodies.

A major driver of fragmentation has been government shake-ups, which undermine policy continuity and institutional cohesion. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the government has repeatedly created, merged and dissolved ministries and witnessed substantial turnover: more than thirty ministers and dozens of deputy ministers have left their positions since February 2022. Some key positions, such as the Minister of Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine (European Commission, 2024^[9]), were left vacant for prolonged periods. Such instability can complicate long-term reform planning and weaken the capacity to co-ordinate complex, cross-cutting initiatives.

Human capital deficits undermine domestic institutional performance

A further – arguably more disruptive – driver of institutional fragmentation has been the enormous human capacity loss across the public sector. Between February 2022 and the end of Q1 2023 more than 24,000 civil servants left their posts, implying a turnover rate of roughly 20% (OECD, 2024^[8]). *Nearly 66 percent of workplaces at the national level report critical staff shortages* according to the fourth Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (European Union et al., 2025, p. 176^[10]). Turnover has been uneven across ministries, leaving some departments with unsustainably low staffing: for instance, the Ministry of Social Policy's (MinSoc) policy development staff was halved over 2022 and some departments reported vacancies in up to two-thirds of posts (OECD, 2024^[8]). Beyond a decline in staff numbers, the war has taken a toll on well-being: there are growing mental health problems among Ukrainians (Kalaitzaki et al., 2024^[10]) – and by extension among public servants.

Capacity constraints and institutional fragmentation seem to have negatively affected the domestic policy process as reflected by the weak quality of proposals for new legislation and policies. Especially when considering that they often overlap with existing government policies, lack cost estimates and entail weak impact assessments (OECD, 2023^[8]; European Commission, 2024^[9]).

Capacity shortfalls at critical nodes of the policy process can amplify these shortcomings. The Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (SCMU) performs essential substantive, legal, financial and procedural review of all draft legal proposals, co-ordinates interdepartmental working groups and prepares the Government's work plans (OECD, 2024^[8]). Evidence suggests the SCMU's review function is applied inconsistently, with inadequate checks of policy overlap, alignment with government priorities and financial feasibility – creating bottlenecks and weakening collective policy coherence (OECD, 2024^[8]).

Capacity limitations act as a barrier to effective engagement with foreign partners

Given persistent capacity constraints and skills gaps within the administration, delegating strategic policy work to external providers has often been a pragmatic choice. However, outsourcing partner engagement risks creating opaque communication channels that can produce misunderstandings between the Government of Ukraine and its international counterparts. Similarly, opacity can exacerbate corruption risks. Reliance on external providers also creates dependencies: if such contractors become unaffordable or unavailable, partnerships may be disrupted and important institutional know-how lost.

A further challenge is that foreign partners must frequently engage with Deputy Ministers rather than middle managers or specialist technical staff. Deputy Ministers are commonly overstretched and have limited availability for detailed, substantive exchanges. In addition, high turnover of Deputy Ministers – often driven by political appointments (European Commission, 2025^[11]) – exacerbates this problem and can abruptly disrupt relationships. Consulted foreign partners confirmed that these dynamics slow co-operation and reduce access to subject-matter expertise. Strengthening the capacity of middle management and technical specialists to lead foreign partner engagement would improve continuity and the technical quality of exchanges. Moreover, it is important to highlight that there is no top civil service position for managing large policy areas in Ukrainian ministries (corresponding to a Director-General equivalent in OECD countries). Thus, de facto, there is a missing link between the political leadership and middle management (department heads).

In this context, the government and its partners should jointly undertake a targeted bottleneck analysis to identify critical chokepoints in the recovery and reform process. This analysis should a) map staffing and skill gaps at critical nodes of the policy and recovery architecture, b) identify the roles and posts that are essential for effective foreign partner engagement and c) catalogue strategically important outsourcing arrangements and assess their cost-effectiveness and sustainability.

On the basis of the analysis, the government and foreign partners could review and prioritise targeted capacity building responses, including: a) co-ordinated expansion of partner-funded capacity-building programmes focused on middle managers and technical specialists, b) strategic placement of secondees and targeted long-term advisory posts within key units and c) systematic engagement of students, researchers and diaspora experts through internships, fellowships and secondee programmes to rebuild in-house expertise.

It is important to emphasise that the bottleneck analysis should primarily focus on tackling human capital scarcities and deficiencies of key nodes in the short term and inform the implementation of swift and targeted interventions to overcome these. This analysis and the subsequent interventions would thus be complementary to Ukraine's broader civil service reform that inter alia focuses on introducing much-needed meritocratic recruitment processes, remuneration reform (salary improvements for civil servants) and the digital transformation of human resource processes. That being noted, it is crucial to ensure ongoing alignment between this exercise and the wider civil service reform.

Ukraine's institutional set-up to engage with foreign partners is not cohesive

Ukraine's institutional architecture for engaging foreign partners remains fragmented. While the SCMU, MoE, MoF, MDCT and MinSoc have performed key co-ordination functions, the government has not adopted a unified, whole-of-government approach. The result is parallel engagement tracks with foreign partners and weak alignment of Ukrainian entities across co-ordination formats.

Sectoral Working Groups

Sectoral Working Groups (SWGs) are a central vehicle for sector-specific co-ordination: chaired by senior ministry representatives and co-chaired by foreign development partners, they bring together partner countries, IFIs and international organisations to discuss sectoral reforms, legislation and recovery interventions. After limited activity for several years, SWGs were rebooted in 2024 and consolidated from 27 to 18 groups (see *Annex A*). Co-Chairs carry responsibility for strategic direction, agenda setting and Secretariat functions. Nevertheless, horizontal linkages across SWGs – and between SWGs and other co-ordination formats – remain underdeveloped. This constrains cross-sector information exchange and inhibits the consolidation of needs across ministries and regions.

The SCMU has also sought to align partner engagement with Ukraine's EU accession process. The SCMU's Government Office for Co-ordination on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, together with the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration (Ukraine's chief negotiator), has played a central role in this regard (European Commission, 2025^[13]; European Commission, 2024^[10]). Deputy Ministers for EU integration appointed across ministries also provide important additional co-ordination capacity (European Commission, 2025^[11]). Yet these arrangements have not fully overcome the wider fragmentation in partner engagement.

Recognising the problem, the government has proposed reforms to strengthen cross-government co-ordination: notably, the MDCT intends to establish a cross-governmental *Recovery Taskforce* to improve information sharing, consolidate needs across regions and ministries and monitor foreign support (see Chapter 2). Such a mechanism could help to close horizontal gaps if it is explicitly able to link SWGs,

SCMU co-ordination functions and EU-integration structures – and if it is supported by sufficient staffing, clear reporting lines and formal operating procedures.

EU Accession process

The EU accession process demands reforms that are central to Ukraine's recovery: it serves as a driver that inspires and as an obligation that imposes a hard deadline. After being granted candidate status in June 2022, Ukraine completed the bilateral screening of its alignment with the EU acquis and is now in formal accession negotiations while implementing reforms which transpose the acquis in national legislation (European Commission, 2025^[11]). The key reforms are prescribed by interim and closing benchmarks. A strong focus has been on Ukraine's progress under the Fundamentals cluster (inter alia covering rule of law and judicial reform, financial control, public procurement) but advances have so far been mixed. For instance, in July 2025 the Ukrainian Parliament adopted laws that would have compromised the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO). While these laws were reversed following domestic protests and vocal concerns of the foreign partner community, such actions highlight ongoing challenges in rigorously implementing anti-corruption reform (European Commission, 2025^[11]).

A major catalyst for reforms and a substantial source of funding is the Ukraine Facility that entered into force in March 2024 and comprises an envelope of EUR 50 billion across three pillars: direct financial assistance to the Ukrainian state (budget support) contingent on reform progress (Pillar I), blended finance and grants to incentivise public and private investments (Pillar II) as well as accession-related technical assistance (Pillar III). On the Ukrainian side, the MoE has been given primary responsibility for implementing the Facility, co-ordinating preparation of the Ukraine Plan 2024-2027 and acting as the national co-ordinator and single point of contact for international development partners (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2024, p. 13^[18]). The MoF plays a complementary and essential role – maintaining the Reform Matrix, auditing implementation of the Ukraine Plan (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, 2025^[12]) and participating in the key co-ordination format for Pillar II, the Ukraine Investment Framework Steering Board¹ (UIF SB) (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, 2025^[13]).

Despite these arrangements, implementing, monitoring and steering of the reforms remain a challenge. The Commission's Ukraine Report (2025) acknowledges progress in reforms while highlighting areas for further improvement, particularly in improving the scope of monitoring of policy and legislative reforms. Moreover, stakeholder consultations indicate that the MoE's steering authority under Pillar II has so far been limited: the MoE has largely performed a convening role but has de facto not always been empowered to take binding decisions. It further has not yet been able to produce a comprehensive overview of Ukraine's investment needs.

The Ukraine Donor Platform and Engagement with the IMF, International Financial Institutions and the G7 Finance Track

The MoF occupies a central co-ordination role in donor engagement – including co-chairing the Steering Committee of the Ukraine Donor Platform (UDP) established by the G7 in December 2022 to align support for Ukraine's budgetary, recovery and reconstruction needs (Ukraine Donor Platform, n.d.^[14]). The UDP is the broadest international co-ordination format dedicated to Ukraine's recovery, covering 24 countries, as well as international organisations (see Chapter 2). Although Ukrainian representatives regularly participate in UDP meetings, stakeholder consultations indicate that interventions have not consistently reflected a whole-of-government position or presented Ukrainian

priorities in a concise, consolidated manner. This weakens Ukraine's ability to steer donor discussion and to prioritise resources against a unified national strategy.

The MoF plays also a central co-ordinative role in securing state budget support and liaising with major IFIs. Together with the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) the MoF is the primary counterpart to the IMF, whose Extended Fund Facility (around USD 15.5 billion) (IMF, 2025^[11]) has provided budget financing tied to structural benchmarks, similar to Pillar I of the Ukraine Facility. The MoF is also the principal interlocutor for major IFIs – including the World Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) and the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) – which provide a mix of loans, grants, technical assistance and multi-donor trust funds (MDTF) critical to reconstruction. Under the G7 Finance Track the MoF is involved in discussions regarding the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loan Mechanism, which is providing up to USD 50 billion in budget support repayable from projected extraordinary revenues linked to immobilised Russian sovereign assets (G7 Research Group, 2024^[15]).

While these arrangements give the MoF considerable influence over donor co-ordination and state financing, co-ordination with other government bodies is insufficiently developed. Strengthening Ukraine's capacity to present consolidated, sector-prioritised needs across ministries – through clearer internal mandates, pre-meeting co-ordination protocols and improved Secretariat support – would increase the effectiveness of UDP and related donor engagements, better align multilateral and bilateral support with national recovery priorities and enhance accountability against reform and financing benchmarks.

The absence of a unified foreign aid tracking system undermines strategic decision making and accountability

Multiple, parallel aid tracking initiatives currently operate without a single, cohesive framework (OECD, 2024^[16]). These include MoF systems for financial flows and Ukraine Facility Reforms Matrix; the SCMU's technical assistance tracking; the MDCT's DREAM system for recovery and restoration projects; MoE monitoring of Ukraine Facility-related finance; MinSoc's humanitarian aid records; and the Ministry of Energy's tracking for the energy sector. These systems are neither fully integrated nor comprehensive: certain non-concessional instruments are not consistently captured. Given the unprecedented scale of assistance (ODA to Ukraine reached USD 40.5 billion in 2023), establishing a single, government-led aid-tracking platform is essential to demonstrate accountability to domestic and international stakeholders, to guide partner interventions and to optimise allocation and monitoring of foreign funds (OECD, 2024^[16]).


A steering body under the Prime Minister could tackle fragmentation and foster synergies

To reduce policy fragmentation and provide foreign partners with a single-entry point, the Government could create a steering body under the Prime Minister. It would be a state body that should be able to provide authoritative guidance. Its mandate should be tightly focused on a few cross-cutting government priorities: a) high-level co-ordination and creation of strategic linkages across key recovery processes; b) foreign partner co-ordination and donor engagement²; and c) pragmatic measures to tackle capacity constraints of critical nodes for the recovery process across the government. Rather than micromanaging individual programmes, the steering body would produce a single, strategic view of progress across recovery streams, identify and promote synergies and convene

frequent substantive interactions with responsible line ministries and external partners to resolve bottlenecks and align timing and conditionalities. It does not aim to replace co-ordination structures of existing recovery processes but intends to better align them and tackle strategically relevant bottlenecks with targeted measures.

The steering body would play a key role in formulating and operationalising a national recovery vision. In addition, given the currently unclear allocation of the strategic planning function across government, the steering body could play a key role in defining the division of strategic planning responsibilities across government bodies and recovery streams. To inform strategic planning and enable an effective engagement with foreign partners as a single-entry point, it would further be indispensable to establish a team under the steering body that performs cross-sectoral aid tracking and scenario planning based on economic forecasts and demographic projections. Related to this, and in co-operation with relevant government entities, it could be valuable if the steering body plays a major role in the co-ordination of efforts across recovery streams to enhance data quality.

Infographic 1.1. Steering body under the Prime Minister



Source: Authors' creation

Anchoring the steering body under the Prime Minister would strengthen whole-of-government accountability, simplify foreign partner engagement and improve the sequencing and effectiveness of recovery efforts. Being led by the Prime Minister, the steering body would be ideally placed and empowered to monitor, guide and enhance key recovery processes across the entire economy and society.

Its core permanent staff (to a large extent civil servants) should include data and foresight experts, synergy and synchronisation specialists and human capital experts, complemented by delegated officials from ministries and senior advisers from foreign partners to ensure operational integration and timely knowledge transfer. Task teams anchored by the steering body and embedding the *Recovery and Reform Delivery Office at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (RDO)* to a significant extent within its

structure, would help operationalise its agenda. The RDO has been created in 2016 and since then acted akin to a government inhouse consultancy, providing analytical and coordinative support to support several reform processes.

The RDO staff could provide some of the manpower for several steering body functions and play an active role to facilitate linkages between the steering body and government entities. Such linkages could also be facilitated via the so-called *Recovery and Reform Support Teams (RSTs)*, which have de facto been teams of external consultants that have been deployed across various government bodies to support reforms.

Critical success factors for the steering body would include sustained Prime Ministerial backing, a clear legal and regulatory mandate distinct from advisory bodies, targeted budgetary resources (a mix of domestic and partner funding), a compact but technically diverse team and robust stakeholder-management practices. Without such a body, a single view of recovery, comprehensive aid tracking and a genuinely whole-of-government approach are unlikely to materialise, perpetuating overlap, inefficiency and weakened accountability (see *Annex B* for more details).

