Pew Research Center

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German Views of the U.S.-Germany Relationship Turn Sharply Negative

Most Americans describe the relationship between the two countries as good, although fewer do compared with last year

BY *Jacob Poushter, Jordan Lippert and Sofia Hernandez Ramones*

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How we did this

In 2017, Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung began collaborating on joint public opinion surveys to gauge relations between the United States and Germany. Topics surveyed include relations with other countries; partnerships on foreign policy issues; views of China, Russia and the conflicts in the Middle East; democracy and the state of international relations.

The questions were developed together, and each organization fielded a survey in its own country starting in 2017. Some questions have been repeated annually to track attitudes over time.

The results have been published in both countries. Here are the Center reports and analyses for November 2024, November 2023, October 2022, November 2021, November 2020, May 2020, March 2020, March 2019 and February 2018. The Körber-Stiftung findings are contained within its larger "The Berlin Pulse" report and can be found here for 2025 and prior years.

For the U.S. findings, Pew Research Center surveyed 1,015 adults from Sept. 19 to 26, 2025. The survey was conducted by Ipsos for the Center on the Ipsos KnowledgePanel Government & Academic Omnibus. Ipsos' KnowledgePanel is an online survey panel recruited using address-based sampling. The survey is weighted by gender, age, race, ethnicity, education, income and other categories.

The German findings are from a Körber-Stiftung survey of 1,503 adults from Sept. 15 to 26, 2025. The survey was conducted by Forsa Institute via telephone.

Here are the questions used for this report, along with responses, and the U.S. survey methodology.

German Views of the U.S.-Germany Relationship Turn Sharply Negative

Most Americans describe the relationship between the two countries as good, although fewer do compared with last year

By Jacob Poushter, Jordan Lippert and Sofia Hernandez Ramones

In the ninth annual joint Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung surveys of the United States and German publics, we find profound changes in perceptions of the bilateral relationship. These are the first surveys in this series conducted since Donald Trump began his second term as U.S. president and Friedrich Merz became chancellor of Germany.

Key findings:

- Americans continue to have a positive view of relations between the two countries, even with a significant decline in perceptions since last year. Germans have completely flipped their assessments of the relationship over that same period.

- A declining share of Americans and Germans say the other country is a partner on key international issues, and around a third or fewer of Germans see the U.S. as a partner on each of the five issues we tested.

Americans continue to say relations with Germany are good, as German views flip since last year

% of adults in the U.S./Germany who say relations today between the U.S. and Germany are …



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Prior to 2022, U.S. surveys were conducted over the phone. German results are all from telephone surveys.
Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 19-26, 2025. Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 15-26, 2025.
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- France has once again become the most important foreign policy partner for the German public: 46% name France as this, while 26% say the same for the U.S. Only 1% of Americans name Germany as its most important partner, with the United Kingdom topping the list at 19%.

- Americans see China and Russia as major military threats to their country. Germans only see Russia, not China, as a major security threat.

- Both publics continue to perceive China as an economic threat and are concerned about its growing influence, even as this sentiment softens.

U.S.-Germany relations

In our 2025 survey, 71% of U.S. adults say that relations with Germany are very or somewhat good. This represents a 13 percentage point decline since last year. Around a quarter of Americans (24%) say relations with Germany are bad, the highest share saying this since 2018.

In Germany, there is a dramatic decline in those viewing relations with the U.S. as positive. Last year, before Trump was elected U.S. president again, 74% had positive views of the U.S.-German relationship. In 2025, 27% of Germans say relations with the U.S. are good, while 73% say they are bad.

There has also been a shift in partisan attitudes among Americans toward U.S.-Germany relations. In the current survey, 81% of Republicans and those that lean toward the Republican Party say relations with Germany are good, while 65% of Democrats and those that lean toward the Democratic party say the same. In 2024, 91% of Democrats and Democratic leaners and 84% of Republicans and GOP leaners said relations between the two countries were good.

In another sign of strained relations between the NATO allies, 38% of Germans see the U.S. as a major threat to their economy, 48% see the U.S. as a minor economic threat, and 14% say the U.S. is no threat economically.

