

European Telecoms

The FANGs are out – stock picks

- ▶ Prefer ORA: fibre, cost control, inexpensive, CEO stability
- ▶ Prefer DT: enlightened regulation, consolidated mobile market
- ▶ Buy rating on KPN (good execution), BT (headwinds discounted)

This report accompanies the publication of a new telecoms thematic note, <u>The FANGs are out</u> (30 January 2018) that looks at the interface of telecoms and technology regulation. After years of being on the receiving end of onerous rules imposed at the behest of Silicon Valley (i.e., net neutrality), there is now a tectonic shift underway for telecoms. The FANGs (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, Google) have fallen from grace, and telecoms operators are looking to capitalise on this. We very much doubt operators can seize the role of 'innovation dynamo' from the technology giants, and even net neutrality regulation is secure for the present (at least in Europe). However, one advantage of the new climate is that regulators now have, in the form of the FANGs, a fresh set of targets with a far higher media profile than that of the stolid telecoms operators. The appeal/urgency of regulating the FANGs could displace resource that might otherwise have been directed at loading further burdens on telecoms.

To challenge on the global stage, European players will need scale, and the European Commission has two modest opportunities to signal its support here. The first is with its review of the proposed Dutch mobile merger. Aspects of this deal look more feasible than recent predecessors, but the task of securing approval will be extremely challenging given the stance of DG COMPETITION. The second is with the ongoing negotiation of the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC), which contains some positive elements but has been overshadowed by the topic of tight oligopoly regulation. The measures proposed here remain a risk but we are hopeful that their impact will likely be mitigated. Meanwhile, the sector as a whole continues to benefit from factors like regulatory fibre pricing flexibility and the fact that in-country mobile consolidation was permitted in a number of markets (note this has not meant higher consumer prices). Indeed, the industry's revenue growth is much healthier than a few years ago, when regulation was at its nadir and revenues rapidly contracting. That said, progress is presently of the slow but steady variety, and catalysts are wanting (barring a surprise in the Netherlands). Our preferred names are Orange, which is well advanced with fibre, relatively inexpensive and likely to see its CEO reconfirmed, and DT, which is well positioned both strategically and in terms of regulation. We update some estimates and TPs (see page 7), but make no changes to ratings.

EQUITIESTELECOMS, MEDIA & TECHNOLOGY

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Ratings and target prices

| | | | Current | TP | | Rat | ing | Upside/ | Market cap | EV/EBITDA | EV/EBITDA | D/Y | D/Y |
|----------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|------------|----------|----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|
| Company | Ticker | Currency | price | Old | New | Old | New | downside | (EURm) | 2018e | 2019e | 2018e | 2019e |
| BT Group* | BT/A LN | GBP | 2.63 | 3.60 | 3.60 | Buy | Buy | 36.9% | 29,755 | 6.2x | 6.0x | 6.1% | 6.2% |
| Deutsche Telecom | DTE GR | EUR | 14.58 | 18.50 | 18.50 | Buy | Buy | 26.9% | 69,399 | 7.1x | 6.7x | 5.0% | 5.1% |
| KPN | KPN NA | EUR | 2.89 | 3.70 | 3.70 | Buy | Buy | 28.2% | 12,125 | 7.2x | 6.9x | 4.8% | 5.3% |
| Orange | ORA FP | EUR | 14.85 | 17.00 | 17.00 | Buy | Buy | 14.5% | 39,489 | 5.2x | 5.0x | 4.4% | 4.4% |
| Source: HSBC estimates, Th | nomson Reuters. | Priced as of clos | se at 26 January | 2018 * for BT 20 | 018e column s | shows FY19 | e metric | | | | | | |

Disclosures & Disclaimer

This report must be read with the disclosures and the analyst certifications in the Disclosure appendix, and with the Disclaimer, which forms part of it.

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Stock anatomy


- Prefer ORA: fibre, cost control, inexpensive, CEO stability
- Prefer DT: enlightened regulation, consolidated mobile market
- Buy rating on KPN (good execution), BT (headwinds discounted)

Surprise: The sector is showing steady, if modest, improvement

Operational conditions for the major European telecoms players have been improving, though admittedly from a low base. This may come as a something of a surprise, given the sector's poor stock performance relative to the broader market over the past couple of years. There have certainly been headwinds (one example being mobile roaming regulation), but overall, the telecoms industry's revenue and EBITDA lines have been moving in the right direction. We largely attribute this to the improvements in regulation seen over the past half-decade: in particular, the granting of pricing flexibility to incumbents deploying fibre (courtesy of the *non-discrimination and cost methodology recommendation*), but note also that mobile consolidation was approved in a series of markets before DG COMPETITION reversed course.

At a national level, sector revenues that were comparatively recently showing sharp declines have now stabilised. For 2017, we expect revenues to have contracted just -0.2%, and from here we anticipate a return to very modest growth in a sub 1% band going forward. We expect this ongoing modest improvement to be underpinned by the continuing shift from basic to super-fast or even ultra-fast broadband, as well as by better conditions in many mobile markets (those countries where consolidation did secure approval should benefit – including via the better investment that can be supported as a result). Note that current mobile revenue growth rates have been depressed by roaming regulation (though this should fade from H2 2018), as well as MTR cuts in Germany.

Incumbent domestic revenue trend (% change y/y)



Source: HSBC estimates, Company data



The incumbents' international activities tend to contribute faster growth than do their domestic operations (one of the issues European regulators and policy makers will need to face if they wish to see more capital invested domestically on infrastructure upgrade projects). Group revenue growth rates therefore tend to be similarly distributed but faster than those recorded in the respective home markets. DT's (DTE GR, EUR14.6, Buy) hefty exposure to T-Mobile US (TMUS, USD65, Buy) deserves special mention in this regard, given it is now as important as Germany to the group in revenue terms.

Incumbent group revenue trend (% change y/y)



Source: HSBC estimates, Company data

A similar pattern emerges when examining EBITDA developments. At a national level, the incumbents saw EBITDA contracting at mid-single digit (or worse) rates for much of the first half of the decade, from 2010. They finally returned to growth in 2016, and we continue to anticipate growth over the remainder of the decade – albeit only in the range 1-2%. This is the result of a combination of modest revenue growth combined with a relatively small measure of margin expansion (as incumbents continue with their now well-established cost efficiency programmes).

Incumbent domestic EBITDA trend (% change y/y)




Source: HSBC estimates, Company data

Just as with revenue trends, EBITDA growth at the group level has also been (and looks set to continue to be) better than that seen in the operators' respective domestic markets. We expect 3.0% for 2017 and anticipate a similar level of growth over the next couple of years. Hence it is again apparent that international activities provide superior growth – especially when outside of Europe (e.g., T-Mobile US).



Incumbent group EBITDA trend (% change y/y)




Source: HSBC estimates, Company data

Contrary to the allegations sometimes levelled against the sector, telecoms operators are investing in upgrading network infrastructure. Domestic capex/sales ratios were at their nadir in the early years of this decade, and have since risen to reach (we project) 19.5% for 2017e. We expect the level of capital intensity to remain elevated over the next few years, as operators invest in upgrading to ultra-fast broadband in particular (although we are sceptical about the need for an aggressive 5G build). This should also tend to keep the capex/sales ratio in the high teens in the early years of the next decade – albeit on a fading trend towards the mid-teens percentages that we have consistently argued represent the best assumptions for the longer term.

Capital intensity tends to be a little lower at the group level, as a function of the fact that the most capital intensive projects (e.g., fixed-line access infrastructure) tend to be domestic, whereas international activities are often tilted towards mobile (which usually exhibits a slightly lower capex/sales ratio). We expect a group capex/sales ratio of 17.3% for 2017e.

Incumbent group OpCF trend (% change y/y)



Source: HSBC estimates, Company data

We anticipate operating cash flow growth of 2.1% for 2017e, slower than the sharp improvement seen in 2016 (part of which reflected the conclusion of Vodafone's heavy Project Spring investment). Going forward, we forecast mid-single digit operating cash flow growth, given that several operators are passing peak fibre build and we expect deployment of 5G to be progressive rather than aggressive.



Anatomy of a sector

This rest of the present section focuses on reviewing the most fundamental drivers for the large cap European telecoms stocks. We group these key factors under four high-level headings: revenues, costs, balance sheet and valuation. The framework employed here is essentially that described in our report <u>Choose your poison</u> (31 March 2017). We have naturally updated the charts to incorporate the latest data. To summarise our views on the individual companies:

- Of the sector's largest names, we prefer Orange and DT (both rated Buy). Orange has continued to execute well and there are encouraging signs that conditions are starting to improve domestically. The company is also investing heavily in FTTP, which should help to ensure a stable regulatory environment. DT benefits from a relatively benign mobile market and some of Europe's most enlightened, pro-investment regulation. Meanwhile, T-Mobile US continues to perform strongly.
- KPN (Buy) has also executed well, especially in terms of its convergence strategy. The uncertainty generated by the proposed merger between the third and fourth mobile players in the Netherlands may also yield opportunities. Looking further out, though, any associated remedies could destabilise the market and fixed-line regulation could turn tougher, so certain caveats do apply. The lack of certainty on Belgian fixed-line regulation is the primary reason we retain a Hold rating on Proximus.
- Both major UK-based operators face headwinds. **Vodafone** (Hold) is delivering on cost control, but competition is a concern in Italy (due to Iliad's entry) and India (where more funds have already had to be injected). A Vodafone-Liberty Global combination has been long discussed in the press, but could prove complex. **BT** (Buy) has suffered as a result of multiple uncertainties including regulation, FTTP plans and the pension deficit. We are hopeful that a sufficient number of these can be addressed satisfactorily for the shares to show some recovery.
- ▶ The larger Scandinavian stocks appear fairly valued: we rate **Telia**, **Telenor** and **TDC** Hold. All three companies have ambitious plans to reduce their cost bases in the face, primarily, of legacy and B2B headwinds. Distinguishing between the three, we are structurally more inclined toward Telenor's geographic diversity, while Telia's medium-term competitive outlook is the most uncertain.
- Swisscom (Hold) has long pursued a successful strategy centred on network investment, but we think domestic conditions are likely to deteriorate – with Sunrise providing effective competition – and it remains relatively expensive.
- At the Mediterranean operators **Telefonica** and **TI** (both rated Hold), we continue to have concerns over the balance sheets. In Spain, there have been some signs of stabilisation, although concerns remain about the fourth mobile player Masmovil and the continuing parallel fibre deployment of alternative players. Meanwhile, in Italy, Open Fiber's infrastructure build (which could have profound consequences in the longer term) and Iliad's impending entry into the mobile market add to the uncertainty though Iliad's launch date remains undefined and may be delayed until Q2 2018.

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Changes in ratings/Target prices

| Company | Ticker | Currency | Share price | New Rating | Old Rating | New TP | Old TP | Upside/Downside |
|------------------------|----------|----------|-------------|------------|------------|--------|--------|-----------------|
| BT Group | BT/A LN | GBP | 2.63 | Buy | Buy | 3.60 | 3.60 | 36.9% |
| Deutsche Telekom | DTE GR | EUR | 14.58 | Buy | Buy | 18.50 | 18.50 | 26.9% |
| Elisa Oyj | ELISA FH | EUR | 33.05 | Reduce | Reduce | 29.50 | 29.20 | -10.7% |
| KPN | KPN NA | EUR | 2.89 | Buy | Buy | 3.70 | 3.70 | 28.2% |
| Orange | ORA FP | EUR | 14.85 | Buy | Buy | 17.00 | 17.00 | 14.5% |
| Proximus | PROX BB | EUR | 28.10 | Hold | Hold | 32.00 | 32.00 | 13.9% |
| Swisscom | SCMN VX | CHF | 518.80 | Hold | Hold | 515.00 | 515.00 | -0.7% |
| TDC | TDC DC | DKK | 40.07 | Hold | Hold | 39.80 | 38.00 | -0.7% |
| Telecom Italia | TIT IM | EUR | 0.72 | Hold | Hold | 0.85 | 0.85 | 18.0% |
| Telefonica | TEF SM | EUR | 8.50 | Hold | Hold | 9.00 | 9.30 | 5.8% |
| Telekom Austria | TKA AV | EUR | 7.93 | Reduce | Reduce | 7.50 | 7.00 | -5.4% |
| Telenor | TEL NO | NOK | 182.15 | Hold | Hold | 170.00 | 150.00 | -6.7% |
| Telia Company | TELIA SS | SEK | 38.53 | Hold | Hold | 37.60 | 42.00 | -2.4% |
| Vodafone | VOD LN | EUR | 2.26 | Hold | Hold | 2.30 | 2.30 | 2.0% |
| Telefonica Deutschland | O2D GR | EUR | 3.99 | Hold | Hold | 4.10 | 4.10 | 2.7% |


Source: HSBC estimates. Price as of 26 January 2018



Macro conditions

Our evaluation framework does not take a view as to whether it is better that an operator have more or less exposure to developed or emerging markets. That said, given exposure to emerging markets could equally be a benefit (most obviously if global macro conditions improve) or a liability (if more volatile conditions re-emerge), and given that investors will have their own preferences on this matter, we set out the relevant revenue mixes below.

Domestic/non-domestic non-EM/EM 2017e revenue contribution




Source: HSBC estimates

The most prominent features here will not come as a great surprise. Telenor and Telefonica have the heaviest exposure to emerging markets, being considerably ahead of a second tranche of such players like Vodafone and TI. An alternative and perhaps useful way of thinking about this data is to consider which operators have the smallest exposure to their domestic market: not far behind Telenor and Telefonica in this regard is DT, thanks in part to its extensive European footprint but also to the rapid growth seen at T-Mobile US. By contrast, Proximus, Swisscom, BT, KPN and TDC are predominantly domestic operators – with Orange not far behind, despite having a presence in numerous emerging markets.

GDP growth rate exposure

GDP growth is an important driver for telecoms revenues, with the prevailing level of economic activity especially pertinent when thinking about demand from business customers. We therefore review not only the pace of economic growth seen in 2017 but also the extent to which

Revenue weighted GDP growth 2017e (x-axis) vs delta 2017e (y-axis)





it is projected to change in the 12 months that follow. Note that the figures are revenue weighted, and so it is perhaps not surprising that Telenor (which has the highest emerging market focus) should enjoy the fastest rate of GDP growth. However, we would also highlight the improvement that is anticipated in the GDP growth exposure of Telefonica and TI.

Domestic fixed-line markets

The contest for lines


At the core of our positive thesis on the European telecoms sector has been the view that the transition to fibre-based broadband is inherently positive for revenues. This is in large part a function of the higher bills associated with upgraded platforms that are able to support more sophisticated services. However, it is also about defending market share. Operators with upgraded platforms ought to be better able to defend their customer bases from the competitive and substitutional threats from cable and mobile respectively.

We also think that the number of retail lines lost should decelerate as a result of the challenges facing the resellers escalating. When broadband was dominated by ADSL technology, resellers enjoyed a substantial arbitrage, renting copper lines at cost-orientated prices and then substantially undercutting the incumbent's retail prices. Today that process is more difficult (at least in most markets with rational regulation), as wholesale access prices are higher with the shift to fibre, with the result that the percentage size of the arbitrage is much diminished, lessening the discount that resellers can offer prospective customers.

As a result, line loss has slowed markedly, with an operator like BT now able to deliver approximately stable retail plus wholesale lines, and only a relatively modest decline of 3% in retail lines. DT represents a similar story, -0.7% and -2.4% respectively. Orange again is comparable – which we regard as a highly creditable result, given that its network upgrade is dependent on FTTP, which is much slower to deploy nationally. Nevertheless, it has restrained line loss to levels similar to those seen at DT.

In Spain, Telefonica led with a series of heavily discounted convergent offers to defend its market share, but the response from Vodafone and Orange in purchasing ONO and Jazztel respectively has resulted in a competitive environment where all three players working on sunk costs and competition has been fierce. Swisscom has experienced significant fixed-to-mobile substitution resulting in an acceleration of line losses.

Retail line loss and Retail + Wholesale line loss (LTM)





For KPN, line losses are evidence of pressure on its business segment and of Vodafone-Ziggo launching a convergent product. Demand for fixed-line telephony in Norway and Sweden continues to fall very rapidly, potentially because the transition to fibre broadband (FTTP) provides customers with an option to switch off their fixed-line connections; Telenor and Telia both continue to experience heavy y-o-y line losses.

In Italy, after years of heavy line losses largely due to fixed-to-mobile substitution, TI is finally demonstrating some effectiveness in reducing the rate of line loss. This is thanks to a stronger commercial push for broadband coupled with the structural absence of a cable network alternative (while it is still too early for the parallel FTTP deployment from Open Fiber to have had an impact in terms of line losses for TI).


Competitor build

Infrastructure-based competition will obviously intensify in those places where the incumbent competes with operators that are extending their own network footprint. Regulation has been an important component of this story: in certain countries, wholesale fibre products have not been mandated everywhere, which has compelled rivals to build their own infrastructure if they wish to compete. Hence the large increase in rival coverage in France and Spain, impacting Orange and Telefonica respectively.

Additional competitor coverage is also a negative for TI and BT, although this build has been prompted by rather different factors. In Italy, it has been a result of the government tasking ENEL (ENEL IM, EUR5.18, Buy, Target Price EUR5.80) with launching an extensive fibre build (Open Fiber). This remains a prominent long-term risk for TI, and while sceptics will argue it is very early days, the project has been making observable progress.

Turning to the UK, Liberty Global's plans to extend coverage comes on the back of Ofcom's willingness, since 2009, to reward infrastructure investment with pricing flexibility. However, short-sighted (in our view) proposals to cut wholesale fibre prices could now undermine the economics of this competing build. Others have also announced fibre plans, but note that such projects are comparatively modest (e.g., CityFibre, with Vodafone as an anchor tenant, is targeting 1m premises – though it could then go further if the initial build is successful).

Competitor's target fibre build per annum as a % of total lines



Source: HSBC estimates, company data



4.5x 4.1x 4.0x 3.5x 3.1x 2.8x 3.0x 2.5x 2.0x 2.0x 2.0x 1.9x 1.8x 2.0x 1.6x 1.6x 1.3x 1.5x 1.0x 0.5x 0.0x

Copper ULL to wholesale fibre price multiple (September 2017)

ORA

PRX

Source: HSBC, National regulatory authorities

DΤ

ВТ

Unbundled local loop to wholesale fibre boost

KPN

A core feature underpinning the improvement seen in most markets has been the higher cost of wholesale fibre as compared to unbundled copper. This reduces the arbitrage available to resellers, and thereby compels them to focus on an upselling model rather than concentrating on a discount-driven market share land grab model that erodes industry revenues and undermines its ability to support network upgrade investment.

SWI

TDC

TFF

ΤI

TLNR


TFI IA

The extent to which wholesale fibre pricing exceeds that of unbundled copper is therefore a useful metric to consider, with the typical range lying between 1.5x and 2.0x. We would repeat our concern that DT's wholesale prices are on the low side, and the same might be said for Orange. All things being equal, an incumbent should benefit from higher prices, but excessively high wholesale tariffs can have a similar effect to wholesale products being altogether absent – i.e., persuading competitors to build their own networks. An incumbent that loses a customer to a competitor wholesaling the line is better off than one losing a customer to a competitor with a completely independent network (because in this scenario it loses even the wholesale fee).

Triple- and quad-play

The practice of bundling telecoms services in triple- and quad-play packages has become extremely widespread. As discussed in our thematic report, <u>FT5G: What the telecoms sector needs is a new acronym</u>, 16 January 2017), bundling fixed-line, payTV and mobile has much to recommend it, in the form of producing stickier customers (thus lower churn) and generating cost synergies for those that have integrated networks. However, from a pure revenue perspective, it is worth distinguishing between its two flavours.

Penetration growth of triple-play and quad-play (LTM, y-o-y)





On the whole, triple-play is a revenue-per-line accretive process, as pay TV is in Europe a relatively new product, and so bundling it with telecoms services provides a ready means of upselling customers to higher bills (for an enhanced offering). Quad-play, on the other hand, is more problematic, because the fourth service added to the bundle (i.e., mobile) is already very mature. Operators transitioning customers from triple- to quad-play therefore face the prospect of having to win customers from rivals, who will obviously resist. If those rivals lack an adequate quad-play proposition of their own (perhaps due to an inferior fixed-line infrastructure or content proposition), they will need to respond with price discounts.

This is why we would expect the transition to triple-play to generally be bill-inflationary, but see that to quad-play as potentially being price disruptive. As a consequence, investors may prefer markets where growth in triple-play penetration (bill-inflationary) exceeds that in quad-play penetration (bill-deflationary). This issue has been particularly prominent in Spain, where Telefonica has enthusiastically pursued quad-play bundling, but where bills have tumbled. We also see quad-play as behind many of the long-term issues that have played out in France this decade.

Other companies to watch carefully on this topic include KPN and Proximus, KPN has pushed bundling to defend market share and we believe that its network upgrade investments have put it in a strong position from a standpoint of service quality. For the time being, the merged Vodafone-UPC operations are struggling, while T-Mobile and Tele2 have felt compelled to attempt a merger.


In Switzerland, Swisscom is successfully migrating customers to 4P limiting ARPU dilution. The smaller mobile operator SALT currently has no fixed-line proposition and offers its mobile services at heavily discounted prices, but it has so far proven to be a weak competitor for Swisscom due to prolonged network under-investment. Conversely, Sunrise offers a viable, but still quality oriented, alternative to Swisscom's 4P offer, and therefore its 4P offer has not destabilised the market. With respect to DT, we have previously flagged our concern that its quad-play tariffs are more aggressive than is necessary, especially in the context of the company's domestic network superiority. On the contrary, the speed of bundling so far remains relatively modest in Germany.

Competitive structure

Operators facing 'teenage' competitors (rivals with market share in the mid teens) are most susceptible to an aggressive pricing environment. Competitors that are smaller than this will tend to struggle to make an impact, lacking scale, and it will not generally be worth the incumbent cutting tariffs in order to counter such a relatively small threat. Competitors that are larger than this have to bear in mind their own need to generate an adequate return, and cutting prices for their entire base in pursuit of the relatively smaller gains in market share that are now available to them may not look so appealing. Competitors with market share in the mid teens, however, are big enough to matter but small enough to want to capture significant additional market share. Hence, for each domestic market, we measure how close the nearest competitor comes to 15% market share. Dutch and

Belgian markets look attractive on the basis of their lack of teenagers.

Delta of Q3 2017 market share of closest fixed-line 'teenager' to 15%



Operators facing 'teenage' competitors are most susceptible to an aggressive pricing environment



Domestic mobile markets

Revenue conditions stable


Mobile markets are healthier...

...but we remain cautious in Norway, Italy and France

While European mobile markets are hardly displaying rapid growth, they are nonetheless in much improved condition by comparison with their state earlier in the decade. Clearly, the healthy demand seen for data capacity has been vital, although we would also add that **the degree of consolidation that the sector has been able to achieve has also made a positive contribution** (note that pricing in these markets has continued to decline at an uninterrupted pace, but customers are increasingly purchasing larger packages on improved quality networks).

The above said, we are cautious on the situation in Norway, where Telenor faces what is in effect a new entrant, ICE, which displaced Tele2 in the 2012 spectrum auction, precipitating the latter's departure from the market. Meanwhile, in Italy, although current conditions are benign, bear in mind that Iliad will shortly enter as the fourth network. Historically, conditions have been extremely difficult in France, although a more rational environment emerged in the course of last year.

Mobile service revenue growth (LTM, y-o-y)




Source: HSBC estimates, company data

Competitive structure

As with the fixed-line segment, we assess mobile markets to identify those operators facing what we term 'teenager' competitors (i.e., with market share in the teens: big enough to make an impact, small enough to prioritise building market share) – the type that is structurally most likely to be disruptive to bills. A low figure on the accompanying chart indicates the presence of a 'teenager' with market share close to 15%; by contrast, a large figure indicates that competitors are considerably bigger (and so 'adult' in status) or smaller (and hence with less capability to disrupt).

Delta of Q3 2017 market share of closest mobile 'teenager' to 15%



Source: HSBC estimates, company data

With the failure of consolidation in the UK, France and Denmark (albeit for varying reasons), each of these markets incorporates at least one teenager. This is also the case in Switzerland and Sweden. Note that mobile operators combining with cable players could become more formidable competitors due to their opportunity to cross-sell. The structure of the Dutch market obviously hinges on the merger proposed between T-Mobile and Tele2.




Those countries where consolidation did occur now appear in much better shape

Those countries where consolidation did occur now appear in much better shape, and should be better placed to tackle future network investment requirements. Note that the figures in the chart can be unduly flattering to certain markets, in particular Italy given Iliad's impending entry. Although the Wind/Three merger in effect replaces two teenagers with an 'adult' and an 'infant', the latter will have powerful regulatory backing (e.g., a highly attractive roaming agreement) that will likely enable it to punch well above its weight.

Pricing conditions

Mobile pricing is under continuous pressure, but it is still worth monitoring which countries have higher bills as potentially being at greater risk of disruption. We adjust our figures for PPP, as otherwise countries like Switzerland would look perennially expensive. However, even having performed this normalisation, the Norwegian market still looks potentially vulnerable.

Mobile ARPU 2016 (PPP-adjusted, USD)



Source: HSBC calculations, company data



Those with exposure in Europe to integrated operations (Orange and DT) should be better placed in the long run to cope with the convergence phenomenon

and the transition to 5G


Non-domestic market exposure

Non-emerging markets

Although the incumbents' international portfolios have become more concentrated over recent years, with companies like KPN choosing to focus domestically, many of its peers retain a diverse international portfolio. We think that those with exposure in Europe to integrated operations (such as Orange and, to an increasing degree, DT) should be better placed in the long run to cope with the convergence phenomenon and the transition to 5G.

Given Europe's track record of regulation that is unsupportive of investment, it is perhaps not surprising that the stand-out non-domestic developed market lies outside of Europe altogether, i.e., the US. Here DT's T-Mobile US unit continues to grow at an impressive rate.

Non-domestic, non-EM 2017e revenue growth (y-o-y)




Source: HSBC estimates

Emerging markets

Historically, emerging markets have contributed a vital element of growth to European operators. They have also been volatile though, with Vodafone's difficulties in India as a result of Jio's entry there providing a recent example of how a market that was formerly a consistent contributor to growth can swiftly and sharply reverse.

We are anticipating better growth from Brazil helping TI, while Telefonica's LatAm-heavy emerging market activities should also generate some growth. Elsewhere, Telenor has in the past reported robust emerging market revenue growth but is presently seeing more subdued growth rates in the face of heightened competition. Telia is in the process of selling its non-Baltic/Nordic assets, reverting to a pure European operator.

Emerging market 2017e revenue growth (y-o-y)






Cost cutting programmes

Even though conditions have somewhat improved over the past few years (thanks to factors like better fixed-line regulation and partial consolidation), achieving top-line growth remains difficult – to say the least. Therefore cost control remains a crucial component of operators' plans, although the extent of the efficiency gains aimed at does vary materially. The accompanying chart shows targeted annual gross cost savings as a proportion of EBITDA.

Annualized gross cost savings targeted as a percentage of EBITDA




Source: HSBC estimates

TI has ambitious cost control targets, in the face of increasing competition in its domestic market. However, we remain dubious that this will be sufficient to compensate for the impact of Open Fiber's competing fibre platform plus Iliad's entry as a mobile competitor. Well-established cost cutting programmes are in place at incumbents like Orange and KPN. Much of Telenor's strong recent performance has been driven by its new-found focus on cost control.

Operators that we expect will be facing faster cost inflation include BT, Telefonica and Telenor We also monitor inflation trends that might escalate costs and thus impede efforts to improve efficiency. Operators that we expect will be facing faster cost inflation include BT (sterling weakness), Telefonica and Telenor (emerging market exposure).

Revenue weighted inflation changes (2017e vs 2016a)






Balance sheet and dividend coverage

Balance sheet strength remains a highly desirable feature of telecoms operators as investments – although admittedly players with weaker finances can represent attractive opportunities if sentiment improves and gearing leverages the resulting upside.

Net debt/EBITDA (2017e)




Source: HSBC estimates. Note: estimates for BT and Vodafone correspond to FY18e, Net debt definition includes contingent liabilities like spectrum, hybrid bonds, pension deficit etc

Despite the low rates environment, the more highly leveraged names have found conditions challenging in the past couple of years. Investors remain concerned about the levels of gearing seen at both TI and Telefonica. The Spanish incumbent has attempted to address this through making non-core asset disposals (although some, like the sale of O2 UK, have been frustrated). It should be noted that DT is not all that far behind taking the pension deficit fully into account, but the management is guiding to steady 10% CAGR FCF growth that should support this.

Dividend cover is another important measure of resilience. Coverage has been improving at Vodafone, now that the exceptional capex associated with Project Spring is passed. Most of the incumbents have a reasonable degree of headroom, although this has not prevented questions arising about their ability to fund dividends should additional pressures develop (for example, at BT, if there were to be additional calls on cash flows from an accelerated FTTP build and/or the pension). It is a welcome sign of confidence that an operator like Orange has recently been able to raise its floor guidance, despite the company's extensive FTTP investment.

