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People in Many Countries Consider the U.S. an Important Ally; Others See It as a Top Threat

Europeans often name Russia as a top threat, while those in the Asia-Pacific tend to name China

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RECOMMENDED CITATION

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How we did this

For this Pew Research Center analysis, we asked respondents in 25 nations which country they think is the most important ally to their own. Then we asked which country they think poses the greatest threat to their own.

People could name anything that came to mind for both questions. We asked about countries specifically but recorded all non-country responses (such as “European Union”). Follow-ups to the threat question asked respondents to think about the country, or entity, they had just named.

For non-U.S. data, this analysis draws on nationally representative surveys of 28,333 adults conducted from Jan. 8 to April 26, 2025. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Surveys were conducted face-to-face in Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa and Turkey. In Australia, we used a mixed-mode probability-based online panel.

Countries included in this report



Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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In the United States, we surveyed 3,605 U.S. adults from March 24 to March 30, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Interviews were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the [ATP’s methodology](#).

Here are the [questions used for this analysis](#), along with responses, and the [survey methodology](#).

People in Many Countries Consider the U.S. an Important Ally; Others See It as a Top Threat

Europeans often name Russia as a top threat, while those in the Asia-Pacific tend to name China


When asked which country is the most important ally to their own, many people around the world name the United States. **This is the most common response in 12 of the 24 non-U.S. countries** included in a new Pew Research Center survey. It is tied for the top response in three additional countries.

But others say the U.S. is their nation’s greatest threat. This is the most common response in six countries and tied for top in two others.

In neighboring Canada and Mexico, as well as in Argentina, Brazil and Kenya, the U.S. is

Where is the U.S. considered the most important ally, and where is it considered the greatest threat?

% who say the United States is their country’s ...



* The difference between the shares naming the U.S. top ally (in Nigeria, Hungary and Kenya) or top threat (in Kenya and Spain), when compared with the other most common response, are not statistically significant.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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the top response on *both* the ally and threat questions.

Respondents could name anything that came to mind for these questions. We did not ask them to choose from a list.

Russia and China also emerge as key threats

Russia is the most commonly named threat in eight of the 10 European countries surveyed. (It ties with the U.S. in one more: Spain.) In France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, roughly half of adults or more say Russia is their country's greatest threat.

In the U.S. and in several Asia-Pacific countries, people tend to see China as their greatest threat. It's the most common response in Australia, Japan and the U.S., and the second-most common in India and South Korea. In Indonesia, China is tied with Israel for the second-most common response.

In general, proximity and historical conflict both seem to play an important role in which countries people see as significant threats to their own.

For this analysis, we surveyed 31,938 adults in 25 countries, including the U.S., from Jan. 8 to April 26, 2025. The survey was conducted prior to the start of the Israel-Iran war in June, and before the U.S. attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Refer to [Appendix A](#) for more details about the survey field period.

Views of the U.S.

As an ally

Israeli adults are especially likely to name the U.S. as their country’s most important ally. Israelis also stand out for their [particularly positive ratings](#) of the U.S. and its president, the same Center survey found.

Japanese and South Koreans, too, overwhelmingly agree that the U.S. is their most important ally. Very few name any other country.


And roughly half of adults or more in Canada and the UK name the U.S. as their most important ally. For their part, 18% of Americans see the UK as their top ally (the most common response) while 12% name Canada (the second-most common).

Related: [Americans’ views of allies and threats](#)

Though fewer than half of people in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, India, Italy, Mexico and Poland name the U.S. as their most important ally, it is still the most common response in each of these nations. In Kenya, as well as in Nigeria, similar

Who do people consider their country’s most important ally?

% who say ___ is their country’s most important ally



* In Kenya, Nigeria and Hungary, the difference between the U.S. and the other most common response is not statistically significant.
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shares see the U.S. and China as top allies. And in Hungary, similar shares name the U.S. and the European Union.

In countries where the U.S. is *not* the most common response, there are a few others that tend to rise to the top:

- **Germany** is the most common response in France and the Netherlands.
- **France** is the most common response in Germany and Greece.
- In Indonesia and South Africa, more people name **China** than any other country.

Read more about views of allies in [Chapter 1](#).

As a threat

Though the U.S. is seen as an important ally in many places, people in eight countries most frequently name it as their top threat. Majorities in both Canada and Mexico view the U.S. this way, as do roughly a quarter of adults or more in Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa. In Kenya and Spain, the U.S. ties for the top response on this question.