U.S. and Germany as partners on key issues

Looking at five key issues in the U.S.-Germany partnership, two findings standout:

- Americans are more likely to say that Germany is a partner on all five key issues than Germans are to say the same about the U.S.
- There have been sharp declines among Germans saying the U.S. is a partner on these key issues, and a milder, but still significant, decline among Americans over the last three years.

Americans and Germans now less likely to see each other as partners on key issues

% of adults in the U.S./Germany who say the other country is a partner on …



Note: For full U.S. trends, see topline.
Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 19-26, 2025. Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 15-26, 2025.
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For example, 62% of Americans say Germany is a partner on promoting free trade, compared with only 21% of Germans who say the same of the U.S. There is currently a 15% tariff on most German exports to the U.S. Last year, 64% of Germans said the U.S. was a partner on promoting free trade. And U.S. sentiment has also softened on this issue, down 10 percentage points since 2023.

Fewer Germans also say the U.S. is a partner on promoting democracy since 2023 (-36 percentage points). And since the change in U.S. administrations from 2024 to today, fewer Germans say the U.S. is a partner for dealing with the war in Ukraine (-32) and dealing with China (-18).

There has also been a 22-point drop on Germans seeing the U.S. as a partner on dealing with the Israel-Hamas war since last year. (The survey was conducted before the first phase of Trump's peace deal to end the war was signed.) U.S. sentiment has also dropped on these key issues, ranging from an 8 to 10-point decline since 2023.

There are few significant demographic and political differences on these key issues. But Democrats are more willing to say Germany is a partner on promoting free trade (67%) compared with Republicans (59%), and similarly more likely to say the same about promoting democracy worldwide (63% vs. 56%, respectively).

In Germany, younger people are generally more willing to say that the U.S. is a partner on these issues and relations are good, but on no question do a majority of 18- to 29-year-old Germans say this.

U.S. and Germany's top foreign policy partner

Americans most commonly name the UK when asked which country is the most important partner for American foreign policy – as has been the case since we first asked this question in 2017. However, many did not answer the question (36%).

Among both Republicans and Democrats, the UK is the most common response (21% and 19%, respectively). But when it comes to the second and third most frequently declared countries, views differ by party:

Roughly 1 in 5 Americans see UK as top foreign policy partner; nearly half of Germans say France

% of adults in the U.S./Germany who say __ is currently the most important partner for American/German foreign policy



* Among Americans, 1% say "Germany."
Note: Open-ended question. Those who answered "Other," "No country" or did not answer are not shown. In the U.S., responses given by **fewer than 3%** of respondents are not shown. In Germany, responses given by **fewer than 2%** of respondents are not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 19-26, 2025. Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 15-26, 2025.
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- Among Republicans, Israel (12%) and China (8%) are the next most common responses.
- For Democrats, it's China (12%) and Canada (9%).

Germans are most likely to say that France is their top partner in foreign policy, a change from recent years. Since 2021, corresponding with Joe Biden's presidency, Germans have said that the U.S. was their greatest partner. Today, in the wake of Trump's return to the White House, 26% say so.

A significant share in Germany also says they don't know (15%).

Germans now see France as greater partner, tracking with U.S. presidential administration changes

% of German adults who say __ is currently the most important partner for German foreign policy



Note: Open-ended question.
Source: Korber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 15-26, 2025.
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France is most commonly named among supporters of many of Germany's major political parties, including the governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/ Christian Social Union (CSU). Supporters of the opposition Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, however, are most likely to name the U.S.

European Union's influence

Views on the European Union's influence over the recent years differ among the U.S. and Germany. The more common opinion in the U.S. is that the EU's influence has stayed about the same over the recent years, while Germans are much more likely to say it is getting weaker.

Germans are also 20 percentage points more likely to say the EU is getting weaker in 2025 than they were last year. Among Americans, views on the EU's influence have remained largely unchanged since 2024.