Dividend cover (2017e)




Source: HSBC estimates. Note: estimates for BT and Vodafone correspond to FY18e



Valuation

The telecoms sector's benchmark valuation measure continues (at least for the present) to be EV/EBITDA – although incoming accounting changes may lead to more emphasis being placed on FCF measures going forwards. While the deficiencies of EV/EBITDA are plain enough (it is, after all, essentially a measure of profits before costs, given the fact that it excludes capex), its ready comparability does make it extremely useful. We would highlight that Orange looks cheap on this measure – as admittedly does TI. Given its excellent strategic positioning, we would highlight that DT is hardly expensive.


EV/EBITDA (2017e)



Source: HSBC calculations. Note: estimates for BT and Vodafone correspond to FY18e

EV/OpFCF provides a natural complement to EV/EBITDA, since it takes account of capex, although it can also be more volatile as a consequence. Note that both these sets of figures (i.e., EV/EBITDA and EV/OpFCF) tend to make KPN appear more expensive than is really the case: after the disposal of E-Plus, the company reached an agreement with the tax authorities and currently pays virtually no cash tax. As a consequence, KPN achieves a higher cash conversion ratio of EBITDA and operating FCF compared to the rest of the sector. Swisscom has also traditionally looked expensive on these measures due in part to its relatively low tax rate.

EV/OpFCF (2017e)




Source: HSBC calculations, Thomson Reuters Datastream. Note: estimates for BT and Vodafone correspond to FY18e



Turning finally to dividend yields, we would acknowledge these are arguably not a true valuation measure, but in view of the significance of dividends in driving the telecoms sector's total returns, we think this metric remains highly relevant. Again, there is considerable volatility, with certain companies cutting dividends altogether as a consequence of balance sheet strains (e.g., TI). Vodafone's dividend yield looks attractive, especially now that Project Spring coverage-related issues are behind it.

Dividend yield (2017e)



Source: HSBC calculations, Thomson Reuters Datastream. Note: estimates for BT and Vodafone correspond to FY17e. For TI the ordinary shares currently receive no dividend, while the savers shares receive the minimum level according to the company's bylaws.

Comparing the operators, we would note that Orange continues to look appealing, especially in terms of EV/EBITDA and now that it has issued robust dividend guidance. Meanwhile, we would highlight that DT is strongly positioned strategically but investors need not pay a substantial premium for this.

Looking instead at the operators against their own history (i.e., as compared to the previous year's valuation ranges, identified by the black diamonds and grey squares on the accompanying charts), we would highlight that BT is looking relatively inexpensive – albeit the UK incumbent plainly faces its fair share of challenges at present. Telefonica is also relatively inexpensive, though not to quite the same degree.

30 January 2018



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Company profiles



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Q3 FY18: 2 February

BT Group (BT/A LN, 263p, Buy, TP 360p)

Investment Thesis

BT faces a catalyst-rich first half of calendar 2018. On balance we believe the net result will be positive for the shares. However the short-term path ahead may not be entirely smooth.

In order of significance to our investment case, we highlight a series of network-related decisions which will be taken – both by regulator Ofcom, and by BT itself – which will dictate the outlook for the company's returns into the medium term. The regulator will issue its final position on the 'Wholesale Local Access' Review (expected mid-February), the purpose of which is to set the regulatory environment for the wholesale pricing of copper and fibre for the next three years. The initial conclusions were unhelpful, first reversing the trajectory of copper (unbundled local loop) pricing (from stable to deflationary in real terms, in contravention of EU guidelines), and second implementing a cost-orientated pricing regime on the entry-level fibre to the cabinet product; the centre-point of Ofcom's guidance suggested a cumulative three-year price decline of 40.6%. Both these decisions undermine the investment rationale in our view and will have been facing substantial push-back from those investing in UK telecoms infrastructure (not just BT) in the past six months. The opportunity is therefore for a modestly more positive outcome than Ofcom's central case (presently incorporated into our BT forecasts).

Openreach – BT's now legally separate network division – is currently running its own consultation process, investigating demand for yet faster broadband speeds in the form of fibre-to-the-home/premise (FTTH/P). Openreach, and by extension BT, is seeking a satisfactory economic equation to allow acceptable returns on what would be a colossal private investment. The next document will discuss pricing of a potential product, and the associated conditions that would allow for greater confidence in future network cost-savings (so-called 'cutover'). There is clearly a political as well as regulatory calculation to be borne in mind when calibrating expectations.

The company's pension is currently subject to a triennial review, the result of which will be a repayment plan designed to close the deficit (expected to be c.GBP10bn). With negative real discount rates, the risk of over-committing to the pension is substantial, and so must be managed with delicate discussions with the pension Trustees. BT's CFO has discussed several levers that might moderate the deficit, including changes to actuarial assumptions, business diversification (vs. the previous assessment) and the injection of supporting assets into the scheme. We model a GBP2bn one-time cash injection, alongside GBP800m of subsequent annual payments. Despite the High Court's refusal to allow a part of the scheme to shift from RPI to CPI, we still believe a modestly positive outcome here is possible. The outcome of pension discussions and BT's fibre plans will influence future dividend options; we currently forecast 2% DPS growth; dividend yield is 6.1% (FY18e).

Beyond these two pots are a series of smaller catalysts. We think the risk around the Premier League rights auction is almost certainly over-stated. We forecast 25% inflation but note that spending this sum may deliver substantially more games as the Premier League tweaks the auction structure. While deep-pocketed new entrants are mooted, the same was true of previous auctions, and we think the price tag will be too steep. We look forward to more detail on the forthcoming integration of Consumer and EE, which we expect will lead to the opportunity for further cost synergies to be extracted. It is also integral in realising additional revenue opportunities, through the creation of a more integrated/converged portfolio. In Global Services, we expect to see small disposals over time, which while putting pressure on the Group's top line, are unlikely to impact EBITDA.

The share has a FY19e PE ratio of 9.4x, trades on a post-pension FCF yield of 6.2%, and a dividend yield of 6.0%. Despite longer-term uncertainties, we think the share undervalued.



Valuation

We make no changes to our estimates. We derive our unchanged 360p TP using a FCFF-based DCF (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the <u>Valuation and risks section</u>), which implies 36.9% upside and we rate the stock Buy.

FCFF based DCF valuation

| in GBPm, unless specified | | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|--|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| EBITDA (post-exceptionals) | | 6,870 | 7,357 | 7,488 | 7,596 | 7,769 | 7,950 | 8,147 | 8,325 |
| Cash capex | | -3,411 | -3,850 | -3,399 | -3,468 | -3,475 | -3,498 | -3,536 | -3,574 |
| Net cash interest | | -549 | -529 | -529 | -488 | -444 | -441 | -437 | -433 |
| Cash tax paid | | -635 | -661 | -1,003 | -587 | -622 | -652 | -684 | -712 |
| Working capital change | | -270 | -50 | -50 | -50 | -50 | -50 | -50 | -50 |
| Equity FCF | | 2,004 | 2,267 | 2,507 | 3,002 | 3,178 | 3,309 | 3,440 | 3,556 |
| Add back: Net interest cost | | 549 | 529 | 529 | 488 | 444 | 441 | 437 | 433 |
| Deduct: tax shield on net interest | | -93 | -90 | -90 | -83 | -75 | -75 | -74 | -74 |
| FCFF | | 2,460 | 2,706 | 2,946 | 3,407 | 3,547 | 3,674 | 3,803 | 3,916 |
| TV | | | | | | | | | 63,291 |
| PV explicit cash flows | | 2,460 | 2,511 | 2,536 | 2,721 | 2,628 | 2,526 | 2,426 | 2,318 |
| PV of terminal cash flow | | | | | | | | | 37,462 |
| PV of total explicit CF | 17,666 | 32% | | | | | | | |
| PV of TV | 37,462 | 68% | | | | | | | |
| Total enterprise value | 55,128 | | | | | | | | |
| Net Debt (FY18e) | -11,301 | | | | | | | | |
| add back: FY18 interim divi cash pay-out | 501 | | | | | | | | |
| Contingent liabilities | -7,971 | | | | | | | | |
| Total value of equity | 36,357 | | | | | | | | |
| Shares (m) | 9,903 | | | | | | | | |
| Price per share (GBPp) | 3.60 | | | | | | | | |



Relative Valuation


- After an year of de-rating in 2016, the company's multiples stabilised in 2017; but both EV/EBITDA and EV/OpFCF still trade at the low end of historical ranges
- Consensus earnings revisions have been very limited in past six months; the decline in OpFCF forecasts has been slightly greater than EBITDA, as capex expectations increase
- ▶ The company is cheap on both EV/EBITDA and EV/OpFCF relative to its peers. Its dividend yield is one of the highest in the sector at 6.2% (FY19e).

BT Group - Valuation benchmark chart


Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| Price return | -0.4% | -4.1% | -0.8% | -15.4% | -13.0% |
| Total return | -0.5% | -2.3% | 1.0% | -10.8% | -8.3% |
| Total return vs SXKP | -1.6% | -2.0% | 0.4% | -7.5% | -11.4% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | -2.0% | -3.3% | 0.4% | -8.2% | -14.5% |
| Total return vs FTSE 100 | 0.4% | -3.4% | -2.0% | -15.5% | -19.6% |


Relative valuation




1yr fwd EV/EVITDA



Sales estimates revision



1yr fwd EV/OpFCF



EBITDA estimates revision




Capped at +/-50x levels





^{*} Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018

OpFCF estimates revision





Buy

Financials & valuation: BT Group Plc

Financial statements

| Year to | 03/2017a | 03/2018e | 03/2019e | 03/2020e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (GBPm |) | | | |
| Revenue | 24,082 | 23,876 | 23,849 | 23,947 |
| EBITDA | 6,739 | 6,870 | 7,357 | 7,488 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -3,572 | -3,635 | -3,578 | -3,541 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 3,167 | 3,235 | 3,779 | 3,946 |
| Net interest | -804 | -769 | -739 | -730 |
| PBT | 2,354 | 2,465 | 3,040 | 3,216 |
| HSBC PBT | 3,532 | 3,310 | 3,400 | 3,468 |
| Taxation | -446 | -545 | -608 | -643 |
| Net profit | 1,908 | 1,921 | 2,432 | 2,573 |
| HSBC net profit | 2,869 | 2,642 | 2,720 | 2,774 |
| Cash flow summary (GBPm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 5,554 | 3,495 | 5,419 | 5,208 |
| Capex | -3,145 | -3,311 | -3,350 | -3,399 |
| Cash flow from investment | -1,667 | -5,133 | -3,850 | -3,399 |
| Dividends | -1,435 | -1,539 | -1,566 | -1,597 |
| Change in net debt | -913 | 2,369 | -3 | -212 |
| FCF equity | 2,232 | 1,974 | 2,610 | 2,666 |
| Balance sheet summary (GBP | m) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 15,029 | 14,799 | 15,299 | 15,299 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 16,498 | 16,327 | 15,940 | 15,797 |
| Current assets | 6,875 | 5,424 | 5,477 | 4,639 |
| Cash & others | 2,476 | 818 | 821 | -67 |
| Total assets | 42,372 | 40,989 | 41,155 | 40,175 |
| Operating liabilities | 8,293 | 8,782 | 8,902 | 8,715 |
| Gross debt | 12,713 | 13,299 | 13,299 | 12,199 |
| Net debt | 8,932 | 11,301 | 11,298 | 11,086 |
| Shareholders' funds | 8,325 | 7,764 | 8,669 | 9,776 |
| Invested capital | 27,633 | 26,950 | 26,993 | 27,087 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| , , | | • | | |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Year to | 03/2017a | 03/2018e | 03/2019e | 03/2020e |
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | 26.47 | -0.86 | -0.11 | 0.41 |
| EBITDA | 5.88 | 1.94 | 7.09 | 1.78 |
| Operating profit | -15.21 | 2.14 | 16.82 | 4.44 |
| PBT | -22.28 | 4.73 | 23.29 | 5.81 |
| HSBC EPS | -13.18 | -7.59 | 2.97 | 1.99 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| ROIC | 9.1 | 9.6 | 11.3 | 11.8 |
| ROE | 30.7 | 32.8 | 33.1 | 30.1 |
| ROA | 5.6 | 5.7 | 7.0 | 7.4 |
| EBITDA margin | 28.0 | 28.8 | 30.8 | 31.3 |
| Operating profit margin | 13.2 | 13.5 | 15.8 | 16.5 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 8.4 | 8.9 | 10.0 | 10.3 |
| Net debt/equity | 107.2 | 145.4 | 130.2 | 113.3 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 62.2 | 30.9 | 48.0 | 47.0 |
| Per share data (GBPp) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 19.20 | 19.39 | 24.56 | 25.98 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 28.87 | 26.68 | 27.47 | 28.01 |
| DPS | 15.40 | 15.71 | 16.02 | 16.34 |
| Book value | 83.77 | 78.40 | 87.55 | 98.72 |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 03/2017a | 03/2018e | 03/2019e | 03/2020e |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| BT Adjusted revenues | 24,082 | 23,876 | 23,849 | 23,947 |
| BT Adjusted EBITDA | 7,645 | 7,495 | 7,507 | 7,538 |
| BT Adjusted PBT | 3,532 | 3,310 | 3,400 | 3,468 |
| BT Adjusted EPS (GBp) | 29 | 27 | 27 | 28 |
| BT Normalised FCF | 2,782 | 2,735 | 2,917 | 2,557 |
| | | | | |

Valuation data

| Year to | 03/2017a | 03/2018e | 03/2019e | 03/2020e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| EV/EBITDA | 6.4 | 6.6 | 6.2 | 6.0 |
| EV/IC | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| PE* | 9.1 | 9.9 | 9.6 | 9.4 |
| PB | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 2.7 |
| FCF yield (%) | 6.6 | 5.8 | 7.7 | 7.8 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 5.9 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 6.2 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (GBPp) | 263 | Free float | 85% |
|---------------------|---------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (GBPp) | 360 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | BT.L | Country | United Kingdom |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | BT/A LN | Analyst | Stephen Howard |
| Market cap (USDm) | 36,996 | Contact | 44 20 7991 6820 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.009 | | | | | | |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.084 | | | | | | |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes | | | | | | |
| Social Indicators | | | | | | | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 21.5 | | | | | | |
| Employee turnover (%) | n/a | | | | | | |
| Diversity policy | Yes | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |

Source: Company data, HSBC

Rovernance Indicators No. of board members Average board experience (years) Female board members (%) Board members Independence (%) 67

Price relative



Source: HSBC

Note: Priced at close of 26 Jan 2018



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Q4 results: 22 February

Deutsche Telekom (DTE GR, EUR14.57, Buy, TP EUR18.50)

Investment Thesis

52% of DT's value stems from its German assets, and arguably sentiment towards the stock is weighted even more heavily than this. We continue to have a positive outlook on both the mobile and fixed-line markets in Germany, and think Deutsche Telekom is proving adept at managing its domestic portfolio of assets. Two deals announced late in 2017 mean the business will, pending regulatory approval, soon be able to operate as a converged player in all of its European markets, removing Austria and the Netherlands from their earlier status as outliers. Finally the 65.5% stake in T-Mobile US continues to grow in value as the business continues to strongly outperform peers.

Consolidation in the German mobile market took place in 2014, taking the market to three network operators. We think this is the ideal market structure to maximise returns on investment (for all interested parties) and we expect above-average market growth as a consequence. The segmentation of the market between premium and value brands looks to be stable despite some concerns this time last year. Some of the competition seen in the indirect channels appears to be moderating, and competitive levels in the Enterprise market also appear to have fallen. Convergent tariffs are present, but far from dominant, given a comparatively low price discount available. There is risk here, following the consolidation of Drillisch and United Internet, which will offer converged tariffs at some point in the first half of 2018. Yet at this point, while we expect these tariffs to be competitive, we do not believe they will trigger a price war from well-invested peers.

In German fixed line, we think the BNetzA's approach to regulating the sector over the last few years has been sensible, in particular the pricing arrangements surrounding the wholesale fibre market ('Kontingentmodell'). We are very supportive of Deutsche Telekom's approach to building fibre; its FTTC plans will deliver 100Mbps to 80% of German households by the end of 2018 and illustrate a sensible trade-off between rapidity of deployment and breadth of coverage. The challenge for 2018 is to convince the market (and the government) that plans for beyond 2018 are sufficiently ambitious while at the same time not allowing the domestic capex budget to halloon

The Capital Markets Day in May 2018 will be the year's key event, providing the next four-year plan. We expect stable capex in Germany to be the key message (at or slightly above EUR4bn per year). This may allow for a greater emphasis to be placed on FTTP as other capex projects roll off, but we expect a targeted approach (eg business parks) rather than a broad-brush commitment.

The stake in T-Mobile US (TMUS US, USD65.28, Buy, Target Price USD70) (37% of DT EV) has grown in value by 69% over the past two years (equivalent to c.EUR3.00 per Deutsche Telekom share). TMUS is taking share in the US (+3.6ppt over two years), and has several options to provide sustained medium-term growth (including a more national presence thanks to 600MHz spectrum, moving in B2B and increasing selling footprints). The appreciation of the US subsidiary implies a European asset de-rating over the same time-frame; we estimate the core European business now trades of 6.2x 2018e EBITDA, 10% discount vs. sector peers.

30 January 2018



Valuation

We make no changes to our estimates. We derive our unchanged EUR18.5 target price from a sum-of-parts (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the <u>Valuation and risks</u> <u>section</u>), implying 26.9% upside and we rate the stock Buy.

Sum-of-the-parts valuation (EURm, unless stated)

| Country | Valuation | DT | EV/EBITDA mul | | | | Implied value |
|------------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------------|------|---------|-----------|---------------|
| | Method | stake | 2017 | 2018 | prop EV | Per share | % of EV |
| Germany | Multiple | 100% | 8.0 | 7.8 | 67,804 | 14.72 | 52% |
| USA | HSBC TP USD70 | 65.5% | 7.9 | 7.3 | 48,227 | 10.47 | 37% |
| Greece | Multiple | 40% | 7.8 | 7.8 | 3,539 | 0.77 | 3% |
| Romania | Multiple | 100% | 5.0 | 5.0 | 830 | 0.18 | 1% |
| Hungary | Multiple | 59% | 8.2 | 7.8 | 2,630 | 0.57 | 2% |
| Croatia | Multiple | 51% | 8.1 | 7.8 | 1,606 | 0.35 | 1% |
| Slovakia | Multiple | 100% | 7.6 | 7.8 | 2,460 | 0.53 | 2% |
| Poland | Multiple | 100% | 5.5 | 5.0 | 2,455 | 0.53 | 2% |
| Czech republic | Multiple | 100% | 5.4 | 5.0 | 2,191 | 0.48 | 2% |
| Austria | Multiple | 100% | 5.1 | 5.0 | 1,534 | 0.33 | 1% |
| Others | Multiple | various | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.00 | 0% |
| Europe | Multiple | | 0.0 | 6.7 | 17,245 | 3.74 | 13% |
| T-Systems | Multiple | 100% | 2.0 | 2.0 | 998 | 0.22 | 1% |
| GHS | Multiple | 100% | 4.8 | 5.0 | -2,500 | -0.54 | -2% |
| T-Mobile Netherlands | Multiple | 100% | 4.7 | 5.0 | 2,096 | 0.45 | 2% |
| DFMG (tower business) | Multiple | 100% | 11.6 | 11.0 | 5,328 | 1.16 | 4% |
| Corporate development | Multiple | 100% | 0.0 | 8.2 | 7,424 | 1.61 | 6% |
| Elimination | Multiple | | 9.0 | 8.0 | -327 | -0.07 | 0% |
| NPV of restructuring charges | NPV | | | | -7,394 | -1.61 | -6% |
| Group total | | | 7.4 | 7.0 | 131,476 | 28.54 | 100% |
| Group net debt (YE2017e) - minori | ities adjustment | | | | -42,906 | -9.31 | |
| Minorities (US, Greece, Hungary, O | Croatia) | | | | | 0.00 | |
| Net contingent liabilities/assets | | | | | -7,187 | -1.56 | |
| Tax asset NPV | | | | | 4,898 | 1.06 | |
| Total equity value | | | | | 85,100 | 18.50 | |
| O/S shares | | | | | 4,607 | | |



Relative Valuation

- ▶ DT has underperformed in last 6 months compared to the sector (SXKP) and its 1 year forward EV/EBITDA multiple is trading at the low-end of the two-year range. On EV/OpFCF the stock is trading close to its historical average
- Estimate revisions have been slightly negative for EBITDA, primarily driven by USD depreciation
- ▶ DT's slight premium versus the sector reflects its strong relative positioning and positive earnings outlook (8% EBITDA, 11% FCFE CAGR 2014-2018).

Deutsche Telekom - Valuation benchmark chart


Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| Price return | 1.3% | -2.6% | -5.3% | -6.0% | -10.8% |
| Total return | 1.2% | -2.6% | -5.3% | -6.0% | -7.7% |
| Total return vs SXKP | 0.1% | -2.3% | -6.0% | -2.7% | -10.9% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | -0.3% | -3.5% | -6.0% | -3.3% | -13.9% |
| Total return vs DAX 30 | 1.9% | -4.6% | -6.9% | -14.4% | -20.3% |


Relative valuation




1yr fwd EV/EVITDA




Sales estimates revision



1yr fwd EV/OpFCF




EBITDA estimates revision




Capped at +/-50x levels

Dividend yield and corresponding Gsec 10yr bond yield



* Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018

OpFCF estimates revision





Financials & valuation: Deutsche Telekom

Buy

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | | 12/20176 | 12/20108 | 12/20196 |
| Profit & loss summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Revenue | 73,095 | 75,469 | 75,999 | 77,600 |
| EBITDA | 22,544 | 23,741 | 22,356 | 23,644 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -13,380 | -13,581 | -12,198 | -12,177 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 9,164 | 10,159 | 10,159 | 11,467 |
| Net interest | -2,492 | -2,264 | -2,438 | -2,378 |
| PBT | 4,547 | 5,915 | 5,840 | 7,303 |
| HSBC PBT | 4,174 | 6,477 | 7,731 | 9,099 |
| Taxation | -1,443 | -2,099 | -1,108 | -1,386 |
| Net profit | 2,675 | 2,631 | 3,214 | 4,029 |
| HSBC net profit | 2,942 | 4,063 | 4,745 | 5,484 |
| Cash flow summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 15,446 | 17,062 | 16,887 | 17,629 |
| Capex | -13,640 | -11,043 | -11,810 | -12,043 |
| Cash flow from investment | -13,736 | -16,146 | -11,315 | -11,573 |
| Dividends | -1,509 | -2,769 | -3,097 | -3,406 |
| Change in net debt | 2,389 | 2,046 | -2,476 | -2,650 |
| FCF equity | 3,459 | 7,270 | 7,101 | 7,337 |
| Balance sheet summary (EUR | m) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 60,599 | 63,169 | 61,955 | 60,788 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 46,758 | 45,860 | 46,191 | 46,754 |
| Current assets | 26,638 | 18,469 | 18,994 | 19,414 |
| Cash & others | 13,460 | 5,401 | 5,926 | 6,346 |
| Total assets | 148,485 | 139,335 | 138,971 | 138,778 |
| Operating liabilities | 18,704 | 18,561 | 18,878 | 18,804 |
| Gross debt | 64,650 | 58,637 | 56,686 | 54,456 |
| Net debt | 49,959 | 52,005 | 49,529 | 46,879 |
| Shareholders' funds | 29,305 | 26,600 | 26,407 | 26,689 |
| Invested capital | 101,831 | 103,537 | 102,336 | 101,805 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | 5.6 | 3.2 | 0.7 | 2.1 |
| EBITDA | 22.6 | 5.3 | -5.8 | 5.8 |
| Operating profit | 30.4 | 10.9 | 0.0 | 12.9 |
| PBT | -4.8 | 30.1 | -1.3 | 25.0 |
| HSBC EPS | -18.1 | 35.8 | 16.8 | 15.6 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
| ROIC | 11.1 | 11.8 | 10.8 | 11.9 |
| ROE | 10.0 | 14.5 | 17.9 | 20.7 |
| ROA | 3.6 | 4.1 | 4.9 | 5.7 |
| EBITDA margin | 30.8 | 31.5 | 29.4 | 30.5 |
| Operating profit margin | 12.5 | 13.5 | 13.4 | 14.8 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 9.0 | 10.5 | 9.2 | 9.9 |
| Net debt/equity | 128.6 | 141.8 | 130.5 | 117.0 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.0 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 30.9 | 32.8 | 34.1 | 37.6 |
| Per share data (EUR) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 0.58 | 0.56 | 0.68 | 0.86 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 0.64 | 0.87 | 1.01 | 1.17 |
| DPS | 0.60 | 0.66 | 0.73 | 0.80 |
| Book value | 6.35 | 5.67 | 5.63 | 5.69 |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| DT Revenues | 73,095 | 75,469 | 75,999 | 77,600 |
| DT EBITDA company def | 21,420 | 22,413 | 23,556 | 24,784 |
| restructuring book charges | -2,013 | -1,300 | -1,200 | -1,140 |
| DT Net income adjusted | 4,572 | 5,116 | 5,717 | 6,407 |
| DT FCF definition | 4,939 | 5,909 | 6,329 | 6,874 |
| | | | | |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| EV/EBITDA | 6.6 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 6.7 |
| EV/IC | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| PE* | 22.9 | 16.8 | 14.4 | 12.5 |
| PB | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| FCF yield (%) | 3.5 | 6.8 | 6.5 | 6.6 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 4.1 | 4.5 | 5.0 | 5.5 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (EUR) | 14.57 | Free float | 67% |
|--------------------|----------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (EUR) | 18.50 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | DTEGn.DE | Country | Germany |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | DTE GR | Analyst | Stephen Howard |
| Market cap (USDm) | 86,287 | Contact | 44 20 7991 6820 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------|--|--|--|--|--|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.04 | | | | | |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.09 | | | | | |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes | | | | | |
| Social Indicators | | | | | | |
| Employee costs as % of sales 22% | | | | | | |
| Employee turnover (%) 4.01% | | | | | | |
| Diversity policy Yes | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |

Source: Company data, HSBC

| Governance Indicators | |
|----------------------------------|------|
| No. of board members | 28 |
| Average board experience (years) | 7.68 |
| Female board members (%) | 36% |
| Board members Independence (%) | 64% |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC

Note: Priced at close of 26 Jan 2018

30 January 2018



Adam Fox-Rumley*, CFA

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Q4 results: 18 January

Elisa (ELISA FH, EUR33.05, Reduce, TP EUR29.50, from EUR29.20)

Investment Thesis

Elisa is a well-run and strategically well directed business, but it is expensive in the context of European telecoms peers and suffers from deteriorating earnings visibility. While it generates an outstanding return on invested capital (17.0% in 2016), this is reflected in an EV/IC of 3.7x as well as substantial trading premiums to the sector on more traditional metrics such as EV/EBITDA (+55.5% premium, 2018e) and equity FCF yield (+38.8%). Consequently operational execution must, in our view, continually provide positive surprises. Through 2017, and provisionally looking into 2018, the levels of competitive intensity in Finnish mobile have meant this has been harder to do. Consequently since the Q3 results (18 October 2017), the stock has underperformed the sector (SXKP) by 5.1ppts.

Our thesis is that the market underestimates the level of competition in the Finnish mobile market. Telia, the second largest mobile operator, has underperformed the market's rate of growth for at least the last four years and has ambitions to finally catch up. As such it has recently led the market with some comparatively aggressive (though notably time-limited) promotions. Third operator DNA (DNA FH, EUR15.13, not rated) IPOed comparatively recently (30 November 2016), and consequently is under some pressure to maintain the strong performance delivered leading into, and indeed following, that event.

We see this increased competitive intensity in Elisa's churn disclosure. This metric has increased y-o-y for the last six quarters, culminating in a 5ppt q-o-q step-up in Q3 2017 (cf a five-year average q-o-q step-up of 1.5%). Management has made clear that it is not willing to cede any market share, and consequently the company's gross additions have consistently increased though 2017; in short, the cost of competing is rising. Within the mix, we have also highlighted continual pressure on consumer mobile post-paid net additions – a KPI which is not given, but can be triangulated – which makes interpreting net additions and ARPU trends increasingly difficult.

While Finland is a heavily mobile-centric telecoms market, fixed broadband is becoming incrementally important at the margins with video-based application driving increasing demand for higher (fibre-based) fixed-line broadband connections. Elisa has begun to talk about its network expansion plans slightly more, acknowledging that it needs to build some more infrastructure to satisfy this increasing customer demand, and yet detail (eg technology, locations) remains fairly limited. The country's fixed line infrastructure is something of a patchwork, and as such Elisa's network build is similarly localised. We note Telia has been acting as a source of broadband customers for the market over the last few quarters, but that it is DNA rather than Elisa that is capitalising here.

Finally we think the company could do more when it comes to disclosure of organic growth rates. Small-scale M&A is an integral part of the business given the company's strong balance sheet, and yet these additions meaningfully distort the presentation of underlying growth rates. For instance reported Q3 y-o-y revenue growth of 8.4% maps to an organic growth rate of 4.0% (Q2 was 13% reported, 4% organic). Organic growth of EBITDA for Q3 was not provided but we estimated reported growth of +6.6% was c.3% organic.