Table 1.1. Recommendations – Overarching dynamics at the national level

Key findings	Recommendations
<p><i>Co-ordination challenges:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Oftentimes <u>deficient inter-governmental co-ordination</u> within and across policy areas ▪ Ukraine's <u>institutional architecture</u> for engaging <u>foreign partners remains fragmented</u> ▪ <u>Lack of unified foreign aid tracking</u> 	<p>Creation of a steering body under the Prime Minister with a focus on cross-cutting issues such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ High-level <u>co-ordination</u> of and creation of <u>linkages</u> between <u>key recovery processes</u> ▪ <u>Foreign partner co-ordination</u> (including the provision of a unified aid tracking system and a single view of all foreign partner projects per government body) ▪ Development of targeted measures to tackle significant <u>capacity constraints</u> at key nodes of recovery streams.
<p><i>Human capacity deficits across the domestic recovery architecture:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Human capacity constraints at <u>key nodes</u> impede the recovery process ▪ While often pragmatic, <u>outsourcing arrangements</u> can be <u>risky</u> ▪ <u>Strong reliance on deputy ministers</u> for foreign partner engagement can be <u>disruptive</u> due to them being overstretched and due to high turnover 	<p>Analysis across the public sector to detect and tackle key (short-term) capacity bottlenecks, accounting for both the relative scarcity of skilled staff and the strategic importance of their units for Ukraine's recovery process:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Stocktake and <u>review</u> of all <u>outsourcing or consulting arrangements</u> (incl. impact, room for improvement, financial sustainability) ▪ Assessment of <u>targeted human capacity measures</u> such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Cap.-building programs aimed at building skills to engage foreign partners ○ Strategic placement of secondees, ○ A more systematic engagement of students and researchers.

Subnational level

Decentralisation bolstered local capacities, but subnational level co-ordination remains disjointed

Ukraine's decentralisation reform from 2014 – 2020 significantly enhanced capacities of local governments, consolidating over 10 000 local councils into 1 469 municipalities (OECD, 2022^[17]). It increased their fiscal autonomy, which in turn enhanced their investment capacity and enabled the independent provision of critical emergency services following the outbreak of the Russian full-scale invasion (OECD, 2025^[6]). However, exacerbated by the war, many regional and local actors suffer from severe capacity deficits and sub-national co-ordination remains fragmented: key convening mechanisms such as the high-level Inter-Departmental Co-ordination Commission for Regional Development (ICC) – which aimed to act as a (mainly) national level co-ordination body for regional development policy – have so far³ been largely inactive (Šušteršič, 2023^[18]), and mandates and interlinkages among actors [subnational administrations, associations of subnational authorities, the State Agency for Reconstruction and Development of Infrastructure (SARDI), regional development agencies, IDP Councils⁴, Civil Society Organisations etc.] are ambiguous.

The conditions for the creation of local and regional military administrations as well as their future roles are also unclear. Following a decision by the President in 2022, more than 200 regional and local military administrations have been established across the country (Potapenko et al., 2025^[19]). These are temporary bodies, set up for the duration of martial law. They often co-exist alongside conventional local and regional government authorities but have (partially or fully) substituted them on several occasions (Rzheutka, 2025^[20]). So far, there remains ambiguity about the criteria according to which they are set up (European Commission, 2024^[9]) and about their future function within the subnational governance system. An abrupt phase-out following the end of martial law could prove disruptive when considering that they often perform critical functions, such as the implementation of public investment projects, and are on some occasions foreign partners' key subnational focal points. Therefore, a timely, systematic assessment concerning their mandates appears warranted. Such an assessment will likely need to be conducted in a case-specific manner as local conditions can warrant different decisions (e.g. phase-out vs merger).

The heads of local and regional military administrations are appointed by the President, who has significant influence on Ukraine's subnational governance. Examples of this include his power to appoint the Governors of the Ukrainian regions (*Oblasts*) (Mylovanov and Roland, 2022^[21]) and the *Congress of Local and Regional Authorities under the President of Ukraine*. This Congress, formed in 2021, has aimed to facilitate exchange between the central, regional and local level and to catalyse the implementation of reforms (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities under the President of Ukraine, n.d.^[22]). The Congress has attracted a large membership (> 1 750 members) and is attended by a diverse set of stakeholders. However, there are some indications that the Congress has acted in a top-down manner and that municipal leaders have been invited to its meetings by national government and Oblast administrations arbitrarily (OECD, 2022^[17]). In addition, there is scope for greater inclusivity and stronger co-ordination between the main Ukrainian associations of local and regional authorities, including for more effective engagement of foreign partners.

To reduce confusion and support foreign partners, the MDCT should conduct a mapping of Ukraine's subnational governance structures and assess the mandates and transition plans for military administrations. Moreover, the recently set up *Regional Recovery Co-ordination Centre* and the MDCT's intention to create a *Recovery Taskforce* chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister for

Reconstruction – could improve co-ordination between the subnational and national level if fully implemented with clear roles for local authorities, the private sector and civil society.

Foreign partners could, in some instances, also play a stronger co-ordinating role at the subnational level by adopting region-specific foci. A region-specific approach entails that a foreign partner country predominantly focuses its support to Ukraine and engagement with stakeholders on one specific region (Oblast) (see *Annex C*). Our research and stakeholder consultations have indicated that by focusing on a single Ukrainian region it would be possible for some small partner countries to conduct comprehensive stakeholder engagement which would not be realistic at the national level. These countries could in turn act as region-specific focal points for other foreign partners. Thus, to enhance regional development and co-ordination, foreign partners countries could conduct joint strategic sessions or roundtables to assess the benefits and drawbacks of such region specific-foci and co-ordination functions.

Foreign partners active in specific regions could further consider establishing region-level co-ordination platforms to fill a gap in subnational co-ordination similar to what Betliy and Kosse (2025) suggest. While multilateral co-ordination mechanisms exist at the national and international levels, comparable fora are largely absent at the regional level. Regional platforms – somewhat similar to the UDP but tailored to regional needs – would allow Ukrainian stakeholders to present priorities and enable partners to agree on joint region-specific interventions. To maximise impact, these platforms should be interlinked with national and multilateral co-ordination formats (e.g. SWGs, UDP, Recovery Taskforce) to ensure alignment of priorities avoid duplication and synchronise planning and financing across scales.

The composition of the regional platforms would vary across the regions due to their specificities but should in principle contain (key) foreign partners – who should co-host the platforms' Secretariats – as well as regional and key local authorities and administrations. Where sensible, it could also be assessed to set up inter-regional platforms that would cover several regions, the foreign partners active in them as well as a variety of other stakeholders with relevance for recovery processes within the regions. Such inter-regional platforms might for instance be warranted if relevant stakeholders in individual regions would not have the capacity to co-host a region-specific platform or when there are inter-regional recovery projects.

International partnerships have helped cities and regions to overcome capacity deficits

Over 350 Ukrainian cities have established partnership arrangements with foreign municipalities, unlocking capacity-building, internships in European administrations, mentoring and financial and in-kind support. Political-level mechanisms such as the *European Alliance of Regions and Cities for the Reconstruction of Ukraine* (see Box 1.1) as well as networking and capacity-support mechanisms such as the Council of European Municipalities and Regions' *European Partnership Hub* provide Ukrainian subnational authorities with a co-ordination, advocacy and match-making functions. However, the subnational level remains insufficiently connected to multilateral recovery co-ordination fora (for example, the UDP and UIF Steering Board), limiting information flows between subnational actors and international finance and planning processes (Council of European Municipalities and Regions, 2025^[23]).

Partnerships also have inherent limits – partner cities' fiscal constraints and varying engagement skills can restrict the scale and sustainability of support – although outreach via the Ukrainian Global Community (UGC) can sometimes help bridge communication and trust gaps where diaspora or regional networks exist.

Box 1.1. European Alliance of Regions and Cities for the Reconstruction of Ukraine

Initiated by the European Committee of the Regions (CoR), the Alliance brings together EU and Ukrainian local and regional authorities as well as their partners to support and coordinate joint efforts for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine. It has engaged in various political advocacy efforts that inter alia contributed to the addition of a local and regional dimension of the Ukraine Recovery Conference from 2024 onwards.

During its regular (usually bi-monthly) meetings at the working level, the Alliance discusses relevant projects and initiatives, announces publications and events, and engages key partners such as the European Commission and Ukraine Donor Platform. These meetings prepare political recommendations of the Alliance to the URC and serve as a platform for stakeholder consultation on the relevant opinions of the CoR. The CoR provides the Secretariat of the Alliance.

Source: European Committee of the Regions (2025), *European Alliance of Cities and Regions for the Reconstruction of Ukraine*, <https://cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/cooperations-and-networks/european-alliance-cities-and-regions-reconstruction-ukraine>.

The Ukrainian Global Community is an under-engaged strategic partner for recovery

Beyond supporting municipal and regional partnerships⁵, the UGC – an estimated 20-25 million people across 60+ countries – has supplied large remittance flows⁶, entrepreneurial activity⁷ and human capital (Arroyo and Kaupa, 2025^[24]) that can directly address municipal capacity gaps – and provide various forms of support at the regional and national level. More than a thousand UGC initiatives have been created over time which implement a variety of measures for and with the UGC individuals. However, there is untapped potential to harness the UGC for the subnational level. Successful examples such as the Mykolaiv Water Hub (Mykolaiv Water Hub, n.d.^[25]) demonstrate how the Ukrainian diaspora can mobilise finance, expertise and international advocacy for city-level infrastructure and service delivery.

The Ukrainian government has worked to engage with the UGC and has created *Unity Hubs* to coordinate services⁸ for Ukrainians abroad (European Commission, 2025^[26]). Nevertheless, relations with parts of the UGC have at times been strained by past government rhetoric and engagement practices (Tokariuk, 2025^[27]), and a repeated reallocation of the institutional mandate to engage with the Ukrainian Global Community across different ministries has impeded an effective collaboration.

Another critical barrier for the systematic and deep engagement of the UGC has been the absence of an accessible and comprehensive single view of major UGC initiatives, organisations, enterprises and key champions. Thus, foreign partner organisations, the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian stakeholders (e.g. subnational authorities) are often not able to conduct a targeted engagement that would ideally account for the diverging mandates, skills, capacities, economic conditions, interests, sensitivities and past activities of the UGC (initiatives, but also key individuals). Simultaneously, the UGC lacks an integrated overview of focal points and engagement opportunities with Ukrainian stakeholders across the national, regional and local level. There has so far also been no mapping or website that would provide UGC initiatives and their partners within Ukraine with consolidated real-time information about foreign partner projects or funding calls with relevance for them.

One partial remedy for this gap could be the creation of a “Diaspora Skills for Recovery” registry (OECD, forthcoming^[28]) which could on a voluntary basis be populated by UGC members to provide information about their expertise which could then be matched with national and subnational Ukrainian recovery

needs. Another option could be the establishment of subnational UGC engagement bodies⁹ that could serve as regional and local focal points for the UGC, providing them with information about engagement opportunities. In the same vein, it appears valuable to reflect about the set-up of UGC engagement teams or focal points across Ukrainian national ministries to leverage the UGC's potential holistically across recovery processes.

To lower search costs and maximise synergies it could be carefully assessed to set up a digital UGC engagement portal (Arroyo and Kaupa, 2025^[24]) while accounting for several caveats related to its operationalisation (see *Annex D* for an elaboration of potential features and possible impediments for its roll-out). Should a decision in favour of such a portal be made, it appears valuable to explore hosting it within a multi-stakeholder initiative. The recently launched *Diaspora Alliance for Ukraine's Recovery*, which aims to act as a platform for co-ordinated co-operation between the state, the Ukrainian Global Community and foreign partners (Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine, 2025^[29]), could be considered as a viable option. However, should this initiative indeed decide to move forward with a digital portal it would be crucial to avoid overlaps and ensure synergetic interlinkages with other relevant websites (e.g. DREAM).

Beyond co-operation with the UGC, it is a crucial endeavour of the Ukrainian government to facilitate the voluntary return of Ukrainians who are currently abroad. Their return could help counteract Ukraine's acute labour shortages and positively contribute to Ukraine's public finances (OECD, 2025^[6]). However, it will be important to avoid communication that could be perceived as adverse pressure to return and that could deter members of the UGC from co-operation – especially, given recent surveys, indicate that Ukrainians willingness to return has been decreasing (Arroyo and Kaupa, 2025^[24]).

Table 1.2. Recommendations – Subnational level

<i>Key findings</i>	<i>Recommendations</i>
	Short-term:
Roles and interlinkages of subnational actors and co-ordination formats are often vague	Co-ordination: Comprehensive mapping of Ukraine's subnational governance structure and clarification of key actors' roles to better delineate and adjust them
Region-specific approaches facilitated comprehensive stakeholder engagement by some (smaller) countries	Co-ordination: Joint workshop(s) on region-specific approaches of foreign partner countries to learn about benefits and drawbacks of these approaches
Lack of regional stakeholder co-ordination platforms	Co-ordination: Creation of regional level co-ordination platforms
Significant human capital deficits at the subnational level across actors – oftentimes exacerbated by brain drain	<i>Human capacity:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Creation of a "Diaspora Skills for Recovery" registry ▪ Creation of subnational bodies to engage with the UGC ▪ Reflection about the implementation of a digital Portal to engage the Ukrainian Global Community (incl. several mechanisms to leverage the human and financial resources of the UGC)
	Medium-term:
Ambiguity concerning subnational military administrations (e.g. establishment criteria, phase-out)	Co-ordination: Review of regional and local military administrations

Public Investment Management Reform and broader funding architecture

Substantial amounts of investments are needed to (re)establish infrastructure and services.


According to the most recent Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction needs over the next decade are estimated at almost USD 524 billion (European Union et al., 2025^[30]). To rebuild Ukraine in a sustainable manner, the country will need to overcome the two-fold challenge of mobilising the required funding and developing the absorptive capacities necessary to put the funding to productive use.

One of the most ambitious endeavours in this context has been the reform of Ukraine's Public Investment Management (PIM) Framework. Starting with the launch of the *Roadmap for Reforming the Public Investment Management System* in December 2023, the Government of Ukraine has undertaken significant efforts to define the public investment management process – spanning project preparation, appraisal, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, 2023^[31]). Steps have been undertaken to integrate PIM Reform in the budget process (e.g. amendments to the Budget Code in 2025).

A key undertaking of the PIM Reform has been the formation of Project Pipelines, which are portfolios of prioritised projects and programmes. In alignment with sectoral strategies and the Medium-term Plan for Priority Investments, sectoral ministries are supposed to create prioritised lists of projects and programmes for each sector (*Sectoral Pipelines*). The sectoral ministries receive and examine project proposals developed by government bodies and publicly owned enterprises. In addition, the MoF, MoE and MDCT assess the proposed projects across several dimensions – including their alignment with overarching strategic goals, compliance with public investment methodology, financial feasibility and technical feasibility.

Following further examination by inter-departmental bodies, the *Strategic Investment Council* (chaired by the Prime Minister and composed of all line ministries) approves a unified portfolio of projects for state budget funding (*Single Project Pipeline*). A Pilot Single Project Pipeline was formed in September 2024 (European Union et al., 2025^[30]) and updated in September 2025 (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, 2025^[32]).

Infographic 1.2. Public Investment Management (PIM): Formulation of Single Project Pipeline



Source: Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (2025), Public Investment Management (PIM): Formulation of Single Project Pipeline, <https://www.pempal.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/4.%20The%20process%20of%20reforming%20the%20Public%20Investment%20Management%20%28PIM%29%20system%20in%20Ukraine.pdf>.