While Democrats are more likely than Republicans to think the EU's influence is getting stronger (29% vs. 17%), Republicans are more likely to say its influence is staying about the same (52% vs. 42%).

Germans are more likely to say the European Union is losing influence

% of adults in the U.S./Germany who say the EU's influence is __ in recent years



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China, Russia and Iran as military threats

Americans are more likely than Germans to view China and Iran as a military threat to their country's security. When it comes to Russia, however, about half or more of adults in both countries see it as a *major* threat.

- **China:** While 61% of Americans consider China a major military threat to their security, few Germans (9%) hold the same view.
- **Russia:** Roughly six-in-ten Americans see Russia as a major military threat, while about half of Germans agree.
- **Iran:** About a third of Americans see Iran as a major military threat, a much higher share than the 10% of Germans who say the same.

Just months after the U.S. conducted air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, fewer Americans say Iran is a major military threat in 2025 than said the same last year (42%).

Differing views of military threats in the U.S. and Germany

*% of **U.S. adults** who say that the following countries pose (a) ___ to American security*



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Meanwhile, Germans have grown more concerned with Russia as a major military threat: 47% say this now, compared with the 39% who said the same last year.

Among Germans, 57% of those who support CDU/CSU (Merz's party) and 64% who support the Social Democratic Party (coalition partner) say Russia is a major threat to their security. But around three-in-ten who support AfD (the right-wing populist party with the second most seats in parliament) agree that Russia is a major military threat (28%).

Additionally, Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are 10 percentage points more likely than Republican and Republican-leaning independents to see Russia as a major military threat to American security (65% vs. 55%), marking a shift from 2024 when 62% of both groups saw Russia as a major threat.

Views of these countries as major threats also vary among Americans by age. Those ages 60 and older are at least 20 points more likely than those ages 18 to 29 to consider China and Russia a major military threat.

China’s influence

Although few Germans consider China a major *military* threat to their country, they are much more likely to consider it a major *economic* threat (59% vs. 9%). Meanwhile, a similar share of Americans consider China a major economic and a military threat (66% vs. 61%).

Among Americans, those ages 60 and older are more likely than adults ages 18 to 29 to perceive China as a major economic threat (73% vs. 53%). In Germany, 53% of adults ages 60 and older say China is a major economic threat to their country, compared with 64% of 18- to 29-year-olds.

When it comes to China’s role in the world, half or more of Americans and Germans think that China’s growing influence is more of a bad thing. Few in both countries consider this a good thing (7%).

Majorities in both countries see China as a major threat to their economy

% of adults in the U.S./Germany who say that China poses (a) __ to their country



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The share who says that China's growing influence is more of a bad thing has declined since 2023 in both countries (-10 in the U.S. and -12 in Germany). This reflects an upswing in views toward China in many countries around the world over the past few years.

Half or more of Americans and Germans say China's growing influence is bad

% of adults in the U.S./Germany who say China's growing influence (is) …



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Military assistance to Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel

Americans have mixed opinions when asked whether the U.S. should or should not provide military assistance to Ukraine in its war with Russia, Taiwan in its conflict with China, and Israel in its war with Hamas. (Our survey was fielded prior to the ceasefire agreed to by Israel and Hamas in early October 2025.)

Many Americans are unsure on whether the U.S. should provide military assistance to certain countries. Roughly three-in-ten or more say they are not sure about each conflict we asked about.

In the case of Ukraine and its war with Russia, more say the U.S. should provide military aid than say it should not. Democrats (54%) are more likely than Republicans (28%) to support giving military assistance to Ukraine.

Americans have mixed opinions when it comes to providing military assistance in world conflicts

% of U.S. adults who say the U.S. __ provide military assistance to …



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On Taiwan, opinion is about evenly split.

When it comes to Israel, more say that the U.S. should not provide aid than say it should (47% vs. 22%, respectively). Since last year, support for providing military help to Israel has declined.

We also asked a question about how committed Trump was to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine. Here Americans are about evenly split: 40% think he is at least somewhat committed, while 42% think he is not.