Valuation

We make no changes to our estimates. We adjust our TP to EUR29.5 (from EUR29.2) as we roll forward our valuation to the current date (refer to the <u>Valuation and risks section</u> for details of our assumptions and risks) Our revised TP implies 10.7% downside and we rate the stock Reduce, as growth offered does not justify the stock's premium valuation to the sector.

FCFF based DCF valuation

| in EURm, unless stated | | | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e | 2021e | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e |
|----------------------------------|---------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| EBITDA | | | 627 | 644 | 665 | 679 | 691 | 701 | 711 |
| Less: Cash capex | | | -221 | -224 | -227 | -229 | -232 | -234 | -237 |
| Less: Cash net interest | | | -17 | -17 | -17 | -17 | -17 | -17 | -17 |
| Less: Cash tax paid | | | -70 | -70 | -75 | -79 | -82 | -84 | -86 |
| Add: Working capital change | | | -15 | -9 | -10 | -9 | -9 | -8 | -8 |
| Equity FCF | | | 304 | 324 | 337 | 344 | 351 | 358 | 364 |
| Add: Net interest costs | | | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| Less: Tax shield on net interest | | | -3 | -3 | -3 | -3 | -3 | -3 | -3 |
| Free cash flow to firm | | | 317 | 337 | 350 | 357 | 365 | 371 | 377 |
| TV | | | | | | | | | 6,287 |
| PV explicit cash flows | | | 317 | 315 | 306 | 291 | 278 | 264 | 250 |
| PV of terminal cash flow | | | | | | | | | 4,175 |
| PV of total explicit cash flows | 1,704 | 29% | | | | | | | |
| PV of TV | 4,175 | 71% | | | | | | | |
| Total enterprise value | 5,879 | | | | | | | | |
| Net debt (FY18e) | (1,039) | | | | | | | | |
| add: Dividend payout | 255 | | | | | | | | |
| Associates | 6 | | | | | | | | |
| Contingent liabilities | -20 | | | | | | | | |
| Appraised value of equity | 5,081 | | | | | | | | |
| Shares (m) | 160 | | | | | | | | |
| Price per share | 29.5 | | | | | | | | |

30 January 2018



Relative Valuation


- Despite underperformance in past 6 months vs. SXKP, the stock is still trading at a significant premium to its peer group on EV/EBITDA
- Consensus earnings revisions have increased, primarily incorporating acquisitions in Estonia
- ▶ The company's stable dividend yield is substantially above the local government bond yield

Elisa - Valuation benchmark chart


Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Price return | 3.6% | 0.8% | -5.6% | -5.1% | 3.3% |
| Total return | 3.6% | 0.9% | -5.6% | -5.1% | 8.2% |
| Total return vs SXKP | 2.5% | 1.2% | -6.3% | -1.8% | 5.0% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | 2.1% | -0.1% | -6.2% | -2.4% | 2.0% |
| Total return vs OMXH | 4.7% | -1.8% | -6.4% | -7.4% | -4.8% |

Relative valuation




1yr fwd EV/EVITDA



Sales estimates revision




1yr fwd EV/OpFCF




EBITDA estimates revision




Capped at +/-50x levels





^{*} Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018

OpFCF estimates revision





Financials & valuation: Elisa Oyj

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Revenue | 1,636 | 1,773 | 1,808 | 1,829 |
| EBITDA | 563 | 606 | 627 | 644 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -224 | -233 | -239 | -235 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 339 | 373 | 387 | 409 |
| Net interest | -18 | -18 | -17 | -17 |
| PBT | 320 | 399 | 370 | 392 |
| HSBC PBT | 330 | 359 | 370 | 392 |
| Taxation | -63 | -70 | -70 | -75 |
| Net profit | 257 | 329 | 300 | 317 |
| HSBC net profit | 267 | 290 | 300 | 317 |
| Cash flow summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 487 | 515 | 525 | 547 |
| Capex | -209 | -241 | -221 | -224 |
| Cash flow from investment | -421 | -233 | -221 | -224 |
| Dividends | -223 | -239 | -255 | -270 |
| Change in net debt | 162 | -37 | -49 | -54 |
| FCF equity | 284 | 271 | 303 | 319 |
| Balance sheet summary (EURr | n) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 1,040 | 1,189 | 1,188 | 1,186 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 714 | 751 | 734 | 724 |
| Current assets | 639 | 631 | 695 | 758 |
| Cash & others | 45 | 203 | 252 | 306 |
| Total assets | 2,533 | 2,725 | 2,770 | 2,822 |
| Operating liabilities | 311 | 585 | 600 | 620 |
| Gross debt | 1,169 | 1,291 | 1,291 | 1,291 |
| Net debt | 1,124 | 1,087 | 1,039 | 985 |
| Shareholders' funds | 971 | 775 | 805 | 837 |
| Invested capital | 2,037 | 1,783 | 1,765 | 1,743 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | 4.2 | 8.4 | 1.9 | 1.2 |
| EBITDA | 5.7 | 7.6 | 3.4 | 2.7 |
| Operating profit | 8.7 | 9.8 | 3.9 | 5.7 |
| PBT | 10.1 | 24.7 | -7.2 | 5.9 |
| HSBC EPS | 5.8 | 8.6 | 3.2 | 5.9 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| ROIC | 16.7 | 17.7 | 19.8 | 21.0 |
| ROE | 28.2 | 33.3 | 37.9 | 38.7 |
| ROA | 11.6 | 13.2 | 11.5 | 12.0 |
| EBITDA margin | 34.4 | 34.2 | 34.7 | 35.2 |
| Operating profit margin | 20.7 | 21.0 | 21.4 | 22.4 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 32.0 | 34.4 | 37.6 | 38.7 |
| Net debt/equity | 115.7 | 140.2 | 128.9 | 117.5 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.5 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 43.3 | 47.4 | 50.5 | 55.5 |
| Per share data (EUR) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 1.61 | 2.06 | 1.88 | 1.99 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 1.68 | 1.82 | 1.88 | 1.99 |
| DPS | 1.50 | 1.60 | 1.69 | 1.79 |
| Book value | 6.08 | 4.86 | 5.05 | 5.24 |
| | | | | |

Reduce

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Finnish mobile revenues | 922 | 974 | 1,008 | 1,040 |
| Estonia mobile revenues | 99 | 104 | 108 | 112 |
| Elisa fixed business revenues | 615 | 656 | 638 | 622 |
| Elisa EBITDA adjusted | 564 | 609 | 627 | 644 |
| Elisa FCF after investments | 257 | 271 | 304 | 324 |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 4.1 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.6 |
| EV/EBITDA | 11.8 | 10.9 | 10.4 | 10.1 |
| EV/IC | 3.3 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
| PE* | 19.7 | 18.2 | 17.6 | 16.6 |
| PB | 5.4 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.3 |
| FCF yield (%) | 5.1 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 5.8 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 4.5 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 5.4 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (EUR) | 33.05 | Free float | 100% |
|--------------------|----------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (EUR) | 29.50 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | ELISA.HE | Country | Finland |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | ELISA FH | Analyst | Adam Fox-Rumley, CFA |
| Market cap (USDm) | 6,876 | Contact | +44 20 7991 6819 |


ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------|--|--|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.08 | | |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.16 | | |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes | | |
| Social Indicators | | | |
| Employee costs as % of sales 16.8 | | | |
| Employee turnover (%) | NA | | |
| Diversity policy | | | |
| | | | |

Source: Company data, HSBC

| Governance Indicators | |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| No. of board members | 7 |
| Average board experience (years) | 4.7 |
| Female board members (%) | 43 |
| Board members Independence (%) | 100 |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC

Note: Priced at close of 26 Jan 2018



Luigi Minerva*

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* Employed by a non-US affiliate of HSBC Securities (USA) Inc, and is not registered/ qualified pursuant to FINRA regulations

Q4 results: 31 January

KPN (KPN NA, EUR2.88, Buy, TP EUR3.70)

Investment Thesis

Strong shareholder return and FCF growth remains key to the investment case of KPN. We estimate FCF grows at a 2016-19e CAGR of 10%, and supports a growing dividend. The stock trades on 2018e EV/EBITDA of 7.1x (vs 6.7x for peer group) but benefits from very low taxes, which leads to a higher than average EBITDA to cash-flow conversion. The impact of consolidation in the Netherlands with the merger of T-Mobile and Tele2 (TEL2B SS, SEK98.64, Hold, Target Price SEK100) will depend, if approved by DG COMPETITION, on the nature of the chosen remedies.

Shareholder return: KPN's shares continue to give strong return to shareholders in the form of a regular dividend plus distribution of dividends received from Telefonica Deutschland. Our forecasts incorporate the regular dividend growing at a 2016-19 CAGR of 10.4%, translating into 2018e dividend yield of 4.8% (including TEF-D dividend). Additionally, the 9.5% stake in Telefonica Deutschland remains a financial asset, which, if sold, could further enhance shareholder return. We note the shareholder distribution is not at the expense of balance sheet strength. We estimate the leverage ratio declines to 2.2x by 2019e (compared to 2.8x in 2016).

FCF growth: We estimate FCF grows at a 2016-19e CAGR of 10% and supports a growing dividend. The key drivers of a growing 2016-19e FCF are EBITDA growth and normalization of capex. The company continues to make good progress in its simplification programme, leading to improvement in EBITDA. In terms of capex, we believe 2016 marked the end of an intensive capex cycle with 2017 the first year of a new normalized capex phase (we expect a Netherlands capex/sales ratio in the 18-19% range during 2018e-20e, above company guidance).

Consolidation in the Netherlands: We continue to be strong believers that in-market mobile consolidation is the most effective way to boost network investment, which in turn should drive unit prices lower and bandwidths higher. Indeed, it is our view that a market like the Netherlands would benefit from less fragmentation and therefore we would consider a 3-player market structure proportionate and sufficient. For our detailed treatment of the merit of consolidation see our thematic reports Supercollider (5 February 2014) and Supersonic (13 April 2015).

We expect a full Phase Two review by DG competition for the Tele2-DT deal (see our note *Dutch Telecoms: Tele2 and DT announce merger of Dutch operations*, 18 December 2017 for more details). If DG COMPETITION is consistent with the approach adopted in the case of the UK or Italy, structural remedies could go as far as demanding a new entrant in the Dutch market. If this were the case, T-Mobile and Tele2 would improve their scale, but the overall impact on the market would depend on the nature of the chosen remedies. As we discuss in the companion report *The FANGs are out*, also published today, if the EC demands a fourth MNO as a remedy, then – given the relatively small size of the market opportunity – it may be difficult for DT/Tele2 to find a willing candidate to take a set of merger remedies so as to maintain the Netherlands' four-operator status. Without a change in the EC's stance on merger control, it is therefore hard to see how a deal could be feasible.

For a further review of the approach of the current DG COMPETITION to in-market consolidation, see our reports:

- <u>Prohibition era?</u> (12 May 2016) for our review of the proposed O2UK 3UK merger, which was blocked by the EC, and
- ▶ <u>EC approves Italian deal but only alongside Iliad's entry</u> (2 September 2016) on the merger between Wind and 3Italia, which was approved by the EC with structural remedies, leading to a new entrant in the Italian market.



Valuation

We make no changes to our estimates. We derive our unchanged EUR3.7 target price from a DCF methodology (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the <u>Valuation and risks</u> <u>section</u>), implying 28.2% upside and we rate the stock Buy.

KPN: SOTP valuation

| (In EURm) | EV | Proportion of total operating EV | Method | Implied EV/sales 2017 | Implied EV/EBITDA 2017 | EBITDA margin |
|---------------------------|--------|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|
| Netherlands | 20,627 | 99% | DCF | 3.5 | 8.6 | 41.1% |
| iBasis | 116 | 1% | EV multiple | 0.2 | 5.0 | 3.1% |
| EV | 20,742 | 100% | | 3.2 | 8.5 | 37.2% |
| Adjusted Net debt (2017e) | -6,043 | | | | | |
| Non Core assets | 35 | | | | | |
| TEF-D stake | 1,133 | | | | | |
| Tax assets | 816 | | | | | |
| Hybrid issue | -1,012 | | | | | |
| Contingent liabilities | -320 | | | | | |
| Equity value | 15,352 | | | | | |
| Number of shares | 4,188 | | | | | |
| Target price/share | 3.7 | | | | | |
| Source: HSBC estimates | | | | | | |



Relative Valuation

- KPN is currently trading at the mid-level of the EV/EBITDA and EV/OpCF 1 yr forward multiple range (defined by 2 standard deviations)
- It is trading broadly in line of the peer group on EV/OpCF
- ▶ KPN continues to be at the higher end of the dividend yield range compared to the peer group

KPN - Valuation benchmark chart

Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|--------|-------|
| Price return | 1.9% | -0.8% | -3.3% | -6.0% | 6.2% |
| Total return | 1.9% | -0.8% | -3.4% | -5.0% | 10.7% |
| Total return vs SXKP | 0.8% | -0.5% | -4.1% | -1.7% | 7.6% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | 0.4% | -1.7% | -4.0% | -2.3% | 4.6% |
| Total return vs AEX INDEX | 2.3% | -4.2% | -7.2% | -13.6% | -9.7% |

Relative valuation









Sales estimates revision



1yr fwd EV/OpFCF




EBITDA estimates revision




Capped at +/-50x levels

Dividend yield and corresponding Gsec 10yr bond yield



* Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018

OpFCF estimates revision





Financials & valuation: KPN

Buy

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (EURm) | 12/20100 | 12/20176 | 12/20106 | 12/20136 |
| Revenue | 6,806 | 6,528 | 6,478 | 6,497 |
| EBITDA | 2,429 | 2,337 | 2,384 | 2,450 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -1,545 | -1,441 | -1,405 | -1,360 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 884 | 895 | 979 | 1,089 |
| Net interest | -417 | -262 | -348 | -329 |
| PBT | 466 | 632 | 628 | 757 |
| HSBC PBT | 625 | 722 | 700 | 824 |
| Taxation | -96 | -116 | 0 | 0 |
| Net profit | 793 | 513 | 618 | 747 |
| HSBC net profit | 458 | 535 | 511 | 603 |
| Cash flow summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 1,924 | 1,954 | 2,026 | 2,115 |
| Capex | -1,193 | -1,147 | -1,139 | -1,126 |
| Cash flow from investment | 336 | -569 | -1,139 | -1,126 |
| Dividends | -1,747 | -581 | -598 | -644 |
| Change in net debt | 240 | -717 | -289 | -345 |
| FCF equity | 602 | 720 | 887 | 990 |
| Balance sheet summary (EURn | n) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 3,250 | 3,220 | 3,066 | 2,920 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 5,969 | 5,801 | 5,687 | 5,599 |
| Current assets | 2,134 | 2,091 | 2,083 | 2,086 |
| Cash & others | 1,179 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| Total assets | 14,736 | 13,705 | 13,428 | 13,193 |
| Operating liabilities | 1,893 | 2,111 | 2,139 | 2,201 |
| Gross debt | 8,829 | 8,043 | 7,754 | 7,408 |
| Net debt | 6,760 | 6,043 | 5,754 | 5,408 |
| Shareholders' funds | 3,601 | 3,249 | 3,223 | 3,262 |
| Invested capital | 8,281 | 8,000 | 7,698 | 7,404 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | -2.9 | -4.1 | -0.8 | 0.3 |
| EBITDA | 4.5 | -3.8 | 2.0 | 2.8 |
| Operating profit | 24.9 | 1.3 | 9.3 | 11.3 |
| PBT | -23.0 | 35.7 | -0.6 | 20.5 |
| HSBC EPS | -8.5 | 18.8 | -4.5 | 18.0 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 |
| ROIC | 11.7 | 12.2 | 13.5 | 14.9 |
| ROE | 10.7 | 15.6 | 15.8 | 18.6 |
| ROA | 5.3 | 6.0 | 7.1 | 8.1 |
| EBITDA margin | 35.7 | 35.8 | 36.8 | 37.7 |
| Operating profit margin | 13.0 | 13.7 | 15.1 | 16.8 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 5.8 | 8.9 | 6.8 | 7.5 |
| Net debt/equity | 187.7 | 185.8 | 177.8 | 164.7 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.2 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 28.5 | 32.3 | 35.2 | 39.1 |
| Per share data (EUR) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 0.19 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.18 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.14 |
| DPS | 0.27 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.15 |
| Book value | 0.85 | 0.78 | 0.77 | 0.78 |
| | | | | |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|---------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Netherlands revenue | 6,025 | 5,867 | 5,843 | 5,883 |
| I-basis revenue | 867 | 750 | 721 | 699 |
| Revenue | 6,779 | 6,530 | 6,478 | 6,497 |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.6 |
| EV/EBITDA | 7.5 | 7.5 | 7.2 | 6.9 |
| EV/IC | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| PE* | 26.8 | 22.6 | 23.6 | 20.0 |
| PB | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
| FCF yield (%) | 5.2 | 6.3 | 7.7 | 8.6 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 9.5 | 4.4 | 4.8 | 5.3 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (EUR) | 2.88 | Free float | 100% |
|--------------------|--------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (EUR) | 3.70 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | KPN.AS | Country | Netherlands |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | KPN NA | Analyst | Luigi Minerva |
| Market cap (USDm) | 15,076 | Contact | 44 20 7991 6928 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------|--|--|--|--|--|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.04 | | | | | |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.12 | | | | | |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes | | | | | |
| Social Indicators | | | | | | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 16.8% | | | | | |
| Employee turnover (%) | 9.7% | | | | | |
| Diversity policy | Yes | | | | | |
| 0 | | | | | | |

Source: Company data, HSBC

| Governance Indicators | |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| No. of board members | 7 |
| Average board experience (years) | 3.1 |
| Female board members (%) | 29% |
| Board members Independence (%) | 86% |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC



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Q4 results: 21 February

Orange (ORA FP, EUR14.85, Buy, TP EUR17.00)

Investment Thesis

Orange starts 2018 with a positive outlook. The company is growing (revenue were up 1% in the first 9 months of 2017, EBITDA up 2.2%) and management successfully presented its medium-term strategic plan to investors just before Christmas. In addition, on 22 January 2018, the French Ministry of finances, Bruno Le Maire closed the debate around the re-election for a third mandate of Stéphane Richard at the head of Orange. The Minister, who represents the State and its 29% voting rights in Orange, said that "the CEO did a good job and that he should be re-elected" (Radio Classique, 22 January 2018). Pending the AGM vote, we see this re-election as a positive for Orange shares, with management now fully dedicated to delivering the strategic plan.

Orange's investor day (7 December 2017) succeeded, in our view, in convincing investors that the high capex intensity at Orange (17% capex/sales in 2017e, 17.9% in 2018e) is already paying off and will continue to do so (read *Music to our ears*, 8 December 2017). The company explained in detail how upgraded networks (fibre, 4G) and systems (digitisation, convergence) are generating higher revenue per customer and lower churn. As an example, Orange calculates a EUR6.1 ARPU uplift for FTTH customers in France (compared to ADSL) and a growing market share in fixed broadband driven by fibre. On operational costs, Orange also announced a EUR1bn additional gross saving initiative (after a EUR2.6bn opex reduction target in 2015-18). Management concluded, and our forecasts reflect the same, that the company is in a position to deliver substantial EBITDA growth from 2017 ("around 2% in 2017e, acceleration in 2018 and continued growth in 2019 and 2020"). This, combined with a capex budget reaching a peak in 2018, should lead to growing operating cash flow in 2017-2020, according to Orange guidance.

Our analysis concludes that Orange is well positioned to defend its position in France in 2018 (44% of FY18e revenue). Note we expect the French retail market to remain very competitive: the presence of two subscale players in each of the mobile (Iliad, ILD FP, EUR212.7, Buy) and fixed broadband (Bouygues Telecom, EN FP, EUR45.48, Hold) subsectors maintains strong pressure on prices, while SFR (not rated) needs to stop the customer base erosion, in fixed broadband in particular. But Orange's lead on fibre should protect the incumbent (network differentiation): the company has so far deployed 70% (85% outside the low dense area) of the 9.5m FTTH lines at the end of Q3 17 (of a total of c27m homes) and is therefore is a strong position to maintain its lead. We also expect Iliad to launch a new fixed broadband box, which in the past has been a good recruitment tool for the alternative operator. But this could also be the occasion for Iliad to introduce a richer and more expensive offering that could help Orange in better monetising its network (Orange targets EUR8 ARPU uplift on FTTH in the longer term).

French regulation will also be a key trigger for Orange in 2018. The year started favourably after French operators struck a deal with telecom regulator ARCEP on 12 January: operators will spend EUR3-4bn (albeit not all incremental) collectively in the next five years to improve 4G coverage, in the lower density area in particular, but in exchange operators will not face auctions for the renewal of their 2G and 3G licences (which have to be renewed from 2021). More negatively, ARCEP still intends to increase the level of competition in the B2B market by helping the development of wholesalers, which could limit Orange's capacity to retail its newly built fibre, in particular to SMEs; however we do not expect a rapid change in this market (Orange B2B revenue in France represented 14% of FY17e Group revenue). 2018 should also be a test year to measure the traction of Orange Bank, launched in France in Q4 2017: Orange intends to leverage its large retail presence in telecoms and to generate commissions and fees, but could face losses of around EUR100m in 2018 as a start-up year on our estimates.



Forecast changes

We have made minor changes to our 2017-19 forecasts. For 2017, we increase our EBITDA forecasts to align with company guidance of c2% EBITDA growth. We also increase our capex forecasts for 2018, in line with the company's guidance for peak capex this year. Our higher reported EBITDA forecasts are essentially driven by lower restructuring charges expectations. Changes to estimates are described in the table below.

Orange: Changes to estimates

| | New | | Old | | | Changes | | | |
|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|-------|-------|-------|
| EURm | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e |
| Sales | 41,032 | 41,377 | 41,971 | 41,054 | 41,493 | 42,028 | -0.1% | -0.3% | -0.1% |
| EBITDA restated | 12,785 | 13,085 | 13,477 | 12,709 | 13,058 | 13,593 | 0.6% | 0.2% | -0.9% |
| EBITDA reported | 12,435 | 12,736 | 13,129 | 12,180 | 12,227 | 12,870 | 2.1% | 4.2% | 2.0% |
| Net profit HSBC | 2,985 | 3,080 | 3,271 | 2,913 | 3,070 | 3,344 | 2.5% | 0.3% | -2.2% |
| Capex | -7,240 | -7,404 | -7,213 | -7,193 | -7,265 | -7,193 | 0.6% | 1.9% | 0.3% |
| Source: HSBC estimates | | | | | | | | | |

We are mostly in line with the consensus estimates collected by Orange (January 2018):

Forecasts vs consensus

| | HSBCe | | Consensus | | | Changes | | | |
|-----------------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|---------|-------|-------|-------|
| EURm | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e |
| Sales | 41,032 | 41,377 | 41,971 | 41,035 | 41,348 | 41,841 | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.3% |
| EBITDA restated | 12,785 | 13,085 | 13,477 | 12,785 | 13,099 | 13,417 | 0.0% | -0.1% | 0.4% |
| EBITDA reported | 12,435 | 12,736 | 13,129 | 12,456 | 12,882 | 13,246 | -0.2% | -1.1% | -0.9% |
| Net profit | 2,287 | 2,708 | 2,896 | 2,315 | 2,789 | 3,053 | -1.2% | -2.9% | -5.2% |
| Capex | -7,240 | -7,404 | -7,213 | -7,206 | -7,402 | -7,242 | 0.5% | 0.0% | -0.4% |

Source: HSBC estimates, Company provided consensus

Valuation

We derive our unchanged EUR17 target price for Orange shares from a DCF-based sum-of-parts (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the <u>Valuation and risks section</u>). Our TP implies 14.5% upside and we rate the stock Buy as we expect the company to keep capitalising on its lead in fibre in France.

SOTP Valuation

| EURm | EV | % EV | Implied | Method |
|---------------------------------|---------|--------|---------------|---|
| | | | EV/EBITDA 18e | |
| Orange France | 42,186 | 57.6% | 6.1 | DCF (LT EBITDA margin 40%, WACC 8.1%) |
| Orange Polska (Poland) | 3,841 | 5.2% | 5.4 | HSBC Target price (PLN5.9)(OPL PW, PLN6.1, Hold, covered by Hervé Drouet) |
| Spain | 10,370 | 14.2% | 6.3 | DCF (LT EBITDA margin 29%,WACC 8.4%) |
| Belgium & Luxembourg | 1,936 | 2.6% | 6.4 | HSBC Target price for Orange Belgium (EUR26) (OBEL BB, EUR17.02, Buy) |
| Other European countries | 4,069 | 5.6% | 6.7 | DCF (LT EBITDA margin 36%,WACC 8.1%) |
| Africa & Middle East | 8,261 | 11.3% | 5.2 | DCF (LT EBITDA margin 35%,WACC 10%) |
| Orange Business Services (B2B) | 8,048 | 11.0% | 6.4 | DCF (LT EBITDA margin 20%, WACC 8.7%) |
| ICSS (wholesale) | -5,657 | -7.7% | | DCF (WACC 8.6%) |
| Orange Bank | 170 | 0.2% | | Acquisition cost of Groupama Banque |
| Orange Group EV | 73,225 | 100.0% | | |
| Associates | 1,292 | | | BT Group stake (2.66%), Orange Tunisia, Korek (Iraq), Dailymotion, etc. |
| Minorities | -4,799 | | | Sonatel, Orange Polska, Orange Belgium Jordan Telecom, etc. |
| Net debt (Dec 18) | -24,110 | | | |
| Minority net debt | 1,121 | | | |
| Tax asset NPV & others | 1,146 | | | Discount rate 9.5%, includes 10% of unrecognised tax assets |
| provision for litigations | -506 | | | As in the balance sheet adjusted for the Competition authority's fine in France (B2B) |
| Equity value | 47,369 | | | |
| outstanding shares | 2,686 | | | Assumes 50% probability of TDIRA conversion (26m extra shares |
| Unpaid portion of the dividend | 0.65 | | | in net debt (2017 Final of EURc40 to be paid in 2018) |
| Equity value Dec 18 | 18.3 | | | |
| Target price (equity value NPV) | 17.0 | | | |
| Source: HSBC estimates | | | | |

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Relative Valuation


- Orange shares trade close to medium term average on both EV/EBITDA and EV/OFCF metrics
- Orange trades at a discount to peers on all metrics, reflecting the risk of a French government stake placement (BFMBusiness, 6 November 2017) and the stiff and durable competition in the French telecom market
- Dividend yield at 4.4% (2018e), is in line with the peer average. On 7 December 2017 management announced a new floor for the dividend at EUR0.65 for 2017-2020 earlier guidance was EUR0.65 for 2017 after EUR0.60 in 2016)

Orange - Valuation benchmark chart


Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|------|-------|------|-------|--------|
| Price return | 2.9% | 1.5% | 8.1% | 3.6% | 2.0% |
| Total return | 2.7% | 1.4% | 9.9% | 5.4% | 6.5% |
| Total return vs SXKP | 1.6% | 1.7% | 9.3% | 8.7% | 3.4% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | 1.2% | 0.5% | 9.3% | 8.0% | 0.4% |
| Total return vs CAC 40 | 2.7% | -1.7% | 8.3% | -1.6% | -10.7% |


Relative valuation




1yr fwd EV/EVITDA



Sales estimates revision



1yr fwd EV/OpFCF



EBITDA estimates revision




Capped at +/-50x levels

Dividend yield and corresponding Gsec 10yr bond yield



* Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018





Buy

Financials & valuation: Orange

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (EURm |) | | | |
| Revenue | 40,918 | 41,032 | 41,377 | 41,971 |
| EBITDA | 11,719 | 12,435 | 12,736 | 13,129 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -7,596 | -6,647 | -6,734 | -6,826 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 4,123 | 5,788 | 6,002 | 6,303 |
| Net interest | -2,097 | -1,748 | -1,442 | -1,388 |
| PBT | 1,980 | 4,043 | 4,560 | 4,915 |
| HSBC PBT | 3,507 | 4,882 | 5,052 | 5,407 |
| Taxation | -970 | -1,473 | -1,550 | -1,671 |
| Net profit | 2,935 | 2,287 | 2,708 | 2,896 |
| HSBC net profit | 4,275 | 2,985 | 3,080 | 3,271 |
| Cash flow summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 8,491 | 10,011 | 9,685 | 10,007 |
| Capex | -6,971 | -7,240 | -7,404 | -7,213 |
| Cash flow from investment | -4,879 | -7,416 | -7,637 | -7,213 |
| Dividends | -1,596 | -2,261 | -1,729 | -1,726 |
| Change in net debt | -2,108 | -16 | -319 | -1,068 |
| FCF equity | 1,681 | 1,975 | 2,323 | 2,841 |
| Balance sheet summary (EUR | m) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 41,758 | 41,779 | 42,012 | 42,012 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 25,912 | 26,778 | 27,448 | 27,836 |
| Current assets | 18,824 | 17,101 | 16,118 | 17,177 |
| Cash & others | 6,355 | 4,980 | 3,977 | 5,000 |
| Total assets | 94,668 | 92,634 | 92,362 | 93,611 |
| Operating liabilities | 23,496 | 22,272 | 22,277 | 22,297 |
| Gross debt | 30,799 | 29,408 | 28,086 | 28,042 |
| Net debt | 24,444 | 24,428 | 24,110 | 23,042 |
| Shareholders' funds | 30,688 | 31,269 | 32,249 | 33,418 |
| Invested capital | 56,643 | 58,406 | 59,325 | 59,728 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | 1.7 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 1.4 |
| EBITDA | 3.9 | 6.1 | 2.4 | 3.1 |
| Operating profit | -13.7 | 40.4 | 3.7 | 5.0 |
| PBT | -37.3 | 104.2 | 12.8 | 7.8 |
| HSBC EPS | 43.1 | -30.2 | 3.2 | 6.2 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| ROIC | 5.6 | 6.7 | 6.8 | 7.1 |
| ROE | 13.9 | 9.6 | 9.7 | 10.0 |
| ROA | 2.1 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 4.4 |
| EBITDA margin | 28.6 | 30.3 | 30.8 | 31.3 |
| Operating profit margin | 10.1 | 14.1 | 14.5 | 15.0 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 5.6 | 7.1 | 8.8 | 9.5 |
| Net debt/equity | 73.7 | 72.3 | 69.2 | 63.8 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 34.7 | 41.0 | 40.2 | 43.4 |
| Per share data (EUR) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 1.11 | 0.86 | 1.02 | 1.09 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 1.61 | 1.12 | 1.16 | 1.23 |
| DPS | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.65 | 0.65 |
| Book value | 11.55 | 11.77 | 12.14 | 12.58 |
| | | | | |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Orange revenue | 40,918 | 41,032 | 41,377 | 41,971 |
| Orange EBITDA | 12,682 | 12,785 | 13,085 | 13,477 |
| Orange EBIT | 4,123 | 5,789 | 6,002 | 6,303 |
| Orange Net Income | 2,935 | 2,288 | 2,708 | 2,896 |
| Orange FCF | 5,711 | 5,545 | 5,680 | 6,264 |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| EV/EBITDA | 5.7 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.0 |
| EV/IC | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| PE* | 9.2 | 13.2 | 12.8 | 12.1 |
| PB | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| FCF yield (%) | 4.0 | 4.6 | 5.4 | 6.6 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 4.0 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (EUR) | 14.85 | Free float | 73% |
|--------------------|---------|------------|-----------------------|
| Target price (EUR) | 17.00 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | ORAN.PA | Country | France |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | ORA FP | Analyst | Nicolas Cote-Colisson |
| Market cap (USDm) | 49,098 | Contact | 44 20 7991 6826 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | |
|------------------------------|------|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.03 |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.13 |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes |
| Social Indicators | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 20% |
| Employee turnover (%) | 4% |
| Diversity policy | Yes |
| | |

Source: Company data, HSBC

| Governance Indicators | |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| No. of board members | 15 |
| Average board experience (years) | 4.6 |
| Female board members (%) | 47% |
| Board members Independence (%) | 47% |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC



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Q4 results: 2 March

Proximus (PROX BB, EUR28.1, Hold, TP EUR32.00)

Investment Thesis

Proximus should benefit in theory from an attractive market structure compared with the majority of its European peers, with three operators competing regionally (Proximus and Orange Belgium at the national level, cable operator Telenet (TNET BB, EUR61.55 Hold) in Flanders for fixed services and nationally in mobile, cable operator Voo (not rated) in Wallonia). But as discussed below, the changes in regulation have allowed Orange Belgium to enter the fixed broadband market, whose low market share in fixed broadband (3% Dec 17e) means price pressure will remain in the fixed broadband and the mobile market in the coming quarters (as Orange Belgium sells quad-play offers).