The Government is working to replicate the national project preparation and appraisal process at the subnational level. An overarching national strategic document (the *State Strategy for Regional Development*) has guided the development of subnational strategic planning documents. In alignment with them and with national level priorities, subnational authorities and territorial communities also need to develop medium-term priority public investment plans that provide the guiding foundation to create project concepts and programmes. All administrative units (across all levels of government) are expected to submit every project funded from national, regional or municipal budgets for assessment via DREAM. Following their submission, the project concepts undergo several assessments by government bodies. Endorsed project submissions are then to be included either within Single Project Pipelines of territorial communities (if only relevant at the local level), at the regional level (projects of regional significance) or at the national level (projects of national significance).

It is important to note that despite swift overall PIM Reform advancement some of the described PIM process steps have not (yet) fully manifested in reality. Sector strategies need to be developed or updated, while Sectoral Pipelines are at varying stages of development. Swift progress is needed to overcome this gap, as sector strategies are crucial for guiding reforms and shaping corresponding sectoral investment programmes. Similarly, subnational authorities and territorial communities are still in the process of creating their Medium-Term Priority Public Investment Plans and related project pipelines (Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, 2025^[33]). Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the significant progress made in forming project pipelines at the subnational level.

Several aspects of the PIM Reform merit recognition. These include the definition of a comprehensive multi-level PIM architecture and PIM cycle, which are a distinct improvement vis-à-vis the fragmented status quo ante. Moreover, it is laudable that several mechanisms have been set up to facilitate horizontal and vertical co-ordination.

A key tool that has facilitated project management and stakeholder engagement has been the aforementioned Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management (DREAM). DREAM is a single digital interface via which stakeholders are supposed to perform virtually all actions across the PIM cycle – including the submission, revision, review and approval of every public investment project concept. Among other features, it depicts all projects under the Single Project Pipeline (SPP), providing information on their objectives, cost estimates, maturity, initiator and location (DREAM, n.d.^[5]). However, stakeholder consultations indicate that DREAM continues to have technical deficiencies and that responsibilities for data entry (e.g. central executive bodies vs project initiators) are not always clearly defined, resulting in insufficient and delayed data updates. This problem is exacerbated by very short timelines for project concept submission and additional support for DREAM seems warranted to help it meet these challenges.

Moreover, it should be reflected how to further strengthen DREAM, given the central role the DREAM team plays in building capacities for PIM implementation at the national, regional and local levels. Notably, DREAM has already delivered trainings to over 20,000 stakeholders through a combination of online and offline sessions.

Capacity deficits and co-ordination challenges

Stakeholders consulted for this paper emphasised that human capacity constraints represent a critical impediment for all actors, affecting activities at every stage of the PIM cycle.

A central challenge for PIM Reform is the limited capacity of small, overstretched PIM departments within the MoF, MDCT and MoE. In fact, two of these ministries may together employ only a dozen PIM-related staff members. Accounting for the key role of these ministries across the entire PIM cycle it is thus crucial to fill this gap with a high priority. Ideally, foreign partners and ministries could jointly discuss the most pragmatic remedy which might include the funding of additional Ukrainian experts or the allocation of qualified secondees from foreign partners.

Another remedy to ease the burden for the PIM departments of key ministries could be a stronger role of foreign partners in the project appraisal process for a transitional period. The quality of the projects (which are de facto often project concepts at different stages of maturity) within the Single Project Pipeline has so far been very heterogenous, which is partially due to insufficient capacities on behalf of Ministries to review them. Foreign partners (e.g. IFIs) have already performed a variety of support measures to strengthen the PIM process and notably have set up Project Preparation Facilities (EBRD, 2025^[42]; World Bank, 2025^[43]). Thus, they would be well placed to examine the quality of project proposals submitted to the national level and could provide the Ministries with stronger advisory support concerning the appraisal of the proposed projects. However, it may need to be assessed whether safeguards will need to be set up to mitigate conflicts of interest. Once ministries' capacities and co-ordination has been enhanced, foreign partners' role could be reduced.

While closing capacity gaps within PIM departments of key ministries is a priority, it is indispensable to intensify efforts to tackle them at the subnational level as well. Stakeholder consultations have shown that subnational authorities and territorial communities tend to be overwhelmed, as often very few employees need to perform multiple roles. In addition, on several

occasions they could not be properly educated about the PIM cycle requirements which is partially caused by the high speed at which PIM Reform has progressed so far.

Several actors are already engaged in capacity-building with subnational authorities and territorial communities, but further efforts will be required. These could include the introduction of standardised digital solutions (European Union et al., 2025^[30]) to compensate for the shortage of qualified staff and simplified procedures for low-cost, low-complexity projects. Furthermore, the capacity-building-related recommendations from the previous sections, also apply here and the selective offshoring of some subnational level tasks to the UGC, (foreign) academia and partner cities should be considered. It is further important to reflect on which PIM procedures at the local level could be simplified in proportion to municipalities' capacities. To ensure amendments are well-targeted, close consultation with municipalities is essential, along with an assessment to consider the introduction of participatory engagement formats at a broader scale.

Beyond the need to overcome capacity constraints, the ability of the government to fund the prioritised project remains uncertain. While projects under the project pipelines may be officially eligible for budget funding, this 'labelling' by itself does not guarantee that they will indeed receive government funds. When considering that several project concepts under the Single Project Pipeline are immature or of low quality this may be doubtful.

In this context, it remains uncertain whether the State Fund for Regional Development (SFRD) and other vehicles that provide state funding will be sufficiently well-resourced to maintain commitment to the PIM process. It is a positive sign that the Government of Ukraine approved in October 2025 a list of projects to receive funding from the State Fund for Regional Development (SFRD). Nonetheless, there are doubts whether the Government of Ukraine will allocate a sufficiently large share of the state budget to the SFRD (Kobets et al., 2025^[34]).

In the past, the SFRD has consistently failed to meet its funding target (originally 1% of Ukraine's State Budget Fund, now 1.5%). Against this background, project (concept) developers may lose interest in participating in the PIM process should they believe that the SFRD, as well as other state budget-based funding instruments (e.g. sectoral public investment programmes), will have insufficient means. Given they need to engage in substantial efforts to comply with PIM process requirements, there is a risk that they instead focus on exploring alternative funding and possibly abandon the PIM process.

Interest in the PIM Reform may also fade if co-ordination does not improve. As mentioned, several mechanisms have been set up to facilitate horizontal and vertical co-ordination. However, stakeholders consulted indicated the MoE, MoF and MDCT would lack a single vision and perform several duplicative activities – within the PIM process and when engaging with foreign partners.

Similarly, stakeholders observed competitive dynamics amongst line ministries to ensure the inclusion of their sectoral projects under the SPP. These dynamics could prove problematic if projects are appraised to proportionately reflect sectors instead of recovery priorities (which may asymmetrically vary from sector to sector).

Co-ordination should also be enhanced across levels of government as the co-ordination deficiencies raised under the section *Subnational level* represent significant obstacles.

Furthermore, Ukraine's State Strategy for Regional Development (SSRD) has in practice been implemented in a top-down manner. It has de facto oftentimes determined the structure of subnational recovery plans without integrating feedback from the regional and local level. In view of subnational capacity constraints this approach might at times be pragmatic in the short-term. However, when

accounting for significant (war-induced) heterogeneities across regions this is not sustainable and acts as a hindrance for a much-needed place-based recovery approach.

To overcome co-ordination challenges within the PIM process, stronger involvement of foreign partners could be beneficial in the short-term. Beyond playing a stronger role in the project appraisal process, this involvement could entail their representation within inter-ministerial and vertical co-ordination bodies of the PIM process for a transitional period. Depending on the extent of their involvement, foreign partners could participate in discussions in lifetime, provide substantive inputs and mediate between key stakeholders when necessary. Beyond these horizontal co-ordination formats, it could be useful to embed foreign partners in the design of the Regional Recovery Co-ordination Centre (RRCC) and the Recovery Taskforce, thereby creating a stronger co-ordination bridge between the subnational and national levels of the PIM process.

Once formed, the steering body under the Prime Minister could increasingly assume a guiding role and establish bridges to other key processes of the Ukrainian recovery architecture.

The broader funding architecture extends beyond PIM reform and remains fragmented

Ukraine has to overcome a significant range of challenges for the social cohesion and well-being of its society that have been triggered or exacerbated by the war. These include the need to integrate internally displaced people (IDPs) and veterans, the effective provision of healthcare, the demographic shrinking of the population, the need to provide housing, energy security and fair access to education (OECD, 2025^[6]). Thus, it is a positive sign that several SPP project concepts aim to alleviate these challenges. However, institutional structures across the social recovery and the PIM realms seem not to be strongly interlinked and it should be reflected upon where institutional exchanges could facilitate alignment as well as synergies between these recovery streams.

Similarly, private sector engagement has so far been limited within the remit of PIM Reform. This may for several projects be natural as they might not be commercially attractive and be prudent when accounting for public authorities' limited capacity to build Public-Private Partnerships. However, a stronger private sector involvement (e.g. via feasibility studies, co-funding where possible) might over time be warranted due to the limitations of the state budget.

Beyond interlinkages with other recovery streams, it should be assessed how to ensure the swift allocation of funding for urgent recovery projects. Several imminent recovery and reconstruction needs caused by the war cannot be planned in advance but are often of critical importance for Ukraine's resilience (e.g. energy infrastructure, emergency services) and require rapid interventions. One way forward could be the establishment of an accelerated appraisal and approval track under or linked to the PIM framework. Eligibility criteria and applicable procedures (e.g. procurement rules) should be clearly specified ex ante.

Unrelated to PIM reform, it is worth highlighting that several development funds and promotional entities have been set up to foster private sector development. Major state development funds aimed at the private sector include the *Business Development Fund (BDF)*, the *Ukrainian Startup Fund (USF)* and the *Partial Credit Guarantee Fund in Agriculture (PCGF)*. In a similar vein, private funds with IFI-backing, like Horizon Capital or Dragon Capital, have been playing a catalytic role for Ukraine's growth capital ecosystem. Apart from them, promotional entities such as *UkraineInvest*, the *Entrepreneurship and Export Promotion Office* and the *Made in Ukraine Offices* across Ukrainian regions have aimed to spur private sector development.

While several of these funds and entities seem to perform well, there are indications of a lack of co-ordination amongst them. For instance, stakeholder consultations indicate that co-ordination challenges among some of these entities were caused by competitive dynamics between ministries. This risk becomes even more apparent when considering that the BDF (MoE and MoF), USF (MinDigit) and PCGF (MoE) have somewhat overlapping target groups but fall under the remit of different ministries.

The risk of fragmentation may also be increased by the number of overlapping funding instruments. For instance, from 2015 – 2019 a total of 110 grants and subventions linked to regional and local development were implemented by a wide range of institutions (OECD, 2022, p.190 [7]). Moreover, it remains an open question whether the recently announced *European Flagship Fund for the Reconstruction of Ukraine*, the *US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund* and the *Ukraine Recovery Fund* will add to the fragmentation or whether they will perform synergistic and coordinative roles.

A Ukrainian Development Bank might be an impactful catalytic institution medium-term

A Ukrainian Development Bank (UDB) might be able to create synergies across sectors and mobilise catalytic finance. As proposed by several researchers (Carletti et al., 2024^[43]; Melnykovska, Monnet and Thiemann, 2025^[44]; Berglöf and Rashkovan, 2023^[45]), a UDB might be able to systematically leverage funding for Ukraine's recovery. In an ideal scenario it could also take stock of all existing catalytic instruments and actors to then consolidate several of them under its umbrella. It could thereby eliminate several competitive dynamics and inefficient overlaps. Another benefit of this consolidation would be its ability to integrate and analyse data across different support programmes and instruments, and ideally the concentration of development finance know-how under its roof. This could then empower the UDB to play a crucial role for informing the formulation and implementation of cross-sectoral recovery policies, complementing the steering body under the Prime Minister as well as the ministries at a more operational level. Importantly, it should not duplicate decision-making at the steering body / ministerial level. The division of responsibilities between KfW (German Development Bank), BGK (Polish Development Bank) and their respective ministries (responsible for setting policy objectives) could provide some orientation.

To ensure the political independence of the UDB and to attain capital markets funding it would be indispensable to position major foreign partners on its supervisory board. Strong Ukrainian ownership of the UDB would be crucial to ensure its legitimacy and to build good working relationships with Ukrainian stakeholders. However, to safely access capital markets, the presence of strategic foreign partners (e.g. IFIs) (Carletti et al., 2024^[35]), as well as the implementation of a strong governance framework appears warranted. Endowed with capital market funding and foreign partner guarantees, it could be well positioned to conduct riskier long-term infrastructure investments, to provide financial support for smaller municipalities and crowd in private sector funding (by covering some of its risk). The UDB's governance framework should incorporate robust safeguards for managing fiscal risks.

Given its central operational role within Ukraine's recovery architecture, it could further act as a key node for foreign partners when it comes to implementing recovery programmes across regions.

However, there are several caveats as regards the creation of a UDB. These include potential political resistance by line ministries which may not wish to transfer their funds to a separate institution, the possible perception on behalf of DFIs and IFIs that this entity would compete with them, and challenges related to the attraction of qualified staff – especially if the former would be expected to second staff to this institution.

Thus, while the creation of a well-functioning UDB might provide important support to Ukraine's recovery, it is necessary to discuss broadly whether and how to operationalise it. Ideally, a series of action-oriented seminars among major foreign and domestic stakeholders (including major donors, IFIs, DFIs and ministries etc.) could assess the pros and cons of such an approach, a potential timeline for its introduction in the medium-term and the different roles that stakeholders would need to perform.

Given the success they had in terms of catalytic and strategic support for their national ecosystems, it appears useful to closely consult with the BGK, the KfW and the BDF. A close involvement of the BDF in this exercise is crucial when considering the BDF's key role for SME finance in Ukraine, its introduction of a sound governance framework, and its concrete ambition to become eligible for EU Pillar II as well as capital markets funding. Notably, the BDF's governance structure has been enshrined within a law (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, 2025^[36]) that is inter alia intended to act as a safeguard against political influences, and it is worth pointing out that three out of five members of the BDF's supervisory board are independent, having been selected via a competitive process with IFI and DFI involvement. It is further important to highlight that the aforementioned law converts the BDF starting from 1 January 2026 into the so-called 'National Development Institution'. However, this organisation is as of now not resemble a fully-fledged UDB and focuses solely on SME finance.