Republicans think he is more committed than Democrats (69% vs. 16%). In another Center survey conducted in March 2025, slightly more Americans said Trump was committed (47%) than not (41%).

And a similar question in Germany about whether Trump was interested in securing long-term peace between Russia and Ukraine showed 34% of Germans saying he is interested in peace and 65% saying he is not.

American and German attitudes toward free speech

Generally, Americans see the U.S. and Germany as places where people are free to express their opinions regardless of how popular those opinions might be.

Just under half of Americans say people are *extremely* or *very* free to express their opinions in the U.S., even if that opinion is unpopular. A third say the same about Germany. However, Americans are also more likely to say they are unsure when it comes to free speech in Germany (22%) than in the U.S. (6%).

Americans are more likely to say people are free to express their opinions in the U.S. than Germany

% of U.S. adults who say that people are __ free to express their opinions, even if that opinion is unpopular in the following countries



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For their part, Germans similarly see people in their country as freer to express their opinions, even if that opinion is unpopular, than people in the U.S.

Related: *Free Expression Seen as Important Globally, but Not Everyone Thinks Their Country Has Press, Speech and Internet Freedoms*

Acknowledgments

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Methodology

Ipsos KnowledgePanel and Omnibus methodology

Introduction

Ipsos delivers affordable, statistically valid online research through KnowledgePanel. KnowledgePanel is the first and largest online research panel that is representative of the entire U.S. population. Panel members are randomly recruited through probability-based sampling, and households are provided with access to the Internet and hardware if needed.

Ipsos recruits panel members using address-based sampling (ABS) methods to ensure full coverage of all households in the nation. Once household members are recruited for the panel and assigned to a study sample, they are notified by email for survey taking, or panelists can visit their online member page for survey taking (instead of being contacted by telephone or postal mail). This allows surveys to be fielded quickly and economically. In addition, this approach reduces the burden placed on respondents, since email notification is less intrusive than telephone calls and the self-administered mode minimizes social desirability bias and positivity effects that can be present with an interviewer. Many respondents find answering online questionnaires more interesting and engaging than being questioned by a telephone interviewer. Furthermore, respondents have the convenience to choose what day and time to complete their assigned survey.

KnowledgePanel methodology

KnowledgePanel provides probability-based samples with an "organic" representation of the study population for measurement of public opinions, attitudes and behaviors. The panel was first developed in 1999 by Knowledge Networks, an Ipsos company. Panel members are randomly selected so that survey results can properly represent the U.S. population with a measurable level of accuracy and a calculable response rate, features that are not obtainable from nonprobability or opt-in online panels.

KnowledgePanel's recruitment process was originally based exclusively on a national random-digit dial (RDD) sampling methodology. In 2009, in light of the growing proportion of cellphone-only households, Ipsos migrated to an ABS recruitment methodology via the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. ABS not only improves population coverage, but also provides a more effective means for recruiting hard-to-reach individuals, such as cellphone-only households, non-internet households, young adults and persons of color. Households without an internet connection are provided with a web-enabled device and free internet service.

After initially accepting the invitation to join the panel, participants are asked to complete a short demographic survey (the initial Core Profile Survey); answers to this survey allow efficient panel sampling and weighting for future surveys. Upon completing the Core Profile Survey, participants become active panel members. All panel members are provided privacy and confidentiality protections.

Adults from sampled households are invited to join KnowledgePanel through a series of mailings, including an initial invitation letter, a reminder postcard and a subsequent follow-up letter. Moreover, telephone refusal-conversion calls are made to nonresponding households for which a telephone number could be matched to a physical address. Invited households can join the panel by:

- Completing and mailing back a paper form in a postage-paid envelope
- Calling a toll-free hotline phone number maintained by Ipsos
- Going to a designated Ipsos website and completing the recruitment form online

KnowledgePanel Latino℠ recruitment

In 2008, KnowledgePanel Latino℠ was developed to provide researchers with the capability to conduct representative online surveys with U.S. Hispanics, including both English- and Spanish-dominant Hispanics. With the advent of KnowledgePanel Latino, the first U.S. online panel representative of Hispanics was established to include those without internet access and those who only speak Spanish. Hispanic members recruited through KnowledgePanel's traditional ABS sampling methodology described above are supplemented with recruitment using a custom dual-frame RDD sampling methodology targeting telephone exchanges associated with census blocks that have a 65% or greater Latino population density (this density level covers just over 50% of the U.S. Hispanic population). Moreover, cellular numbers from rates centers with high concentration of Hispanics are also used to improve the representation of samples. With this telephone recruitment, households are screened in the Spanish language to only recruit those homes where Spanish is spoken at least half the time.