Every Belgian telcos confirmed at the time of their Q3 17 results that the level of competition was stronger than usual. Proximus's fixed broadband internet market share was slightly down at 46.5% in Q3 17 versus 46.6% in Q2 (but higher than the 46.4% reached in Q3 16). Our view is that higher competition was triggered by Orange Belgium taking share from cable operators with its quad-play LOVE offers. Cable operators in turn defended their positions in both regions of the country with promotions, hitting Proximus at the same time. To some extent the incumbent can defend itself with its dual-brand strategy: Scarlett for price-conscious clients and the Proximus brand for higher-end customers. Quad-play offers (Tuttimus, a combination of fixed broadband, TV and mobile) are also proving an efficient way for Proximus to defend its market share, despite minimal discount being attached to this 4-play package compared to its sum-of-the-parts value. Proximus has reiterated its strategy to protect value rather than chasing volumes in such markets (and also put forward a few price increases at the beginning of the year).

The main question for Proximus's investment case in 2018 relates to the regulatory environment in Belgium, as this will define the level of competition intensity that should be expected in the coming years. Belgium, with its track record of benign regulation, is now looking to establish a more open fixed market. To foster competition, Belgian telecoms and media regulators are currently working on new cable wholesale tariffs, which will define the price at which Orange Belgium can access cable networks and become a significant fixed broadband player. Under the current regulatory framework, we estimate Orange Belgium pays cEUR24 per month to cable operators to resell the same on the retail market. We calculate it makes no profit (content costs, extra services such as speed), which brings into question its capacity to remain a competitor in the long term. Hence the regulator is conducting a new market analysis, with a decision on tariffs by 30 April 2018. This implicit deadline was set on 25 October, after a Belgian appeals court cancelled the initial decision of 2013 (and the follow-up in 2016) to regulate cable, setting the current wholesale tariffs. As detailed in our report *Still optimistic for regulatory change*, 24 October 2017, we expect a EUR5 cut to wholesale access fees via the introduction of a cost-oriented model, as opposed to the retail-minus model currently in place.

Pending this regulatory change, Proximus continues to deliver a sound network strategy. An earlier adopter of VDSL, the technology now covers 94% of Belgian homes (83% with vectoring), delivering 100Mbps to more than half the population. But with cable operators also upgrading their networks, a year ago (December 2016), Proximus announced a EUR3bn fibre plan over a decade (we expect total Group capex budget of around EUR1bn in 2018). The target is to cover more than 85% of businesses and more than 50% of homes with FTTH by 2026, with a priority for businesses (65% after five years vs 18% for households). This programme should secure Proximus's position in the fixed broadband market. On the cost side, has taken continuous steps to reduce headcount: the early retirement plan set in 2016 identified almost 1.9k employees (13.1k Group employees in Q3 17) leaving by 2019, excluding natural attrition. This contributes to the EUR150m cost reduction plan.



Forecast changes

We have adjusted the charge for the early leave plan, impacting reported EBITDA. Our 2017 capex estimate also rises after adding the cost of football rights (EUR66m). The adjusted net profit difference in 2018 is driven by a higher tax rate than our initial assumptions. These forecasts assume that Proximus is in line to achieve most of its cost saving plan by 2019. The company targets a reduction of domestic opex of EUR150m in 2015-19: we forecast EUR142m.

Changes to estimates

| | | New | | Old | | | Change | | |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|
| (EURm) | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e |
| Revenue | 5,775 | 5,786 | 5,805 | 5,809 | 5,868 | 5,928 | -0.6% | -1.4% | -2.1% |
| EBITDA adjusted | 1,817 | 1,848 | 1,903 | 1,842 | 1,882 | 1,923 | -1.4% | -1.8% | -1.1% |
| EBITDA reported | 1,771 | 1,808 | 1,873 | 1,842 | 1,882 | 1,923 | -3.9% | -3.9% | -2.6% |
| HSBC Net profit | 510 | 501 | 534 | 528 | 542 | 562 | -3.4% | -7.6% | -4.9% |
| Capex | -1,063 | -1,001 | -1,004 | -999 | -1,009 | -1,020 | 6.4% | -0.8% | -1.5% |

Source: HSBC estimates

Operational forecasts vs consensus

| | HSB | C estimate | s | Compa | any consen | sus | | Variance | |
|------------------------|-------|------------|--------|--------|------------|--------|-------|----------|-------|
| (EURm) | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e |
| Revenue | 5,775 | 5,786 | 5,805 | 5,786 | 5,792 | 5,807 | -0.2% | -0.1% | 0.0% |
| EBITDA adjusted | 1,817 | 1,848 | 1,903 | 1,817 | 1,843 | 1,877 | 0.0% | 0.3% | 1.4% |
| EBITDA reported | 1,771 | 1,808 | 1,873 | 1,764 | 1,804 | 1,856 | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.9% |
| Capex (excl. Football) | -997 | -1,001 | -1,004 | -1,009 | -1,004 | -1,008 | -0.1% | -0.3% | -0.4% |

Source: HSBC estimates

Valuation

We value Proximus with a DCF approach. We roll forward our forecasts by 12 months, which combined with our new forecasts returns an unchanged target price of EUR32 (details on assumptions and risks in the *Valuation and risks section*. Despite 13.9% upside implied by our TP, we retain a Hold rating given the uncertainties surrounding the regulatory environment and the consequent market structure from 2018 onward.

Proximus DCF Valuation

| | | 2015a | 2016a | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e | 2021e | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e |
|---------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Revenues | | 6,012 | 5,871 | 5,775 | 5,786 | 5,805 | 5,837 | 5,876 | 5,919 | 5,966 | 6,018 | 6,074 |
| Pre Tax NOPLAT | | 777 | 816 | 827 | 895 | 944 | 966 | 991 | 1,012 | 1,040 | 1,075 | 1,111 |
| Tax | | -194 | -204 | -207 | -265 | -236 | -242 | -248 | -253 | -260 | -269 | -278 |
| NOPLAT | | 583 | 612 | 620 | 630 | 708 | 725 | 743 | 759 | 781 | 806 | 833 |
| Depreciation | | 869 | 917 | 940 | 954 | 958 | 964 | 966 | 971 | 966 | 959 | 951 |
| Capex | | -926 | -949 | -1,063 | -1,001 | -1,004 | -992 | -999 | -971 | -953 | -944 | -940 |
| Free cash flow | | 526 | 580 | 497 | 583 | 662 | 697 | 711 | 759 | 794 | 821 | 844 |
| Terminal Value | | | | | | **- | ••• | | | | | |
| Terminal growth rate | 1.5% | | | | | | | | | | | |
| WACC | 7.3% | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Discount Factors | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PV of Cash Flow | 3,951 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PV of continuing Value | 8,870 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Enterprise Value | 12,821 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net Debt end-2018 | 1,940 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Minority Interests | -147 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tax assets, Pension liabilities | -473 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Market Value | 10,554 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| No. of Shares | 321 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Price Per share (end-2018) | 32.8 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Price per share NPV | 30.5 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Unpaid portion of dividend | 1.5 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Target price | 32.0 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Source: HSBC estimates | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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Relative Valuation

- Proximus looks cheap on both EV/EBITDA and EV/OFCF metrics, possibly due to the uncertainty regarding the regulatory decision on cable wholesale access prices, which could impact the overall market
- Shares could also reflect the risk of the Belgian State selling down some of its 53.5% stake (Le Soir, 7 October 2017)
- Dividend yield is higher than peers at 5.4%, reflecting the company's policy to return most of its annual free cash flow on the back of its low leverage (2018e Net debt/EBITDA of 1.1x)

Proximus - Valuation benchmark chart


Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| Price return | 2.6% | 1.3% | -2.2% | -11.6% | 4.3% |
| Total return | 2.6% | 1.3% | -1.0% | -10.6% | 8.1% |
| Total return vs SXKP | 1.5% | 1.6% | -1.7% | -7.3% | 5.0% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | 1.1% | 0.4% | -1.7% | -7.9% | 2.0% |
| Total return vs BEL 20 | 2.5% | -3.2% | -3.6% | -17.5% | -10.8% |


Relative valuation




1yr fwd EV/EVITDA




Sales estimates revision



1yr fwd EV/OpFCF



EBITDA estimates revision



Capped at +/-50x levels

Dividend yield and corresponding Gsec 10yr bond yield



^{*} Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018





Financials & valuation: Proximus

Hold

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Revenue | 5,871 | 5,775 | 5,786 | 5,805 |
| EBITDA | 1,733 | 1,771 | 1,808 | 1,873 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -917 | -940 | -954 | -958 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 816 | 831 | 855 | 914 |
| Net interest | -101 | -72 | -98 | -98 |
| PBT | 715 | 759 | 757 | 817 |
| HSBC PBT | 778 | 805 | 797 | 847 |
| Taxation | -167 | -226 | -231 | -246 |
| Net profit | 523 | 511 | 501 | 547 |
| HSBC net profit | 489 | 510 | 501 | 534 |
| Cash flow summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 1,495 | 1,529 | 1,474 | 1,518 |
| Capex | -962 | -1,073 | -1,001 | -1,004 |
| Cash flow from investment | -960 | -1,279 | -1,001 | -1,004 |
| Dividends | -485 | -327 | -484 | -483 |
| Change in net debt | -58 | 68 | 12 | -31 |
| FCF equity | 502 | 399 | 479 | 525 |
| Balance sheet summary (EURm |) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 3,378 | 3,623 | 3,623 | 3,623 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 2,910 | 3,010 | 3,057 | 3,103 |
| Current assets | 1,745 | 1,903 | 1,904 | 1,907 |
| Cash & others | 309 | 500 | 500 | 500 |
| Total assets | 8,117 | 8,626 | 8,674 | 8,722 |
| Operating liabilities | 2,032 | 2,396 | 2,413 | 2,437 |
| Gross debt | 2,170 | 2,429 | 2,440 | 2,410 |
| Net debt | 1,861 | 1,929 | 1,940 | 1,910 |
| Shareholders' funds | 2,819 | 2,687 | 2,703 | 2,752 |
| Invested capital | 5,692 | 5,640 | 5,671 | 5,695 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | -2.3 | -1.6 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| EBITDA | 5.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 3.6 |
| Operating profit | 5.0 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 7.0 |
| PBT | 9.1 | 6.1 | -0.3 | 7.9 |
| HSBC EPS | 3.5 | 4.3 | -1.6 | 6.6 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| ROIC | 9.5 | 9.7 | 10.0 | 10.6 |
| ROE | 17.4 | 18.5 | 18.6 | 19.6 |
| ROA | 7.5 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 7.3 |
| EBITDA margin | 29.5 | 30.7 | 31.3 | 32.3 |
| Operating profit margin | 13.9 | 14.4 | 14.8 | 15.8 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 17.1 | 24.6 | 18.5 | 19.2 |
| Net debt/equity | 62.4 | 68.8 | 68.8 | 66.6 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 80.3 | 79.3 | 75.9 | 79.5 |
| Per share data (EUR) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 1.62 | 1.59 | 1.56 | 1.70 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 1.52 | 1.58 | 1.56 | 1.66 |
| DPS | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.54 |
| Book value | 8.75 | 8.34 | 8.40 | 8.55 |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Proximus Revenues | 5,871 | 5,775 | 5,786 | 5,805 |
| Proximus EBITDA adjusted | 1,796 | 1,817 | 1,848 | 1,903 |
| Proximus EBIT adjusted | 879 | 877 | 895 | 944 |
| Proximus Net income adjusted | 586 | 557 | 541 | 577 |
| Proximus FCF definition | 559 | 308 | 499 | 540 |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| EV/EBITDA | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.0 |
| EV/IC | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| PE* | 18.5 | 17.8 | 18.0 | 16.9 |
| PB | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| FCF yield (%) | 5.4 | 4.2 | 5.1 | 5.6 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.5 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (EUR) | 28.10 | Free float | 42% |
|--------------------|---------|------------|-----------------------|
| Target price (EUR) | 32.00 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | PROX.BR | Country | Belgium |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | PROX BB | Analyst | Nicolas Cote-Colisson |
| Market cap (USDm) | 11,810 | Contact | 44 20 7991 6826 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | | | | |
|------------------------------|------|--|--|--|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.01 | | | |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.09 | | | |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes | | | |
| Social Indicators | | | | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 20% | | | |
| Employee turnover (%) | 2% | | | |
| Diversity policy | Yes | | | |
| Source: Company data, HSBC | | | | |

| Governance Indicators | |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| No. of board members | 14 |
| Average board experience (years) | 4.2 |
| Female board members (%) | 43% |
| Board members Independence (%) | 43% |
| | |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC



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* Employed by a non-US affiliate of HSBC Securities (USA) Inc, and is not registered/ qualified pursuant to FINRA regulations

Q4 results: 1 February

Swisscom (SCMN VX, CHF518.80, Hold, TP CHF515.0)

Investment Thesis

The Swiss telecoms market is one of the most ideally structured in Europe, in our view. In mobile there are three players: Swisscom (the market leader), Sunrise (SRCG SW, CHF89.70, Buy, the challenger) and Salt (not listed) the potential market disrupter). In fixed-line: Swisscom, cable operators (essentially UPC, owned by Liberty Global, LBTYA US, USD38.19, Buy) and Sunrise. A regulatory framework designed to incentivize infrastructure investments has shaped the nature of competition over time, with a marked bias towards quality. All this with consumers' propensity to pay for a high quality service and macro conditions creating a broadly stable and defensive backdrop.

We summarize the investment case for Swisscom in the following five points:

- Swisscom has high market shares across every segment and this makes it a natural target for competition. However, we think Swisscom has so far been defending its market position well.
- We expect the entry of Salt in fixed-line (which we expect for H1 2018) to be more negative for Swisscom compared to Sunrise's presence. Further, a potential fixed-mobile consolidation (see our latest report <u>Swiss Telecoms Hypothesis Now: Fixed-mobile consolidation scenario</u>, 11 January 2018), especially in the case of a Sunrise-UPC merger, could create a strong second converged operator in Switzerland, thus relatively weakening Swisscom. However, in this scenario, we expect Salt to be the real loser, as a small third operator in a concentrated market. A risk here is that remedies imposed by the competition authority could involve more intrusive regulation of fixed-line access to allow Salt to compete better as a converged fixed-mobile player.
- 3. Capex is likely to continue at a high run-rate (~19% capex/sales). We believe this is the best way to preserve the high quality market position while effectively using sub-brands in the lowend market segments. After having championed VDSL (alongside Proximus), Swisscom is now well ahead of its peer group on FTTS/G.fast which, given the characteristics of the Swiss network, is a much more efficient solution than FTTH, in our view.
- 4. In Italy, we believe Fastweb has missed a significant opportunity to gain more scale by not purchasing the remedies assets from the Wind-Tre merger (won by Iliad). Moreover, the FTTH deployment by Open Fiber (see <u>Telecom Italia: Iliad and OF, key challenges ahead</u>, 22 May 2017), if successful, will reduce the scarcity value of Fastweb's infrastructure.
- 5. The stock is up 4.0% in the last three months (vs the index at 0.3% over the same period) and continues to look fairly valued. Even in the absence of growth, it still offers what we expect to remain a stable dividend with an attractive yield (c4% in 2018e). It remains a good option for those investors seeking income with a more defensive exposure (low leverage and no M&A ambitions).



Valuation

We make no changes to our estimates. We derive our unchanged CHF515 target price from a DCF-based sum-of-parts (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the *Valuation and risks section*), implying 0.7% downside and we rate the stock Hold against a backdrop of increasing competition balanced by an attractive dividend yield.

Swisscom valuation summary

| | (In CHFm) |
|--|-----------|
| Switzerland | 31,902 |
| Italy | 4,624 |
| Enterprise value | 36,526 |
| Net debt (end-2018e) | 7,968 |
| Non-core assets | 136 |
| Minorities | 105 |
| Contingent liabilities | 1,774 |
| Equity value | 26,815 |
| Shares | 51.8 |
| Equity value/share (CHF, as of Dec-18) | 518 |
| Equity value/share (CHF, as of Jan-18) | 493 |
| Dividend to be paid in 2018e (CHF) | 22 |
| Target value/share (CHF, as of Jan-18) | 515 |
| Source: HSBC estimates | |



Relative Valuation


- Swisscom trades at a high EV/EBITDA vs the European peer incumbents. A large part of the premium is due to the lower effective tax rate (21% in Switzerland compared to 25-35% in the rest of the Europe) and to lower interest rates in Switzerland, which result in higher conversion to FCF
- Consensus estimates a flat revenue growth for Swisscom for the period 2017-19, while the EBITDA estimates have been revised upwards for the same period in last few months
- ▶ Historically, Swisscom seems to trade within the 4-5% dividend yield range. It is currently trading close to the lower end of the range, with an implied dividend yield of 4.2%.

Swisscom - Valuation benchmark chart


Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| Price return | -0.2% | -0.1% | 4.0% | 9.9% | 18.7% |
| Total return | -0.2% | -0.1% | 4.0% | 9.8% | 24.6% |
| Total return vs SXKP | -1.4% | 0.2% | 3.3% | 13.1% | 21.4% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | -1.7% | -1.1% | 3.4% | 12.5% | 18.4% |
| Total return vs SMI | -0.3% | -1.4% | 0.6% | 3.9% | 7.7% |


Relative valuation




1yr fwd EV/EVITDA



Sales estimates revision



1yr fwd EV/OpFCF




EBITDA estimates revision



Capped at +/-50x levels

Dividend yield and corresponding Gsec 10yr bond yield



^{*} Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018



Net profit

Capex

Dividends

FCF equity

HSBC net profit

Cash flow summary (CHFm) Cash flow from operations

Cash flow from investment

Balance sheet summary (CHFm)

Change in net debt

Intangible fixed assets

Tangible fixed assets

Current assets

Cash & others

Operating liabilities

Shareholders' funds

Invested capital

Total assets

Gross debt

Net debt



Hold

Financials & valuation: Swisscom

1,604

1,555

3,714

-2.416

-2,448

-1,140

-196

1,343

6,912

10,177

3,535

21,454

2,853

8,496

7,846

6,514

17,121

650

Financial statements Key forecast drivers

1,593

1,539

3,699

-2.431

-2.275

-1,140

1,299

6,897

10,744

3,492

21,894

2,888

8,368

7,868

7,481

17,745

500

22

1,488

1,488

3,495

-2.455

-2,455

-1,140

100

1,224

6,777

11,142

3,494

22,163

2,878

8,468

7,968

7,830

18,034

500

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e | Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (CHFm) | | | | | Swisscom Revenues | 11,643 | 11,627 | 11,661 | 11,633 |
| Revenue | 11.643 | 11.627 | 11.661 | 11,633 | Swisscom EBITDA adjusted | 4,273 | 4,242 | 4,229 | 4,244 |
| EBITDA | 4,293 | 4.344 | 4,229 | 4,244 | Swisscom EBIT adjusted | 2,128 | 2,119 | 2,052 | 2,039 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -2.145 | -2.123 | -2.177 | -2,206 | Swisscom Net income adjusted | 1,584 | 1,491 | 1,488 | 1,476 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 2,148 | 2,120 | 2,052 | 2,039 | Swisscom FCF definition (OpFCF) | 1,791 | 1,825 | 1,606 | 1,688 |
| Net interest | -155 | -157 | -154 | -156 | | | | | |
| PBT | 1,990 | 2,055 | 1,887 | 1,872 | | | | | |
| HSBC PBT | 1,970 | 1,953 | 1,887 | 1,872 | | | | | |
| Taxation | -386 | -460 | -399 | -395 | Valuation data | | | | |

1,476

1,476

3,519

-2.386

-2,386

-1,139

1,308

5,195

11,443 3,492

500

20,551

2,875

8,473

7,973

8,167

16,755

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 |
| EV/EBITDA | 8.5 | 8.4 | 8.7 | 8.6 |
| EV/IC | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| PE* | 17.3 | 17.4 | 18.0 | 18.2 |
| PB | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.3 |
| FCF yield (%) | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 4.6 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 |

| E* | 17.3 | 17.4 | 18.0 | 1 |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|---|
| В | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.4 | |
| CF yield (%) | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.3 | |
| Dividend yield (%) | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 | |
| Based on HSBC EPS (diluted) | | | | |

Issuer information

| Share price (CHF) | 518.80 | Free float | 42% |
|--------------------|---------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (CHF) | 515.00 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | SCMN.S | Country | Switzerland |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | SCMN SW | Analyst | Luigi Minerva |
| Market cap (USDm) | 28,735 | Contact | 44 20 7991 6928 |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | -0.3 | -0.1 | 0.3 | -0.2 |
| EBITDA | 4.8 | 1.2 | -2.7 | 0.4 |
| Operating profit | 6.8 | 3.4 | -7.6 | -0.6 |
| PBT | 12.9 | 3.2 | -8.1 | -0.8 |
| HSBC EPS | -1.9 | -1.0 | -3.3 | -0.8 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| ROIC | 10.6 | 10.6 | 9.6 | 9.8 |
| ROE | 26.5 | 22.0 | 19.4 | 18.4 |
| ROA | 8.1 | 7.9 | 7.3 | 7.5 |
| EBITDA margin | 36.9 | 37.4 | 36.3 | 36.5 |
| Operating profit margin | 18.4 | 19.1 | 17.6 | 17.5 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 27.7 | 27.7 | 27.5 | 27.2 |
| Net debt/equity | 120.3 | 105.3 | 102.0 | 97.9 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 47.3 | 47.0 | 43.9 | 44.1 |
| Per share data (CHF) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 30.99 | 30.78 | 28.75 | 28.51 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 30.05 | 29.74 | 28.75 | 28.51 |
| DPS | 22.00 | 22.00 | 22.00 | 22.00 |
| Book value | 125.86 | 144.54 | 151.29 | 157.80 |
| | | | | |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | |
|------------------------------|------|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.00 |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.05 |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes |
| Social Indicators | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 11% |
| Employee turnover (%) | 9% |
| Diversity policy | Yes |
| Source: Company data, HSBC | |

| Governance indicators | |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| No. of board members | 9 |
| Average board experience (years) | 4.7 |
| Female board members (%) | 33% |
| Board members Independence (%) | 56% |
| | |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC



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Q4 results: 2 February

TDC (TDC DC, DKK40.07, Hold, TP DKK39.80 from DKK38.00)

Investment Thesis

TDC is now more than half-way through a substantial restructuring which, to-date, has not suffered from some of the pitfalls that had initially caused us some unease. The share has rallied strongly from September 2017 lows (+12%) but we think valuation is now up with events. For longer-term sustained growth to be assured, we need to see evidence of a turnaround in B2B (especially when it comes to closing legacy products) and think that management needs to take some difficult decisions in the Consumer business.

Our view remains that Danish mobile – which DG Competition prevented from consolidating to three mobile network operators in 2015 – remains a tricky market, and one for which we think market enthusiasm has a tendency to get ahead of itself. Following the effective block on consolidation of Telia and Telenor's businesses, all mobile operators put through price rises. Nevertheless, the challenger brand of fourth operator Three – Oister – remains very competitively priced *and* continues to take market share. Without Oister shifting its prices upward, there appears to be a competitive constraint on broader price moves. Additionally 2018 will see a lapping of 2017 tariffs adjustments that stemmed from roam-like-at-home regulation. These were well received (indeed better than expected) but the challenge is to find a similar more-for-more story.

In fixed line the company has merged its consumer brands, and is now working exclusively under the YouSee banner (the old cable business). This helps marketing and product consistency, which is important given TDC operates both cable and copper networks. Consumers are now offered the best network available, which for 55% of households is cable. This network is being rapidly upgraded by Huawei to full DOCSIS 3.1, which should provide both a degree of future-proofing, and a quality of service boost to existing customers. TDC has agreed to a voluntary regulatory regime whereby wholesale access to its cable network is granted (in return for forbearance on wider regulation). These offers are in the early stages, and while we are cautious, initial take-up does not seem particularly problematic.

The area that does require attention is TV. We think the annual prices rises traditionally applied to TV tariffs are intrinsically unsustainable given the very real competitive pressure from OTT services. A bold option would be to announce substantial investment in set-top boxes (currently in less than 33% of TV homes) to increase access to the extra services (on-demand, catch-up etc) that are typically provided by a cable platform, and yet are absent for the bulk of Danish homes.

Finally in Denmark, the B2B market remains difficult, and we are yet to see the ambitious large-scale decommissioning of products that was promised as part of the company's restructuring plan. At the end of 2017, the government telecoms framework agreements (SKI) were largely successfully held. This should ease some of the earlier pressure on the B2B segment, but we would caution that this is typically a deflationary environment and end customers are hardly ramping up telecoms budgets.

The focus for 2018 will be on the company's ability to drive additional costs out of the business: as restructuring efforts come to an end, the output must be delivered. Structural headwinds remain in some divisions (eg Business), and yet consensus now expects EBITDA growth to be delivered in 2018. This, combined with falling capex from H2 2018e onward, is likely to support FCF growth, where consensus of DKK2.4bn is already ahead of guidance (DKK2.3bn). As leverage continues to fall, discussions will at some point turn to the outlook for the dividend, which after its earlier reset, means the stock presently yields just 2.9% (2018e).



Forecast changes

We make only very modest changes to the forecasts in our model as we update our forecasts after recent results, outlined in the table below.