Table 1.3. Recommendations – Public Investment Management Reform and broader funding architecture

Key findings	Recommendations
	Short-term:
<p><i>PIM Reform:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Significant human capacity deficits across all actors and the entire PIM cycle, e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Substantial capacity deficits within PIM divisions of the MoF, MoE and MDCT ○ High human capital deficits across the subnational level ▪ Uncertainty about funding availability ▪ Some competitive dynamics across ministries 	<p><i>PIM Reform:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Human capacity building efforts across the national, regional and local levels – with a priority focus the MoF's, MoE's and MDCT's PIM departments ▪ Additional support to expand the capacities of DREAM ▪ Assessment to simplify project procedures for low-complexity, low-cost projects ▪ Reflection about a fast-track for urgent recovery projects ▪ Accelerated introduction of digital tools to perform public investment planning, implementation and monitoring ▪ Assessment whether foreign partners (esp. IFIs) could play a stronger role in the project appraisal process for consideration by MoF, MoE and MDCT
	Medium-term:
<p>Fragmented broader funding architecture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provision of several (overlapping) <u>funding instruments</u> via <u>different (domestic and foreign) entities</u> ▪ Some <u>competitive dynamics</u> between ministries which are responsible for the oversight and steering of state development funds ▪ <u>Lack</u> of a major <u>funding entry point</u> for foreign partners ▪ <u>Absence</u> of a <u>domestic institution</u> that could leverage <u>capital markets</u> finance for long-term <u>development projects</u> ▪ <u>Absence</u> of a (single) <u>development finance institution</u> that considers <u>development finance and policies across sectors</u> 	<p>Creation of a multi-stakeholder taskforce to examine the creation of a Ukrainian Development Bank</p>

2 Foreign support architecture

The international support for Ukraine has been unprecedented, with foreign partners having provided approx. USD 180 billion in military assistance, USD 174 billion in financial assistance and USD 26 billion in humanitarian assistance between 24 January 2022 and 31 October 2025 according to the Kiel Institute's Ukraine Support Tracker (Trebesch et al., 2025^[37]). To ensure these resources are allocated effectively, it is necessary to implement sound co-ordinative mechanisms.

Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, foreign partners have established a wide range of co-ordination formats that have enabled information exchange and mobilisation of financial and technical support and have included Ukrainian representation. While this high number of formats is undoubtedly a significant indicator of support for Ukraine, it is also symptomatic of the co-ordination challenges. The sheer number of actors – each with distinct mandates and interests – has created significant co-ordination challenges and competitive dynamics that impede a coherent recovery strategy. Consulted stakeholders have highlighted missing links across co-ordination formats and lack a single view when it comes to the programmes, funds and mechanisms aimed at Ukraine's recovery.

In the absence of a Marshall Plan style steering role, strategic funding and reform influence are dispersed among the EU institutions, the G7, the IMF, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), individual countries, regional and municipal actors, as well as the Ukrainian Global Community. While the EU institutions have been the largest provider of ODA and can affect MDBs' activities via the Ukraine Investment Framework Steering Board (UIF SB), they have had comparatively little direct steer when it comes to the design of the IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF), the debt restructuring decisions of the Group of Creditors of Ukraine, or the provision of funding via some IFI MDTFs. Similarly, in the design of reforms, a range of actors, including the EU, the IMF, the MDBs and individual countries, have significant influence. The same also holds for technical assistance, which has been provided by an extensive range of actors across the multilateral, country and subnational levels.

Multilateral dimension

The European Commission has played a pivotal role in Ukraine's recovery as (co)-chair of a set of decision-making and co-ordination bodies of great significance. These include the co-ordination mechanisms of the Ukraine Facility, as well as formats with broader memberships such as the UDP, the HoC and seven SWGs.

Ukraine Facility

Within the Ukraine Facility, co-ordination varies by pillar: Pillar I is driven by a joint assessment of reforms by the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission (Commission) and the EU Member States, whereas for Pillars II and III, the Commission follows Ukraine-led calls for proposals for financial (Pillar II) and technical (Pillar III) assistance projects. While Pillar III involves discussions only between the Commission and prospective implementing agencies, Pillar II enables exchanges among a broader

range of actors, including the Commission, EU Member States, the Government of Ukraine and implementing agencies.

These discussions tend to take place within the broader remit of the Ukraine Investment Framework Steering Board (UIF SB), which is chaired by the European Commission and comprises the Commission and EU Member State representatives, as members – the Government of Ukraine, the Rada and the European Parliament as observers. Importantly, while the Commission takes the final funding decision for implementing partners' proposals, several inclusive interactions can be noted within the broader remit of the Steering Board. For instance, there are several discussions across the proposal assessment cycle with the implementing partners (IFIs, European DFIs), the Government of Ukraine and the EU Member States. In addition, Ukraine can present its own project proposals (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, 2025^[13]) and raise strategic questions related to the provision of financial instruments under the UIF SB.

The UIF SB provides useful public information – calls for proposals, an overview of implementing partners, a register of all UIF SB-approved programmes, guidance for businesses on how to submit expressions of interest, as well as links that lead potential investors to the websites of investment facilitating entities such as UkraineInvest, Prozorro (for Ukrainian public procurement opportunities) and the Ukrainian State Property Fund (for privatisation opportunities).

However, it operates under legal constraints that can impede the participation of non-European partner organisations in terms of public procurement. Article 11 of the *Ukraine Facility Regulation* could act as a hindrance for non-European partners. It regulates *participation in procurement and in grant and prize award procedures for activities financed under the Facility* (European Union, 2024^[39], p. 25), that may not be provided if:

- i. An entity resides in a non-European country that does not provide support to Ukraine comparable to the EU when accounting for the size of the country's economy and/or
- ii. If that country does not provide the EU with reciprocal access to its own aid and procurement projects in Ukraine.

Importantly, non-European IFIs such as the World Bank are eligible financing partners under the UIF – and Article 11 could restrict eligibility for public procurement but not eligibility as a financing partner.

Beyond this, consulted stakeholders highlighted that the frameworks for the use of EU funds can be overly prescriptive in terms of tying funding to tightly pre-specified outcomes, and one stakeholder indicated that IFIs might be hesitant to link their MDTFs to the Ukraine Facility (to preserve flexibility). A meaningful example of a possible co-ordination gap is the *Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund* (URTF): its governing body – the URTF Partnership Council – co-chaired by the World Bank and Ukrainian government, does not include the European Commission.

Thus, to ensure alignment among key actors, it is crucial to ensure real-time information sharing across all co-ordination structures. Concretely, this could be done via a mutual obligation of the Commission, World Bank and other actors to publish minutes, calls for proposals and draft programme concepts on the UDP website (if necessary, in a protected space that requires an additional log-in). This obligation should also be extended to other actors and co-ordination bodies (see sub-section on *UDP* below) and thereby enable a single view to prevent a misalignment of efforts amongst stakeholders more broadly. Beyond that, the delivery of the information provided by the UIF and broader Ukraine Facility could benefit from some improvements as smaller foreign partners tend to struggle when assessing how they could collaborate with these mechanisms.

Occasional competitive dynamics between IFIs should be moderated

Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that stakeholders have highlighted both collaboration and competition amongst the IFIs. Positive examples of IFI collaboration include joint business outreach workshops, efforts to align procurement rules and the co-implementation of projects. Also, they have set up regular meetings to discuss their activities in Ukraine and exchange with each other within formalised structures such as the IFI Co-ordination Group or at IFIs' annual meetings. However, several stakeholders pointed to competitive behaviour among them. For instance, a case was mentioned in which an IFI appeared to appropriate another institution's concept when engaging a potential donor.

Such competitive dynamics warrant moderation by foreign partners. Some competition amongst IFIs and other foreign partners might be useful to incentivise the development of better project proposals. However, given that donor resources are limited, it is crucial to focus on leveraging synergies where possible. A key role should in this context be played by the UIF SB and other donors that fund IFIs. For instance, for project outlines where synergies between IFIs could be expected *ex ante*, they could offer somewhat larger funding envelopes should IFIs hand in joint proposals.

In addition, the UIF SB and other IFI donors could conduct an ex-post assessment of major projects implemented in Ukraine to evaluate whether a joint IFI collaboration could have been more beneficial. After having detected project types for which such IFI collaboration might be fruitful, they then could perform a similar *ex ante* assessment for to be launched project concepts, examining where joint proposals would be preferable. The Government of Ukraine should be consulted throughout this process and the *ex post* assessment should be performed in close consultation with the IFIs. In this context, it also appears useful to conduct a systematic review of IFI-internal guidelines and rules that might cause additional IFI-internal bureaucratic burdens should they decide to engage in partnerships with other IFIs. If these burdens are reduced, willingness to collaborate on some project types could be increased.

To strengthen co-ordination with key Ukrainian actors, the UIF SB could broaden its scope by selectively inviting several non-ministerial actors as observers. For instance, several funds and fund managers, such as the SFRD, BDF, USF, PCGF, Horizon Capital, or Dragon Capital have played an essential role for Ukraine's recovery. Such targeted inclusion would allow these actors to align their operations more closely with national priorities and improve project design, while reducing the risk that ministries become information bottlenecks. Sensitive deliberations would remain limited to a smaller core group, but observers could be invited to participate in relevant sessions and receive redacted minutes that exclude classified material. This calibrated approach would preserve necessary confidentiality while enhancing transparency, operational coherence and engagement between fund managers and Ukrainian ministries.

Ukraine Donor Platform

One of the most significant co-ordination efforts of the EU has been its support for the operation of the UDP. Although the UDP was launched as a G7 initiative, the EU has assumed a leading role as Co-Chair and primary provider of the Secretariat.

The UDP's remit is broad: it convenes EU and G7 countries, IFIs, as well as the IMF and OECD (see *Annex E* for information on the co-operation between the OECD and Ukraine). Moreover, although the UDP has a dedicated private sector co-ordination stream through the Business Advisory Council and engages civil society (e.g. via two large-scale civil society engagement events in 2025), such participation has so far been intermittent. Multi-stakeholder representation is also not limited to its

membership but reflected by the composition of its Secretariat, which is largely staffed with secondees from countries and IOs (see *Annex F* for more information on the UDP).

Regular presentations by Ukrainian high-level representatives about Ukrainian needs and priorities, the assignment of one Secretariat staff per each SWG, the simultaneous operation of the Secretariat in Brussels and Kyiv as well as the creation of the Recovery Operational Group (ROG)¹⁰ are testimony to the UDP's efforts to reflect Ukraine's views.

The UDP functions as an information hub, contributing to transparency on donor intentions, programmatic pipelines and policy positions. UDP discussions have helped co-ordinate high-level political messaging and sequencing that underpinned major funding commitments, enabling faster identification of gaps, co-financing opportunities and areas suited to IFI, bilateral or DFI instruments. In this context it is not surprising that several consulted stakeholders praised the UDP's function as the central venue for information-sharing and reflection about recovery priorities. These discussions take place at different hierarchical levels (Ministerial level, Steering Committee, Expert Group) and more frequently (bi-weekly for Expert Group discussions) than some other co-ordination formats. For instance, several SWGs often convene only a few times per year.

The UDP could create more room for in-depth discussions

While our stakeholder consultations indicate broad recognition of the UDP as a crucial information-sharing platform, several stakeholders urged it to assume a more prominent role in guiding decision-making. Likewise, some interlocutors called for the UDP to host more substantive, policy-focused discussions on reform priorities and progress.

Creating more space for discussions on substantive reforms is desirable but there need to be realistic expectations about their possible impact. In contrast to co-ordination formats like the UIF SB, MDTF donor formats, or the G7 tracks, the UDP makes neither direct decisions on financial assistance nor on technical assistance. Substantive discussions about reform measures tend to take place within the remit of the EU accession negotiations, the IMF EFF missions and via bilateral exchanges between Ukraine and foreign partners. It is unlikely that actual negotiations or discussions with binding reform implications will happen under the umbrella of the UDP, taking into account the large number of UDP attendees. To provide a complementary value added, discussions should therefore be shaped in such a manner that they enable policymakers to better take more informed decisions outside of the UDP.

The UDP Secretariat has already been undertaken several efforts to regularly consult UDP members about priorities to be addressed in the appropriate discussion level (Expert Group, ROG, or Steering Committee). As a follow-up, the Secretariat could share one-pagers on how outcomes were taken forward and by whom.

The UDP should be more closely linked with other co-ordination formats and other key actors

Another shortcoming of the UDP has been a relatively weak link with subnational actors and the Ukrainian Global Community (UGC). Representatives of the regional and humanitarian space as well as the UGC have so far been absent from the UDP deliberations despite being central to recovery efforts and directly affected by topics such as PIM reform. Given the UGC's valuable know-how, insights and resources, its exclusion risks potential information gaps and misalignment.

It could help to explore engaging further with actors such as the *European Alliance of Regions and Cities for the Reconstruction of Ukraine*, the *European Partnership Hub (CEMR)* and the *UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Ukraine* for agenda-specific discussions. Meetings with Ukrainian civil society organisations, as well as an initial exchange between the UDP Secretariat and the European Alliance of Regions and Cities for the Reconstruction of Ukraine, can be seen as encouraging steps in the right direction. In this way, the information flow could be enhanced and misalignments avoided. Given the UGC does not have a single umbrella organisation, the UDP could reflect with relevant stakeholders (incl. IOM, bilateral development agencies, etc.) about how UGC organisations could engage with the UDP. This could involve a model similar to the exchanges organised with civil society or an initial in-depth dialogue at the expert level.

The UDP should also be better integrated with other co-ordination formats. For example, while Secretariat staff members have been assigned as contact points for each SWG, our stakeholder consultations suggest that UDP participants often have only limited insight into the SWGs. Similarly, there is a need for further alignment between the UDP and the HoC which have often featured almost identical discussions.

Better align efforts of the UDP and the Heads of Co-operation Group

Like the UDP, the Heads of Co-operation Group (HoC) has been convening at regular intervals. However, while its discussions also focus on various cross-cutting strategic issues with relevance to Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction, they notably take place in Kyiv – and not in Brussels or Online as is the case for the UDP. The HoC is co-chaired by the Head of Co-operation of the EU Delegation to Ukraine and the UN and composed of foreign partners' heads of co-operation in Ukraine¹¹. Like the UDP, it is regularly attended by senior Ukrainian officials. It further has acted to some extent as a link between the SWGs by virtue of many SWG Co-Chairs being represented on the HoC.

The HoC's proximity to in-country actors and the UDP's engagement with foreign partner countries at a higher political level can be complementary. However, given the overlap in discussion topics, there is a risk of duplication. This risk is exacerbated by ambiguities about the precise division of tasks between these formats. A careful assessment of how to improve the interlinkage between the HoC and UDP is warranted. Initial steps could include measures to ensure the regular and seamless information exchange across these formats (e.g. via the UDP website as the Portal for the Recovery of Ukraine, - see below – as a shared resource). Joint exchanges through certain meeting formats between the HoC and UDP, as well as ongoing reflections about an enhanced co-operation should be positively noted.

In this context, a relocation of the UDP Secretariat to Kyiv, conditional on the security situation, should also be considered. Beyond enhanced interlinkages between the UDP and other in-country co-ordination formats, like the HoC, a relocation could strengthen on-the-ground engagement and give more local ownership.

Transform the UDP as a single-window Portal for the Recovery of Ukraine

Another crucial short-term measure to significantly enhance foreign partner co-ordination could be the transformation of the UDP website into a user-centred Portal for the Recovery of Ukraine. This portal could preferably provide a single view of all co-ordination efforts, funding opportunities, financial flows, job opportunities and knowledge outputs with relevance for the recovery of Ukraine. The portal could offer an interactive visual map of multilateral, country and subnational co-ordination formats with standardised profiles showing membership, decision making processes, outputs and links, a

searchable register of major recovery programmes and projects, a stakeholder directory and a consolidated events calendar dedicated to the recovery of Ukraine.