Household member recruitment

During the initial recruitment survey, all household members are enumerated. Following enumeration, attempts are made to recruit every household member who is at least 13 years old to participate in KnowledgePanel surveys. For household members ages 13 to 17, consent is collected from the parents or the legal guardian during the initial recruitment interview. No direct communication with teenagers is attempted before obtaining parental consent.

Survey sampling from KnowledgePanel

Once panel members are recruited and profiled by completing KnowledgePanel's Core Profile Survey, they become eligible for selection for client surveys. Typically, specific survey samples are based on an equal probability selection method (EPSEM) for general population surveys. Customized stratified random sampling based on "profile" data can also be implemented as required by the study design. Profile data can also be used when a survey calls for pre-screening – that is, members are drawn from a subsample of the panel, such as females, Republicans, grocery shoppers, etc. (This can reduce screening costs, particularly for lower incidence subgroups.) In such cases, Ipsos ensures that all subsequent survey samples drawn that week are selected in such a way as to result in a sample that remains representative of the population distributions.

As detailed above, significant resources and infrastructure are devoted to the recruitment process for KnowledgePanel so that its active panel members can properly represent the adult population of the U.S. This representation is achieved not only with respect to a broad set of geodemographic indicators, but also for hard-to-reach adults (such as those without internet access or Spanish-language-dominant Hispanics) who are recruited in proper proportions. Consequently, the raw distribution of KnowledgePanel mirrors that of the U.S. adults fairly closely, barring occasional disparities that emerge for certain subgroups due to differential recruitment and attrition.

For selection of general population samples from KnowledgePanel, a patented methodology has been developed such that samples from the panel behave as EPSEM samples. Briefly, this methodology starts by weighting the pool of active members to the geodemographic benchmarks secured from a combination of the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) and the latest March supplement of the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) along several dimensions. Typically, the geodemographic dimensions used for weighting the entire KnowledgePanel include the following dimensions, with additional nesting of dimensions as well:

- Gender (male/female)
- Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60+)
- Race/Hispanic ethnicity (White/non-Hispanic, Black/non-Hispanic, Other/non-Hispanic, 2+ races/non-Hispanic, Hispanic)
- Education (less than High School, High School, Some College, Bachelor and beyond)
- Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
- Household income (under $10K, $10K to <$25K, $25K to <$50K, $50K to <$75K, $75K to <$100K, $100K to <$150K, and $150K+)
- Home ownership status (own, rent/other)
- Household size (1, 2, 3, 4+)
- Metropolitan area (yes, no)
- Hispanic origin (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, other, non-Hispanic)

- Language dominance (non-Hispanic and English dominant, bilingual, and Spanish dominant Hispanic) when survey is administered in both English and Spanish

Using the resulting weights as measures of size, a probability-proportional-to-size (PPS) procedure is used to select study specific samples. It is the application of this PPS methodology with the imposed size measures that produces demographically balanced and representative samples that behave as EPSEM. Moreover, in instances where a study design requires any form of oversampling of certain subgroups, such departures from an EPSEM design are accounted for by adjusting the design weights in reference to the census benchmarks for the population of interest.

Survey administration

Once assigned to a survey, members receive a notification email letting them know there is a new survey available for them to complete. This email notification contains a link that sends them to the survey. No login name or password is required. The field period depends on the client's needs and can range anywhere from a few hours to several weeks.