In an additional 10 countries, including many in Europe, the U.S. is the second-most common response, or tied for second.

Views of the U.S. as a threat over time

We asked a version of this question in 2019, with [slightly different](#) – but comparable – wording. Since then, the share of Canadians naming the U.S. as their country’s greatest threat has almost tripled, from 20% to 59%. The share of Mexicans who say the same has shown a smaller but still significant increase, from 56% to 68%.


Notably, there are three countries where the share naming the U.S. as their top threat has dropped. This is the case in Turkey (where it fell from 46% in 2019 to 30% today), Argentina (from 40% to 24%) and Israel (from 4% to 1%).

In addition to the U.S., Russia and China have also emerged as key threats across the 25 countries surveyed.

Read more about views of threats and their perceived impact on economic and national security in [Chapter 2](#).

U.S., China and Russia are seen as top threats across multiple countries

% who say ___ is their country’s greatest threat



* In Spain, the difference between the U.S. and Russia is not statistically significant. In Kenya, the difference between the U.S. and Somalia is not statistically significant.

Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.

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As *both* ally and threat

In Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Mexico – all located in the Americas – the U.S. is the most common response on both the ally and threat questions. About two-in-ten adults or more in Canada (25%) and Mexico (20%) see the U.S. as their country’s top ally *and* top threat. In Argentina and Brazil, only around one-in-ten name the U.S. on both questions.

In Kenya, similar shares name the U.S. and China as their most important ally, while the U.S. is tied with Somalia as the top threat.

Russia as a threat

Russia is the most commonly named threat in eight of the 10 European countries surveyed, with majorities in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden taking this stance. In Spain, similar shares name the U.S. and Russia. Greece is somewhat of an outlier among the European countries surveyed: Only 3% name Russia as a top threat, and instead 74% say Turkey.

Supporters of right-wing populist parties in some European countries are less likely to see Russia as their top threat. This is true for supporters of Fidesz in Hungary (11% vs. 52% among nonsupporters), Alternative for Germany, or AfD (31% vs. 67%), Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (49% vs. 60%) and Lega in Italy (25% vs. 35%). But few among these groups, if any, see Russia as an ally. (Read [Appendix B](#) for more information on how we classify populist parties.)

Ukraine is the second-most commonly named threat in Hungary (27%) and tied for second in Poland (6%), both of which share a border with the country. Our research has also found that roughly three-quarters of Hungarians [lack confidence](#) in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to do the right thing regarding world affairs, while views of him are mixed in Poland.

Fidesz supporters are particularly likely to view Ukraine as Hungary’s top threat (45% vs. 14% among nonsupporters). In fact, they are four times more likely to name Ukraine than to name Russia.

China as a threat

Many people in the U.S. and in the Asia-Pacific region believe China poses the greatest threat to their country. Roughly half of adults in Australia and Japan hold this view, as do a third in South Korea (ranked second behind North Korea, 40%) and India (after Pakistan, 41%). The India survey was conducted Feb. 7-April 21, 2025, before the recent [deadly conflict between India and Pakistan](#).

China is the top-ranked threat in the U.S. (named by 42% of Americans), though views differ by party. Republicans and Republican-leaning independents name China more than any other country (58%), while Russia is the top response among Democrats and Democratic leaners (39% vs. 28% who name China).


Views of China as a threat over time

When we last asked this question in the U.S. in 2023, [China was seen as the top threat](#) by both Republicans and Democrats. Views among Republicans have not changed much since then. But Democrats are now much less likely to name China – and much more likely to name Russia – as their country’s greatest threat.

The share of people in India who name China as their greatest threat is up 16 percentage points since 2019. In Canada, on the other hand, the share who point to China has fallen by 15 points over that period. China was the top-ranked threat in Canada before the U.S. took its place in the most recent survey.

Which country is the top threat to the U.S.? Republicans say China, Democrats more frequently name Russia

% of U.S. adults who say ___ is their country’s greatest threat



Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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Other top threats

Israel is the only country we surveyed in which almost no one views the U.S., Russia or China as a threat. Instead, 52% of Israelis name Iran as the top threat to their country, while 17% say Hamas. (Our questions asked about countries, but people were able to name another entity if they chose to.) The Israel survey was fielded Feb.5-March 11, 2025, during a [recent ceasefire](#) between Israel and Hamas and before [Israel launched air strikes](#) on Iranian nuclear facilities and other targets on June 13.