A priority module could be a funding and technical assistance dashboard: a live, single view of open calls, instruments and timelines and a high-level visualisation of aggregate funding flows linked to Ukraine's aid-tracking system. A key feature would be a single comprehensive overview of all upcoming opportunities for funding and technical assistance. Furthermore, to draw attention to the platform it would be useful if all UDP participants commit to publishing funding and technical assistance opportunities primarily on this portal. Linked to the overview, it would be essential to develop a comprehensive guide that contains information concerning the major funding providers, their key foci and the general eligibility criteria for their funding instruments. Importantly, the funding-related section could also contain a visualisation of Ukraine's aid tracking system (see *Chapter 1*), depicting all funding flows and decisions.

It would be valuable to include a section dedicated to mobilising human capital that could contain an overview of upcoming job, secondment, internship, study and research opportunities that contribute to Ukraine's recovery. The Portal could be further complemented by a news feed, a showroom for success stories and good practices as well as a collection of key publications with relevance for Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction.

Operationally, the Portal could be established in phases with a pilot focused on a core set of modules and as a small number of actors who have already rolled out co-ordination-oriented websites (e.g. UIF SB, German Platform for the Reconstruction of Ukraine), have set-up funding-oriented websites (e.g. PitchBook, Crunchbase, Dealroom, Vestbee) and who have been involved in the set-up of an aid tracking system for Ukraine. UDP participants would need to commit providing relevant timely information to be featured into the Portal by the Secretariat. To provide a comprehensive overview while avoiding the duplication of efforts, it further would be useful to feature links to other websites of foreign partners (e.g. German Platform for the Reconstruction of Ukraine) and Ukrainian initiatives (e.g. DREAM) that aim to facilitate recovery-related co-ordination.

Sectoral Working Groups

Following their reboot and consolidation in 2024, several SWGs have performed an important function when it comes to the co-ordination of sector-specific efforts. In practice, they have facilitated information-sharing, reform discussions, feedback on Ukrainian policies, donor mapping and the alignment of foreign partner initiatives.

However, performance varies across SWGs. These variations are often driven by heterogeneous Chair and Co-Chair capacities and willingness to strategically and administratively steer their SWGs. For instance, several Ukrainian Chairs have at times been absent from the SWGs, which made it impossible to make decisions – especially when considering that an escalation mechanism for decision-making at higher levels has been missing so far.

In addition, discussions across some SWGs have not gone beyond information sharing which is partly caused by the large number of participants (often >30). In fact, our stakeholder consultations suggest that smaller informal meetings outside of the SWG scope are often a preferred alternative due to trust and practicality reasons.

A number of efforts have been undertaken to assess and improve the performance of the SWGs. These include a review and creation of a SWG Stocktaking Report led by the EU (Chair of the HoC) and several discussions on the enhancement of the SWGs within the remit of the HoC. As a result of these discussions, there has been a recognition to better reflect the regional (and humanitarian) dimension of Ukraine's recovery across SWGs.

A notable initiative is the MDCT's proposal to establish a Recovery Taskforce to co-ordinate and match Ukrainian and foreign partners across sectors. Chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister for Reconstruction, it would include a Secretariat, the Ukrainian Co-Chairs of 13 recovery-related SWGs, Deputy Ministers for Restoration across ministries, Deputy Heads of all 24 Regional State Administrations and foreign partners (Ambassadors or HoCs, IFIs and UN agencies). Managed by the Secretariat, the Taskforce would aim to enhance cross-sector information exchange, consolidate Ukrainian needs across regions and ministries and monitor and guide foreign support.

At first glance, the proposal is promising, as it could match consolidated Ukrainian needs through a whole-of-government approach with foreign partner support. It could thereby offer a single cross-sectoral view that reduces transaction costs and overlaps. However, it has not yet been implemented, and its success will depend on government buy-in and clarity on how local authorities, the private sector and civil society will be involved.

Several measures should be considered to enhance SWGs' performance

Several measures could enhance the effectiveness of SWGs. Based on the SWG Stocktaking Report, the HoC should assess how to strengthen underperforming SWG Secretariats (e.g. via further secondments) and consider whether phasing them out or restructuring them would be a more efficient solution. Such an examination should include an open discussion with all stakeholders of the affected SWGs and should consider the risk associated. It could also be considered to what extent representation of local and regional authorities within them is sensible, to ensure a direct exchange with the subnational level.

To enable swift decision-making, it is also indispensable to introduce a clear procedure for raising issues to higher decision-making levels, e.g. when Ukrainian chairs are absent from SWGs. In the short-term, it might be the most effective if unresolved issues are brought to the (deputy) ministerial level by the foreign partner Co-Chair. Should discussions however relate to disagreements across sectors, it might be useful to establish a formalised pathway for addressing these matters at the Prime Minister's level, via his/her steering body.

To better integrate SWGs within a single foreign partner architecture, their Secretariats should, where feasible, share all meeting minutes and materials with the UDP or through the UDP's portal for the recovery of Ukraine. Similarly, they should publish information on upcoming SWG meetings in the portals' events section and add SWG participants' activities in the mapping.

Finally, to explore further improvement potential for SWGs and other co-ordination formats it would be useful to conduct a joint benchmarking exercise. Via interactive sessions, the workshop should serve to convey a full picture of all co-ordination efforts, help to assess possibilities for better interlinkages, and explore shared challenges and good practices on how to overcome them. To ensure a comprehensive approach it should ideally cover the Secretariats and Chairs of all major foreign partner co-ordination formats covering the international, national and subnational levels. Importantly, implementers of co-ordination mechanisms aimed at the Ukrainian Global Community should take part, as well as organisers of key sectoral co-ordination formats such as the G7+ Energy Co-ordination Group, European Alliance of Regions and Cities for the Reconstruction of Ukraine, Skills Alliance and SME Resilience Alliance (see *Annex G*). Subject to its initial outcomes, it could be considered to implement such a workshop annually.

Table 2.1. Recommendations – Multilateral dimension

Key findings	Recommendations
<p><i>Co-ordination challenges across platforms:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fragmentation and <u>insufficient interlinkages</u> among co-ordination platforms ▪ Absence of a single view concerning co-ordination formats, funding opportunities, calls for technical assistance, job opportunities and events with relevance for Ukraine's recovery 	<p>UDP: Transformation of the Ukraine Donor Platform website into the main portal for Ukraine's Recovery and Reconstruction to provide a single view of co-ordination efforts, funding opportunities, financial flows, job opportunities and knowledge outputs with relevance for the recovery of Ukraine</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Visual <u>map of all co-ordination mechanisms</u> at the multilateral, country level and subnational level ▪ Single comprehensive <u>overview</u> of all upcoming <u>opportunities for funding and technical assistance</u> ▪ Creation and display of a comprehensive <u>guide</u> that contains <u>information concerning the major funding providers</u>, their key foci and the general eligibility criteria for their funding instruments ▪ Display of Ukraine's <u>aid tracking system</u> ▪ Overview of upcoming <u>job, secondment, internship, study and research opportunities</u> that contribute to Ukraine's recovery ▪ <u>Section related to the curation of knowledge</u> for Ukraine's recovery (incl. a news feed, a showroom for success stories and good practices) ▪ <u>Event calendar</u>
<p><u>UDP engagement</u> with <u>Ukraine-based stakeholders</u> could be further strengthened and the UDP and HoC discussions <u>overlap</u> significantly</p>	<p>UDP: Better align efforts of the UDP and the Heads of Co-operation Group and Relocation of the UDP's Secretariat to Kyiv in the medium-term.</p>
<p>UDP discussions could be more <u>targeted</u> and focus more <u>on substantive reforms</u></p>	<p>UDP: Create more room for in-depth discussions and improve follow-up.</p>
<p>Representatives of the regional space as well as the UGC have largely been absent from the UDP deliberations despite their important role for Ukraine's recovery</p>	<p>UDP: Explore ways to engage with to better involve representatives from regions/municipalities and the Ukrainian Global Community in the UDP, e.g. by an initial in-depth dialogue at the UDP expert level and/or by involving them through a model similar to the exchanges organised with civil society.</p>
<p>IFIs collaborate on many occasions constructively but there are also some adverse competitive dynamics</p>	<p>Measures to incentivise IFI collaboration where possible and reasonable:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Ex post assessment</u> of major projects to assess for which project types <u>IFI collaboration</u> would have been valuable ▪ <u>Ex ante assessment</u> of project concepts, examining where joint projects would be preferable ▪ Consideration to provide <u>higher project funding</u> for joint project proposals where <u>IFI synergies</u> could be expected <i>ex ante</i> ▪ <u>Review of IFI-internal guidelines</u> and rules that might act as impediments for joint IFI projects

Key findings	Recommendations
Some catalytic funds and fund managers have only limited access to UIF SB sessions , who tend to rely on ministries which can result in information bottlenecks	<p>UIF SB: Broaden scope of UIF SB sessions by selectively including non-ministerial Ukrainian entities as observers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Invitation of key players to relevant agenda items as observers ▪ Circulation of meeting minutes (omitting sensitive information) to a larger set of stakeholders
The proposed Recovery Taskforce might facilitate the matching of consolidated Ukrainian needs through a <u>whole-of-government approach</u> with foreign partner support	SWGs: Continued efforts to assess the feasibility and implementation of the Recovery Taskforce
Performance has varied across SWGs and discussions across some SWGs have not gone beyond (formalistic) information sharing	<p>SWGs: Targeted assessments how to improve the capacities of underperforming SWG Secretariats, e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consideration of (additional) secondments ▪ Choice of a new or additional Co-Chair
Several Ukrainian Chairs have at times been absent from the SWGs which made it difficult to take forth decisions for several sectoral issues – especially when considering that an <u>escalation mechanism for decision-making at higher levels has been missing</u>	SWGs: Introduction of a clear procedure for the escalation of issues to higher decision-making levels when Ukrainian Chairs are absent from SWGs .
Interlinkages and exchange among several co-ordination formats could be improved to better align and <u>exchange good practices</u> for co-ordination	All co-ordination formats: Joint benchmarking workshop amongst all multilateral, national and subnational co-ordination formats to gather a full picture of all co-ordination efforts, explore shared challenges and good practices on how to overcome them.

Country-level dimension

Funding


Individual countries have performed an indispensable role in the recovery of Ukraine when it comes to financial, technical and humanitarian support. Members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provided Ukraine with approx. USD 40.5 billion in 2023 which has been the largest amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) that has ever been provided to an individual country in the history of ODA allocation (OECD, 2024^[16]).

Beyond the provision of aid to Ukraine some countries have played a crucial role for the maintenance of Ukraine's debt sustainability as members of the Group of Creditors of Ukraine, jointly deciding to restructure Ukrainian government debt and to suspend debt payments until March 2027 (the end of the current IMF EFF)¹² (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2024^[38]).

Similarly, it is important to recall that individual countries have had significant influence on international organisations' decision-making and funding provision. For instance, they have enhanced IFIs' ability to provide Ukraine with financial and technical assistance via the provision of grants, guarantees, capital increases and the (co-) funding of projects.

The EU institutions provided roughly half of the record ODA amount in 2023 and have also been the largest providers of economic and humanitarian aid for Ukraine. This funding has been enabled by EU Member States' contributions to the EU budget, which by extension could be used to raise further capital market funding to provide Ukraine with macro-financial assistance. Also, when adding military aid to the picture it becomes apparent that individual countries have made the largest overall contributions.

Figure 2.1. Total bilateral allocations and reassigning EU-level aid to individual EU countries



Source: Based on Trebesch et al. (2025), *The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?*, Figure 3 and Figure A29, <https://www.kielinstitut.de/publications/ukraine-support-tracker-data-6453/>.

Co-operation structures of individual countries with Ukraine

The number of government and government-supported entities supporting Ukraine within their respective countries is vast. These do often not only include the respective ministries but often also development agencies, development banks and development finance institutions, export credit agencies entrepreneurship and export promotion agencies, as well as chambers of commerce. To provide a rough idea of the high number of interactions that exist between these entities and Ukraine it can be noted that the German Development Agency GIZ has 46 ongoing projects in Ukraine (GIZ, n.d.^[39]).

These entities usually coordinate amongst each other and with other stakeholders within their countries via country-specific co-ordination mechanisms and platforms. The institutionalisation of these mechanisms and platforms varies significantly across countries and ranges from informal non-publicised discussion sessions between various national actors to institutionalised structures with clearly assigned responsibilities concerning the co-ordination for the recovery of Ukraine. Similarly, there is substantial heterogeneity across countries when it comes to the (non-)publication of guiding national strategic frameworks and digital platforms, which for some countries spell out recovery priorities (e.g. sector foci), display funding channels and commitments, and map out a multitude of national actors, funding, co-operation and engagement opportunities, as well as advisory offers and events.

Accessible information on co-ordination mechanisms, strategic documents and the national actor mappings is limited in many countries. Consequently, external stakeholders must invest substantial time and effort to find relevant documents, entities, projects and funding opportunities. Thus, to facilitate collaboration amongst various stakeholders, it would be good to systematically map and communicate national efforts in an accessible manner. A positive example for the co-ordination of national level efforts is the German Platform for the Reconstruction of Ukraine which can serve as an inspiration for other countries (see Box 2.1). Ideally, partner countries would create similar websites and sub-sections of the UDP Portal that present national strategic frameworks, allocated funding, opportunities for financial and technical assistance, as well as an overview of relevant national (and subnational) stakeholders. Finland and Denmark offer further ideas for how to depict strategic approaches and stakeholder overviews.

Box 2.1. German Platform for the Reconstruction of Ukraine

The German Platform for the Reconstruction of Ukraine serves as a hub that facilitates technical exchange for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine. It is operated by the German Government and provides a range of coordinative services.

For instance, while no funding is disbursed via the platform itself, it shares a range of funding, advisory and networking offers provided by a range of actors. These include a range of services for firms interested in business with Ukraine, co-operation opportunities with Ukrainian educational institutions, programmes to support civil society engagement and professional development programmes.

Also, it contains an overview of Germany's support to Ukraine and features references to events such as the Ukraine Recovery Conference as well as the Ukraine Donor Platform.

Source: Platform for the Reconstruction in Ukraine (2024), *Jointly supporting the reconstruction*, <https://www.ukraine-wiederaufbauen.de/ukraine-en>.

Apart from in-country co-ordination mechanisms it is notable that individual countries have set up numerous mechanisms and formats via which they engage with Ukraine. At the highest political level, Ukraine has concluded bilateral (security) agreements with all G7 and 21 of the EU Member States. Despite their name, these do not only focus on security aspects but also lay out past and future commitments in terms of economic and humanitarian co-operation. In addition, stakeholder consultations have shown that several countries have set up national government-level bilateral dialogues for co-ordination with Ukraine that convene at different intervals (e.g. twice per month with Sweden, once every two months with France), have varying compositions and are largely invisible online.

