Safe as Houses? Conservative Social Policy, Public Opinion and Parliament

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FOLLOWING the general election of 1979, the Labour party took many years to come to terms with its defeat and the subsequent dominance of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative party. In a similar fashion, the Conservatives, too, seemed for a considerable time unable to learn the lessons of their defeat in 1997 and the rise of New Labour. After three general election defeats and five leaders since 1997, under David Cameron the Conservatives appear to have become electable once more. One aspect of the changes under Cameron has been a shift in the Conservative party's rhetoric, and to some extent in its policy positions, on a range of social policy issues. Given the considerable interest in whether David Cameron has indeed led the Conservative party to a more centrist position, or whether despite the rhetoric the party remains wedded to right-wing policies and approaches, this article examines the potential challenges for a Conservative government of either stance, focusing on the extent of possible support for the Conservatives' approach to social policy amongst three key groups: the public, Conservative MPs and members of the House of Lords.

Social policy is worthy of particular consideration as it has been a key area of government action, with major reforms from the 1980s onwards, and has been central to attempts to broaden the Conservatives' appeal under Cameron. It is also of considerable importance to contemporary society, accounting for around two thirds of public expenditure and impacting upon many people on a daily basis. The article draws upon a range of evidence, including semi-structured interviews with more than 10 per cent of members of both Houses, undertaken between 2004 and 2008. The samples were balanced to reflect the political make up of each House, as well as reflecting a broad range of parliamentary experience, including MPs and Peers who first entered Parliament between 1970 and 2006. In both samples women were somewhat over-represented, constituting 24 per cent of the sample for the House of Commons and 34 per cent for the House of Lords, compared with the 20 per cent of each House who are female.

Conservative social policy

Following his defeat of David Davis (widely seen as a Thatcherite traditionalist) in a ballot of Conservative members, Cameron made clear that the Conservatives needed to broaden their electoral appeal beyond the core vote that was then insufficient to deliver victory. In particular he quickly sought to make Conservative candidates more diverse by including more female and black candidates in winnable seats through the development of an 'A-list'. He also argued that the Conservatives had to accept that Blair and New Labour had been right in their analysis of the mood of the United Kingdom in the 1990s, with economic success and social justice going hand-in-hand, and almost immediately began to alter the language used by the Conservative party and to move in the direction of the political centre ground.

Early in his leadership Cameron argued for the Conservatives to support social action to promote social justice and combat poverty, stating that economic stability would take precedence, and suggesting that the party should reach out beyond its core support. He has placed considerable emphasis on social inclusion, the provision of public services and the preservation of the NHS, as well as rejecting 'pie-in-the-sky tax cuts'. At the same time, he has promoted longstanding Conservative concerns such as support for traditional family structures and a more minimal role for the state, arguing, for example, that '[t]he answer lies in communities themselves, not in well-meaning schemes directed from Whitehall' and that 'we want people to rely on their family, not the state; because you can't take responsibility for something unless you have control over it; and because true opportunity means having the freedom to achieve all you can in life'.[1]

Cameron has also placed considerable emphasis upon 'quality of life' issues such as climate change and the environment and the work-life balance, and has also taken a more tolerant line on sexual orientation and lifestyles than many of his predecessors. In relation to crime and anti-social behaviour, he famously departed from the Conservative party's traditionally punitive stance, when he said, in July 2006, that: 'The long-term answer to anti-social behaviour is a pro-social society where we really do get to grips with the causes of crime. . . . Family breakdown, drugs, children in care, educational underachievement—these provide the backdrop to too many lives and can become the seed bed of crime.'[2] However, Bennett argues that within a year Cameron was reiterating the view 'that punishment is legitimate, that we are faced with dystopian moral decay and that the long-term solution lies in a reassertion of a traditional family structure'.[3]

Perhaps the most significant element of Cameron's message, particularly for social policy, is the idea that society is 'broken', whether applied to family breakdown, welfare dependency or poverty, or to problems with public services, such as schools, hospitals, policing and housing. In this respect, Cameron's Conservatism owes something to his predecessor as Conservative leader, Iain Duncan Smith, who, after standing down, established the Centre for Social Justice, which produced a report entitled *Breakdown Britain* (2006) and the subsequent one *Breakthrough Britain* (2007). These contained a mix of fairly conventional Conservative thinking, such as support for the traditional family and tax incentives for married couples, but also provided some new ideas such as a childcare tax credit and the tapering of financial support for parents. They also highlighted the way in which state provision could be seen as having replaced the role of charities and community organisations, to the detriment of the role and ideas of those groups, and as a response, suggested a need for a smaller central state, with more significant roles being played by many of the organisations of civil society.