Typically, after three days, automatic email reminders are sent to all nonresponding panel members in the sample. Additional email reminders are sent, and custom reminder schedules are set up as needed. To assist panel members with their survey taking, each individual has a personalized member portal listing all assigned surveys that have yet to be completed.

Ipsos also operates an ongoing modest incentive program to encourage participation and create member loyalty. The incentive program includes special raffles and sweepstakes with both cash rewards and other prizes to be won. On average, panel members complete three to four surveys per month with durations of about 10 to 15 minutes per survey. An additional incentive is usually provided for longer surveys.

Response rates

As a member of the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), Ipsos follows the AAPOR standards for response rate reporting. While the AAPOR standards were established for single survey administrations and not for multistage panel surveys, Ipsos uses the Callegaro-DiSogra (2008) algorithms for calculating KnowledgePanel survey response rates.

Omnibus survey completion rates

The field period and completion and qualification rates for this survey are presented below:

Omnibus survey completion rates

Field start	Field end	N fielded	N completed	Completion rate	N qualified	Qualification rate
Sept. 19, 2025	Sept. 26, 2025	1,544	1,015	66%	1,015	100%

Limitations of the design and data collection

All forms of public opinion research are subject to unmeasured error that cannot be eliminated. When a probability-based panel like KnowledgePanel is used, Ipsos employs the total survey error approach to identify and minimize error due to coverage error, sampling error, nonresponse error, measurement error, and data processing and editing error. Coverage error is addressed in our KnowledgePanel recruitment strategies. Sampling error is addressed in recruitment and at the time of sample selection for each study. Nonresponse error is reduced in recruitment, study sampling, panel management strategies (including communication, incentive, and retention protocols), and weighting of the final data. These strategies support the computation of sampling error to estimate the extent to which the results from the sample might differ from population values. To reduce measurement error, our research staff evaluates questionnaires in terms of item flow, wording, and response formats to provide respondent-friendly surveys and elicit high-quality data. Additionally, we conduct a quality control review of data processing steps and any data cleaning to minimize errors.

Ipsos KnowledgePanel weighting

Study-specific post-stratification weights

Once all survey data have been collected and processed, design weights are adjusted to account for any differential nonresponse that may have occurred. Depending on the specific target population for a given study, geodemographic distributions for the corresponding population are obtained from the CPS, the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), or in certain instances from the weighted KnowledgePanel profile data. For this purpose, an iterative proportional fitting (raking) procedure is used to produce the final weights. In the final step, calculated weights are examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The resulting weights are then scaled to aggregate to the total sample size of all eligible respondents.

For this study, the following benchmark distributions of U.S. adults ages 18 and over from the 2025 March Supplement of the CPS were used for the raking adjustment of weights for **18+ Gen pop** respondents:

- Gender (male/female) by Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60+)
- Race/Hispanic ethnicity (White/non-Hispanic, Black/non-Hispanic, Other or 2+ races/non-Hispanic, Hispanic)
- Education (Less than High School, High school, Some College, Bachelor or higher)
- Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
- Metropolitan status (metro, non-metro)
- Household income (less than $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 or higher)
- Language dominance (English Dominant Hispanic, Bilingual Hispanic, Spanish Dominant Hispanic, Non-Hispanic)

The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3.1 percentage points at the 95% confidence level, for results based on the entire sample of adults. The margin of sampling error takes into account the design effect, which was 1.04. The margin of sampling error is higher and varies for results based on sub-samples. In our reporting of the findings, percentage points are rounded off to the nearest whole number. As a result, percentages in a given table column may total slightly higher or lower than 100%. In questions that permit multiple responses, columns may total substantially more than 100%, depending on the number of different responses offered by each respondent.

Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
September 2025 Survey
November 24, 2025 Release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, refer to the Methodology section.

- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline "total" columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.

- Combined totals are based on unrounded topline figures. Prior to 2024, combined totals were based on rounded topline figures, so these figures might be different than in previous years.

- The U.S. survey was conducted by Ipsos for Pew Research Center on the Ipsos KnowledgePanel Government and Academic Omnibus. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel and on the phone. Web and phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.