Beyond the national level, there is an even larger number of sectoral and cross-sectoral co-ordination and exchange formats. Cross-sectoral examples for such formats are:

- inter-governmental commissions to co-ordinate bilateral economic co-operation (e.g. Ukrainian-Latvian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Co-operation)
- co-ordination efforts to connect the private sector of the respective country with Ukraine's businesses (e.g. Japan-Ukraine Platform on the Infrastructure Technology for Recovery and Reconstruction)

- nationally initiated high-level events to discuss key questions of relevance to Ukraine's recovery (e.g. Japan-Ukraine Conference for Promotion of Economic Growth and Reconstruction, Wilton Park Conference)
- standing advisory bodies such as the German Advisory Group with the Ukrainian Government, which provide ongoing guidance to Ukraine concerning economic reforms

In a similar vein, sectoral level efforts include

- engagements between the respective line ministries
- the creation of sectoral partnerships (e.g. bilateral energy partnerships)
- sector-specific hubs and platforms (e.g. *Japan-Ukraine Joint Task Force on Revitalization Strategy of Agriculture*, *City [of London]-Ukraine Hub*)

The volume of actors and co-ordination mechanisms can strain Ukrainian counterparts

While this plethora of co-ordination efforts are indicators for a strong commitment to support Ukraine's recovery, they can often act as a burden for Ukrainian counterparts. The sheer number of individual country actors as well as the frequency of their meetings can often overstretch Ukrainian representatives. Thus, it appears useful to conduct a systematic review across countries (and other foreign partners) to assess when a bilateral approach is strictly required and when a multi-stakeholder approach might be more effective.

A good practice for multi-country alignment is the co-operation structure that was set up amongst the Nordic and Baltic countries. Apart from integrating Ukraine-related discussions into joint co-ordination structures from the working level to the political level they conducted joint Nordic-Baltic field visits to regions and cities where some of them have been active. In this way, they can benefit from pre-established stakeholder networks. Equally, Ukrainian counterparts benefit from having to participate in only one meeting with a range of foreign partners instead of having multiple ones. Moreover, the Nordic-Baltic countries have initiated joint initiatives such as the Nordic-Baltic High Level Advisory Group (Government of Sweden, 2024^[40]) which provides Ukraine with support in the EU accession process and exchange amongst each other before and after every UDP meeting to align. Also, Nordic-Baltic countries co-ordinate within the broader remit of NEFCO board meetings.

Thus, it may be useful for other partners to consult with the Nordic-Baltic countries and other foreign partner countries to gain insights into how they organise joint field visits, how their co-operation structures address Ukraine and the operation of the Nordic-Baltic High Level Advisory Group.

Special Envoys for the Reconstruction and Recovery of Ukraine

Several countries have appointed special envoys for the reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine. In addition to representing their countries in the UDP Steering Committee, their roles vary depending on national mandates and seniority. Beyond co-ordination, some are tasked with mobilising private-sector engagement (Government of the Netherlands, 2023^[55]; Government Offices of Sweden, 2024^[56]), promoting civil support for Ukraine, co-organising events such as the Ukraine Recovery Conferences (President of Ukraine, 2025^[41]) and coordinating engagement with subnational authorities (e.g. Italy).

Special Envoys have convened both bilaterally and in multilateral settings beyond the UDP channels. For example, both the French (President of Ukraine, 2023^[56]; Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, 2025^[57]) and Italian Special Envoy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2025^[42]) have repeatedly met with Ukrainian ministers and other high-level stakeholders to discuss the further development of their bilateral engagement across thematic areas. Also, they have been exchanging with each other outside

of the UDP and have had joint discussions with high-level Ukrainian leadership. One example of this has been a meeting of 19 Special Envoys as part of the EU-Ukraine Investment Conference in November 2024 in Warsaw (Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, 2024^[43]), where they discussed priority tasks for reconstruction and economic growth with several Ukrainian ministers as well as the Commission.

Their roles and activities have usually not been communicated in a systematic manner. The UDP Portal could include a dedicated Special Envoy section presenting each envoy's profile, mandate, priorities, recent and planned activities and – where permissible – contact details. The page could also tag Envoys' participation in events and feed these entries into the Portal's events calendar, improving transparency and enabling more systematic, joined-up engagement in Ukraine's recovery process.

Recovery and Reconstruction Events

Countries have also made a substantial contribution to Ukraine's recovery process by hosting events dedicated to the recovery of Ukraine that sustain political momentum, showcase new projects and mobilise partners. High-profile gatherings – in particular the *Ukraine Recovery Conferences (URC)* – have been important venues for speeches, seminars and announcement (Ukraine Recovery Conference, n.d.^[44]) (see *Annex H*). They have also performed an important co-ordinative function by hosting several co-ordination formats (e.g. UDP, G7+ Energy Co-ordination Group) and by facilitating networking amongst numerous stakeholders, and catalysing finance through targeted matchmaking.

However, several changes would increase the impact of these events. Many have been held far from Ukraine, imposing significant travel burdens on Ukrainian participants with already stretched capacities; locating more events within or near Ukraine's borders would boost Ukrainian attendance and reduce logistical strain. Stakeholders also reported that event outcomes are often framed in generic terms. Defining clear objectives and measurable indicators in advance (for example, the number and type of partnership agreements to be concluded) would make events more results-oriented and easier to evaluate. Notably, such indicators have already been followed and communicated for some events (e.g. URC, ReBuild Ukraine) and could serve as orientation for others in this regard.


Table 2.2. Recommendations – Overarching dynamics at the national level

Key findings	Recommendations
<p>Accessible information on co-ordination mechanisms, strategic documents and national actor mappings is often limited in many countries. Consequently, external stakeholders must invest substantial time and effort to find relevant documents, entities, projects and funding opportunities.</p> <p>In addition, linkages across national level co-ordination platforms and international level platforms like the UDP are missing (no single view)</p>	<p>Creation of websites and sub-sections of the UDP Portal that should feature national strategic frameworks, allocated funding, opportunities for financial and technical assistance, as well as an overview of relevant stakeholders.</p>
<p>The sheer number of individual country actors as well as the frequency of their meetings can often overstretch Ukrainian representatives.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Systematic review across countries (and other foreign partners) to assess when a bilateral approach is strictly required and when a multi-stakeholder approach might be more effective ▪ Joint workshop to discuss the Nordic-Baltic co-operation approach
<p>Interlinkages and exchange among several co-ordination formats could be improved to better align and <u>exchange good practices</u> for co-ordination.</p>	<p>All co-ordination formats: Joint benchmarking workshop amongst all multilateral, national and subnational co-ordination formats to gather a full picture of all co-ordination efforts, explore shared challenges and good practices on how to overcome them.</p>

Annex

Annex A – Sectoral Working Groups

Infographic A.1. Sectoral Working Groups Composition



Source: Authors' creation

The Sectoral Working Groups (SWGs) have acted as key mechanisms for sector-specific co-ordination. Comprising a wide range of international partners, they discuss several sectoral reforms, laws and interventions relevant to Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction. They are chaired by senior representatives from Ukrainian ministries and co-chaired by international partners, who are responsible for the strategic direction and agenda-setting, as well as for organising the Secretariat function. As per the SWG Terms of Reference, each SWG is supposed to meet four times a year, but Co-Chairs may decide on different intervals.

The following SWGs – grouped across the clusters Fundamentals, Human Capital, Economy and Business and Recovery and Infrastructure – are currently active:

Fundamentals:

- *SWG Public Administration and Governance* (Chair: Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine; Co-Chair: European Union)
- *SWG Digital Transformation* (Chair: Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine; Co-Chair: Switzerland)
- *SWG Law Enforcement* (Chair: Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine; Co-Chairs: European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine)
- *SWG Rule of Law* (Chairs: Ministry of Justice of Ukraine/National Agency on Corruption Prevention; Co-Chair: European Union, United States)
- *SWG Public Financial Management / Public Investment Management* (Chair: Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine; Co-Chairs: World Bank, European Union)

Human Capital:

- *SWG Education* (Chair: Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine; Co-Chairs: UNICEF, Finland)
- *SWG Healthcare* (Chair: Ministry of Health of Ukraine; Co-Chair: World Health Organisation)
- *SWG Social Protection* (Chair: Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine; Co-Chairs: UNICEF, United Kingdom)
- *SWG Veteran Policy* (Chair: Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine; Co-Chair: Sweden, United Kingdom)
- *SWG Gender Equality* (Chair: Government Commissioner for Gender Equality of Ukraine; DPM for European and Euro-Atlantic integration; Co-Chairs: Canada, Sweden)

Economy and Business:

- *SWG Economic Recovery, Industry and SMEs* (Chair: Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine; Co-Chairs: European Union, Germany)
- *SWG Agriculture* (Chair: Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine; Co-Chair: European Union with support from the FAO)
- *SWG Humanitarian Demining* (Chair: Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine; Co-Chairs: United Nations and Japan)

Recovery and Infrastructure:

- *SWG Energy* (Chairs: Ministry of Energy of Ukraine)
- *SWG Decentralisation* (Chair: Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine; Co-Chairs: European Union, Switzerland)
- *SWG Transportation and Logistics* (Chair: Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine; Co-Chairs: EIB, World Bank)
- *SWG Housing and Utilities* (Chair: Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine; Co-Chairs: EIB, World Bank, France)
- *SWG Climate and Green Transition* (Chairs: Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, Ministry of Energy of Ukraine; Co-Chairs: Sweden and UNDP)

Annex B – Steering body under the Prime Minister

To overcome the fragmentation of the domestic policy process and to provide foreign partners with a single-entry point Ukraine could consider creating a steering body under the Prime Minister. Ideally, it would focus on a few cross-cutting government priorities such as:

- the high-level co-ordination of and creation of linkages between key recovery processes
- foreign partner co-ordination¹³
- the development of pragmatic approaches to tackle capacity constraints

The objective should be to produce a single view on their progress and to strategically build stronger cross-linkages between them. The role of oversight is not to micromanage individual policy streams, but to foster complementarity and coherence across them. Achieving this will require regular, substantive interactions with the relevant government bodies and foreign partners to align objectives, sequencing and implementation modalities.

The steering body would play a key role in formulating and operationalising a national recovery vision. Relatedly, given the currently unclear allocation of the strategic planning function across government, the steering body could play a key role in defining the division of strategic planning responsibilities across government bodies and recovery streams. To inform strategic planning and enable an effective engagement with foreign partners as a single entry point, it would further be indispensable to establish a team under the steering body that performs cross-sectoral aid tracking and scenario planning based on economic forecasts and demographic projections.

Depending on the speed of its establishment, the steering body could guide the bottleneck analysis on the Ukrainian side. This analysis could focus on tackling human capital scarcities and deficiencies of key nodes in the short term and inform the implementation of swift and targeted interventions to overcome these. This analysis and the subsequent interventions would thus be complementary to Ukraine's broader civil service reform that inter alia focuses on introducing much-needed meritocratic recruitment processes, remuneration reform, and the digital transformation of human resource processes. That being noted, it is crucial to ensure ongoing alignment between this exercise and the wider civil service reform.

On external engagement, the steering body could create both an aid tracking mechanism and scenario planning system. This would entail the creation of several projections of foreign aid allocation trajectories and model risks of abrupt funding reductions stemming from political shifts, donor budget cycles or other contingencies. In parallel, scenario planning would be enabled by the development of economic forecasts and demographic projections – in co-operation with domestic and foreign stakeholders.

To be effective, an aid tracking platform should be designed as an interoperable system that integrates sectoral tracking tools into a unified architecture. This would allow line ministries to tag, monitor and analyse all sector-specific interventions – including grants, concessional and non-concessional instruments, in-kind assistance and blended finance – across different implementing entities, while ensuring full compatibility with DREAM and other core public investment and recovery systems. Bridging general aid-tracking functions with specialised sectoral monitoring would reduce information gaps, strengthen strategic prioritisation and enhance the coherence of donor-supported interventions across emergency response, resilience-building and long-term transformation objectives.

To address capacity constraints, the steering body should examine various practical solutions on behalf of Ukraine and foreign partners. In collaboration with relevant government bodies and with foreign partners, this could include a systematic assessment of how the Ukrainian Global Community could be engaged, and how civil society organisations could be effectively involved in governance arrangements.

To fulfil functions effectively, the steering body will require a multi-faceted staffing composition. The core component of the steering body should be highly qualified permanent staff in form of:

- Data and Foresight Experts (to implement the unified aid tracking and scenario planning system)
- Synergy and Synchronisation Experts (to synchronise and interlink key recovery processes)
- Human Capital Experts (to explore practical solutions on how to overcome capacity constraints)

Beyond this core staff, it would be important to build bridges between the steering body and the respective government bodies. One tool could be the delegation of staff from these government bodies to the steering body who on several occasions could be under shared working arrangements. This would mean that they could allocate some proportion of their time to work for the steering body while dedicating the remainder to strategic work within their government entities.

Delegated senior experts from foreign partners could form a central anchor for the steering body. They would bring technical know-how, strategic advice and potentially mediate between different stakeholders when needed, while also serving as vital bridge between the steering body and foreign partners.

To integrate the steering body effectively into Ukraine's government structure, it would be essential to set up task teams with key stakeholders – relevant government bodies, foreign partners, academia. Guided by the steering body, these task teams should engage regularly to identify challenges, agree next steps and assign responsibilities to respective actors.

The steering body would further benefit from closely embedding the *Recovery and Reform Delivery Office at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (RDO)* within its architecture. The RDO has been created in 2016 and since then acted akin to a government inhouse consultancy, providing analytical and coordinative support to support several reform processes. The RDO staff could provide some of the manpower for several steering body functions and play an active role to facilitate linkages between the steering body and government entities. Such linkages could also be facilitated via the so-called *Recovery and Reform Support Teams (RSTs)*, which have de facto been teams of external consultants that have been deployed across various government bodies to support reforms.

Political backing and a narrow strategic remit are preconditions for the steering body's success. International experience shows that similar steering structures require sustained endorsement from the highest levels of government – notably the Prime Minister – to secure authority and compliance across ministries (Lafuente and Gonzalez Cordoba, 2018^[45]). Equally important is a clear regulatory and legal mandate that differentiates the steering body from existing advisory entities. Adequate, predictable funding (ideally a mix of domestic and foreign partner contributions) will be necessary to attract and retain highly qualified staff and to reduce vulnerability to single-source funding interruptions.

Operational design considerations and success factors, drawn from prior experience with comparable co-ordinative entities, (Rao, 2022^[25]; Lafuente and Gonzalez Cordoba, 2018^[24]), include:

- need to maintain a narrow focus on key priorities
- an emphasis on building relationships between steering body personnel and other stakeholders
- keeping a potent but compact size of staff
- the recruitment of staff with technical, procedural and political skill
- a balance between senior and junior staff

Without a functioning steering body, achieving a single, government-wide view of recovery processes and a unified aid tracking system is unlikely. Fragmentation and competitive dynamics across government entities would probably persist undermining policy coherence, implementation efficiency and accountability to domestic and foreign stakeholders.

A useful reference point is the UK Delivery Unit in the Prime Minister's Office under Tony Blair, which served as a major catalyst for public service reform (Clement, 2022^[46]). However, it should be noted that over time several of its enabling features (e.g. compact size, political buy-in) vanished. Accounting for this and the unique Ukrainian context, this model should not be copied but can provide valuable lessons learned.