A majority of Israelis also named Iran as their greatest threat in 2019, when we asked a similar question.

People in Turkey name Israel as their country's greatest threat (43%). This is a marked increase since 2019, when only 10% of Turks held this view. At that time, the U.S. was seen as the top threat.

In Indonesia, another [Muslim-majority country](#), 17% of adults name Israel (tied with China for the second-most common response).

1. Who do people think is their country’s most important ally?

When asked to name their country’s most important ally, people around the world often point to the U.S. Respondents in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America also frequently name China, while those in Europe commonly cite the EU or specific European powers.

People in **the U.S. and Canada** look across their shared border on this question, naming the other country as their most important ally. The UK is also a popular response in these nations – in fact the most popular among Americans. Among U.S. adults, 18% say the UK is their top ally, and 12% name Canada. In Canada, a 55% majority say the U.S. is their top ally, while 17% name the UK.

Most adults in the **European countries** surveyed see their own neighbors as important allies, though the U.S. is also a common answer throughout the region. In some places, a particular European power rises to the top. In the Netherlands, for example, a

The U.S. is seen as an important ally across regions

% who say ___ is their country’s most important ally

	Most common response	2nd most-common response	3rd most-common response	Don’t know/Refused (VOL)
U.S.	18% UK	12% Canada	9% Israel	38%
Canada	55 U.S.	17 UK	7 EU*	8
France	45 Germany	14 U.S.	6 UK/EU	12
Germany	53 France	20 U.S.	11 EU	5
Greece	32 France	22 No country	14 U.S.	5
Hungary	24 EU*	23 U.S.	7 Russia*	17
Italy	42 U.S.	9 EU/France/Germany/No country		8
Netherlands	54 Germany	13 U.S.	9 EU*	6
Poland	43 U.S.	11 EU*	9 Germany*	14
Spain	20 EU*	17 France	10 U.S.*	14
Sweden	20 Finland	14 EU/Norway/U.S.*		7
UK	51 U.S.	20 EU	7 France	7
Australia	35 U.S.	21 No country	14 UK	5
India	35 U.S.	19 Russia	5 Japan*	27
Indonesia	27 China	19 U.S.*	16 Russia*	7
Japan	78 U.S.	4 No country*	3 Taiwan*	7
South Korea	89 U.S.	5 No country*	3 China	2
Israel	95 U.S.	2 No country*	1 UK	1
Turkey	42 Azerbaijan	21 No country	7 Russia*	13
Kenya	38 U.S.*	33 China	5 Tanzania*	5
Nigeria	33 China*	30 U.S.	12 UK	15
South Africa	45 China	28 U.S.	10 Russia	11
Argentina	43 U.S.	11 Brazil/China		19
Brazil	41 U.S.	25 China	3 Japan/No country	20
Mexico	37 U.S.	28 China	12 Canada	13

* Response is not significantly different from the next-most common response. Refer to the topline for the full list of responses by country.
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54% majority of adults name Germany as their country's top ally. Elsewhere in Europe, multiple responses crop up at similar rates. In Hungary, about equal shares of adults see the EU (24%) and the U.S. (23%) as their country's most important ally.

The U.S. is also seen as a key ally across the **Asia-Pacific region**. People in Australia, India, Japan and South Korea are more likely to name the U.S. than they are to name any other country. This includes 89% of adults in South Korea and 78% in Japan. In Indonesia, China takes the top spot at 27%, while the U.S. is the second-most common response at 19%.

In **Israel**, 95% of adults name the U.S. as their most important ally, more than any country surveyed. But in nearby **Turkey**, the largest share of adults (42%) see Azerbaijan as their top ally. Turkey is the only country included in the survey (other than the U.S. itself) where fewer than 10% name the U.S. on this question.

In the **sub-Saharan African countries** surveyed, China joins the U.S. on the list of most common responses. Similar shares of adults in Nigeria, as well as in Kenya, say the U.S. and China are their country's most important ally. China takes the top spot for South Africans (45%), while the second-largest share (28%) name the U.S. as their top ally.

The U.S. and China are also seen as major allies in **Latin America**, too, though the U.S. is more commonly named across all three survey countries in this region: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.