Forecast changes

| | | New Old | | | Old | | w Old | | | Delta (%) | | |
|------------------------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-----------|--|--|
| | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | | | |
| Revenue | 20,423 | 20,136 | 20,098 | 20,518 | 20,174 | 20,128 | -0.5% | -0.2% | -0.2% | | | |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 8,305 | 8,292 | 8,386 | 8,364 | 8,308 | 8,409 | -0.7% | -0.2% | -0.3% | | | |
| EFCF | 2,200 | 2,331 | 2,561 | 2,216 | 2,317 | 2,556 | -0.7% | 0.6% | 0.2% | | | |
| DPS | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.16 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.16 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | | | |
| Source: HSBC estimates | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Valuation

We adjust our FFCF-based DCF target price to DKK39.8 (from DKK38.0) (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the <u>Valuation and risks section</u>), as a result of changes in forecasts and roll forward of our valuation. Our new TP implies 0.7% downside and we rate the stock Hold.

Free cash to the firm DCF valuation model

| DKKm | | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e | 2021e | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e |
|----------------------------------|---------|--------|---------------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| EBITDA company | | 8,292 | 8,386 | 8,488 | 8,594 | 8,702 | 8,812 | 8,923 |
| Cash Capex | | -4,108 | -4,011 | -3,943 | -3,896 | -3,864 | -3,845 | -3,835 |
| Cash tax | | -706 | -749 | -799 | -835 | -912 | -975 | -1,045 |
| tax rate | | 28.7% | 27.7% | 27.2% | 26.9% | 26.5% | 26.3% | 26.1% |
| Working Capital changes | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Restructuring | | -360 | -288 | -259 | -233 | -210 | -189 | -170 |
| FCFF | | 3,119 | 3,337 | 3,486 | 3,630 | 3,716 | 3,804 | 3,873 |
| Terminal Value | | | | | | | | 59,492 |
| Discount Factor | | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.88 | 0.83 | 0.78 | 0.73 | 0.68 |
| Present value | | 3,119 | 3,133 | 3,073 | 3,004 | 2,888 | 2,775 | 2,653 |
| PV of cash flows | 17,525 | | | | | | | |
| PV of TV | 40,749 | | | | | | | |
| Enterprise Value | 58,275 | Te | erminal grow | th rate | 0.0% | | | |
| Net debt (FY18e) | -18,560 | Co | ost of Capita | l | 6.5% | | | |
| Adjust for hybrid capital (100%) | -5,552 | Co | ost of equity | | 9.1% | | | |
| Contingent liability | -215 | | | | | | | |
| Value of minorities | -157 | | | | | | | |
| add back: dividend | 843 | | | | | | | |
| Appraised value of the equity | 34,634 | | | | | | | |
| Number of shares | 803 | | | | | | | |
| Fair Value per share | 39.80 | | | | | | | |

Source: HSBC estimates



Relative Valuation

- The stock has seen continued re-rating in past 6 months; thus is currently trading above its historical levels
- Consensus revisions has been very modest in the past 6 months
- Compared to the peer group, TDC is trading in-line on EBITDA and OpFCF multiples; but its dividend yield is below the sector average.

TDC - Valuation benchmark chart


Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|------|-------|--------|
| Price return | 1.8% | 4.5% | 4.2% | 2.9% | 4.7% |
| Total return | 1.8% | 4.5% | 4.1% | 2.9% | 7.6% |
| Total return vs SXKP | 0.7% | 4.8% | 3.4% | 6.1% | 4.4% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | 0.3% | 3.6% | 3.5% | 5.5% | 1.4% |
| Total return vs OMXC20 | 2.7% | 3.2% | 3.7% | -1.8% | -10.7% |

Relative valuation



1yr fwd EV/EVITDA



Sales estimates revision



1yr fwd EV/OpFCF



EBITDA estimates revision



Capped at +/-50x levels

Dividend yield and corresponding Gsec 10yr bond yield



* Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018





Hold

Financials & valuation: TDC A/S

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (DKKm) | | | | |
| Revenue | 21,031 | 20,423 | 20,136 | 20,098 |
| EBITDA | 8,207 | 8,005 | 7,932 | 8,098 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -4,940 | -4,914 | -4,806 | -4,736 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 3,267 | 3,091 | 3,126 | 3,361 |
| Net interest | -765 | -658 | -658 | -649 |
| PBT | 3,566 | 2,426 | 2,463 | 2,707 |
| HSBC PBT | 2,548 | 2,300 | 2,463 | 2,707 |
| Taxation | -529 | -606 | -616 | -677 |
| Net profit | 2,868 | 1,659 | 1,688 | 1,870 |
| HSBC net profit | 1,917 | 1,729 | 1,852 | 2,034 |
| Cash flow summary (DKKm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 6,642 | 6,484 | 6,534 | 6,669 |
| Capex | -4,454 | -4,187 | -4,108 | -4,011 |
| Cash flow from investment | -4,581 | -3,758 | -4,108 | -4,011 |
| Dividends | -802 | -802 | -843 | -885 |
| Change in net debt | -3,898 | -1,939 | -1,634 | -1,822 |
| FCF equity | 2,610 | 2,554 | 2,551 | 2,760 |
| Balance sheet summary (DKKm) | | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 34,208 | 32,827 | 32,047 | 31,315 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 18,041 | 17,989 | 18,021 | 17,979 |
| Current assets | 5,743 | 4,971 | 6,459 | 8,136 |
| Cash & others | 1,687 | 1,670 | 3,158 | 4,835 |
| Total assets | 64,332 | 62,472 | 63,208 | 64,104 |
| Operating liabilities | 10,170 | 10,101 | 10,053 | 10,026 |
| Gross debt | 24,186 | 21,998 | 21,852 | 21,706 |
| Net debt | 22,133 | 20,194 | 18,560 | 16,737 |
| Shareholders' funds | 24,206 | 24,319 | 24,926 | 25,672 |
| Invested capital | 46,135 | 44,016 | 43,316 | 42,569 |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | -13.7 | -2.9 | -1.4 | -0.2 |
| EBITDA | -12.2 | -2.5 | -0.9 | 2.1 |
| Operating profit | | -5.4 | 1.2 | 7.5 |
| PBT | | -32.0 | 1.6 | 9.9 |
| HSBC EPS | -20.0 | -9.9 | 7.1 | 9.9 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| ROIC | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 5.9 |
| ROE | 8.6 | 7.1 | 7.5 | 8.0 |
| ROA | 5.6 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 4.0 |
| EBITDA margin | 39.0 | 39.2 | 39.4 | 40.3 |
| Operating profit margin | 15.5 | 15.1 | 15.5 | 16.7 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 10.7 | 12.2 | 12.1 | 12.5 |
| Net debt/equity | 91.4 | 83.0 | 74.0 | 64.4 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.1 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 30.0 | 32.1 | 35.2 | 39.8 |
| Per share data (DKK) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 3.58 | 2.07 | 2.10 | 2.33 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 2.39 | 2.15 | 2.31 | 2.53 |
| DPS | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.16 |
| Book value | 30.18 | 30.30 | 31.06 | 31.99 |
| | | | | |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|---------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 8,474 | 8,305 | 8,292 | 8,386 |
| Adj Net profit post Hybrid adjustment | 2,064 | 1,901 | 1,958 | 2,086 |
| Adj EPS post Hybrid adjustment | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.6 |
| FCFE company definition | 2,082 | 2,200 | 2,331 | 2,561 |
| Adj Net Debt(incl Hybrid bond) | 24,909 | 22,970 | 21,336 | 19,513 |
| Adj Net Debt/EBITDA (x) | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.3 |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| EV/EBITDA | 7.4 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 6.8 |
| EV/IC | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| PE* | 16.8 | 18.6 | 17.4 | 15.8 |
| PB | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| FCF yield (%) | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 7.1 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.9 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (DKK) | 40.07 | Free float | 100% |
|--------------------|--------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (DKK) | 39.80 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | TDC.CO | Country | Denmark |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | TDC DC | Analyst | Adam Fox-Rumley, CFA |
| Market cap (USDm) | 5,435 | Contact | +44 20 7991 6819 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | |
|------------------------------|-------|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.023 |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.108 |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes |
| Social Indicators | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 18.1 |
| Employee turnover (%) | NA |
| Diversity policy | Yes |
| Source: Company data, HSBC | |
| | |

| Average board experience (years) | 4.3 |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| Female board members (%) | 36 |
| Board members Independence (%) | 55 |
| | |

11

Governance Indicators

No. of board members

Price relative



Source: HSBC



Luigi Minerva*

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* Employed by a non-US affiliate of HSBC Securities (USA) Inc, and is not registered/ qualified pursuant to FINRA regulations

Q4 results: 6 March

Telecom Italia (TIT IM, EUR0.72, Hold, TP EUR0.85)

Investment Thesis

The investment case of Telecom Italia remains challenging primarily due to two factors: the entrance of Iliad (which we expect in first half of 2018) and the ongoing parallel deployment of Open Fiber. Additionally, in Brazil, where TI has a c67% stake in TIM Participaçoes, in-market consolidation seems unlikely until Oi's restructuring is completed. We believe all these specific factors increase the level of risk embedded in the investment case, making overall the risk-reward profile still relatively unattractive.

Entry of Iliad: In our note <u>Telecom Italia – Hold: Iliad and OF, key challenges ahead</u>, 22 May 2017 we identify two tariffs Iliad could use to enter the Italian market: EUR2 (voice centric) and EUR12 (data centric). In our most recent tariff tracker (see <u>Italian Telecoms – Tariff tracker #4: 'below-the-line' and 'more-for-less'</u>, 27 November 2017) we conclude those tariff plans would represent, respectively, a 65%+ and 25%+ discount to comparable tariffs currently available in the market. We also highlight that price adjustments continue before Iliad's launch, with TI and Wind lowering the entry level with 'pay-as-you-go' plans. The companies are also targeting a specific group of customers proactively using 'below-the-line' promotions. Our TI valuation base case includes a 'normally disruptive' entry from Iliad, driving a TI mobile service revenue decline of 3.3% in FY18e, after growth in FY16 and FY17e. We expect around 11% market share (SIM ex M2M) by 2020 for Iliad. We also run 'Jio style' scenario analyses, should Iliad decide to launch its services for free initially: with TIM's 2018e ARPU declining by -10% and Iliad reaching 11% market share by 2019e, the impact on TI's equity value could be as high as 14c/share (see next page).

Open Fiber and the network spin-off debate: OF's plans are ambitious, aiming for a national FTTH deployment using existing civil infrastructure (largely made available by ENEL) as much as possible and, where possible, by-passing Tl's local exchanges. OF's progress is slower than expected but we continue to consider it a credible threat. We expect it to cover 7.8m homes in the Clusters A and B by 2021 (compared to guidance of 9.5m). Regulation remains key: AGCOM should avoid cutting wholesale fibre prices and Tl's SMP status should be revisited to take into account the emergence of a parallel fibre network. In recent months the possibility that TI may consider spinning off its fixed-line network has become again topical (see, for instance, IlSole24Ore, 24 November 2017). Amos Genish, Tl's CEO, stated during the Q3 2017 conference call that the network remains a strategic asset and that giving up control is not an option for Tl. In the meantime the government continues to apply some pressure with the Minister of Economic Development Carlo Calenda asking Tl, as recently as December 2017 (see IlSole24Ore), to consider all options on the network, including a spin-off. We have a cautious view on the network spin-off as a viable, value-generating option; we believe the market tends to overestimate the impact that such a development may have on Tl's value.

Brazil: we think TIM Brasil's postpaid subscriber, mobile services revenue and ARPU growth assumptions released in its 2017-19 Industrial Plan are too aggressive. The implied c6% revenue CAGR (c8% excluding MTRs) over the next three years looks possible in the very short term because of comps, but maintaining such a growth pace through 2019 seems unlikely to us, for no other reason than the competitive dynamics in Brazil, unless TIM captures a disproportionate amount of macro-fuelled telecom growth. Mr Genish stated in the Q3 2017 results conference call that TIM Brazil remains a core strategic asset. We see remote possibility of in-market consolidation in the short term. In fact, the potential interest for Oi (OIBR3 BZ BRL3.77, Reduce) from China Telecom (728 HK, HKD3.90, Buy – see *China Telcos*, 25 January 2018) could perpetuate the 4-player mobile market structure and enhance Oi's ability to be price disruptive.



A bear case: Iliad launches in the "Jio style"

In our note <u>Telecom Italia – Hold: Iliad and OF, key challenges ahead</u>, 22 May 2017 we ran two versions of our bear case scenario assuming a "Jio style" of entry by Iliad into the Italian market.

In <u>scenario A</u>, we assume a -5% y-o-y decline in TIM's ARPU in 2018 (compared to a base case of -1.8%).


In <u>scenario B</u>, we assume a -10% y-o-y decline in TIM's ARPU in 2018 and a faster market share take-up with Iliad reaching 11% by 2019. In our base case we assume Iliad gains 11% market share by 2020 with TI's mobile ARPU declining by -1.8% in FY18e.

Refer to the waterfall chart below for the likely impact of such scenarios on our Telecom Italia's valuation.

Valuation

We derive our unchanged EUR0.85 target price from a DCF method (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the <u>Valuation and risks section</u>), implying 18.0% upside and we rate the stock Hold as we expect TI to face increasing competitive pressures in the Italian market, with the entry of Iliad as a new mobile operator and the ongoing parallel deployment of Open Fiber.

Impact of bear case scenarios on Telecom Italia's fair value (EUR/share)



Source: HSBC



Relative Valuation

- ▶ TI continues to trade at a significant discount to peers on EV/EBITDA and on EV/OpCF.
- TI pays no dividend to the ordinary shareholders. We expect the dividend not to resume before 2020
- ▶ The company is trading in the lower half of the EV/EBITDA and EV/OpCF 1 yr forward multiple range (defined by 2 standard deviations) indicating the stock is currently relatively cheap compared to its historical multiples range.

Telecom Italia - Valuation benchmark chart


Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|-------|--------|-------|--------|--------|
| Price return | -0.2% | -2.4% | -4.4% | -16.9% | -11.1% |
| Total return | -0.1% | -2.4% | -4.3% | -16.8% | -11.1% |
| Total return vs SXKP | -1.2% | -2.0% | -5.0% | -13.6% | -14.2% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | -1.6% | -3.3% | -4.9% | -14.2% | -17.2% |
| Total return vs FTSE MIB INDEX | -0.8% | -10.1% | -9.5% | -28.3% | -37.8% |


Relative valuation




1yr fwd EV/EVITDA



Sales estimates revision



1yr fwd EV/OpFCF




EBITDA estimates revision




Capped at +/-50x levels

Dividend yield and corresponding Gsec 10yr bond yield



^{*} Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018





Financials & valuation: Telecom Italia

Hold

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (EURm |) | | | |
| Revenue | 19,025 | 19,868 | 19,848 | 19,921 |
| EBITDA | 8,002 | 8,526 | 8,562 | 8,554 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -4,291 | -4,471 | -4,595 | -4,570 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 3,722 | 4,058 | 3,966 | 3,984 |
| Net interest | -907 | -1,442 | -1,412 | -1,347 |
| PBT | 2,846 | 2,600 | 2,537 | 2,619 |
| HSBC PBT | 2,965 | 2,620 | 2,537 | 2,619 |
| Taxation | -880 | -1,046 | -945 | -976 |
| Net profit | 1,808 | 1,157 | 1,156 | 1,155 |
| HSBC net profit | 1,702 | 1,247 | 1,156 | 1,155 |
| Cash flow summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 6,111 | 5,980 | 6,224 | 6,190 |
| Capex | -5,108 | -6,338 | -4,425 | -4,221 |
| Cash flow from investment | -4,414 | -6,103 | -4,425 | -4,221 |
| Dividends | -227 | 0 | -166 | -166 |
| Change in net debt | -2,159 | 529 | -1,633 | -1,804 |
| FCF equity | 1,009 | -501 | 1,821 | 2,008 |
| Balance sheet summary (EUR | m) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 36,563 | 37,894 | 38,475 | 38,961 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 16,360 | 17,144 | 16,392 | 15,557 |
| Current assets | 11,662 | 10,126 | 10,657 | 10,668 |
| Cash & others | 3,964 | 2,466 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Total assets | 70,446 | 70,866 | 71,222 | 70,880 |
| Operating liabilities | 8,283 | 8,610 | 8,649 | 8,657 |
| Gross debt | 34,525 | 33,030 | 31,930 | 30,127 |
| Net debt | 25,119 | 25,648 | 24,014 | 22,211 |
| Shareholders' funds | 21,207 | 22,346 | 23,337 | 24,326 |
| Invested capital | 52,338 | 54,088 | 53,876 | 53,529 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | -3.5 | 4.4 | -0.1 | 0.4 |
| EBITDA | 14.2 | 6.5 | 0.4 | -0.1 |
| Operating profit | 33.9 | 9.0 | -2.3 | 0.4 |
| PBT | 224.5 | -8.6 | -2.4 | 3.2 |
| HSBC EPS | 943.4 | -26.7 | -7.3 | -0.1 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| ROIC | 5.5 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 5.6 |
| ROE | 8.8 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 4.8 |
| ROA | 4.3 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 |
| EBITDA margin | 42.1 | 42.9 | 43.1 | 42.9 |
| Operating profit margin | 19.6 | 20.4 | 20.0 | 20.0 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 8.8 | 5.9 | 6.1 | 6.4 |
| Net debt/equity | 106.6 | 102.3 | 90.8 | 79.6 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 3.1 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.6 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 24.3 | 23.3 | 25.9 | 27.9 |
| Per share data (EUR) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| DPS | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Book value | 1.01 | 1.06 | 1.11 | 1.16 |
| | | | | |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Domestic business | 15,006 | 15,144 | 15,057 | 14,937 |
| Brazilian mobile | 4,047 | 4,756 | 4,823 | 5,016 |
| Others/Elimination | -28 | -32 | -32 | -32 |
| Group Revenues | 19.025 | 19.868 | 19.848 | 19.921 |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
| EV/EBITDA | 5.6 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 4.9 |
| EV/IC | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| PE* | 8.9 | 12.2 | 13.1 | 13.1 |
| PB | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| FCF yield (%) | 5.1 | -2.5 | 9.3 | 10.2 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (EUR) | 0.72 | Free float | 78% |
|--------------------|---------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (EUR) | 0.85 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | TLIT.MI | Country | Italy |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | TIT IM | Analyst | Luigi Minerva |
| Market cap (USDm) | 18,206 | Contact | 44 20 7991 6928 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|--|--|--|--|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.04 | | | | |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.14 | | | | |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes | | | | |
| Social Indicators | | | | | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 16.3% | | | | |
| Employee turnover (%) | 11% | | | | |
| Diversity policy | Yes | | | | |
| | | | | | |

Source: Company data, HSBC

| Governance Indicators | |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| No. of board members | 15 |
| Average board tenure (years) | 2.6 |
| Female board members (%) | 40% |
| Board members Independence (%) | 60% |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC



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Q4 results: 22 February

Telefónica (TEF SM, EUR8.50, Hold, TP EUR9.0 from EUR9.3)

Investment Thesis

Telefonica's presence in key European markets (Spain and Germany, which combined contribute over 40% of group EBITDA) makes it a beneficiary of improved regulation and consolidation (with the notable exception of the UK) in Europe. However, in Brazil (Telefonica's key international market), we see remote possibilities of in-market consolidation in the short term. In fact, the potential interest for Oi from China Telecom (728 HK, Buy, HKD3.90 – see *China Telcos*, 25 January 2018) may perpetuate the 4-player mobile market structure and enhance Oi's ability to be price disruptive. Performance in the rest of LatAm remains very much mixed: The Mexican operation is chronically sub-scale with profitability under pressure, Chile and Peru are experiencing disruptive competition, which also affects profitability, while Colombia and Argentina are performing relatively well.

Spain: In its domestic market Spain, our key concern continues to be the existence of parallel networks. As we discussed in *Choose your poison* (31 March 2017), in markets where alternative operators have deployed their own network, they face no recurrent wholesale cost, and have therefore more freedom to be disruptive for the sake of gaining market share. In fact, ongoing wholesale costs are an important factor in determining a market's orderliness: they represent a marginal cost that must be covered month by month, quarter by quarter and therefore reflected in retail tariffs; they are rather different from the industry's bête noir, namely, sunk costs, which are cost associated with a parallel network deployment.

Brazil: We see limited scope for consolidation in fixed-line following the acquisition of GVT by Telefonica Brasil (VIVT4 BZ, BRL52.94, Hold). Any combination with Oi, in our view, is unlikely in the short term, as we expect the incumbent coming out of the reorganisation to be recapitalised to operate on its own for a while in 'proof of concept' mode. Another milestone required for consolidation would be the concession regime becoming an authorisation one, an uncertain 2018 event because of elections.

At the **group** level, we expect the focus to remain on deleveraging both organically and with a possible IPO of UK operations (see *Financial Times*, 27 June 2017). We estimate a 2018 leverage ratio of 3.1x, treating the hybrids as 100% debt. We expect the dividend to remain flat at 40c/share (implying a 4.7% dividend yield) also in 2018e-19e, which would imply a comfortable ~40% FCF payout ratio (2018e-19e)



Forecast changes

We have reduced our estimates with the main impact from the depreciation of LatAm currencies vs EUR. As such, we estimate the weighted average basket of non-EUR currencies (in countries where TEF has operations) has depreciated by 4% since we last published (in September 2017). In the table below, we summarise our changes in estimates.

Telefonica - Changes in estimates

| (In EURm) | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e |
|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Revenue | | | |
| New | 52,432 | 51,137 | 52,340 |
| Old | 52,647 | 52,847 | 54,416 |
| % Change | -0.4% | -3.2% | -3.8% |
| - | | | |
| Adjusted EBITDA | | | |
| New | 16,653 | 16,405 | 17,084 |
| Old | 16,902 | 17,098 | 17,918 |
| % Change | -1.5% | -4.1% | -4.7% |
| Capex | | | |
| New | 8,160 | 7,878 | 7,939 |
| Old | 8,188 | 8,060 | 8,223 |
| | * | , | |
| % Change | -0.3% | -2.3% | -3.5% |
| EPS | | | |
| New | 0.69 | 0.75 | 0.90 |
| Old | 0.70 | 0.73 | 0.93 |
| % Change | -1.8% | 3.3% | -3.4% |
| Source: HSBC estimates | | | |

Valuation

We adjust our TP to EUR9 from EUR9.3 as we reduce our estimates, partially offset by rolling forward of our valuation to Feb-18. We use a DCF-based SOTP method to derive our new TP (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the <u>Valuation and risks section</u>), which implies 5.8% upside and we rate the stock Hold as concerns remain on the competitive environment in its domestic market Spain and LatAm region.

Telefonica Valuation summary

| (EURm) | EV | Proportion | Method | Implied | Implied EBI | TDA Margin |
|---------------------------------|---------|-------------|------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------|
| , | | of total EV | | EV/Sales (2018e) | EV/EBİTDA (2018e) | (2018e) |
| Telefonica de España | 41,508 | 38% | DCF | 3.3 | 7.9 | 41% |
| LatAm | 43,492 | 39% | | 1.8 | 5.8 | 31% |
| HispanoAmerica | 21,918 | 20% | DCF | 1.9 | 6.4 | 30% |
| Brazil | 21,574 | 20% | Spot price | 1.8 | 5.4 | 33% |
| Europe (Germany and UK) | 25,546 | 23% | DCF + TP | 1.9 | 7.2 | 26% |
| Total EV | 110,546 | | | | | |
| Group net debt (2018e) | -42,750 | | | | | |
| Deferred tax assets/liabilities | 4,357 | | | | | |
| Hybrid (100%) | -7,469 | | | | | |
| Minorities | -12,266 | | | | | |
| Investment and other assets | 631 | | | | | |
| Contingent Liability | -5,702 | | | | | |
| Dividend still to be paid | 2,077 | | | | | |
| Equity value (Dec-18) | 49,425 | | | | | |
| Equity value (Feb-18) | 46,662 | | | | | |
| Number of Shares (m) | 5,192 | | | | | |
| Target price (Feb-18) | 9.0 | | | | | |
| Source: HSBC estimates | | | | | | |

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Relative Valuation

- TEF is currently trading at the average of the EV/EBITDA and EV/OpCF 1 yr forward multiple range (defined by 2 standard deviation)
- Telefonica is trading at a 2018e dividend yield of 4.7% broadly in line with the peer average
- The recent downward revision in the consensus revenue and EBITDA estimates could be explained, in our view, by the depreciation of LatAm currencies vs EUR.

Telefónica - Valuation benchmark chart

Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| Price return | 3.0% | 3.0% | -3.4% | -10.1% | -6.8% |
| Total return | 3.0% | 3.0% | -1.5% | -8.4% | -3.4% |
| Total return vs SXKP | 1.8% | 3.3% | -2.2% | -5.1% | -6.6% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | 1.4% | 2.1% | -2.1% | -5.8% | -9.6% |
| Total return vs IBEX 35 | 1.8% | -1.4% | -4.9% | -10.0% | -18.6% |

Relative valuation



1yr fwd EV/EVITDA



Sales estimates revision




1yr fwd EV/OpFCF





EBITDA estimates revision




Capped at +/-50x levels

Dividend yield and corresponding Gsec 10yr bond yield



^{*} Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018





Hold

Financials & valuation: Telefonica

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Revenue | 52,035 | 52,432 | 51,137 | 52,340 |
| EBITDA | 15,118 | 16,519 | 16,405 | 17,084 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -9,649 | -9,482 | -8,904 | -8,602 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 5,469 | 7,037 | 7,502 | 8,481 |
| Net interest | -2,219 | -2,154 | -1,638 | -1,550 |
| PBT | 3,246 | 4,886 | 5,867 | 6,934 |
| HSBC PBT | 4,622 | 4,927 | 5,468 | 6,535 |
| Taxation | -847 | -1,219 | -1,407 | -1,663 |
| Net profit | 2,369 | 3,487 | 4,195 | 4,967 |
| HSBC net profit | 3,482 | 3,565 | 3,893 | 4,664 |
| Cash flow summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 12,827 | 13,810 | 13,187 | 13,502 |
| Capex | -8,846 | -9,162 | -7,878 | -7,939 |
| Cash flow from investment | -10,098 | -9,007 | -7,978 | -8,039 |
| Dividends | -2,906 | -2,527 | -2,476 | -2,476 |
| Change in net debt | -566 | -3,113 | -2,732 | -2,987 |
| FCF equity | 4,673 | 4,351 | 5,695 | 6,012 |
| Balance sheet summary (EUR | m) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 49,204 | 46,336 | 46,436 | 46,536 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 36,393 | 33,344 | 32,318 | 31,654 |
| Current assets | 19,974 | 19,930 | 19,634 | 19,815 |
| Cash & others | 3,736 | 4,601 | 4,500 | 4,500 |
| Total assets | 123,641 | 116,154 | 114,936 | 114,556 |
| Operating liabilities | 20,702 | 19,743 | 19,459 | 19,418 |
| Gross debt | 60,361 | 56,573 | 53,740 | 50,752 |
| Net debt | 48,595 | 45,482 | 42,750 | 39,762 |
| Shareholders' funds | 18,157 | 17,449 | 19,568 | 22,458 |
| Invested capital | 81,133 | 75,265 | 74,429 | 74,088 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | -5.2 | 0.8 | -2.5 | 2.4 |
| EBITDA | 14.3 | 9.3 | -0.7 | 4.1 |
| Operating profit | 55.1 | 28.7 | 6.6 | 13.1 |
| PBT | 258.7 | 50.5 | 20.1 | 18.2 |
| HSBC EPS | 19.7 | -0.2 | 9.2 | 19.8 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| ROIC | 5.3 | 6.8 | 7.6 | 8.7 |
| ROE | 20.5 | 20.0 | 21.0 | 22.2 |
| ROA | 3.4 | 4.6 | 5.1 | 5.7 |
| EBITDA margin | 29.1 | 31.5 | 32.1 | 32.6 |
| Operating profit margin | 10.5 | 13.4 | 14.7 | 16.2 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 6.8 | 7.7 | 10.0 | 11.0 |
| Net debt/equity | 171.2 | 170.1 | 149.8 | 127.8 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 3.2 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.3 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 26.4 | 30.4 | 30.8 | 34.0 |
| Per share data (EUR) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 0.47 | 0.67 | 0.81 | 0.96 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 0.69 | 0.69 | 0.75 | 0.90 |
| DPS | 0.55 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.40 |
| Book value | 3.59 | 3.36 | 3.77 | 4.33 |
| | | | | |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|---------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| T. Espana | 12,816 | 12,640 | 12,679 | 12,823 |
| T. UK | 6,860 | 6,540 | 6,565 | 6,663 |
| T.Brasil | 11,090 | 12,598 | 12,263 | 12,760 |
| T. HispanoAmerica | 12,579 | 12,486 | 11,581 | 11,994 |
| T. Deutschland | 7,504 | 7,242 | 7,145 | 7,175 |
| Total Group Revenue | 52,035 | 52,432 | 51,137 | 52,340 |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| EV/EBITDA | 7.5 | 6.7 | 6.5 | 6.1 |
| EV/IC | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| PE* | 12.4 | 12.4 | 11.3 | 9.5 |
| PB | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.0 |
| FCF yield (%) | 7.2 | 6.7 | 8.8 | 9.3 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 6.5 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.7 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (EUR) | 8.50 | Free float | 100% |
|--------------------|--------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (EUR) | 9.00 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | TEF.MC | Country | Spain |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | TEF SM | Analyst | Luigi Minerva |
| Market cap (USDm) | 54,893 | Contact | 44 20 7991 6928 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | |
|------------------------------|-------|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.04 |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.10 |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes |
| Social Indicators | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 15.6% |
| Employee turnover (%) | 6.8% |
| Diversity policy | Yes |
| | |

Source: Company data, HSBC

| Governance Indicators | |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| No. of board members | 18 |
| Average board experience (years) | 10 |
| Female board members (%) | 11% |
| Board members Independence (%) | 50% |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC



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Q4: 21 February

Telefónica Deutschland (O2D GR, EUR3.99, Hold, TP EUR4.10)

Investment Thesis

Telefonica Deutschland (O2D) is Telefonica's German subsidiary (69.2%-owned by TEF, 9.5%-owned by KPN, 21.3% free float) and is a pure German telecom operator benefiting from a healthy three-player market structure. O2D faces mobile service revenue pressure as its customer mix changes, with wholesale gaining more weight. Combined with roaming and termination revenue losses we see reported service revenue growth deteriorate in 2017 and slight negative growth in 2018 as well. However, we believe the impact on gross profits from the change in customer mix should be limited given the gross profit per wholesale customer is not necessarily lower than that of a retail customer given no direct commercial costs for a wholesale customer. We expect FCF to grow strongly and cover dividends by 2020. With an underleveraged balance sheet, we believe O2D's commitment to grow dividends is credible.