Annex C – Region-specific approach of some foreign partner countries

Denmark (Mykolaiv), Estonia (Zhytomyr), Latvia (Chernihiv), France (Chernihiv) and Italy (Odesa) have opted for a dedicated (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia) or partial (France, Italy) focus on supporting individual Ukrainian regions in their bilateral co-operation.

Amongst the countries who have followed region-specific approaches, Denmark sets itself apart, as it has committed 60% of its bilateral Ukraine Transition Programme funds to the support of Mykolaiv (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2025^[47]). While initially focusing on emergency assistance, its scope has been expanded and now also covers infrastructure reconstruction. It is worth highlighting that Denmark has coordinated its efforts with local, regional and national Ukrainian authorities via a Danish-Ukrainian Steering Group that meets on a half-yearly basis and has opened an Embassy Office in Mykolaiv to coordinate its efforts for the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2024^[48]).

While Denmark stands out, consultations with other stakeholders have also shown that by focusing on a single Ukrainian region it would be possible for a small partner country to conduct comprehensive stakeholder engagement which would not be realistic at the national level.

Annex D – Digital Portal to engage with the Ukrainian Global Community

When considering the introduction of a UGC portal, it should be noted with caution that several conditions would need to be met to enable a successful launch. Causes for a potential failure of such portals can include an insufficient buy-in of key stakeholders (e.g. government, diaspora, foreign partners), trust-related issues, overlaps with related initiatives, insufficient efforts and resources to operate the platform, concerns related to data use and privacy, or an insufficient awareness about the platform due to ineffective media campaigns amongst other issues. In fact, several UGC portals did not successfully take off.

That being noted, a digital UGC portal has theoretically the potential to serve as a one-stop shop to collaborate with the UGC. Beyond a mapping (based on voluntary self-reporting) of the UGC and existing UGC initiatives it could provide various facilitative elements for UGC engagement (Arroyo and Kaupa, 2025^[38]; Keudel et al., 2024^[36]). Displaying opportunities across Ukraine's cities and regions it could include:

- an overview of work, volunteering, internship and secondment offers (in person and remote)
- a mentoring scheme connecting the UGC and regional and local actors (e.g. authorities, businesses, students)
- an address book containing UGC focal points across Ukraine's cities and regions
- jobs for UGC members within foreign partner organisations
- a matchmaking tool aimed at connecting subnational projects with the UGC, foreign partners and international investors
- virtual training courses provided by UGC members
- remittance or donation vehicles that would enable targeted funding contributions to specific regional and local projects
- a showroom of successful UGC initiatives
- a one-stop shop for diaspora investors, containing:
 - co-investment opportunities for the UGC (foreign partners and the Government of Ukraine could match UGC investments)
 - legal, financial and administrative support, including guidance on procedures, permits and business registration

To collect subnational needs and to develop UGC engagement opportunities that could feature on the UGC Portal it would be of crucial importance to develop subnational UGC engagement bodies. Some inspiration could here be drawn from the UNDP's Migration and Local Development and DAR 1+3 projects that successfully enabled the systematic development of local level diaspora engagement bodies across Moldova (Arroyo and Kaupa, 2025^[38]; Maciucă, 2020^[44]).

Importantly, the possible UGC Portal's features should be identified in close exchange with several public and private stakeholders. Here, it would not only be pivotal to obtain the UGC's buy-in but to co-create major features of the UGC Portal. Some inspiration for the creation of the UGC Portal could be drawn from Ireland's *Global Irish Portal* but the co-creation process might yield the identification of different priorities and features.

Annex E – Co-operation between the OECD and Ukraine

The OECD has worked with Ukraine since its independence in 1991. A **Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Strengthening Co-operation between the OECD and Ukraine** was signed in 2014, following the OECD Council's decision to respond positively to Ukraine's request for further OECD support. An **OECD-Ukraine Action Plan** to implement the MoU was signed with the Government in April 2015. It was periodically updated until 2022 to reflect evolving government priorities.

In 2023, after Ukraine was recognised as a prospective Member of the Organisation, the Action Plan was superseded by the adoption of the four-year [OECD Ukraine Country Programme \(UCP\)](#) which runs from 2023-2027. Launched at the OECD's annual Ministerial Council Meeting in June 2023, with the participation of former Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal, the Country Programme consists of 31 policy reviews and capacity-building projects, a list of selected OECD legal instruments to which Ukraine could request adherence; and targets for enhancing Ukraine's participation in OECD bodies. To date, Ukraine is a full Associate/Member of 9 OECD bodies and a Participant in 44 bodies. Ukraine has adhered to 39 legal instruments.¹⁴

To support the Country Programme's implementation, as well as the co-ordination of OECD activities various stakeholders, an **OECD Ukraine-Kyiv Liaison Office** was established in June 2022 in Paris before being relocated to Kyiv in February 2023, hosted by the Slovak Embassy.

The OECD participates in the Steering Committee of the **Ukraine Donor Platform** and acts as a knowledge partner in the **Ukraine Recovery Conference**. The OECD's involvement in Ukraine's recovery is rooted in its mandate and long history of supporting post-war recovery and transformation. Founded after the Second World War to help rebuild Europe, the OECD has been a key player in fostering institutional reform and economic prosperity.

With a view to **future co-operation**, the **OECD** could support **Ukraine** with the implementation of several recommendations of this Policy Paper:

- **Steering Body:** offering additional guidance on its design and functions and capacity-building in areas such as human capital development, foreign partner engagement and foreign aid tracking. For instance, the OECD has already been implementing efforts to enhance aid tracking.
- **Foreign aid tracking:** the OECD is implementing the project "*Capacity building to track and manage development and humanitarian aid flows to the recovery of Ukraine*", which includes a needs assessment and capacity building activities for Ukrainian authorities to track international assistance. Based on this work, the OECD can advise on the creation of a single aid tracking platform.
- **Subnational governance structures:** the OECD has considerable insight into Ukraine's subnational governance and provided a range of recommendations to improve Ukraine's multi-governance architecture via the [OECD Multi-level Governance Study Rebuilding Ukraine by Reinforcing Regional and Municipal Governance](#). Potential further co-operation could include strengthening Ukraine's subnational governance structures, an assessment of regional and local military administrations' role in the post-war context (e.g. review of options for structured phase-out or merger with civilian administrations), support for the development of regional level co-ordination platforms as well as identifying further opportunities of region-specific approaches with foreign partner countries.

- **Ukrainian Global Community:** building on the OECD's seminar series "Return and Reintegration of Ukrainians" and its forthcoming publication "*Ukraine's Strategic Response to the Displacement Crisis: Return, Reintegrate, Reconnect*", the OECD can support engagement with the Ukrainian Global Community as well as policies focused on the voluntary return and reintegration of Ukrainians.
- **Public Investment Management Reform and broader funding architecture:** apart from this policy paper, the forthcoming OECD "*Infrastructure Policy Review*" will provide a range of recommendations to help restoring Ukraine's infrastructure through improved planning, procurement and management for reconstruction projects. Future support might entail more targeted follow-up assessments and capacity-building for key stakeholders.
- **Ukrainian Development Bank and catalytic entities:** the OECD's work on [Mapping Ukraine's Financial Markets and Corporate Governance Framework for a Sustainable Recovery](#) provides valuable insights into Ukraine's financial architecture and the OECD can provide further expertise when assessing the possible creation of a Ukrainian Development Bank and the design of other catalytic entities.


Beyond support directly related to the implementation of recommendations of this policy paper, there are several **further areas for deepening co-operation**:

- **Public Administration Reform:** Public Administration Reform remains at the forefront of Ukraine-OECD engagement. Beyond the already mentioned [SIGMA Monitoring Report: Public Administration in Ukraine](#) and the forthcoming *Public Governance Review* Ukraine has expressed interest in joining the Network of Senior Officials from Centres of Government. Other priority areas for co-operation could include tackling dis- and mis-information threats. Under the EU accession roadmap on public administration reform Ukraine continues to align its legislation and practices related to merit-based recruitment and civil service remuneration reform with the OECD/SIGMA Principles of Public Administration.
- **Decentralisation:** the OECD could continue to support Ukraine on its way towards robust and effective regional authorities. In addition to activities outlined in the Country Programme, work could focus on developing strategic documents for regional development and integrating European Cohesion Policy into Ukraine's budget and planning processes.
- **Anti-corruption, good governance and rule of law:** anti-corruption reforms remain cross-cutting issues in the OECD's co-operation with Ukraine. Alignment of Ukrainian legislation with OECD legal instruments in the context of Ukraine's participation in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (WGB) was listed among Ukraine's top priorities during the Secretary-General's meetings with the President and the Prime Minister and is set as a key goal in the Government Action Plan approved in September 2025. It is reflected in the Country Programme through the capacity building to align Ukrainian legislation with the requirements of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the [OECD Integrity and Anti-Corruption Review of Ukraine](#). The further support could focus on awareness raising and targeted capacity building, stakeholder involvement, and activities promoting business integrity aligned with the 2021 Anti-Bribery Recommendation. Continued OECD support could also help strengthen competition policy in line with the recommendations from the [OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: Ukraine 2025](#). Building on the forthcoming OECD Justice Policy Review, the OECD can support Ukraine in strengthening the independence and integrity of the judiciary and aligning the justice system with international standards and best practices.

- **Business environment and investment climate:** apart from the capacity-building activities already embedded in the Ukraine Country Programme, the OECD could provide additional assistance to Ukraine in establishing a robust business and investment climate, offering support in developing business incentives and risk insurance for investors, with a focus on financial instruments and war risk mitigation insurances for investors. The Ukraine Facility Plan aims at developing a culture of entrepreneurship, creating favourable conditions for business development and attracting investments. Best practices from OECD Member countries could benefit Ukraine in the establishment of its contemporary model of business development support infrastructure.
- **SOE corporate governance:** the OECD supported Ukraine in the alignment of its corporate governance legislation with international best practices in the context of Ukraine's pending request to adhere to the [OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs](#) and to implement recommendations stemming from the [OECD's Review of the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: Ukraine](#). The OECD supported the development of secondary legislation, including a State Ownership Policy and a State Dividend Policy, largely aligned with international standards and the OECD Guidelines. Continued capacity building will help Ukraine ensure that SOEs operate efficiently, transparently and in an accountable manner, and will also be important for the country's EU integration goals. Further co-operation could focus on establishing a co-ordinated state ownership model, equitable treatment of shareholders and enhancing transparency of SOEs financial reporting. Additionally, creating an intra-governmental system for implementing OECD SOE governance recommendations would be valuable. The Ukraine Facility Plan aims to align corporate governance with G20/OECD principles and related OECD Guidelines.
- **Taxation and financial management:** the OECD is providing broader support to Ukraine in implementing its National Revenue Strategy in line with Tax Policy Review activities outlined in the Country Programme. Additional support could be provided for implementing the roadmap on public investment management and developing instruments to enhance public investments. Attention could also be given to the adaptation of the OECD's codes on financial market, given their complexity and significance for Ukraine's aspired accession to the OECD. The Ukraine Facility Plan, through reforms on public financial management, will enhance the efficiency of mobilising and utilising public funds by aligning its methodology for spending review preparation with OECD best practices. Additionally, the OECD can support Ukraine in enhancing its audit and financial control systems in accordance with OECD/SIGMA principles on financial inspection. It would enable efficient revenue, expenditure and public debt management in Ukraine.

Annex F – Ukraine Donor Platform

Infographic A.2. UDP Organisational Structure




Source: Based on Ukraine Donor Platform (unpublished).

The UDP is one of the broadest international co-ordination formats dedicated to Ukraine's recovery, which became operational in January 2023. The mandate of the UDP has been to co-ordinate foreign partners' support for Ukraine's budgetary financing and its recovery and reconstruction needs.

The UDP has three Co-Chairs – the European Commission representing the EU, the US and the Government of Ukraine. The permanent members of the Platform are Ukraine and the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union). In addition, because of the size of their contributions to Ukraine, five countries are annual members of the platform (Denmark, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden). Their membership can be renewed on an ongoing basis contingent on them exceeding pre-specified thresholds.¹⁵ 11 further countries¹⁶ do not meet these but only lower thresholds¹⁷ and can participate as annual observers in most of the UDP's meetings, in listening mode and in some formats actively. Importantly, platform member countries must be established democracies with market economies. Beyond these countries, the IMF, the major International Financial Institutions and the OECD are also part of the UDP.

Infographic A.3. Ukraine Donor Platform Composition



Source: Based on Ukraine Donor Platform (unpublished).

The UDP Secretariat works across two offices, located in Brussels and Kyiv. The Brussels Office is hosted by the Directorate General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Commission (DG ENEST), and the Kyiv Office by the RDO. The UDP Secretariat's personnel in Brussels comprises the Head of Secretariat (European Commission), two Commission staff members and 16 secondees from the UDP's countries, the EIB and the EBRD. In addition to their duties for the UDP, the secondees also have representative roles and duties for their home institutions. The Deputy Head of the Secretariat is a representative of the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine.

The Steering Committee is the UDP's main decision-making body that meets roughly on a quarterly basis. Its members are senior-level officials from the UDP countries who usually work for these countries' ministries of foreign affairs and ministries for development co-operation. The Steering Committee is currently co-chaired by DG ENEST's Director General, the Minister of Finance of Ukraine and the Acting Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia. Meetings of the UDP's Steering Committee are usually attended by Ukrainian ministers. In addition, at the Ukraine Recovery Conference, the UDP also organised meetings at the Ministerial level to amplify the messages of the UDP at the highest political level.

At the working level, the UDP convenes via so-called Expert Group meetings. The experts are the Sherpas of the Steering Committee members and discuss various matters with relevance for Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction.

The UDP also aims to exchange with the business community and civil society organisations. Specifically, a Business Advisory Council has been established under the umbrella of the UDP, composed of senior business executives appointed by each UDP member. They provide views and advice on improving Ukraine's business environment and attracting more foreign direct investment. Moreover, while the UDP does not have a comparable standing body representing civil society, it engages with civil society organisations intermittently through its Steering Committee and Expert Group.

The UDP further co-ordinates with the G7 and with the IFIs. Exchanges with the G7 Finance Track tend to focus on the mobilisation of budgetary support, co-operation with the G7+ Energy Co-ordination Group (see *Annex G*) on strengthening Ukraine's energy system and the exchanges with the so-called IFI Co-ordination Group (composed of the European Commission, Ukraine and the IFIs) on various topics with relevance for IFIs' engagement for Ukraine.

Apart from these Brussels-based structures, the UDP co-operates with the HoC and the SWG. In fact, each SWG has a contact point at the UDP.

Annex G – (Other) multilateral co-ordination platforms

Beyond the already mentioned multilateral co-ordination formats there are several other platforms that should be accounted for.

A key co-ordination mechanism to support the vocational education and training of Ukrainians has been the *Skills Alliance for Ukraine* which is a joint initiative of 84 donors, their implementing organisations, international and civil society organisations (Skills Alliance for Ukraine, n.d.^[49]). The Skills Alliance has been created by the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development. The latter is funding a Secretariat which has been managed by the German Development Agency GIZ. Co-ordination meetings of all members take place every few months, most recently in October 2025, and tend to comprise more than 150 participants. In addition, there are working level exchanges within the Skills Alliance's subgroups which allow for short updates of current initiatives, projects, presentation of best practices or funding opportunities.