Views by ideology

Views of the U.S. as an ally vary by ideology. Those who place themselves on the right are generally more likely than those on the left to name the U.S. as their country’s most important ally.

This pattern is especially clear in Europe: Views differ by about 25 points in Hungary, Poland and the UK. (For their part, adults on the left in these countries are more likely than those on the right to say the EU is their most important ally.)


Still, the largest ideological gap (+34 points) is found in Australia, where 59% of those on the right name the U.S. as their most important ally, compared with 25% of those on the left.

There are ideological differences even in Japan (+12) and Israel (+11), where vast majorities of the population name the U.S. as their top ally.

In Europe, people with a favorable view of right-wing populist parties are also more likely to see the U.S. as an ally. The largest differences are in Hungary and Poland: Supporters of Fidesz in

In most countries surveyed, more on the ideological right than left see the U.S. as an important ally

% who say the United States is their country’s most important ally, by ideology



Note: Only statistically significant differences are shown.
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Hungary are four times as likely as nonsupporters to see the U.S. as an ally (42% vs. 10%), while supporters of Law and Justice in Poland are twice as likely as nonsupporters (66% vs. 33%) to take this stance.

There are also significant differences between supporters and nonsupporters of Reform UK (+24 points), AfD in Germany (+21), Lega in Italy (+14), Vox in Spain (+14), Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (+11) and National Rally in France (+6).

2. Who do people think is their country’s greatest threat?

China, Russia and the U.S. are the countries most widely viewed as international threats across 25 nations surveyed. In fact, one of these countries appears in the top three most common responses from every nation included in our survey, except Israel. Still, sizable shares in some places say there is no country that poses the greatest threat to their own.

In the **U.S.**, people most often point to China as their country’s greatest threat, followed by Russia. In **Canada**, however, a majority say their top threat is the U.S., with smaller shares naming China and Russia. Canada is one of several nations where the U.S. is considered *both* a top threat and a top ally.

Across **Europe**, respondents most consistently say Russia poses the greatest threat to their country. Notably, three-quarters of adults or more in Poland and Sweden take this stance.

The shares naming Russia as a threat in Europe today are much larger than when we asked a similar question in 2007 in a subset of these

China, Russia and the U.S. are considered key threats

% who say ___ is their country’s greatest threat

	China	Russia	U.S.		
	Most common response	2nd most-common response	3rd most-common response	Don't know/Refused (VOL)	
U.S.	42% China	25% Russia	4% No country*	22%	
Canada	59 U.S.	17 China	11 Russia	7	
France	50 Russia	16 U.S.	9 China	8	
Germany	59 Russia	19 U.S.	7 China	5	
Greece	74 Turkey	9 U.S.	5 No country*	2	
Hungary	33 Russia	27 Ukraine	10 No country	12	
Italy	32 Russia	16 No country*	15 U.S.*	5	
Netherlands	57 Russia	20 U.S.	9 China	3	
Poland	81 Russia	6 Ukraine*	5 Germany	3	
Spain	31 U.S.*	26 Russia	18 Morocco	9	
Sweden	77 Russia	11 U.S.	5 China	2	
UK	49 Russia	18 U.S.	12 China	7	
Australia	52 China	20 U.S.	12 No country	6	
India	41 Pakistan	33 China	4 Bangladesh	16	
Indonesia	40 U.S.	19 China*	17 Israel	7	
Japan	53 China	18 U.S.	12 North Korea*	4	
South Korea	40 North Korea	33 China	13 U.S.*	1	
Israel	52 Iran	17 Hamas	6 No country*	9	
Turkey	43 Israel	30 U.S.	6 No country*	11	
Kenya	25 Somalia*	23 U.S.	10 China*	12	
Nigeria	25 No country	15 China*	13 U.S.	29	
South Africa	35 U.S.	19 Russia	15 Nigeria*	11	
Argentina	24 U.S.	13 China*	13 Russia	21	
Brazil	29 U.S.	15 China*	12 Russia	20	
Mexico	68 U.S.	6 Russia*	5 China*	11	

* Response is not significantly different from the next-most common response. Refer to the topline for the full list of responses by country.
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countries. In the UK, for example, people at that time were more likely to name Iran, Iraq, China and the U.S. as threats. Fewer than 10% of Britons saw Russia as a significant threat, compared with 49% today.