Forecast changes

The changes to our forecasts, as summarised in the table below, are primarily explained by our incorporating the Q3 2017 results into our model. Overall, the impact on valuation is not meaningful.

Telefónica Deutschland - Changes in estimates

| | | _ New | | | Old | | | _ Delta | |
|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|-------|
| (In EURm) | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e |
| Wireless Service revenue | 5,259 | 5,239 | 5,302 | 5,212 | 5,226 | 5,292 | 0.9% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Revenue | 7,242 | 7,145 | 7,175 | 7,076 | 7,047 | 7,090 | 2.3% | 1.4% | 1.2% |
| EBITDA clean | 1,813 | 1,858 | 1,901 | 1,807 | 1,832 | 1,886 | 0.3% | 1.4% | 0.8% |
| Y-o-Y growth | -0.8% | 2.5% | 2.4% | -1.0% | 1.4% | 2.9% | | | |
| EBITDA margin | 25.0% | 26.0% | 26.5% | 25.5% | 26.0% | 26.6% | -2.0% | 0.0% | -0.4% |
| FCFE | 358 | 692 | 765 | 359 | 720 | 742 | -0.2% | -3.9% | 3.0% |
| Dividends paid | -744 | -781 | -803 | -744 | -781 | -803 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |

Source: HSBC estimates

Valuation

We derive our unchanged EUR4.10 target price from a DCF method (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the *Valuation and risks section*), implying 2.7% upside and we rate the stock Hold based on an attractive dividend yield supported by strong cash conversion but limited valuation upside.

DCF - Telefonica Deutschland

| | EURm | | |
|------------------------|--------|----------|-------|
| EV (Germany) | 13,562 | WACC | |
| Value non-core assets | 0 | RFR | 2.5% |
| Contingent liabilities | 0 | Kd | 3.0% |
| Dividends to be paid | 781 | Beta | 1.0 |
| Net debt 2018e | -1,295 | MRP | 6.0% |
| Equity Value | 13,048 | Ke | 8.5% |
| Shares (in m) | 2,975 | D/(D+E) | 18.0% |
| Value per share | 4.1 | E/(D+E) | 82.0% |
| current share price | 3.99 | tax rate | 12.8% |
| upside | 2.7% | WACC | 7.4% |
| | | TGR | 0.5% |

Source: HSBCe



Financials & valuation: Telefonica Deutschland

Hold

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (EURm |) | | | |
| Revenue | 7503.0 | 7241.8 | 7144.9 | 7175.0 |
| EBITDA | 2068.9 | 1760.7 | 1857.7 | 1901.4 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -2118.5 | -1915.1 | -1879.3 | -1835.0 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | -49.7 | -154.4 | -21.6 | 66.4 |
| Net interest | -35.8 | -38.1 | -42.1 | -42.2 |
| PBT | -85.4 | -192.5 | -63.7 | 24.2 |
| HSBC PBT | -391.5 | -186.4 | -114.2 | -30.7 |
| Taxation | -90.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Net profit | -175.5 | -192.5 | -63.7 | 21.1 |
| HSBC net profit | -391.5 | -186.4 | -114.2 | -30.7 |
| Cash flow summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 2283.3 | 1610.7 | 1799.3 | 1848.2 |
| Capex | -1101.5 | -1030.5 | -1107.5 | -1083.4 |
| Cash flow from investment | -990.6 | -1145.5 | -1107.5 | -1083.4 |
| Dividends | -713.9 | -744.0 | -780.9 | -803.3 |
| Change in net debt | -426.1 | 407.3 | 89.1 | 38.5 |
| FCF equity | 1078.5 | 570.3 | 691.8 | 764.7 |
| Balance sheet summary (EUR | m) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 8146.1 | 7389.8 | 6500.8 | 5611.8 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 4216.7 | 4114.7 | 4231.9 | 4369.3 |
| Current assets | 2245.7 | 1975.0 | 1965.3 | 1968.3 |
| Cash & others | 612.8 | 700.0 | 700.0 | 700.0 |
| Total assets | 15300.8 | 14146.4 | 13364.9 | 12616.4 |
| Operating liabilities | 3218.4 | 3441.1 | 3437.4 | 3462.3 |
| Gross debt | 1757.7 | 2141.7 | 2230.9 | 2269.4 |
| Net debt | 798.5 | 1205.7 | 1294.9 | 1333.4 |
| Shareholders' funds | 9408.4 | 7707.6 | 6840.6 | 6028.7 |
| Invested capital | 10777.3 | 9338.3 | 8560.5 | 7787.0 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| rtatio, growth and p | ci silaic a | iiuiyaia | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|----------|----------|----------|
| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | -4.9 | -3.5 | -1.3 | 0.4 |
| EBITDA | 14.7 | -14.9 | 5.5 | 2.4 |
| Operating profit PBT | | | | |
| HSBC EPS | | | | |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 |
| ROIC | 7.3 | 7.3 | 9.7 | 11.7 |
| ROE | -4.0 | -2.2 | -1.6 | -0.5 |
| ROA | -0.9 | -1.0 | -0.2 | 0.5 |
| EBITDA margin | 27.6 | 24.3 | 26.0 | 26.5 |
| Operating profit margin | -0.7 | -2.1 | -0.3 | 0.9 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 57.8 | 46.2 | 44.1 | 45.1 |
| Net debt/equity | 8.5 | 15.6 | 18.9 | 22.1 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 286.0 | 133.6 | 139.0 | 138.6 |
| Per share data (EUR) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.02 | 0.01 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | -0.13 | -0.06 | -0.04 | -0.01 |
| DPS | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.28 |
| Book value | 3.16 | 2.59 | 2.30 | 2.03 |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|---------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Service revenues reported | 5,437 | 5,259 | 5,239 | 5,302 |
| Mobile Revenues | 6,498 | 6,361 | 6,338 | 6,413 |
| Fixed Line Revenues | 981 | 866 | 793 | 748 |
| EBITDA clean | 1,828 | 1,813 | 1,858 | 1,901 |
| EBITDA reported | 2,068 | 1,761 | 1,858 | 1,901 |
| | | | | |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| EV/EBITDA | 6.1 | 7.4 | 7.1 | 6.9 |
| EV/IC | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 |
| PB | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.0 |
| FCF yield (%) | 9.1 | 4.8 | 5.8 | 6.4 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 6.3 | 6.6 | 6.8 | 7.0 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information


| Share price (EUR) | 3.99 | Free float | 21% |
|--------------------|---------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (EUR) | 4.10 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | O2Dn.F | Country | Germany |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | O2D GR | Analyst | Luigi Minerva |
| Market cap (USDm) | 14764.2 | Contact | 44 20 7991 6928 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | |
|------------------------------|-------|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.05 |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.1 |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes |
| Social Indicators | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 9% |
| Employee turnover (%) | 17.9% |
| Diversity policy | Yes |
| Source: Company data, HSBC | |

| Governance Indicators | |
|----------------------------------|------|
| No. of board members | 24 |
| Average board experience (years) | 3.94 |
| Female board members (%) | 29% |
| Board members Independence (%) | 33% |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC



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* Employed by a non-US affiliate of HSBC Securities (USA) Inc, and is not registered/ qualified pursuant to FINRA regulations

Q4 results: 13 February

Telekom Austria (TKA AV, EUR7.93, Reduce, TP EUR7.50, from EUR7.00)

Investment Thesis

The biggest threat that Telekom Austria faces in the medium term is an increasingly converged domestic market. While Austrian telecoms services remain comparatively skewed towards mobile connectivity (certainly versus European peers), there are signs that commercial directions may be poised to change. Three has bought the broadband base of Tele2, representing its first European foray into fixed line. Three's local management has unsurprisingly made some forthright statements of intent about the opportunity that a broader business offers it, highlighting areas where it sees opportunities to take market share.

This would be noteworthy by itself, but at the end of 2017, Deutsche Telekom announced it was seeking to acquire Liberty Global's Austrian business, UPC Austria. This increases the likelihood that a far more significant converged market strategy is likely to be followed by Telekom Austria's competitors.

We are not arguing that TKA is unable to compete in this space (the company's domestic business has been converged since 2010, orchestrated by current Vodafone Germany CEO Hannes Ametsreiter), but that its 59% broadband market share may be vulnerable. TKA has taken mobile subsidies to very low levels in Austria (and indeed more widely), but this is an area that could see upward pressure. Additionally, TKA's target to get 40Mbps fixed broadband to 70% of the country by the end of 2018, may require something of an upgrade, especially if UPC Austria gets a quick boost to DOCSIS3.1. This strategy would allow Deutsche Telekom to compete on quality rather than price (as we imagine it would prefer), but could nevertheless open a substantial gap to the incumbent.

We have one further structural concern in Austria; the set-up of mobile tariffs. These are split into three tiers – premium, optimiser and value (TKA's terms), and TKA has three brands that it deploys across the segments. Our concern is that the premium brand, 'A1', which is also used for the convergent portfolio, is simultaneously being used for SIM only tariffs at prices that overlap with unsuitable rival brands (in particular the MVNO from supermarket chain Hofer), suggesting that there is a risk of spin-down.

Telekom Austria's Group growth profile shows substantial differences between the reported figures and like-for-like measures. 2017's financial performance has been flattered by M&A, currency benefits and one-offs, while operationally, sales growth has been substantially assisted by growth in handset sales (which are low margin). The company's fixed line performance has been good, helped by sales of fixed line broadband across the portfolio, but growth in core mobile service revenue (50% of Group sales) has been negative in the majority of markets (including Austria).

We have argued that given persistent ongoing restructuring costs (related to reducing the size of the active workforce), it is imperative to look at the business on an equity FCF yield, rather than an OpFCF multiple. On this basis, and taking into account the financial characteristics described above, following a dramatic re-rating since mid-2016, the stock screens as being at the expensive end of the sector at below 6%.

We note that the company tends to guide conservatively, and we expect the same for 2018.



Forecast changes

We make small operational changes to our forecasts as we update our model after Q3 results, detailed in the table below.

Forecast changes

| | | New | | | Old | | | Delta | | |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|
| | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | |
| Revenue | 4,336 | 4,318 | 4,307 | 4,326 | 4,324 | 4,324 | 0.2% | -0.1% | -0.4% | |
| Clean EBITDA | 1,385 | 1,395 | 1,413 | 1,369 | 1,383 | 1,410 | 1.2% | 0.9% | 0.2% | |
| Clean Net Income | 319 | 322 | 340 | 298 | 323 | 352 | 7.0% | -0.4% | -3.3% | |
| Capex | 721 | 728 | 724 | 727 | 733 | 731 | -0.9% | -0.6% | -1.0% | |
| Op CF | 664 | 667 | 689 | 641 | 651 | 679 | 3.6% | 2.5% | 1.5% | |

Nb: clean adjusts for exceptional items Source: HSBC estimates

Valuation

We adjust our TP to EUR7.50 from EUR7.0 following upward revision in forecasts and roll forward of valuation to current date. We use a FCFF-based DCF method to derive our new TP (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the <u>Valuation and risks section</u>), which implies 5.4% downside and we rate the stock Reduce given competition concerns.

Free cash to the firm DCF valuation model

| EURm | | | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e | 2021e | 2022e | 2023e |
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Adjusted EBITDA | | | 1,395 | 1,413 | 1,422 | 1,425 | 1,424 | 1,421 |
| Cash Capex | | | -768 | -754 | -742 | -729 | -721 | -722 |
| Cash tax | | | -34 | -36 | -38 | -39 | -40 | -40 |
| Net cash interest | | | -113 | -121 | -121 | -121 | -121 | -121 |
| Interest paid on Hybrid | | | -34 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| WC changes | | | -25 | -23 | -20 | -18 | -16 | -15 |
| Dividends received | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Cash cost of restructuring | | | -96 | -91 | -87 | -82 | -78 | -30 |
| FCF to equity | | | 326 | 390 | 416 | 437 | 449 | 494 |
| Add: Net interest costs & Hybrid divi | | | 147 | 121 | 121 | 121 | 121 | 121 |
| Less: Tax shield | | | -34 | -28 | -28 | -28 | -28 | -28 |
| Free cash flow to firm | | | 439 | 482 | 509 | 529 | 542 | 587 |
| Continuity Value | | | | | | | | 8,733 |
| Discount Factor | | | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.87 | 0.81 | 0.76 | 0.70 |
| PV of FCFF | | | 439 | 450 | 443 | 429 | 409 | 413 |
| PV of Continuity Value | | | | | | | | 6,154 |
| PV of total explicit cash flows | 2,144 | 25.8% | | | | | | |
| PV of TV | 6,154 | 74.2% | | | | | | |
| Enterprise Value | 8,298 | | | | | | | |
| Value of non-core assets | 45 | | | | | | | |
| Contingent liability | -361 | | | | | | | |
| Net Debt YE2018 | -2,624 | | | | | | | |
| Hybrid Bonds | 0 | | | | | | | |
| Equity Value | 5,358 | | | | | | | |
| NOS | 664 | | | | | | | |
| Value per share | 7.50 | | | | | | | |
| Financial summary & valuation | | 2016 | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e | 2021e | 2022e |
| EBITDA margin | | 31.7% | 32.1% | 32.3% | 32.8% | 33.1% | 33.3% | 33.4% |
| Capex/sales | | 18.1% | 16.6% | 16.9% | 16.8% | 16.8% | 16.8% | 16.9% |
| At current price (EUR) | 8.10 | 10.170 | 10.070 | 10.570 | 10.070 | 10.070 | 10.070 | 10.570 |
| Equity FCF yield | 0.10 | 3.1% | 5.6% | 6.1% | 7.2% | 7.7% | 8.1% | 8.3% |
| Dividend yield | | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.6% | 4.9% | 4.9% | 4.9% | 4.9% |
| EV/EBITDA | | 6.2x | 6.0x | 6.0x | 5.9x | 5.8x | 5.8x | 5.8x |
| EV/(EBITDA-Capex) | | 15.9x | 13.6x | 13.3x | 12.6x | 12.2x | 12.0x | 11.8x |
| At target price (EUR) | 7.50 | 15.5% | 13.07 | 10.08 | 12.01 | 12.28 | 12.01 | 11.0 |
| Equity FCF yield | 1.00 | 3.3% | 6.0% | 6.5% | 7.8% | 8.3% | 8.7% | 8.9% |
| Dividend yield | | 2.6% | 2.6% | 2.8% | 5.3% | 5.3% | 5.3% | 5.3% |
| EV/EBITDA | | 6.2x | 6.0x | 5.9x | 5.9x | 5.8x | 5.8x | 5.8x |
| EV/EBITDA-Capex) | | 15.8x | 13.5x | 13.2x | 12.6x | 12.2x | 11.9x | 11.8x |
| | | 13.01 | 10.08 | 10.28 | 12.01 | 14.4 | 11.38 | 11.00 |
| Source: HSBC estimates | | | | | | | | |



Relative Valuation

- ▶ Telekom Austria was one of the strongest performers in the sector in 2017, returning 36%.
- Despite this appreciation the company is approximately on the 25th centile on EV/EBITDA, though more centrally valued using EV/OpFCF. We have stressed the importance of looking at the company's valuation on an equity FCF basis
- Rising consensus estimates have helped support this return to sector-level trading multiples, though much of this has been driven by acquisitions


Telekom Austria - Valuation benchmark chart


Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| Price return | -2.7% | 2.3% | -1.5% | 7.8% | 40.8% |
| Total return | -2.7% | 2.3% | -1.5% | 7.8% | 44.9% |
| Total return vs SXKP | -3.8% | 2.7% | -2.1% | 11.0% | 41.7% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | -4.2% | 1.4% | -2.1% | 10.4% | 38.7% |
| Total return vs ATX | -3.1% | -4.0% | -10.2% | -5.2% | 7.3% |

Relative valuation







1yr fwd EV/OpFCF



EBITDA estimates revision




Capped at +/-50x levels

Dividend yield and corresponding Gsec 10yr bond yield



* Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018





Financials & valuation: Telekom Austria

Reduce

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Revenue | 4,211 | 4,336 | 4,318 | 4,307 |
| EBITDA | 1,354 | 1,395 | 1,385 | 1,403 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -868 | -867 | -858 | -849 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 487 | 528 | 527 | 554 |
| Net interest | -138 | -103 | -118 | -147 |
| PBT | 360 | 422 | 409 | 407 |
| HSBC PBT | 329 | 405 | 409 | 407 |
| Taxation | 54 | -36 | -34 | -34 |
| Net profit | 387 | 360 | 373 | 373 |
| HSBC net profit | 302 | 372 | 375 | 373 |
| Cash flow summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 997 | 1,082 | 1,084 | 1,110 |
| Capex | -817 | -771 | -768 | -754 |
| Cash flow from investment | -825 | -841 | -768 | -754 |
| Dividends | -33 | -133 | -139 | -139 |
| Change in net debt | -144 | -100 | 384 | -216 |
| FCF equity | 329 | 336 | 344 | 355 |
| Balance sheet summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 3,563 | 3,442 | 3,283 | 3,143 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 2,551 | 2,612 | 2,642 | 2,656 |
| Current assets | 1,439 | 2,043 | 1,682 | 1,919 |
| Cash & others | 464 | 1,044 | 660 | 876 |
| Total assets | 7,943 | 8,485 | 7,993 | 8,104 |
| Operating liabilities | 1,348 | 1,448 | 1,412 | 1,537 |
| Gross debt | 2,804 | 3,284 | 3,284 | 3,283 |
| Net debt | 2,339 | 2,240 | 2,624 | 2,408 |
| Shareholders' funds | 2,769 | 2,833 | 2,468 | 2,576 |
| Invested capital | 5,741 | 5,605 | 5,534 | 5,306 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| , 0 | | • | | |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | -0.4 | 2.9 | -0.4 | -0.3 |
| EBITDA | -1.0 | 3.0 | -0.7 | 1.3 |
| Operating profit | -14.8 | 8.6 | -0.3 | 5.1 |
| PBT | -13.6 | 17.4 | -3.2 | -0.5 |
| HSBC EPS | -17.2 | 23.1 | 0.9 | -0.5 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| ROIC | 13.0 | 13.8 | 13.7 | 14.2 |
| ROE | 11.6 | 13.3 | 14.1 | 14.8 |
| ROA | 6.8 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.5 |
| EBITDA margin | 32.2 | 32.2 | 32.1 | 32.6 |
| Operating profit margin | 11.6 | 12.2 | 12.2 | 12.9 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 9.8 | 13.5 | 11.8 | 9.6 |
| Net debt/equity | 84.4 | 79.0 | 106.2 | 93.4 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 42.6 | 48.3 | 41.3 | 46.1 |
| Per share data (EUR) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 0.58 | 0.54 | 0.56 | 0.56 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 0.45 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.56 |
| DPS | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.21 | 0.40 |
| Book value | 4.17 | 4.27 | 3.72 | 3.88 |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Adjusted Revenues | 4,230 | 4,316 | 4,318 | 4,307 |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 1,340 | 1,385 | 1,395 | 1,413 |
| Adjusted EBIT | 475 | 518 | 537 | 564 |
| Adjusted net profit | 258 | 319 | 322 | 320 |
| FCFE clean | 165 | 311 | 326 | 366 |
| Net Debt/EBITDA adjusted for 100% | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| Hybrid | | | | |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| EV/EBITDA | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.6 | 5.3 |
| EV/IC | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| PE* | 17.4 | 14.2 | 14.0 | 14.1 |
| PB | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| FCF yield (%) | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.8 | 7.0 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 5.0 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (EUR) | 7.93 | Free float | 21% |
|--------------------|---------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (EUR) | 7.50 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | TELA.VI | Country | Austria |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | TKA AV | Analyst | Adam Fox-Rumley, CFA |
| Market cap (USDm) | 6,552 | Contact | +44 20 7991 6819 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | |
|------------------------------|------|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.04 |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.16 |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes |
| Social Indicators | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 19% |
| Employee turnover (%) | NA |
| Diversity policy | Yes |
| Source: Company data, HSBC | |

| Governance Indicators | |
|----------------------------------|------|
| No. of board members | 17 |
| Average board experience (years) | 4.77 |
| Female board members (%) | 12% |
| Board members Independence (%) | 88% |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC



Adam Fox-Rumley*, CFA

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Q4 results: 31 January

Telenor (TEL NO, NOK182.15, Hold, TP NOK170.0 from NOK150.0)

Investment Thesis

Telenor in the most international company in European telecoms. On our sum-of-the-parts, almost 50% of the company's enterprise value comes from its Asian operations, and the domestic Norwegian business accounts for just 27% of the total. This is despite the fact that the company has sold some international operations in 2017, with a disposal of its Indian business (23 February 2017), and the structuring of a complete withdrawal from Veon (21 September 2017). In our view, the market should be looking for this geographical exposure to provide above-sector average revenue growth; current medium-term guidance is for 'low single-digit organic revenue growth'.

The 2017 Capital Markets Day (2 February 2017) emphasised a deep focus on cost reduction, with an explicit target for *net* opex reductions of 1-3% per year 2018-2020. This should be a very appealing narrative to investors, and appears to be being delivered on; by Q3 2017 the company had already reached its NOK1bn target. These cost savings, combined with a capex/sales ratio of 15-16% should deliver strong FCF growth (pre-spectrum), which will supports the company's aspiration to grow DPS y-o-y.

Spectrum spend will be a big focus in 2018, in particular in Thailand, which has a history of expensive auctions. Clarity remains relatively limited, with recent suggestions (*see Bangkok post, 19 January 2018*) that a planned auction of 900MHz spectrum will be suspended, and larger amounts of 1800MHz sold; irrespective of this we expect a competitive auction (with N-1 bidding methodology applied) and one in which DTAC really needs to succeed. Allocation of spectrum in Malaysia and Bangladesh has historically been at comparatively low prices and is probably not something for stakeholders to worry about. An award of 700MHz spectrum in Sweden by the end of 2018 may be more costly.

Fibre build in the Nordic countries continues, with a focus on Norway, where the company looks to roll network out once c.50% of homes in an area have expressed an interest. We expect there to be another three or four years of steady construction to be done. In contrast, Sweden remains in land-grab mode, but this is increasingly in more rural (and therefore economically challenging) sites. Telenor consequently appears to be comfortable relying largely on third-party networks rather than extensive own-build.

Competition in the Nordic consumer markets requires continued monitoring. In Norwegian mobile, third operator ICE (Not listed) is focussed on the lowest price points and is outspending peers on commissions, while TDC's Get (an MVNO) appears to be selling largely into its cable base; to date a meaningful threat to Telenor has not materialised. Convergence has not begun in Norway, however Telia spoke of its active hunt for fixed broadband assets in the market (Q4 conference call), and the introduction of quad-play raises the possibility that some form of discounting might follow. Convergence is increasingly the story in Sweden, where Telia has taken tentative first steps, but the market may be accelerated should the proposed merger of Tele2 and Com Hem go ahead as planned. Telenor would be comparatively out-positioned should this deal go ahead.

On valuation Telenor trades a premium to the sector on FCF yield (7.7% vs. peers on 9%, 2018e) but this is somewhat supported by the cost savings that are being delivered. The company's 4.4% dividend yield is in line with the sector average. It is hard therefore, to find substantial additional upside to the current share price.



Forecast changes

We have updated our model for Sep 17 results. Our EBITDA forecasts increase c.2% as we increase cost savings forecasts. Our capex forecasts have reduced, in line with management commentary and recent trends. This leads to increase in our cash flow forecasts. Our 2017e cash forecasts are benefitted by one-off cash inflow from Veon stake disposal.

Forecast changes table

| | | New | | | Old | | | _ Delta _ | |
|--------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|
| NOKm | FY2017e | FY2018e | FY2019e | FY2017e | FY2018e | FY2019e | FY2017e | FY2018e | FY2019e |
| Revenue | 125,881 | 125,844 | 127,860 | 126,946 | 127,567 | 129,332 | -0.8% | -1.4% | -1.1% |
| EBITDA clean | 49,393 | 49,935 | 51,548 | 48,242 | 48,977 | 50,347 | 2.4% | 2.0% | 2.4% |
| margin | 39.2% | 39.7% | 40.3% | 38.0% | 38.4% | 38.9% | | | |
| opFCF | 30,447 | 30,032 | 32,412 | 27,608 | 29,003 | 30,878 | 10.3% | 3.5% | 5.0% |

Source: HSBC estimates

Valuation

We adjust our TP to NOK170.0 from NOK150.0 as a result of increases in our EBITDA estimates. We use a FCFF-based DCF method (from SOTP earlier to bring our assessment of the equity value in-line with the bulk of our coverage) to derive our new TP (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the <u>Valuation and risks section</u>), which implies 6.7% downside and we rate the stock Hold as we believe current share price is supported by sector leading cost performance.