It is important to note that the Skills Alliance is largely an independent mechanism from the SWG Education. However, the Skills Alliance explicitly aims to maintain continuous information exchange between itself and relevant SWGs (especially SWG Education) through Alliance members that participate in the respective SWG meetings.

In a similar vein, the *SME Resilience Alliance* has played a significant role for donor co-ordination to strengthen Ukraine's SME ecosystem. The SME Resilience Alliance has been launched by the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development – which just as for the Skills Alliance have been its co-chairs – together with 12 other countries, and 17 development institutions and international organisations. Notably, the Alliance's Secretariat:

- mapped the Ukrainian SME ecosystem and international support,
- facilitated co-ordination amongst several actors in the SME space (especially via the establishment of a structured quarterly dialogue between the Ukrainian government and international partners),
- provided a monitoring report of the SME Strategy and
- conducted in 2025 nine thematic roundtables on export development, regional support, access to finance, human capital, regulatory environment and sectoral support

So far, the SME Resilience Alliance has supported 290 000 SMEs and mobilised EUR 8.9 billion in donor commitments.

There have also been several impactful co-ordination platforms in the energy sector

G7+ Energy Co-ordination Group

One of the most prominent efforts has been the *G7+ Energy Co-ordination Group* which has been co-ordinating foreign partners to support Ukraine's energy infrastructure. The donor support co-ordinated via the group has been diverse and included various forms of financial and technical assistance. Moreover, the group facilitates information sharing among key governments, donors and private sector contacts for equipment procurement and donations, supports prioritisation for equipment purchases and enhances logistics co-ordination to move equipment into Ukraine. As of July 2025, the

Group has been able to mobilize over USD 7 billion in energy assistance (Government of Canada, 2025^[50]).

One key outcome of the Co-ordination Group's work has been the conclusion of the Clean Energy Partnership between its members (including countries, IFIs, IOs, private sector representatives) and the Government of Ukraine (Federal Foreign Office, 2023^[51]) which has facilitated the provision of financial (incl. grants, guarantees) and technical support for Ukraine's energy sector. In addition, the partnership has acted as a forum for discussion, co-ordination and knowledge-sharing where the Ukrainian Minister of Energy (as well as his Deputy Ministers) have presented about Ukraine's ongoing energy sector challenges and reform progress.

Beyond these measures it should be mentioned that the partnership agreement also requires the Government of Ukraine to implement key energy sector reforms. Examples include requests vis-à-vis the commitment of the Government of Ukraine to conduct further liberalisation of energy and gas markets, to enhance the corporate governance of energy sector state-owned enterprises (in alignment with OECD Corporate Governance standards) as well as the advancement of subsidy and tariff reforms (Federal Foreign Office, 2023^[51]). In addition, the G7+ Energy Co-ordination Group publishes statements that highlight both Ukraine's reform progress as well as areas where further action might be needed.

Energy Community Secretariat

The Energy Community is an International Organisation, aiming to support regional co-operation among the energy sectors of European countries. It is composed of EU Member States as its Participants and several (South) Eastern European countries as Contracting Parties. Their ministries responsible for energy as well as EU representatives¹⁸ shape its decision making at the highest level (Energy Community Secretariat, n.d.^[52]). The Energy Community Secretariat supports the operational implementation of the Energy Community's work programme and notably *ensures that Contracting Parties align their national legislation with the EU energy acquis, prepares institutional meetings, co-ordinates assistance and oversees legal and regulatory compliance* (Energy Community Secretariat, n.d.^[52]).

The Energy Community Secretariat has implemented several measures to support the recovery of Ukraine's energy sector and its alignment with the EU acquis. These prominently include the:

- *Ukraine Legal Support Platform* (Matching lawyers around the globe with Ukrainian energy companies to provide them with pro bono legal support)
- *Ukraine Energy Market Observatory* (Monitoring and review of all developments related to the energy market and corporate governance in Ukraine)
- *Ukraine Energy Support Fund* (Multi-donor fund to finance the needs of Ukrainian energy companies)

The Ukraine Energy Support Fund (UESF) has arguably been the main tool via which foreign partners financially supported the resilience and recovery of Ukraine's energy sector. This multi-donor fund is managed by the Energy Community Secretariat that acts as its fiduciary and has received contributions from a great range of foreign partners, including countries, IFIs and IOs (Energy Community Secretariat, n.d.^[53]).

It stands out among several other multi-donor funds via its funding collection, need prioritisation and funding allocation mechanism:

1. A donation to the UESF's special purpose account can be made upon conclusion of a grant and fiduciary agreement between the donor, the Energy Community Secretariat as fiduciary and the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine. Moreover, donors can earmark the donation for a specific purpose and/or companies.
2. Eligible Ukrainian companies can request support from the Fund via the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine. The Ministry, with the assistance of independent international experts, then verifies the necessity, usefulness and urgency of the requested items before (dis)approving and prioritising the request.
3. The procurement of items is then notably not performed by the Ukrainian energy companies or the Ministry of Energy but by an external procurement agency (UTA-Sweco) and the payment to qualified suppliers is made by the Energy Community Secretariat.
4. After their procurement, the Energy Community Secretariat, supported by external experts, then also tracks the delivery and installation of the items.

Moreover, the UESF is audited annually and provides donors with ongoing reporting on how their funds were used.

As of 21 January 2026, the total value of signed contracts within this framework amounts to EUR 1.6 billion. With an allocation of EUR 557 million, Germany is so far the main contributor, providing 33.8% of the overall finances mobilized by the Fund. The EU's contribution amounts to EUR 259 million (15.7% of the total), UK – EUR 167.7 million (10.2%) and Sweden – EUR 203 million (12.3%).

Our stakeholder consultations confirm the effectiveness of this funding mechanisms which enabled the swift and transparent allocation of urgently needed funds for Ukraine's energy sector recovery.

As a caveat it however should also be noted that one stakeholder consulted indicated that *a large share of earmarked funding limited flexibility in resource allocation, while the production and delivery of complex technological equipment – such as gas turbines – required extended manufacturing and logistics timelines.*

Annex H – The Ukraine Recovery Conferences

The Ukraine Recovery Conferences (URC) are a continuation of the Ukraine Reform Conferences but with a stronger focus on the recovery and reconstruction-related challenges of Ukraine. They usually entail various speeches by high-ranking actors, the announcement of new funding commitments, initiatives and projects as well as the signature of various agreements between a variety of stakeholders. In addition, panel discussions, workshops and roundtables have been implemented across several thematic dimensions and networking as well as matchmaking facilities have been a persistent feature of the three most recent URCs (Ukraine Recovery Conference, 2024^[59]; Ukraine Recovery Conference, 2025^[60]). Beyond this, it can be noted that URCs have acted as a venue for political gatherings such as meetings of the UDP Ministerial level or meetings of the G7+ Energy Co-ordination Group (Ukraine Recovery Conference, 2025^[54]).

The first Ukraine Recovery Conference took place in 2022 in Lugano (Ukraine Recovery Conference, 2022^[55]) where Ukraine presented its initial Recovery and Development Plan and where the Heads of Government, Ministers and high representatives of more than 40 countries as well as high ranking officials and representatives of the Commission, Council of Europe, EBRD, EIB and OECD agreed on the non-binding Lugano Principles that aim to guide Ukraine's recovery process (see below the Box *The Lugano Principles*). The URC 2023 in London added a stronger focus on mobilising the private sector for Ukraine's recovery and a large side event with civil society organisations was organised (Ukraine Recovery Conference, 2023^[56]).

The URC 2024 in Berlin had an even broader scope, which beyond the business dimension contained a human dimension, local and regional dimension as well as an EU dimension. Under these dimensions there was an increased number of discussions and exchanges on how to promote Ukraine's social recovery, support Ukraine's regions and cities as well as Ukraine's EU accession process. In addition, the URC 2024 featured a so-called Recovery Forum which served as a space to facilitate networking and match-making between several stakeholders. For instance, at the Business Fair, businesses could showcase products and activities that contribute to Ukraine's recovery while the Municipality Fair enabled Ukrainian regions and municipalities to showcase their challenges and project ideas (Ukraine Recovery Conference, 2024^[57]).

The most recent URC 2025 in Rome, maintained the four thematic dimensions of the URC 2024 in Berlin. More participants (approx. 7,000 – incl. more than 2,000 company representatives) than any previous URC participated in the event and more than EUR 9.8 billion were announced in new financial commitments to contribute to Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction (Ukraine Recovery Conference, 2025^[58]). In addition, the signature of various memoranda and agreements indicates the commitment of up to EUR 5 billion. These amounts are lower than for the URC 2024 (EUR 16 billion in funding commitments), but it can be noted that a larger number of agreements (approx. 400 instead of 110 in Berlin) has been concluded (Communications Department of the Secretariat of the CMU, 2025^[59]). It is also a positive development that the Business Fair hosted 120 booths, including 30 dedicated to Ukraine's local authorities, which marks a 30% increase compared to the previous URC.

Beyond the URCs, there are also a few other international conferences such as the annual ReBuild Ukraine event, that contain similar features to the URCs but tend to have a (somewhat) smaller scale. Also, it can be noted that the two most recent URCs have been preceded by pre-URC events which aim to tackle one of the four thematic dimensions of the URCs (business, human, local and regional, EU).

Box – The Lugano Principles

1. **Partnership.** *The recovery process is led and driven by Ukraine and conducted in partnership with its international partners. The recovery effort has to be based on a sound and ongoing needs assessment process, aligned priorities, joint planning for results, accountability for financial flows and effective co-ordination.*
2. **Reform focus.** *The recovery process has to contribute to accelerating, deepening, broadening and achieving Ukraine's reform efforts and resilience in line with Ukraine's European path.*
3. **Transparency, accountability and rule of law.** *The recovery process has to be transparent and accountable to the people of Ukraine. The rule of law must be systematically strengthened and corruption eradicated. All funding for recovery needs to be fair and transparent.*
4. **Democratic participation.** *The recovery process has to be a whole-of-society effort, rooted in democratic participation by the population, including those displaced or returning from abroad, local self-governance and effective decentralization.*
5. **Multi-stakeholder engagement.** *The recovery process has to facilitate collaboration between national and international actors, including from the private sector, civil society, academia and local government.*
6. **Gender equality and inclusion.** *The recovery process has to be inclusive and ensure gender equality and respect for human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. Recovery needs to benefit all and no part of society should be left behind. Disparities need to be reduced.*
7. **Sustainability.** *The recovery process has to rebuild Ukraine in a sustainable manner aligned with the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development and the Paris Agreement, integrating social, economic and environmental dimensions including green transition.*

Source: Ukraine Recovery Conference (2022), *Outcome Document of the Ukraine Recovery Conference URC2022 'Lugano Declaration'*, <https://www.urc-international.com/past-conferences/urc22/conference-materials>.

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Notes

¹ MoE and MDCT notably have also participated in meetings of the UIF SB.

² Including the provision of a unified aid tracking system and a single view of all foreign partner projects per government body.

³ It can be noted that legal amendments have been made in 2025 to adjust the composition of the ICC which are intended to revitalise its role.

⁴ IDP Councils function as co-ordination and advisory bodies linking communities of displaced persons with local and national authorities. Composed of representatives of IDPs, NGOs and government institutions, the Councils meet regularly to align efforts on housing, legal aid, healthcare and employment.

⁵ Examples for twinning projects between several German cities and districts with Ukrainian cities like Chernihiv, Rivne, Kharkiv and Melitopol (Keudel et al., 2024^[68]).

⁶ 2022: 10.4% of Ukraine's GDP; 2023: 8.4% of Ukraine's GDP (Tokariuk, 2025^[27]).

⁷ In Poland alone they have created 44,500 companies from January 2022 - December 2023 (Trade.gov.pl, 2024^[86]).

⁸ Unity Hubs aim to be spaces for interaction between Ukraine, international partners and civic (UGC) initiatives, aimed at supporting social cohesion among Ukrainians abroad and providing information and advisory services based on a "one-stop shop" principle.

⁹ Some inspiration could here be drawn from the UNDP's Migration and Local Development and DAR 1+3 projects that successfully enabled the systematic development of local level diaspora engagement bodies across Moldova (Arroyo and Kaupa, 2025^[38]; Maciucă, 2020^[44]).

¹⁰ Via the format of the Recovery Operational Group, UDP participants meet with representatives of the Ukrainian government and Heads of Co-operation based in Kyiv on a roughly quarterly basis.

¹¹ As well as several lower ranking foreign partner representatives.

¹² The Group of Creditors of Ukraine includes Canada, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States of America. Observers to the Group include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The IMF and World Bank play an active role in the Group's meetings to discuss measures related to Ukraine's debt sustainability.

¹³ Including the provision of a unified aid tracking system and a single view of all foreign partner projects per government body.

¹⁴ Ukraine's memberships include the International Transport Forum (ITF), the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches initiative, the Equal Pay International Coalition, the Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the Eurasia Competitiveness Programme, the GREEN Action Task Force, the OECD-EU Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) programme, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purpose (GFTEI) and the European Union Water Initiative in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia.

¹⁵ To be a temporary member of the Platform, a country needs to have contributed since February 2022, or have committed to contribute, at least 0.1% of its 2022 GDP and at least USD1 billion to Ukraine. This includes direct budget support, support to reconstruction and recovery projects and other forms of financial assistance, but not military or humanitarian assistance, or financial contributions that have military purposes.

A temporary member may participate in the Steering Committee as long as its assistance at this significant level continues to be disbursed, and therefore the need for co-ordination remains. For countries which are Member States of the European Union, only their bilateral assistance is taken into account.

¹⁶ Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain and Switzerland.

¹⁷ Countries may acquire annual observer status in the Platform if they have contributed since February 2022, or have committed to contribute, at least 0.05% of their 2022 GDP or at least USD300 million) in financial and economic support to Ukraine. This includes direct budget support, support to reconstruction and recovery projects and other forms of financial assistance, but not military or humanitarian assistance, or financial contributions that have military purposes.

For countries which are Member States of the European Union, they should have provided or committed to provide bilateral economic assistance of at least 0.05% of the country's 2022 GDP or at least USD200 million to Ukraine in addition to their contributions to the EU budget.

¹⁸ Usually, the European Commissioner for Energy and a high-level representative of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

Consolidating Ukraine's recovery architecture

Where it stands and next steps

Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has suffered profound human, economic and infrastructural damage. Recovery and reconstruction needs over the next decade are estimated at around USD 524 billion, creating an urgent need for coherent institutional arrangements that can translate large-scale external support into effective, place-based outcomes. Ukraine's institutions and society have shown remarkable resilience, and an unprecedented array of foreign partners have mobilised resources and expertise. A comprehensive recovery architecture is in place. Nevertheless, fragmentation, co-ordination gaps and acute human-capacity constraints persist, limiting policy coherence and implementation. This paper assesses domestic institutional dynamics – governance, public investment management and subnational capacity – and evaluates roles and co-ordination mechanisms of foreign partners. Drawing on extensive stakeholder consultations, it presents actionable, and time-bound recommendations to strengthen the existing recovery architecture to improve the whole-of-government co-ordination and enhance donor alignment.