The U.S. is also seen as a threat across Europe. It is the second-most common response in six of the 10 European countries surveyed, and tied with Russia at the top in Spain. China is the third-most common answer in five European countries.

Greece is the only European country where fewer than a quarter of adults name Russia as their country's greatest threat; a 74% majority name Turkey. In Hungary and Poland, the U.S. does not appear among the top three responses. Instead, Ukraine emerges as the second-most common threat in Hungary (27%) and ties for second in Poland (6%).

In the **Asia-Pacific**, China looms large. It is the most common or second-most common response in all five nations surveyed in that region, and tops the list in some places by quite a wide margin: Roughly half of adults in **Australia** and **Japan** say China is the greatest threat to their country, followed by about two-in-ten who name the U.S.

In the case of **India** and **South Korea**, proximity and historical conflict seem to shape respondents' views. In India, 41% of adults say Pakistan poses the most significant threat to their country. Another third say China – the next-most common response. (The India survey was conducted Feb. 7-April 21, 2025, before the recent [deadly conflict between India and Pakistan](#).)

Meanwhile, South Koreans most frequently name North Korea as the greatest threat to their country, at 40%.

In **Israel**, about half of people say Iran is their greatest threat, followed by 17% who say Hamas. **Turks**, on the other hand, most commonly name Israel (43%), followed by the U.S. (30%).

In **sub-Saharan Africa**, the U.S. is commonly seen as a significant threat: 35% of South Africans, 23% of Kenyans and 13% of Nigerians take this stance. Another quarter of **Kenyans** say neighboring Somalia is their country's greatest threat (not statistically different from the share who name the U.S.). The most common response among **Nigerians**, given by 25%, is that no country is their greatest threat.

In each of the three **Latin American** countries surveyed, the U.S. is the most common response. **Mexicans** are especially likely to say the U.S. poses the greatest threat to their country, with 68% holding this view.

Views by ideology

In about half of the countries surveyed, those who place themselves on the left are more likely than those on the right to say the U.S. is their country’s greatest threat. For example, 34% of Australians on the left name the U.S., compared with 18% in the center and 5% on the right.

In nine countries, those on the right are more likely than those on the left to say China is their country’s greatest threat.

Views of these countries as economic, national security threats

After respondents named the country they think poses the greatest threat to their own, we asked them to rate how much of an economic threat and national security threat that country is. Overall, the U.S. is seen mostly as an economic threat, while Russia is seen mostly as a security threat.

U.S. as an economic threat


Those who say the U.S. is the greatest threat to their country are generally more likely to view it as an economic threat than a national security concern.

In Canada, roughly three-quarters of adults who name the U.S. say it poses a great deal of threat to their economy. Majorities in Argentina, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, South Korea and Turkey agree.

People who see the U.S. as a threat are less likely to label it a security threat in most countries surveyed. Still, half or more in Mexico (56%), Canada (53%) and France (50%) say it

Among those who say U.S. is their country’s greatest threat, it is seen mostly as a threat to their economy

Among those who say the United States is their country’s greatest threat, % who say it poses a great deal of threat to their country’s ...



Note: Countries where too few respondents named the U.S. as their greatest threat were not analyzed.
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poses a great deal of threat to their national security.

Russia as a national security threat


Among those who say Russia is the greatest threat to their country, more believe it threatens their national security than their economy.

For example, 73% of Americans who see Russia as their top threat say it poses a great deal of security risk, while 32% say this about economic risk.

In Europe, at least a third of people who name Russia see it as a significant security threat. This share comes to roughly half or more in France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK. In these countries, significantly smaller shares view Russia as an economic threat.

Russia seen as a greater threat to national security than economy

Among those who say Russia is their country’s greatest threat, % who say it poses **a great deal of threat** to their country’s ...



Note: Countries where too few respondents named Russia as their greatest threat were not analyzed.
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Views of China’s impact are more mixed

In some countries, assessments of China as an economic and security threat don’t lean one way or the other. For example, 50% of Australians who see China as their greatest threat say it poses a great deal of economic threat, while an identical 50% say it’s a significant national security threat.


People in the U.S. are also about equally likely to label China as an economic threat (64%) and a security threat (61%). The pattern in South Korea is the same.

However, Italians and Nigerians who name China are more likely to say it threatens their economy than their national security.

Japan is the only country where people are more likely to see China as a security threat than an economic one (54% vs. 41%).