FCFF based DCF valuation

| NOKm, unless stated | 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e | 2021e | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e |
|---------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 49,040 | 50,135 | 51,848 | 52,541 | 53,422 | 54,310 | 55,209 | 56,120 |
| Cash Capex | -20,043 | -19,903 | -19,137 | -19,438 | -19,760 | -20,101 | -20,459 | -20,832 |
| Cash tax | -6,134 | -7,783 | -8,084 | -8,572 | -8,860 | -9,170 | -9,457 | -9,727 |
| Net cash interest | -1,226 | -1,196 | -1,080 | -1,259 | -1,046 | -841 | -643 | -454 |
| WC changes | -548 | -143 | -248 | -130 | -143 | -132 | -123 | -116 |
| FCFF | 21,111 | 21,109 | 23,299 | 23,143 | 23,613 | 24,067 | 24,526 | 24,991 |
| Add: Net interest costs | 1,226 | 1,196 | 1,080 | 1,259 | 1,046 | 841 | 643 | 454 |
| Less: Tax shield | -328 | -320 | -289 | -337 | -280 | -225 | -172 | -121 |
| Free cash flow to firm | 22,010 | 21,986 | 24,090 | 24,066 | 24,380 | 24,683 | 24,997 | 25,323 |
| Terminal value | | | | | | | | 413,996 |
| Discount Factor | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.87 | 0.81 | 0.76 | 0.71 | 0.66 |
| PV of FCFF | 22,010 | 21,986 | 22,477 | 20,950 | 19,802 | 18,706 | 17,675 | 16,706 |
| PV of Terminal Value | | | | | | | | 273,126 |
| PV of total explicit cash flows | 116,316 | 29.9% | | | | | | |
| PV of TV | 273,126 | 70.1% | | | | | | |
| Enterprise Value | 389,443 | | | | | | | |
| Value of non-core assets | 3,823 | | | | | | | |
| Minorities | -73,192 | | | | | | | |
| Pension deficit | -2,411 | | | | | | | |
| Contingent liability (proportionate) | -12,128 | | | | | | | |
| Net Debt YE2018 | -38,719 | | | | | | | |
| add back: ND attributable to minority | 4,943 | | | | | | | |
| Equity Value | 271,759 | | | | | | | |
| NOSH (m) | 1,501 | | | | | | | |
| Value per share (NOK) | 170 | | | | | | | |

Source: HSBC estimates



Relative Valuation

- Telenor is richly valued, trading at the upper end of EV/EBITDA multiples and the lower end of the peer group on dividend yield
- ▶ The company is currently trading at the higher end of EV/EBITDA 1yr forward multiple range (defined by 2 standard deviations). Thus justifying the hold rating of the stock
- ▶ The recent positive momentum in EBITDA estimates are driven by cost reduction, with an explicit target for net opex reductions of 1-3% per year 2018-2020


Telenor - Valuation benchmark chart


Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|
| Price return | -3.7% | 2.0% | 5.1% | 14.5% | 37.2% |
| Total return | -3.8% | 2.0% | 7.2% | 16.9% | 44.4% |
| Total return vs SXKP | -4.9% | 2.4% | 6.6% | 20.1% | 41.3% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | -5.3% | 1.1% | 6.6% | 19.5% | 38.3% |
| Total return vs OBX OSLO | -2.5% | 0.1% | 4.1% | 3.3% | 27.0% |

Relative valuation







— 2017


1yr fwd EV/OpFCF



EBITDA estimates revision


2015

-2016




Capped at +/-50x levels

Dividend yield and corresponding Gsec 10yr bond yield



^{*} Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018





Financials & valuation: Telenor

Hold

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (NOKm | 1) | | | |
| Revenue | 125,395 | 125,881 | 125,844 | 127,860 |
| EBITDA | 45,049 | 49,393 | 49,935 | 51,548 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -20,742 | -20,703 | -19,862 | -19,821 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 24,307 | 28,691 | 30,073 | 31,728 |
| Net interest | -2,509 | -2,280 | -1,719 | -1,549 |
| PBT | 11,995 | 23,693 | 28,609 | 30,433 |
| HSBC PBT | 27,721 | 25,995 | 28,609 | 30,433 |
| Taxation | -5,924 | -7,783 | -8,084 | -8,572 |
| Net profit | 3,097 | 12,932 | 17,445 | 18,590 |
| HSBC net profit | 16,649 | 15,838 | 17,945 | 19,090 |
| Cash flow summary (NOKm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 36,639 | 38,989 | 38,104 | 39,373 |
| Capex | -21,840 | -18,946 | -18,311 | -17,606 |
| Cash flow from investment | -21,105 | -11,492 | -19,903 | -17,606 |
| Dividends | -11,246 | -11,961 | -11,824 | -11,943 |
| Change in net debt | 281 | -10,330 | -6,376 | -8,294 |
| FCF equity | 15,749 | 19,837 | 21,678 | 23,573 |
| Balance sheet summary (NOK | (m) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 57,575 | 56,162 | 50,951 | 46,705 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 72,016 | 74,106 | 79,359 | 82,920 |
| Current assets | 52,991 | 45,257 | 51,628 | 60,224 |
| Cash & others | 26,313 | 20,682 | 27,058 | 35,352 |
| Total assets | 206,319 | 191,432 | 198,100 | 206,267 |
| Operating liabilities | 51,648 | 61,908 | 62,178 | 62,840 |
| Gross debt | 86,361 | 65,777 | 65,777 | 65,777 |
| Net debt | 54,381 | 44,051 | 37,675 | 29,381 |
| Shareholders' funds | 50,879 | 48,003 | 54,028 | 61,025 |
| Invested capital | 104,622 | 92,935 | 92,701 | 91,658 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | 2.3 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 1.6 |
| EBITDA | 3.8 | 9.6 | 1.1 | 3.2 |
| Operating profit | 2.8 | 18.0 | 4.8 | 5.5 |
| PBT | -6.0 | 97.5 | 20.8 | 6.4 |
| HSBC EPS | 36.7 | -4.8 | 13.3 | 6.4 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| ROIC | 17.0 | 21.3 | 23.8 | 25.3 |
| ROE | 30.5 | 32.0 | 35.2 | 33.2 |
| ROA | 4.0 | 9.1 | 11.4 | 11.6 |
| EBITDA margin | 35.9 | 39.2 | 39.7 | 40.3 |
| Operating profit margin | 19.4 | 22.8 | 23.9 | 24.8 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 18.0 | 21.7 | 29.1 | 33.3 |
| Net debt/equity | 98.2 | 83.7 | 63.8 | 44.1 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.6 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 67.4 | 88.5 | 101.1 | 134.0 |
| Per share data (NOK) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 2.06 | 8.62 | 11.62 | 12.39 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 11.09 | 10.55 | 11.96 | 12.72 |
| DPS | 7.80 | 7.88 | 7.96 | 8.04 |
| Book value | 33.89 | 31.98 | 36.00 | 40.66 |
| | | | | |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Telenor revenue | 125,395 | 125,881 | 125,844 | 127,860 |
| Telenor EBITDA adjusted | 46,059 | 49,040 | 50,135 | 51,848 |
| Telenor PBT adjusted | 28,731 | 25,642 | 28,809 | 30,733 |
| Telenor Net income adjusted | 19,834 | 14,884 | 17,734 | 18,928 |
| Telenor OCF definition | 24,220 | 30,094 | 30,232 | 32,712 |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2016a | 12/2017e | 12/2018e | 12/2019e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.0 |
| EV/EBITDA | 9.0 | 8.1 | 7.9 | 7.5 |
| EV/IC | 3.9 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.2 |
| PE* | 16.4 | 17.3 | 15.2 | 14.3 |
| PB | 5.4 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 4.5 |
| FCF yield (%) | 4.5 | 5.6 | 6.1 | 6.6 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.4 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (NOK) | 182.15 | Free float | 46% |
|--------------------|--------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (NOK) | 170.00 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | TEL.OL | Country | Norway |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | TEL NO | Analyst | Adam Fox-Rumley, CFA |
| Market cap (USDm) | 35,611 | Contact | +44 20 7991 6819 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | |
|------------------------------|------|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.09 |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.26 |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes |
| Social Indicators | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 10% |
| Employee turnover (%) | NA |
| Diversity policy | Yes |
| | |

Source: Company data, HSBC

| Governance Indicators | |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| No. of board members | 21 |
| Average board experience (years) | 3 |
| Female board members (%) | 38% |
| Board members Independence (%) | 29% |

Price relative



Source: HSBC



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* Employed by a non-US affiliate of HSBC Securities (USA) Inc, and is not registered/ qualified pursuant to FINRA regulations

Telia Company (TELIA SS, SEK38.53, Hold, TP SEK37.6, from SEK42.0)

Investment Thesis

Telia is a company hunkering down to its core; by the end of 2018 it should be exclusively operating in the Nordic and Baltic regions (aside from a global Carrier business), having also substantially reduced its holdings in associate companies in 2017.

It has now been two years since the company's Eurasian assets were classified as 'held for sale', yet effecting disposals has not been straightforward despite management confidence a year ago. Most recently, Geocell has been disposed of (100% owned by Fintur) while Kazakhtelecom has permission from Kazakhstan's antitrust committee to buy 75% of Kcell which would be both Telia's direct 24% stake and Fintur's 51%. A piece-by-piece disposal of Fintur Holdings (owned alongside Turkcell) is now plainly on the agenda; smaller companies may be more digestible by local players. Following the settlement with the US DoJ (USD965m, c. SEK7.9bn), Ucell is probably in a more saleable state. We note a tax dispute in Nepal has surfaced (see *The Kathmandu Post*, 4 January 2018), well after Ncell was sold (Telia denies any liability), highlighting the sale of these assets may not entirely end the company's involvement in the region.

Domestically, there are several items on the agenda in Sweden. Most pressing is the outlook for fibre network expansion. This has been problematic in 2017, not from a demand perspective, but rather the company is running into practical issues associated with a progressively rural build-out (eg securing relevant permits). The market remains in land-grab mode, as overbuild is limited; we still think Telia is likely to build more than peers. But recent Swedish sales growth has seen a meaningful contribution from the substantial connection fees paid and a slower network build adds pressure here. The next challenge is the convergence of fixed and mobile tariffs. This is not in evidence today in Sweden, but Tele2's bid for Com Hem can be expected to change this should it successfully conclude. Telia's management wishes to reduce the threat of discounting by offering more-for-more, but market dynamics are not entirely in its control.

Outside Sweden, the company is pushing to achieve better growth rates in Finland, which the market should be able to support. In Norway, the consumer mobile market is comparatively quiet; commercial pressure may come from either third operator ICE or TDC's Get (an MVNO) but neither is especially active at present. More significantly the integration of B2B mobile provider Phonero is set to complete in early 2018, doubling Telia's size. Potentially this is a flash point for more competition. Denmark is treading water and being managed for cash, while the Baltic countries get little attention, given their scale within the Group.

The company had to instigate special cost-saving measures at its H1 2017 results in order to achieve the full year EBITDA targets. Mostly savings came from headcount reductions, and as such the impact was visible in both Q3 and Q4. There will be a benefit to flow through into the first half of 2018 from these changes. Given the ongoing pressures in the B2B market, the company may need to find further savings as the year develops.

On valuation, the stock trades roughly in-line with sector peers at 6.9x 2018e EBITDA. The company raised its dividend to SEK2.30 from SEK2.0, thus implying an attractive yield of 6.0% compared to 4.7% average of peers. This and the prospect of more cost savings should provide some support, but the increasingly competitive domestic market is a medium-term concern.



Forecast changes

We make small changes to our operational forecasts post FY17 results, primarily raising EBITDA estimates in Finland and Denmark, partly offset by negative revisions in Sweden. The 13-14% reductions in EPS are a consequence of the sale of associate stakes in Megafon and Turkcell at the end of 2017, and the consequent removal (respectively full and partial) of associate income.

Forecast changes (in SEKm, except EPS in SEK)

| | | New | | | Old | | | Delta | |
|-------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------|
| in SEKm | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e |
| Revenue | 80,053 | 80,150 | 80,491 | 78,605 | 78,712 | 79,026 | 1.8% | 1.8% | 1.9% |
| Adj EBITDA* | 26,016 | 26,188 | 26,411 | 25,826 | 25,996 | 26,210 | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.8% |
| Adj EPS* | 2.31 | 2.44 | 2.59 | 2.68 | 2.83 | 3.03 | -13.8% | -13.9% | -14.4% |
| Capex** | -14.031 | -13.296 | -13.172 | -13.527 | -12.889 | -12.785 | 3.7% | 3.2% | 3.0% |

^{*}Adjusted is before restructuring costs

Valuation

Our fair value target price is reduced to SEK37.6 from SEK42.0, primarily driven by c.25% lower realisation from associate stake sale in Turkcell and Megafon than our estimates (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the Valuation and risks section). Our new TP implies 2.4% downside and we rate the stock Hold.

Free cash to the firm DCF valuation model

| SEKm | | | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|-----------------------------------|---------|-------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|---------|---------|
| EBITDA reported | | | 25,516 | 25,988 | 26,251 | 26,539 | 26,845 | 27,164 | 27,495 |
| Cash capex | | | -14,214 | -13,479 | -13,355 | -13,290 | -13,272 | -13,441 | -13,611 |
| Cash net interest | | | -1,611 | -1,520 | -1,514 | -1,504 | -1,495 | -1,478 | -1,456 |
| Cash tax paid | | | -1,405 | -1,671 | -1,946 | -2,487 | -2,546 | -2,609 | -2,673 |
| Change in WC + Provisions | | | -106 | 500 | 250 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Equity FCF | | | 8,179 | 9,818 | 9,686 | 9,257 | 9,532 | 9,636 | 9,755 |
| add back: Net cash interest | | | 1,611 | 1,520 | 1,514 | 1,504 | 1,495 | 1,478 | 1,456 |
| Less: | | | -337 | -318 | -316 | -314 | -313 | -309 | -304 |
| FCFF | | | 9,454 | 11,020 | 10,884 | 10,447 | 10,715 | 10,805 | 10,907 |
| TV | | | | | | | | | 191,309 |
| PV explicit cash flows | | | 9,454 | 10,323 | 9,549 | 8,586 | 8,249 | 7,792 | 7,367 |
| PV of terminal cash flow | | | | | | | | | 129,219 |
| PV of total explicit cash flows | 51,865 | 28.6% | | | | | | | |
| PV of TV | 129,219 | 71.4% | | | | | | | |
| Total EV – continuing business | 181,085 | | | | | | | | |
| EV of discontinued business | 6,335 | | | | | | | | |
| Net debt (FY18e) | -35,353 | I | ncludes 50 | 0% of Hyb | orid | | | | |
| add back: FY18 Dividend pay-out | 9,959 | I | nterim pai | d in April, | Final in O | ctober | | | |
| Associates | 25,810 | | | | | | | | |
| Minorities | -2,335 | | | | | | | | |
| Contingent liabilities | -8,992 | A | Adj for 50% | 6 of Hybri | d + 25% o | f Ncell Co | T liability | | |
| Appraised value of equity | 176,509 | | | | | | | | |
| Shares (m) | 4,330 | | | | | | | | |
| Price per share (SEK) - Dec 18 | 40.8 | | | | | | | | |
| Target price (SEK/share) - Jan 18 | 37.6 | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

Source: HSBC estimates

^{***} Accrued capex including capex on intangible assets Source: HSBC estimates



Relative Valuation

- Cost saving program lead to upward revisions of consensus EBITDA forecasts
- ▶ Stock trades in line with peers on EBITDA metrics; but D/Y of 6% is at the upper end of the peer group.
- We believe outperformance vs SXKP in past 3 months is driven by group's recent successful exits from non-core business/regions

Telia Company - Valuation benchmark chart


Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Price return | 3.5% | 4.0% | 1.8% | 0.7% | 5.4% |
| Total return | 3.5% | 3.9% | 1.7% | 3.4% | 11.1% |
| Total return vs SXKP | 2.4% | 4.2% | 1.0% | 6.7% | 8.0% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | 2.0% | 2.9% | 1.0% | 6.0% | 5.0% |
| Total return vs OMXS30 | 4.6% | 3.5% | 4.2% | 0.9% | 3.6% |

Relative valuation




1yr fwd EV/EVITDA




Sales estimates revision



1yr fwd EV/OpFCF



EBITDA estimates revision




Capped at +/-50x levels





^{*} Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018

OpFCF estimates revision





Financials & valuation: Telia Company AB

Financial statements

| Year to | 12/2017a | 12/2018e | 12/2019e | 12/2020e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (SEKm |) | | | |
| Revenue | 79,867 | 80,053 | 80,150 | 80,491 |
| EBITDA | 25,806 | 25,516 | 25,988 | 26,251 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -12,893 | -12,334 | -12,431 | -12,442 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 12,913 | 13,181 | 13,557 | 13,809 |
| Net interest | -2,154 | -2,479 | -2,338 | -2,329 |
| PBT | 11,186 | 12,378 | 13,289 | 14,040 |
| HSBC PBT | 12,846 | 12,878 | 13,489 | 14,200 |
| Taxation | -1,041 | -2,354 | -2,468 | -2,526 |
| Net profit | 9,608 | 9,489 | 10,285 | 10,975 |
| HSBC net profit | 11,268 | 10,002 | 10,566 | 11,228 |
| Cash flow summary (SEKm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 23,569 | 22,678 | 23,852 | 23,973 |
| Capex | -11,525 | -10,834 | -10,267 | -10,171 |
| Cash flow from investment | -10,115 | -14,249 | -13,479 | -13,355 |
| Dividends | -8,660 | -9,959 | -9,959 | -9,959 |
| Change in net debt | -16,933 | 1,530 | -413 | -659 |
| FCF equity | 6,422 | 9,742 | 11,415 | 11,476 |
| Balance sheet summary (SEK | (m) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 74,627 | 75,211 | 75,628 | 76,017 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 60,024 | 61,319 | 61,950 | 62,475 |
| Current assets | 69,342 | 61,391 | 61,391 | 61,391 |
| Cash & others | 32,951 | 25,000 | 25,000 | 25,000 |
| Total assets | 241,821 | 236,291 | 238,005 | 239,695 |
| Operating liabilities | 19,659 | 20,503 | 21,800 | 22,630 |
| Gross debt | 91,487 | 85,066 | 84,653 | 83,994 |
| Net debt | 33,823 | 35,353 | 34,940 | 34,281 |
| Shareholders' funds | 99,970 | 99,500 | 99,825 | 100,842 |
| Invested capital | 151,383 | 152,419 | 152,170 | 152,253 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 12/2017a | 12/2018e | 12/2019e | 12/2020e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | -5.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| EBITDA | -13.4 | -1.1 | 1.9 | 1.0 |
| Operating profit | -29.4 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 1.9 |
| PBT | 20.1 | 10.7 | 7.4 | 5.7 |
| HSBC EPS | -4.6 | -11.2 | 5.6 | 6.3 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| ROIC | 9.0 | 8.5 | 8.7 | 8.9 |
| ROE | 11.9 | 10.0 | 10.6 | 11.2 |
| ROA | 4.8 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 5.6 |
| EBITDA margin | 32.3 | 31.9 | 32.4 | 32.6 |
| Operating profit margin | 16.2 | 16.5 | 16.9 | 17.2 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 12.0 | 10.3 | 11.1 | 11.3 |
| Net debt/equity | 32.1 | 33.6 | 32.9 | 31.8 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 69.7 | 64.1 | 68.3 | 69.9 |
| Per share data (SEK) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | 2.22 | 2.19 | 2.38 | 2.53 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 2.60 | 2.31 | 2.44 | 2.59 |
| DPS | 2.30 | 2.30 | 2.30 | 2.30 |
| Book value | 23.09 | 22.98 | 23.05 | 23.29 |
| | | | | |

Hold

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 12/2017a | 12/2018e | 12/2019e | 12/2020e |
|---------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 25,438 | 26,016 | 26,188 | 26,411 |
| Adjusted net income | 11,268 | 10,002 | 10,566 | 11,228 |
| Net debt incl 100% Hybrid | 41,493 | 43,023 | 42,610 | 41,951 |
| Dividend from associates | 2,851 | 1,135 | 1,404 | 1,781 |
| Operational FCF | 9,687 | 9,554 | 9,579 | 9,496 |

Valuation data

| Year to | 12/2017a | 12/2018e | 12/2019e | 12/2020e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| EV/EBITDA | 7.1 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.9 |
| EV/IC | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| PE* | 14.8 | 16.7 | 15.8 | 14.9 |
| PB | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| FCF yield (%) | 4.8 | 7.3 | 8.5 | 8.5 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (SEK) | 38.53 | Free float | 53% |
|--------------------|----------|------------|----------------------|
| Target price (SEK) | 37.60 | Sector | Diversified Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | TELIA.ST | Country | Sweden |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | TELIA SS | Analyst | Adam Fox-Rumley, CFA |
| Market cap (USDm) | 21,200 | Contact | +44 20 7991 6819 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------|--|--|--|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.034 | | | |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.177 | | | |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes | | | |
| Social Indicators | | | | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | NA | | | |
| Employee turnover (%) | | | | |
| Diversity policy | Yes | | | |
| | | | | |

Source: Company data, HSBC

| Governance Indicators | |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| No. of board members | 12 |
| Average board experience (years) | 4.6 |
| Female board members (%) | 50 |
| Board members Independence (%) | 67 |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC

Note: Priced at close of 26 Jan 2018



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* Employed by a non-US affiliate of HSBC Securities (USA) Inc, and is not registered/ qualified pursuant to FINRA regulations

Q3 IMS: 1 February

Vodafone Group (VOD LN, 226p, Hold, TP 230p)

Investment Thesis

Vodafone increasingly defies too tight a categorisation; it is certainly no longer simply a wireless telecoms provider. Almost 25% of service revenue is from fixed line and the company has 15m broadband customers and 10m TV subscribers. Cut the business a different way and virtually a third of its service revenue comes from the Corporate sector. The structural demand for mobile services continues and can be illustrated by 88% y-o-y growth in data traffic in H1 FY18. Contract ARPU is stable in most European markets after years of decline. The Group's Global portfolio remains largely intact, though it is unarguably more European than in (say) 2010.

Mobile inevitably remains at the core of the company. We think the German market is one of Europe's best following consolidation, and Vodafone has a strong number two position here. Competitive levels appear to be somewhat lower than a year ago, though we are watching the convergent market carefully following the merger of Drillisch and United Internet. The Spanish mobile pricing environment has been very supportive over the last year, but recently competition at the low-end has begun to pick up, though Vodafone has comparatively little exposure. Our greatest concerns are with Italy, where below-the-line marketing is aggressive in advance of Iliad's entry later in 2018. As a largely pre-paid market, any tariff war is likely to lead to rapid cuts to estimates. Low starting tariffs provide us with little comfort, given Iliad's need to gain market share rapidly.

The fixed line network is an interlinking patchwork of networks, which allow Vodafone to provide high-speed broadband services to its mobile base. It has mixed outright acquisitions (eg Germany, Spain) with own-build (eg Germany), partnerships (eg Portugal, UK) and wholesale agreements (eg UK, Spain). This strategy reflects active capital allocation and we think is suited to the comparatively difficult task of selling fixed line services into an existing mobile base.

Vodafone's three year 'Fit for Growth' programme has come to a close, delivering more centralised spending, increased use of shared service centres and lowering the cost of Group support functions, but cost control remains central to the company's investment case. With a growing top line, absolute cost reductions are not straightforward to achieve, but the company has pointed to an opex base of EUR8bn which could be optimised via 'Digital' means. Opportunities exist to simplify and automate standard processes, use data analytics for better network management, through to Al-enabled customer support. There is certainly a significant opportunity for Vodafone here, though questions remain on whether savings will simply be competed away, and the extent to which they are able to capture a meaningful competitive advantage. Concerns aside, the company is promising to deliver EBITDA growth at a faster pace than revenue growth which is a tantalising medium term prospect.

From a valuation perspective, the company is currently trading in line with peers. While reported growth is high (eg EBITDA growth of 9.3% in H1 FY18), the deconsolidation of problem assets (specifically the Netherlands and India into JVs, though economic ownership is comparatively unchanged) means that owned growth is flattered. The company's return on invested capital is one of the lowest in the sector (3.0%), though with falling capex (relative to the Spring highpoint) and improving profits, returns may reach the cost of capital by FY22. The saving grace is the dividend yield, presently 5.9%. A re-rating to 5% would take the share to 265p.

Finally we do not expect the suggestion of a Vodafone-Liberty Global tie-up to disappear in 2018. Indeed the noise levels may increase (eg *Telegraph*, 28 November 2017). Liberty Global's recent divestment of UPC Austria and the finalisation of the Liberty Latin America (formerly known as LiLAC) spin-off, removes some of the non-overlapping countries; as such a greater portion of the assets would provide some operating synergies.



Forecast changes

We have incorporated the latest forecasts from our colleague Ziyad Joosub for Vodacom group (VOD SJ, ZAR163, Hold; see his 21 December 2017 report FCF yield attractive but still cautious on SA consumer growth and regulations) in our model. This lead to 0.8-1.4% cuts to our adjusted EBITDA forecasts. Our forecasts for rest of the group are unchanged.

Forecast changes table

| (in EURm, unless | | NEW | | | OLD | | | Δ (%) | |
|------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|
| stated) | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e |
| Sales | 46,015 | 46,451 | 47,377 | 46,030 | 46,513 | 47,484 | 0.0% | -0.1% | -0.2% |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 14,346 | 14,519 | 14,935 | 14,462 | 14,690 | 15,149 | -0.8% | -1.2% | -1.4% |
| EPS* (EURc) | 8.9 | 9.1 | 10.5 | 9.2 | 9.6 | 11.1 | -3.4% | -4.8% | -5.2% |
| FCF | 5,213 | 5,532 | 5,837 | 5,312 | 5,658 | 5,989 | -1.9% | -2.2% | -2.5% |

Source: HSBC estimates
* company definition of adjusted earnings

Valuation

We derive our unchanged 230p TP using a SOTP method (details on the assumptions and risks can be read in the Valuation and risks section), which implies 2.0% upside and we rate the stock Hold.

Vodafone sum of the parts valuation

| | FY18 sales (EURbn) | FY18 EBITDA (EURbn) | FY18 EV/sales | FY18 EV/EBITDA | EV | Ownership | Stake (EURbn) | EUR/share | % EV |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------|-----------|------------------|-----------|--------|
| Germany | 10.8 | 3.9 | 3.0x | 8.3x | 32.6 | 91.6% | 29.9 | 1.12 | 26.2% |
| Italy | 6.2 | 2.3 | 2.2x | 6.0x | 13.6 | 100% | 13.6 | 0.51 | 11.9% |
| UK | 6.7 | 1.5 | 1.4x | 6.0x | 9.1 | 100% | 9.1 | 0.34 | 8.0% |
| Spain | 5.0 | 1.5 | 2.3x | 8.0x | 11.7 | 100% | 11.7 | 0.44 | 10.3% |
| Portugal | 1.0 | 0.4 | 2.5x | 7.0x | 2.5 | 100% | 2.5 | 0.09 | 2.2% |
| Greece | 0.9 | 0.3 | 1.7x | 5.5x | 1.5 | 99.9% | 1.5 | 0.06 | 1.3% |
| Others | 3.0 | 0.9 | 1.6x | 5.5x | 4.7 | 100% | 4.7 | 0.18 | 4.2% |
| Europe | 33.4 | 10.7 | 2.3x | 7.1x | 75.8 | 96% | 73.0 | 2.73 | 64.0% |
| Vodacom | 5.3 | 2.0 | 2.9x | 7.7x | 17.9 | 64.5% | 9.8 | 0.37 | 8.6% |
| Turkey | 2.9 | 0.7 | 2.0x | 8.5x | 5.6 | 100% | 5.6 | 0.21 | 4.9% |
| Egypt | 1.0 | 0.4 | 2.4x | 5.5x | 2.5 | 54.9% | 1.3 | 0.05 | 1.2% |
| Others | 2.1 | 0.6 | 1.5x | 5.5x | 3.1 | 78.7% | 2.5 | 0.09 | 2.1% |
| AMAP | 11.3 | 3.7 | 2.3x | 7.2x | 26.4 | 72.8% | 19.3 | 0.78 | 16.9% |
| Eliminations | 1.3 | 0.0 | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0 | 100% | 0.0 | 0.00 | 0.0% |
| Consolidated Group | 46.0 | 14.3 | 2.2x | 7.1x | 102.2 | 90% | 92.3 | 3.45 | 80.9% |
| India | 5.1 | 1.1 | 1.4x | 6.4x | 7.1 | 100% | 7.1 | 0.27 | 6.3% |
| Associate & Investments | | | | | | | | | |
| Safaricom | | 0.9 | | 10.5x | 9.7 | 5% | 0.5 | 0.02 | 0.4% |
| Indus towers | | 1.1 | | 7.2x | 7.7 | 42% | 3.2 | 0.12 | 2.8% |
| Netherlands | | 1.8 | | 10.0x | 17.6 | 50% | 8.8 | 0.33 | 7.6% |
| Australia | | 0.5 | | 8.0x | 4.1 | 50% | 2.1 | 0.08 | 1.8% |
| Enterprise value (EURbn) | | | | | | | 114.0 | 4.26 | 100% |
| Net debt (end FY18) (EURbn) | | | | | | | (29.8) | -1.11 | -26.2% |
| Verizon loan notes | | | | | | | 2.1 | 0.08 | 1.9% |
| shareholder loans to NL JV | | | | | | | 1.0 | 0.04 | 0.9% |
| Contingent liabilities | | | | | | | (9.3) | -0.35 | -8.0% |
| Adjustment to ND for Associate | es/Minorities | | | | | | (7.9) | -0.29 | -6.9% |
| Adjustment to Indian ND | | | | | | | (9.2) | -0.34 | -8.1% |
| NPV of deferred tax assets | | | | | | | 7.0 | 0.26 | 6.0% |
| Interim dividend adjustment | | | | | | | 1.3 | 0.05 | 1.2% |
| Market cap (EURbn) | | | | | | | 69.3 | 2.60 | |
| Market cap (GBPbn) | | | | | | | 60.8 | 2.30 | |
| Shares in issue (bn) | | | | | | | 26.78 | | |

Source: HSBC estimates

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Relative Valuation


- Despite its slight outperformance vs. SXKP over past 12 months, the stock is trading in-line with its historical multiples as well as peer group on EBITDA and OpFCF
- Strong EBITDA performance in H1 18 has driven slight upward consensus revisions
- Dividend yield is one of the highest among peers at 6.1% (FY19e)

Vodafone - Valuation benchmark chart

Recent performance

| | 1W | 1M | 3M | 6M | 12M |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Price return | -0.1% | -4.4% | 4.9% | 2.9% | 17.2% |
| Total return | -0.1% | -4.4% | 6.9% | 4.8% | 24.3% |
| Total return vs SXKP | -1.2% | -4.0% | 6.2% | 8.1% | 21.2% |
| Total return vs MSCI Europe Telecom | -1.6% | -5.3% | 6.2% | 7.5% | 18.2% |
| Total return vs FTSE 100 | 0.8% | -5.4% | 3.9% | 0.2% | 13.0% |


Relative valuation




1yr fwd EV/EVITDA




Sales estimates revision



1yr fwd EV/OpFCF




EBITDA estimates revision




Capped at +/-50x levels

Dividend yield and corresponding Gsec 10yr bond yield



^{*} Total return includes share price appreciation plus any dividend Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and HSBC calculations. Dated as of 26 January 2018