- German results, based on a nationally representative telephone sample, can be found through Körber-Stiftung.

		September, 2025	September, 2024	September, 2023
		United States	United States	United States
IMP_COUNTRY. Which country currently is the most important partner for American foreign policy?	UK	19	20	25
	U.S.	1	3	4
	Canada	7	3	6
	China	10	7	11
	Europe	3	2	2
	Russia	2	1	1
	France	1	1	1
	Germany	1	4	6
	Israel	7	10	4
	Japan	2	2	3
	Mexico	3	3	3
	Ukraine	1	1	1
	India	0	0	2
	Other	3	4	3
	All	0	0	0
	None	3	2	1
	DK/Refused	36	37	24
	Total	100	100	100
	N=	1015	1021	1014

Data is displayed vertically.

U.S. WEB TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		July-August, 2022
		United States
Q1. Which country currently is the most important partner for American foreign policy?	Asia	0
	Africa	0
	Canada	5
	China	11
	Europe	2
	European Union	1
	France	1
	Germany	3
	Israel	6
	Japan	2
	Mexico	2
	NATO	0
	Russia	1
	Saudi Arabia	0
	South America	0
	South Korea	0
	Ukraine	1
	United Kingdom	24
	United States	2
	Other	2
	All	0
	None	1
	DK/Refused	36
	Total	100
	N=	12147

Data is displayed vertically.

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		September, 2021	September, 2020	April, 2020	September, 2019	September, 2018	October, 2017
		United States	United States	United States	United States	United States	United States
Q1. Which country currently is the most important partner for American foreign policy?	**Australia**	2	0	0	1	0	0
	Canada	13	7	10	9	12	3
	China	9	14	18	16	18	15
	France	4	2	1	1	1	3
	Germany	7	10	6	4	3	5
	United Kingdom	31	27	26	22	21	20
	Israel	9	10	3	9	8	9
	Italy	0	0	1	0	1	0
	Japan	1	1	1	2	1	3
	Mexico	6	5	4	6	4	2
	North Korea	0	1	1	1	0	1
	Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Russia	3	4	4	2	5	4
	South Korea	1	1	0	0	0	1
	Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0
	The European Union (EU)	3	5	2	4	3	1
	Other	2	2	3	2	2	4
	DK/Refused	10	11	20	22	19	29
	Total N=	100	100	100	100	100	100
		1008	1007	1008	1004	1006	1012

Data is displayed vertically.

		US_GERM_REL. In general, how would you describe relations today between the United States and Germany?							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**September, 2025**	71	24	9	63	20	4	5	100
	September, 2024	84	9	23	62	8	2	6	100
	September, 2023	86	10	22	63	8	2	4	100

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON

		US_GERM_REL. In general, how would you describe relations today between the United States and Germany?							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**July-August, 2022**	80	15	16	65	13	2	5	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		US_GERM_REL. In general, how would you describe relations today between the United States and Germany?							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**September, 2021**	85	12	23	62	10	2	3	100
	September, 2020	74	21	19	55	17	4	5	100
	September, 2019	74	17	13	62	14	3	9	100
	September, 2018	69	25	12	58	21	4	6	100
	October, 2017	68	22	9	59	18	4	10	100

		PARTNER_BATT_UKRAINE. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Dealing with the war in Ukraine			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**September, 2025**	54	37	9	100
	September, 2024	59	29	12	100
	September, 2023	64	30	6	100

		PARTNER_BATT_TRADE. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Promoting free trade			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	62	29	9	100
	September, 2024	67	22	11	100
	September, 2023	72	21	6	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		PARTNER_BATT_TRADE. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Promoting free trade			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2021	78	19	3	100
	September, 2020	76	21	3	100

		PARTNER_BATT_CHINA. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Dealing with China			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	52	39	9	100
	September, 2024	55	33	12	100
	September, 2023	60	34	6	100

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON

		PARTNER_BATT_CHINA. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Dealing with China			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	52	40	8	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		PARTNER_BATT_CHINA. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Dealing with China			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2021	59	39	2	100
	September, 2020	60	35	5	100