Many see China as an economic threat; Americans and South Koreans also say it threatens their national security

Among those who say China is their country’s greatest threat, % who say it poses a great deal of threat to their country’s ...




Note: Countries where too few respondents named China as their greatest threat were not analyzed.
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Appendix A: Global Attitudes Survey fieldwork timeline

2025 Global Attitudes Survey fieldwork timeline



Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
“People in Many Countries Consider the U.S. an Important Ally; Others See It as a Top Threat”

Appendix B: Classifying European political parties

Classifying parties as populist

Although experts generally agree that populist political leaders or parties display high levels of anti-elitism, definitions of populism vary. We use three measures to classify populist parties: anti-elite ratings from the [2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey](#) (CHES), Norris’ [Global Party Survey](#) and [The PopuList](#). We define a party as populist when at least two of these three measures classify it as such.

CHES, which was conducted from February to May 2020, asked 421 political scientists specializing in political parties and European integration to evaluate the 2019 positions of 277 European political parties across all European Union member states. CHES results are regularly used by academics to classify parties with regard to their left-right ideological leanings, their key party platform positions and their degree of populism, among other things.

We measure anti-elitism using an average of two variables in the CHES data. First, we used “PEOPLE_VS_ELITE,” which asked the experts to measure the parties with regard to their position on direct versus representative democracy, where 0 means that the parties support elected officeholders making the most important decisions and 10 means that “the people,” not politicians, should make the most important decisions. Second, we used “ANTI-ELITE_SALIENCE,” which is a measure of the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric for that particular party, with 0 meaning not at all salient and 10 meaning extremely salient. The average of these two measures is shown in the table below as “anti-elitism.” In all countries, we consider parties that score at or above a 7.0 as “populist.”

The [Global Party Survey](#), which was conducted from November to December 2019, asked 1,861 experts on political parties, public opinion, elections and legislative behavior to evaluate the ideological values, issue position and populist rhetoric of parties in countries on which they are an expert, classifying a total of 1,051 parties in 163 countries. We used “TYPE_POPULISM,” which categorizes populist rhetoric by parties. We added only “strongly populist” parties using this measure. In Italy, experts were asked to categorize the entire center-right coalition instead of individual parties within the coalition. The coalition includes Lega, Forza Italia and Brothers of Italy. For all three parties, we applied the coalition rating of “strongly populist.”

[The PopuList](#) is an ongoing project to classify European political parties as populist, far right, far left and/or euroskeptic. The project specifically looks at parties that have “been represented in their country’s national parliament at least once” since 1989. It is based on collaboration between

academic experts and journalists. The PopuList classifies parties that emphasize the will of the people against the elite as populist.¹ This appendix uses The PopuList 3.0.

Classifying parties as left, right or center

We can further classify these traditional and populist parties into three groups: left, right and center. When classifying parties based on ideology, we relied on the variable “LRGEN” in the CHES dataset, which asked experts to rate the positions of each party in terms of its overall ideological stance, with 0 meaning extreme left, 5 meaning center and 10 meaning extreme right. We define left parties as those that score below 4.5 and right parties as those above 5.5. Center parties have ratings between 4.5 and 5.5.

¹ Mudde, Cas. 2004. [“The Populist Zeitgeist.”](#) Government and Opposition.

European populist party classifications

Party	Country	2019 Left-right	2019 Anti-elitism	2019 Global Party Survey	2022 PopuList
Populist parties on the left					
La France Insoumise	France	1.3	8.3	Strongly populist	Populist
Podemos	Spain	1.9	7.7	--	Populist
Syriza	Greece	2.3	7.0	--	Populist
Populist parties in the center					
Five Star Movement (M5S)	Italy	4.8	9.2	Strongly populist	Populist
Populist parties on the right					
Forza Italia	Italy	6.9	4.1	Strongly populist	Populist
Law and Justice	Poland	7.6	6.9	Strongly populist	Populist
Jobbik	Hungary	7.7	6.1	Strongly populist	Populist
Reform UK*	UK	8.2	5.3	Strongly populist	--
Fidesz	Hungary	8.3	6.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Sweden Democrats	Sweden	8.5	7.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Party for Freedom (PVV)	Netherlands	8.7	9.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Lega	Italy	8.8	7.6	Strongly populist	Populist
Greek Solution	Greece	9.0	7.5	--	Populist
Brothers of Italy	Italy	9.1	7.3	Strongly populist	Populist
Alternative for Germany (AfD)	Germany	9.2	9.0	Strongly populist	Populist
Vox	Spain	9.7	4.1	Strongly populist	Populist
National Rally	France	9.8	8.6	Strongly populist	Populist