OpFCF estimates revision





Financials & valuation: Vodafone Group

Hold

Financial statements

| Year to | 03/2017a | 03/2018e | 03/2019e | 03/2020e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Profit & loss summary (EURm |) | | | |
| Revenue | 47,631 | 46,015 | 46,451 | 47,377 |
| EBITDA | 13,734 | 13,931 | 14,104 | 14,520 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | -11,225 | -10,963 | -9,763 | -9,633 |
| Operating profit/EBIT | 2,509 | 2,968 | 4,341 | 4,887 |
| Net interest | -932 | -389 | -862 | -884 |
| PBT | 2,792 | 2,679 | 3,561 | 4,126 |
| HSBC PBT | 3,272 | 3,818 | 3,976 | 4,541 |
| Taxation | -4,764 | -646 | -891 | -1,028 |
| Net profit | -2,190 | 1,614 | 2,216 | 2,607 |
| HSBC net profit | 2,249 | 2,462 | 2,525 | 2,916 |
| Cash flow summary (EURm) | | | | |
| Cash flow from operations | 10,451 | 11,967 | 12,214 | 12,540 |
| Capex | -8,387 | -7,178 | -7,098 | -7,118 |
| Cash flow from investment | -8,358 | -6,915 | -7,923 | -7,943 |
| Dividends | -3,714 | -3,981 | -4,061 | -4,142 |
| Change in net debt | -5,728 | -1,328 | -231 | -455 |
| FCF equity | -2,155 | 5,520 | 5,215 | 5,482 |
| Balance sheet summary (EUR | m) | | | |
| Intangible fixed assets | 46,220 | 45,110 | 43,990 | 42,895 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 30,204 | 29,432 | 28,712 | 28,117 |
| Current assets | 42,737 | 42,519 | 42,069 | 42,318 |
| Cash & others | 14,955 | 14,541 | 14,051 | 14,292 |
| Total assets | 154,684 | 152,163 | 149,371 | 147,433 |
| Operating liabilities | 30,338 | 30,311 | 30,428 | 30,587 |
| Gross debt | 46,574 | 45,548 | 44,827 | 44,613 |
| Net debt | 31,169 | 29,841 | 29,611 | 29,155 |
| Shareholders' funds | 72,200 | 69,113 | 67,075 | 65,343 |
| Invested capital | 73,868 | 72,210 | 70,292 | 68,450 |
| | | | | |

Ratio, growth and per share analysis

| Year to | 03/2017a | 03/2018e | 03/2019e | 03/2020e |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Y-o-y % change | | | | |
| Revenue | -14.8 | -3.4 | 0.9 | 2.0 |
| EBITDA | -11.5 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 2.9 |
| Operating profit | 30.9 | 18.3 | 46.3 | 12.6 |
| PBT | | -4.1 | 32.9 | 15.9 |
| HSBC EPS | 16.5 | 10.6 | 2.5 | 15.5 |
| Ratios (%) | | | | |
| Revenue/IC (x) | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| ROIC | 6.6 | 7.8 | 8.2 | 9.0 |
| ROE | 2.9 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 4.4 |
| ROA | -0.8 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.5 |
| EBITDA margin | 28.8 | 30.3 | 30.4 | 30.6 |
| Operating profit margin | 5.3 | 6.5 | 9.3 | 10.3 |
| EBITDA/net interest (x) | 14.7 | 35.8 | 16.4 | 16.4 |
| Net debt/equity | 42.3 | 41.7 | 42.7 | 43.2 |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x) | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| CF from operations/net debt | 33.5 | 40.1 | 41.2 | 43.0 |
| Per share data (EUR) | | | | |
| EPS Rep (diluted) | -0.08 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.09 |
| HSBC EPS (diluted) | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.11 |
| DPS | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.16 |
| Book value | 2.58 | 2.50 | 2.42 | 2.36 |
| | | | | |

Key forecast drivers

| Year to | 03/2017a | 03/2018e | 03/2019e | 03/2020e |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Europe Revenues | 34,550 | 33,416 | 33,675 | 34,072 |
| Europe EBITDA | 10,283 | 10,667 | 10,781 | 11,014 |
| Europe EBITDA margin (%) | 29.8 | 31.9 | 32.0 | 32.3 |
| AMAP Revenues | 11,773 | 11,291 | 11,469 | 11,997 |
| AMAP EBITDA | 3,854 | 3,659 | 3,725 | 3,908 |
| AMAP EBITDA margin (%) | 32.7 | 32.4 | 32.5 | 32.6 |

Valuation data

| Year to | 03/2017a | 03/2018e | 03/2019e | 03/2020e |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| EV/sales | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| EV/EBITDA | 7.6 | 7.4 | 7.3 | 7.0 |
| EV/IC | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| PE* | 32.0 | 28.9 | 28.2 | 24.4 |
| PB | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| FCF yield (%) | -2.9 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 7.5 |
| Dividend yield (%) | 5.7 | 5.9 | 6.0 | 6.1 |

^{*} Based on HSBC EPS (diluted)

Issuer information

| Share price (GBPp) | 226 | Free float | 100% |
|---------------------|--------|------------|-------------------|
| Target price (GBPp) | 230 | Sector | Wireless Telecoms |
| Reuters (Equity) | VOD.L | Country | United Kingdom |
| Bloomberg (Equity) | VOD LN | Analyst | Stephen Howard |
| Market cap (USDm) | 85,349 | Contact | 44 20 7991 6820 |

ESG metrics

| Environmental Indicators | |
|------------------------------|-------|
| GHG Intensity (kg/USD) | 0.050 |
| Energy Intensity (kWh/USD) | 0.119 |
| CO2 reduction policy | Yes |
| Social Indicators | |
| Employee costs as % of sales | 11.6 |
| Employee turnover (%) | 18 |
| Diversity policy | Yes |
| | |

Source: Company data, HSBC

| Governance Indicators | |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| No. of board members | 11 |
| Average board experience (years) | 4.5 |
| Female board members (%) | 36 |
| Board members Independence (%) | 82 |
| | |

Price relative



Source: HSBC

Note: Priced at close of 26 Jan 2018



Valuation **Risks**

BT Group BT/A LN

Current price: **GBP2.63**

Target price: **GBP3.60**

Buy Un/downside: 36.9%

We value BT using a FCFF-based DCF valuation. We use a RFR of Key downside risks include: (i) BT's entry into mobile 2.5%, an MRP of 5.5% and a beta of 1.2 (all unchanged). We continue to incorporate a 50bps stock-specific risk into the MRP, to account for increased regulatory risk. This leads to an unchanged cost of equity of 9.1% and unchanged WACC of 7.8%. We assume a contingent liability against net pension deficit of GBP7.7bn. This gives us a fair value target price of 360p, implying 36.9% upside and we rate the stock Buy.

sparking a renewed bout of price competition; (ii) adverse regulation; (iii) higher-than-expected pension deficit; (iv) further poor trading in the company's Global Services and Business & Public Sector divisions; (v) Ofcom deciding to conclude its WLA review at the harsher end of its indicated range of options, and (vi) the Italian accounting issue not being concluded with January 2017 release.

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Deutsche Telekom **DTE GR**

Buy

Current price: EUR14.57

Target price: EUR18.50

Up/downside: 26.9%

We value DT using multiple based SoTP method, except for listed T-Mobile US which is valued at HSBC TP (see valuations and risks below). We use a target multiple of 7.8x 2018e EV/EBITDA to value DT's German and integrated European operations (all unchanged). We see a fair value for DT's mobile-centric assets at 5.0x EV/EBITDA and DT's GHS division at 5.0x. These multiples are assigned relative to the multiple calculated in our report The 4Cs - stock picks (28 January 2016), in which we derived a theoretical multiple for a telecoms market undergoing repair. Our unchanged TP of EUR18.50 implies 26.9% upside; we maintain our Buy rating on the stock.

Downside risks include further delays in a return to revenue growth in Germany, Europe in aggregate not delivering sustained EBITDA growth, less support from regulation, US growth momentum stalling and DT being less financially disciplined in M&A activities.

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Elisa ELISA FH Current price: EUR33.05

Target price: **EUR29.5**

Up/downside: -10.7%

We value Elisa using a FCFF-based DCF methodology to arrive at a Upside risks to our rating and target price include: (i) an fair value target price of EUR29.50 (from EUR29.20). This increase improved economic environment leading to accelerated is primarily driven by increase in rolling forward of our valuation to current date. We use a RFR of 2.5%, a MRP of 6.0% and a beta of 1.0 (all unchanged). This leads to unchanged WACC of 7.1%. Our TP implies downside of 10.7%; we maintain our Reduce rating on the stock as the growth offered does not justify the valuation premium to the sector in our view.

mobile revenue growth, especially in the Corporate sector, as well as a potential slowing of the decline in fixed line services; (ii) better operating cost performance than we currently expect; and (iii) consolidation in the European telecoms sector progressing from in-market deals to crossborder ones.

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KPN **KPN AS**

Buy

Reduce

Current price: **EUR2.88**

Target price: **EUR3.70**

Up/downside: 28.2%

We use a DCF methodology to derive our valuation for the domestic Downside risks include: (1) A pricing environment in the business of KPN. We assume a risk-free rate of 2.5%, a market risk Netherlands being disrupted could lead operators to switch premium of 6.0%, beta of 1.1, and terminal growth rate of 1.0% (all from the current focus on up-selling/cross-selling towards unchanged). We value the 9.5% Telefonica Deutschland (O2D GR; market shares gains; (2) A lower-than-guided dividend from CP EUR3.99; Hold) stake at the current trading price We reiterate our Buy rating, with an unchanged target price of

Telefonica Deutschland (TD), in which KPN owns 9.5% KPN has so far been passing through the dividend received from TD to its shareholders; and (3) changes in fixed-line wholesale regulation for KPN and/or cable.

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EUR3.70, implying 28.2% upside.

Orange **ORA FP**

Buy

Current price: EUR14.85

Target price: EUR17.0

Up/downside: 14.5%

We derive our target price of EUR17 using a sum-of-the-parts. We use a DCF to value France (WACC 8.1%), Spain (8.4%), other Europe (8.1%), Enterprise segment (8.7%), Africa & Middle East (10%), and ICSS (8.6%); all assumptions are unchanged. We use HSBC target prices for Orange Polska (OPL PW, PLN6.10, Hold, TP PLN5.9) and Orange Belgium (OBEL BB, EUR17.02, Buy, TP EUR26), and we bring in all other associates at their respective market prices. Our TP implies 14.5% upside; we reiterate our Buy rating as we believe further upside from the strategic plan outlined in December 2017 is possible, including value creation from fibre deployment.

Key downside risks include: i) worse-than-expected market conditions in France driven by price wars and rising content costs, ii) price war in Spain and iii) business disruption in Africa due to geopolitical risk.

Priced at 26 Jan 2018 Source: HSBC estimates Nicolas Cote-Colisson | nicolas.cote-colisson@hsbcib.com | +44 20 7991 6826



| | | Valuation | Risks |
|---|----------------|---|------------|
| D | Current price: | We use a DCF methodology to arrive at our target price of EUR32 | Key upside |

Proximus PROX BB

Hold

Hold

Buy

EUR28.10 Target price:

EUR32.0 Up/downside:

13.9%

We use a DCF methodology to arrive at our target price of EUR32 per share. We use a WACC assumption of 7.3% (unchanged) in our DCF model, which incorporates a risk-free rate of 2.5%, market risk premium of 6% and beta of 1.0 (all unchanged). Our TP implies 13.9% upside and we reiterate our Hold rating given the uncertainties arising from new regulation in the fixed broadband market and its implications.

Key upside risks include: (i) a less competitive than expected market, allowing Proximus to reduce subsidies; and (ii) higher savings derived from the cost cutting plan compared to the EUR150m over 2015 and 2019 planned by the management. Key downside risks include: (i) high fixedline market share losses driven by a stronger-than expected success of Orange Belgium's fixed-line offers; and (ii) a potential disposal of part of the state's 55.9% stake now that the law authorises such a disposal.

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<u>Swiss</u>com SCMN VX

Current price: EUR518.80

Target price: EUR515.0

Up/downside: -0.7%

We value Swisscom using a DCF-based sum-of-the-parts methodology. We use a WACC of 5.7% for the Swiss operations (RFR 2.5%, MRP 4.5%, beta 1.0 - all unchanged) and 7.5% WACC for Italy (RFR 2.5%, MRP 6.0%, beta 1.2 - all unchanged). We maintain our Hold rating with an unchanged target price of CHF515 per share. Our TP implies -0.7% downside and we rate the stock

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Key upside risks include faster-than-expected revenue and EBITDA growth should competitors' offers be not wellreceived in the market. Key downside risks include increased price competition in mobile and/or fixed line in Switzerland, leading to market share loss or ARPU decline; Iliad's mobile entry in Italy may hurt Fastweb's performance.

T-Mobile US TMUS US

Current price: USD65.28

Target price: USD70.0

Up/downside: 7.2%

We use a DCF methodology to value TMUS US, based on a WACC of 6.3%, composed of a RFR of 2.5% (consistent with our valuation of other US peers), MRP of 4.1% (20-year average - market implied equity risk premium), beta of 1.0x, cost of equity of 7.2%, and a debt/total capital ratio of 30% (all unchanged). The unchanged WACC lead us to a fair value target price of USD70. Our TP implies 7.2% upside. The superior growth potential in EBITDA and operating cash flow of the stock versus peers as well as a healthy ROIC forecast of 8.6% in 2017e-20e contribute to our Buy rating. Although we expect mobile competition to remain intense in the near term, TMUS could continue to gain market share as it expands its footprint with the rollout of 600MHz spectrum.

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Downside risks include: (i) deteriorating subscriber growth as "Un-Carrier" initiatives run out of steam; (ii) competitors reacting more actively, potentially resulting in a sustained value destructive price war; and (iii) an acquisition at an unreasonable price.

TDC A/S TDC DC

Hold

Current price: **DKK40.07**

Target price: **DKK39.8**

Up/downside: -0.7%

We value TDC using a FCFF based DCF. We use a RFR of 2.5%, a MRP of 6.0%, beta of 1.1 and cost of debt of 3.5% (all unchanged), leading to WACC of 6.5%. We incorporate the EUR750m hybrid bond as further, (2) lower levels of competition in both the business 100% debt, though credit rating agencies ascribe 50% of it to be equity. We also add the NPV of estimated cash flow for future spectrum auctions in Denmark as a contingent liability. Changes to our cash flow estimates (explained above) and the roll forward our DCF valuation leads previously proposed), and (4) cross-border M&A. to a fair value target price of DKK 39.8 (earlier DKK38.0). Our TP implies Key downside risks: (1) increased mobile market price -0.7% downside and we rate the stock Hold.

Key upside risks: (1) a better than expected recovery in the domestic mobile market should pricing trends improve market and consumer broadband than we currently expect, (3) four-to-three mobile consolidation coming back onto the agenda in Denmark (albeit in a different form to that competition, (2) local loop unbundling of TDC's cable network leading to significant customer loss in the fixed-line broadband market, (3) an inability to transfer business customers significantly quickly and/or the creation of disruption which leads to customer loss and. (4) deteriorating Group prospects leading to a credit rating downgrade and associated higher interest costs.

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Priced at 26 Jan 2018 Source: HSBC estimates



| Telecom | Italia | |
|---------|--------|--|
| TIT IM | | |

Current price: **EUR0.72** Target price:

EUR0.85

Up/downside: 18.0%

Valuation **Risks**

We use a DCF methodology to derive our valuation for the domestic business of Telecom Italia. To calculate our WACC, we take a risk-free rate of 2.5%, a market risk premium of 6.0% and a beta of 1.3 (all unchanged). For the purpose of valuing TI's Brazilian assets, we value TIM Participações (TIMP3 BZ, BRL13.39, Reduce) at market price. Our target price of EUR0.85 (unchanged) implies upside of 18.0%. We rate the stock Hold in view of our concerns over the impact the entry of Iliad as an MNO in the Italian market may have in the form of increased competitive pressures.

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Key upside risks include: (i) Less-than-anticipated increase in competitive intensity in the Italian mobile market; (ii) a disposal of TIM Participações (Bloomberg, 18 June 2015) at an attractive valuation scenario; (iii) slow or no progress from Open Fiber in its parallel fibre access network deployment. Key downside risks include: (i) slower-than expected progress in the 2017-19 cost-cutting programme announced by management with the 2016 results; and (ii) a more substantial network disintermediation as a result of OF's parallel fibre deployments.

Telefónica TEF SM

Hold

Hold

Current price: **EUR 8.50**

Target price: **EUR 9.0**

Up/downside: 5.8%

We use a DCF-based SOTP valuation to calculate a fair value of EUR9.0 (earlier EUR9.3) for Telefonica. We use a WACC of 8.2% for the Spanish operations (RFR 2.5%, MRP 6.0%, beta 1.1) and 7.2% WACC for UK (RFR 2.5%, MRP 5.0%, beta 1.1) - all unchanged. We add 130bps to the risk premium for emerging assets, and value Telefonica Brasil (VIVT4 BZ, BRL52.94, Hold) at market price. The change in target price is mainly due to combination of reduction in our estimates (explained in the company section of this report) and incorporation of EUR1bn recent hybrid issue in our valuation partially offset by roll forward of our valuation to February 2018. Our new TP implies 5.8% upside and we rate Telefonica Hold primarily in view of our concerns on the competitive environment in Spain.

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Key downside risks include: competition becoming more intense than we expect in LatAm and Spain. Key upside risks include: favourable market conditions for asset disposals and decline in the cost of debt.

Telefonica Deutschland O2D GR

Hold

Current price: EUR3.99

Target price: **EUR4.1**

Up/downside: 2.7%

We use a DCF approach to value the group assuming a WACC of 7.4% based on an 18% long term debt/total capital ratio, 1.0 beta, 6.0% market risk premium, 2.5% risk-free rate, 3% cost of debt, and 12.75% terminal tax rate. Our terminal growth rate assumption is +0.5% to reflect our prudence on the company's long-term growth outlook. Based on these assumptions, which are all unchanged, and our marginally revised estimates, our fair value target price remains EUR4.10. Our target price implies 2.7% upside and we reiterate our Hold rating based on an attractive dividend yield supported by strong cash conversion but limited valuation upside.

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Downside risks include a more aggressive than anticipated competitive environment resulting in delays in market repair, execution risk on the merger integration, a long-term competitive disadvantage from not owning fixed-line infrastructure, and the share overhang from KPN's residual stake. Upside risks include O2D benefiting more from overall market bill-inflationary market growth, higher synergies and Telefonica potentially raising its stake in the company to reduce dividend leakage.

Telekom Austria

Reduce

Current price: **EUR7.93**

Target price: **EUR7.50**

Up/downside: -5.4%

We value Telekom Austria using a FCFF based DCF. We use a RFR of 2.5%, beta of 1.0. Our ERP of 7.2% (from 6.8%), is an EBITDA-weighted average for the Group's key counties, incorporating a 50bps stock-specific risk into the domestic MRP. This leads to a WACC of 7.3% (up from 7.0%). This adjustment is offset by upward forecast revisions (explained above) and rolling forward the valuation to January 2018, leading to fair value TP of EUR7.5 (from EUR7.0). Our target price implies -5.4% downside and we reiterate our Reduce rating given competition concerns.

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Key upside risks include a substantial lessening of competition from MVNOs in Austria leading to improved mobile service revenue performance, better than expected trends in CEE mobile service revenue growth and better than expected cost control leading to improved profitability.

Priced at 26 Jan 2018 Source: HSBC estimates



| elenor EL NO | Current prid |
|-----------------|--------------|
| EL NO | Target price |
| | NOK170.0 |

Hold

nt price: 82.15 price:

Up/downside:

-6.7%

SoTP valuation earlier). We use RFR of 2.5%, ERP of 6.0%, beta of 1.0. Our cost of debt assumption of 3.4% is in line with company's average cost of gross debt. This leads to WACC of 7.2%. We assume 1% terminal growth rate, in-line with most of European incumbents. We incorporate expected spectrum auction outflow (proportionately) in Asian countries in 2018 as contingent liability. This gives us a fair value target price of NOK170 (up from NOK150); implying 6.7% downside. We reiterate our Hold rating as we believe current share price is

supported by sector leading cost performance.

Valuation

Upside risks include a quick recovery in Thailand and

Risks

Malaysia; lower than expected spectrum costs; and net opex savings coming in earlier than we currently expect. Downside risks include a sustained phase of decline in Norway, no recovery in Thailand and Malaysia, and a failure to deliver on net opex savings

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With this report we have moved to use DCF based valuation (from

Telia Company **TELIA SS**

Hold

Current price: **SEK38.53**

Target price: SEK37.60

Up/downside: -2.4%

We value Telia using a FCFF-based DCF. We use a RFR of 2.5%, beta of 1.1, MRP of 6.2% and cost of debt of 2.2% (all unchanged). This leads to unchanged WACC of 6.8%. We have included 50% of hybrid capital, which is not in reported net debt, as a contingent liability and also include capital gain tax liability in Nepal at 25% probability. We hold the Eurasian assets at 3.0x EBITDA (unchanged) and associate Turkcell (TCELL TI, Buy, CMP16.4) at HSBC target price. Our fair value target price reduced to SEK37.6 from SEK42.0, primarily driven by c.25% lower realisation from associate stake sale in Turkcell and Megafon than our estimates. Our TP implies downside of -2.4%; we reiterate our Hold rating as we believe strong dividend yield and prospect of further cost savings are likely to provide support to stock price.

Key upside risks are: (1) better-than-expected adoption of fibre broadband in Sweden, (2) an improved market structure in Denmark

Downside risks are: (1) increased price competition in Swedish mobile market, (2) increased competition following Tele2's acquisition of Com Hem, (3) higher than expected market pressure in Norwegian mobile market from new

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Vodafone Group VOD LN

Hold

Current price: **GBP2.26**

Target price: **GBP2.30**

Up/downside: 2.0%

We use a multiples-based sum-of-the-parts approach to value Vodafone. For Vodacom (VOD SJ, CP ZAR163.00, Hold), we use a FY18e EV/EBITDA multiple implied by HSBC's target price. We assign target multiples to FY18e EV/EBITDA (ranging from 5.5x to 8.3x) for the remaining country units. We assign these multiples relative to the multiple calculated in our report The 4 Cs - stock picks (28 January 2016) in which we derived a theoretical multiple for a telecoms market undergoing market repair of 8.3x. Vodafone India is valued at 6.4x EBITDA, in line with the implicit deal multiple. Forecast changes (explained above) and changed TP of Vodacom are offset as we roll forward our model, to give us unchanged fair value target price of 230p implying 2.0% upside. We reiterate our Hold rating as we remain concerned about the competitive developments in Italy and India. We do not incorporate potential synergies from the proposed merger in India (which we estimate could be worth c11p per share) in our valuation as the deal continues to be dependent upon regulatory approval.

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Upside risks include: (1) an improvement in competitive intensity in the Indian market coming earlier than expected, or a better than-expected recovery post this stabilisation; (2) potential involvement of Vodafone Group in M&A activity (The Register, 15 March 2017). Downside risks include: (1) rivals applying larger discounts to convergent pricing, (2) spectrum costs exceeding our assessment, (3) adverse FX moves, and (4) adverse regulation.

Priced at 26 Jan 2018 Source: HSBC estimates



Changes in ratings/Target prices

| Company | Ticker | Currency | Share price | New Rating | Old Rating | New TP | Old TP | Upside/Downside |
|------------------------|----------|----------|-------------|------------|------------|--------|--------|-----------------|
| BT Group | BT/A LN | GBP | 2.63 | Buy | Buy | 3.60 | 3.60 | 36.9% |
| Deutsche Telekom | DTE GR | EUR | 14.58 | Buy | Buy | 18.50 | 18.50 | 26.9% |
| Elisa Oyj | ELISA FH | EUR | 33.05 | Reduce | Reduce | 29.50 | 29.20 | -10.7% |
| KPN | KPN NA | EUR | 2.89 | Buy | Buy | 3.70 | 3.70 | 28.2% |
| Orange | ORA FP | EUR | 14.85 | Buy | Buy | 17.00 | 17.00 | 14.5% |
| Proximus | PROX BB | EUR | 28.10 | Hold | Hold | 32.00 | 32.00 | 13.9% |
| Swisscom | SCMN VX | CHF | 518.80 | Hold | Hold | 515.00 | 515.00 | -0.7% |
| TDC | TDC DC | DKK | 40.07 | Hold | Hold | 39.80 | 38.00 | -0.7% |
| Telecom Italia | TIT IM | EUR | 0.72 | Hold | Hold | 0.85 | 0.85 | 18.0% |
| Telefonica | TEF SM | EUR | 8.50 | Hold | Hold | 9.00 | 9.30 | 5.8% |
| Telekom Austria | TKA AV | EUR | 7.93 | Reduce | Reduce | 7.50 | 7.00 | -5.4% |
| Telenor | TEL NO | NOK | 182.15 | Hold | Hold | 170.00 | 150.00 | -6.7% |
| Telia Company | TELIA SS | SEK | 38.53 | Hold | Hold | 37.60 | 42.00 | -2.4% |
| Vodafone | VOD LN | EUR | 2.26 | Hold | Hold | 2.30 | 2.30 | 2.0% |
| Telefonica Deutschland | O2D GR | EUR | 3.99 | Hold | Hold | 4.10 | 4.10 | 2.7% |

Source: HSBC estimates. Price as of 26 January 2018



Notes



Notes



Notes



Disclosure appendix

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The following analyst(s), economist(s), or strategist(s) who is(are) primarily responsible for this report, including any analyst(s) whose name(s) appear(s) as author of an individual section or sections of the report and any analyst(s) named as the covering analyst(s) of a subsidiary company in a sum-of-the-parts valuation certifies(y) that the opinion(s) on the subject security(ies) or issuer(s), any views or forecasts expressed in the section(s) of which such individual(s) is(are) named as author(s), and any other views or forecasts expressed herein, including any views expressed on the back page of the research report, accurately reflect their personal view(s) and that no part of their compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendation(s) or views contained in this research report: Stephen Howard, Nicolas Cote-Colisson, Luigi Minerva, Adam Fox-Rumley, CFA and Sunil Rajgopal

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Additionally, for purposes of Article 16, the principal analyst responsible for compliance of the mentioned regulation is the first name in the list under "Analyst Certification" that has local certification, where applicable.

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Upside/Downside is the percentage difference between the target price and the share price.

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| Buy | 45% | (27% of these provided with Investment Banking Services) |
|------|-----|--|
| Hold | 42% | (28% of these provided with Investment Banking Services) |
| Sell | 13% | (18% of these provided with Investment Banking Services) |

For the purposes of the distribution above the following mapping structure is used during the transition from the previous to current rating models: under our previous model, Overweight = Buy, Neutral = Hold and Underweight = Sell; under our current model Buy = Buy, Hold = Hold and Reduce = Sell. For rating definitions under both models, please see "Stock ratings and basis for financial analysis" above.

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HSBC & Analyst disclosures

Disclosure checklist

| Company | Ticker | Recent price | Price date | Disclosure |
|------------------------|----------|--------------|-------------|---------------|
| BT GROUP PLC | BT.L | 2.63 | 29 Jan 2018 | 1, 5, 6, 7 |
| DEUTSCHE TELEKOM | DTEGn.DE | 14.58 | 29 Jan 2018 | 4, 6 |
| ELISA OYJ | ELISA.HE | 33.05 | 29 Jan 2018 | 5 |
| KPN | KPN.AS | 2.88 | 29 Jan 2018 | 4 |
| ORANGE | ORAN.PA | 14.84 | 29 Jan 2018 | 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
| PROXIMUS | PROX.BR | 28.10 | 29 Jan 2018 | 7 |
| SWISSCOM | SCMN.S | 518.80 | 29 Jan 2018 | 4 |
| TELECOM ITALIA | TLIT.MI | .72 | 29 Jan 2018 | 6, 7 |
| TELEFONICA | TEF.MC | 8.50 | 29 Jan 2018 | 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 |
| TELEFONICA DEUTSCHLAND | O2Dn.F | 3.99 | 29 Jan 2018 | 6, 11 |
| TELEKOM AUSTRIA | TELA.VI | 7.93 | 29 Jan 2018 | 2, 5 |
| TELENOR | TEL.OL | 182.15 | 29 Jan 2018 | 5 |
| VODAFONE GROUP | VOD.L | 2.26 | 29 Jan 2018 | 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 |
| Source: HSBC | | | | |

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- 2 HSBC expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services from this company in the next 3 months.
- 3 At the time of publication of this report, HSBC Securities (USA) Inc. is a Market Maker in securities issued by this company.
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- As of 31 December 2017, this company was a client of HSBC or had during the preceding 12 month period been a client of and/or paid compensation to HSBC in respect of investment banking services.
- As of 31 December 2017, this company was a client of HSBC or had during the preceding 12 month period been a client of and/or paid compensation to HSBC in respect of non-investment banking securities-related services.
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- 9 A covering analyst/s or a member of his/her household has a financial interest in the securities of this company, as detailed below.
- 10 A covering analyst/s or a member of his/her household is an officer, director or supervisory board member of this company, as detailed below.
- At the time of publication of this report, HSBC is a non-US Market Maker in securities issued by this company and/or in securities in respect of this company
- 12 As of 24 Jan 2018, HSBC beneficially held a net long position of more than 0.5% of this company's total issued share capital, calculated according to the SSR methodology.
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- 2. All market data included in this report are dated as at close 26 January 2018, unless a different date and/or a specific time of day is indicated in the report.
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- 2. In order to see when this report was first disseminated please see the disclosure page available at https://www.research.hsbc.com/R/34/p6IQt9I



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