		PARTNER_BATT_ISRAEL. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Dealing with the war between Israel and Hamas			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	41	49	10	100
	September, 2024	46	42	12	100

		PARTNER_BATT_DEM. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Promoting democracy around the world			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	59	32	9	100
	September, 2023	67	27	6	100

		FREEEXPRESS_US. In each of the following countries, how free do you think people feel to express their opinions, even if that opinion is unpopular? The U.S.							
		Extremely free	Very free	Somewhat free	Not too free	Not at all free	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	23	22	24	15	8	6	2	100

		FREEEXPRESS_GER. In each of the following countries, how free do you think people feel to express their opinions, even if that opinion is unpopular? Germany							
		Extremely free	Very free	Somewhat free	Not too free	Not at all free	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	10	23	28	10	5	22	3	100

		GROWINFLU_EU. Would you say the European Union's influence in recent years has been getting stronger, getting weaker or staying about the same?				
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	23	25	46	6	100
	September, 2024	20	23	49	8	100

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON

		GROWINFLU_EU. Would you say the European Union's influence in recent years has been getting stronger, getting weaker or staying about the same?				
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total
United States	April, 2024	17	28	50	5	100
	May, 2022	22	32	43	3	100

		UKRCOMMIT_TRUMP. How committed do you think U.S. President Donald Trump is to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine?								
		TOTAL Committed	TOTAL Not committed	Very committed	Somewhat committed	Not too committed	Not at all committed	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	40	42	21	19	15	27	17	1	100

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON

		UKRCOMMIT_TRUMP. How committed do you think U.S. President Donald Trump is to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine?								
		TOTAL Committed	TOTAL Not committed	Very committed	Somewhat committed	Not too committed	Not at all committed	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	March, 2025	47	41	23	23	20	22	12	1	100

		MIL_ASSIST_UKRAINE. Do you think the United States should provide military assistance to the following places or should they not provide military assistance? Ukraine in its war with Russia				
		Yes, should provide military assistance	No, should not provide military assistance	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	41	28	28	3	100
	September, 2024	41	29	27	3	100

		MIL_ASSIST_TAIWAN. Do you think the United States should provide military assistance to the following places or should they not provide military assistance? Taiwan in its conflict with China				
		Yes, should provide military assistance	No, should not provide military assistance	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	32	28	36	4	100
	September, 2024	36	26	34	4	100

		MIL_ASSIST_ISRAEL. Do you think the United States should provide military assistance to the following places or should they not provide military assistance? Israel in its war with Hamas				
		Yes, should provide military assistance	No, should not provide military assistance	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	22	47	28	3	100
	September, 2024	30	36	31	3	100

		CHINA_INFLU. In recent years, China has gained a lot of influence globally. Do you see this as more of a good thing, more of a bad thing or does it not make a difference for our country?				
		More of a good thing for our country	More of a bad thing for our country	Does not make a difference	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	7	61	27	5	100
	September, 2024	5	67	24	4	100
	September, 2023	6	71	21	3	100

		MIL_THREAT_CHINA. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? China				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	61	25	9	5	100
	September, 2024	64	21	9	6	100
	September, 2023	70	21	5	4	100

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON

		MIL_THREAT_CHINA. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? China				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	64	26	7	3	100

		MIL_THREAT_RUSSIA. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? Russia				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	59	27	9	5	100
	September, 2024	59	28	7	6	100
	September, 2023	68	24	5	3	100

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON

		MIL_THREAT_RUSSIA. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? Russia				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	66	26	5	3	100

		MIL_THREAT_IRAN. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? Iran				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	32	46	18	5	100
	September, 2024	42	40	12	7	100

		ECON_THREAT_CH. Does China represent a major economic threat, minor economic threat or no economic threat to the American economy?				
		Major economic threat	Minor economic threat	No economic threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2025	66	21	9	4	100
	September, 2024	67	20	8	5	100
	September, 2023	70	21	5	4	100