* Previously named the Brexit Party.
Note: Left-right indicates the average score CHES experts gave each party on an 11-point left-right scale. Scores for anti-elitism are an average of party position on direct versus representative democracy and the salience of anti-elite rhetoric within the party.
Source: CHES (2019); Global Party Survey (2019); The PopuList (2019).

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Methodology

About Pew Research Center’s Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey

Results for the survey are based on a mix of telephone, face-to-face and online interviews conducted under the direction of Gallup, Langer Research Associates and Social Research Centre. The results are based on national samples, unless otherwise noted. Read more about our [international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs](#).

We conducted both telephone and face-to-face surveys in Hungary and Poland in 2024. Data in our 2024 reports was from the face-to-face survey. The 2024 data in this report comes from the telephone survey for direct comparison to our 2025 telephone data. For this reason, 2024 data for Hungary and Poland may not match data from our earlier reports.

Some, but not all, of our international analyses and reports use demographic variables or categorizations based on external data. We explain these more below:

Ideology

We analyze respondents’ attitudes based on where they place themselves on an ideological scale. We asked about political ideology using several slightly different scales and categorized people as being on the ideological left, center or right.

- In most countries, we asked people to place themselves on a scale ranging from “Extreme left” to “Extreme right.” The question was asked this way in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK.
- In Japan and South Korea, ideology was measured on a scale from “Extremely progressive” to “Extremely conservative.”
- In the U.S., ideology is defined as conservative (right), moderate (center) and liberal (left).
- Ideology was not asked about in India, Indonesia or Kenya.

Religious identification

In each country surveyed, people were asked about their current religious identification. We then analyzed religious groups with sample sizes large enough to be reliable. Respondents of other

religious backgrounds are still included in the national totals, even if we were not able to analyze their religious group separately.

Education

To compare educational groups across countries, we standardize education levels based on the United Nations’ [International Standard Classification of Education](#) (ISCED).

High- and middle-income countries

Countries are classified as either high or middle income based on [categories from the World Bank](#) that rely on per capita gross national income. This is a classification we have used in other Pew Research Center analyses, including when looking at [global views of China](#), [satisfaction with democracy](#), [globalization](#) and [national identity](#).

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 166 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted March 24-30, 2025. A total of 3,605 panelists responded out of 4,045 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 89%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,605 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes [oversamples](#) of Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,460) and live telephone (n=145) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “[About the American Trends Panel](#).”

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.² Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.³ Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the

² AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. “[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling](#).”

³ Email pewsurveys@pewresearch.org.

respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 24-30, 2025. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

For panelists who take surveys online:⁴ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 24.⁵ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 24. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 25.

Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents, ATP Wave 166		
	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	March 24, 2025	March 25, 2025
First reminder	March 27, 2025	March 27, 2025
Final reminder	March 29, 2025	March 29, 2025
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Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 21. Soft launch took place on March 24 and involved dialing until a total of five interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists’ numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

⁴ The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.

⁵ Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed)	2023 American Community Survey (ACS)
Age x Gender	
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Race/Ethnicity x Gender	
Race/Ethnicity x Age	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metropolitan status	
Volunteerism	2023 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Voter registration	2020 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Frequency of internet use	2024 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Religious affiliation	
Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity	
Party affiliation x Age	
Party affiliation among registered voters	

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 166		
Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,605	1.9 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,586	2.7 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,909	2.7 percentage points
Note: This survey includes oversamples of Jewish, Muslim, and non-Hispanic Asian respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.		
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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions, ATP Wave 166

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,605
Logged in (web) / Contacted (CATI), but did not complete any items	2.11	65
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	25
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (CATI)	2.20	346
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other noninterview	2.30	1
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	3
Total panelists sampled for the survey		4,045
Completed interviews	I	3,605
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	90
Noncontact	NC	346
Other	O	4
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		4,045
AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)		89%

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Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 166

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	11%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	73%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 166	35%
Response rate to Wave 166 survey	89%
Cumulative response rate	3%
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