However, despite the change of rhetoric and image, policy development has been, arguably deliberately, limited, with frequent general statements of principle from the leader together with assertions that policies take time to develop. Six policy review groups were established, including those on 'Public services improvement', Social justice' and 'Globalisation and global poverty', that resulted in a series of 'Policy Green Papers'. Whilst specific policy proposals have often been lacking, and the party leadership has generally failed to endorse particular policies or recommendations, it is possible to identify a number of themes or common features across these, including: a continued use of assessment and increased sanctions for benefit claimants; a commitment to a strong voluntary and social enterprise element in society and

the provision of public services, together with significant private sector input; promises of reductions in bureaucracy, but the retention of inspections and audits; and an emphasis on choice for consumers of services.

Even now, only a few months from a general election, the Conservatives' social policies remain somewhat vague, with policy statements frequently referring to what they will not do ('We will scrap stop-and-search forms and cut bureaucracy to allow police officers to spend more of their time on the streets fighting crime'), being rather imprecise ('devolving power to local authorities', or making it 'easier for social tenants to own or part-own their home'), or about structure rather than substantive services (introducing directly elected police commissioners, and freeing the NHS 'from the ministerial meddling that has resulted in money being diverted from patient care to wasteful bureaucracy').

It also remains unclear the extent to which attempts by the Conservatives to move into the centre ground and promote new social policies and a commitment to public services, including the NHS, could in reality fit with those approaches that emphasise and are likely to produce a small state, with more services provided by the private and not-for-profit sectors. Similarly, attempts to identify the ideological underpinnings for Cameron's Conservatism may be complicated by its political pragmatism and its drawing from a variety of political traditions. However, it does appear to represent something of a return to a form of Conservatism that is less ideologically driven than since the 1970s. Like Blair and the other architects of New Labour, Cameron has had to respond to what he saw as new political realities, including, for example, that issues such as inflation and trade union power are no longer key concerns, and that opinion among the electorate had changed, leading to a view that the Conservative party had to 'modernise'.

As a result, in responding to issues such as poverty and social 'breakdown' Cameron's recognition of a role for the state and for public services, including creating the conditions for a flourishing voluntary sector, appears to draw upon both one-nation and neo-liberal approaches, as well as aspects of New Labour discourses. In this context attempts to disavow the Thatcher years, including the statement that 'there is such a thing as society, it's just not the same thing as the state',[4] can be seen as responding to a changed politics, as much as a statement of ideology.

However, the lack of clarity over the Conservatives' policies coupled with the need to respond to the economic crisis, recession and its implications for public expenditure, has led some, not only among the party's critics, to argue that from a relatively centrist position Cameron is allowing the Conservatives to drift to the right. Moreover, in recent months the emergence of public differences of opinion within the party over issues such as potential public spending cuts and the future of the NHS have forced Cameron to make strong public commitments to continued state provision, and in the case of the NHS, an increase in funding under a Conservative government. At this stage therefore, it is unclear precisely what the approach of a Cameron administration would be to social policy and the remainder of this article seeks to illustrate that there may be significant political challenges to be faced whether the party eventually settles on a centrist or more right-wing position.

Conservative policies and public opinion

Since 1997 a great deal of effort has been expended by Conservative leaders in trying to persuade the public that both the economy and public services are safe in Conservative hands. If Cameron is to

succeed where his predecessors have failed, this will be the result of a marked shift in public attitudes towards the Conservative party. However, it may also represent a shift in public attitudes towards the role of the state. Throughout the Thatcher and Blair years, indicators of public opinion, such as the annual British Social Attitudes survey, suggested sustained and broadly consistent public support for a high level of state provision. In particular, while Labour sought to introduce a more selective approach to social policy in some areas, public support for a broad range of state provision remained largely stable during Labour's first two terms (Table 1). When asked whether provision in a range of areas was mainly the responsibility of the government, the person's employer or individuals and their families, a consistently high proportion felt that it is mainly the government's responsibility to pay for healthcare for the sick, ensure that long-term sick and disabled people have enough to live on, and provide for the unemployed. Only in the case of providing enough support for individuals to live on in retirement was public support below 80 per cent, although a majority still favoured state support in this area.

Even taking into account a relative lack of support for state retirement provision, and declining support for government spending on social benefits, it is apparent that a large proportion of the public feel that welfare provision is mainly the responsibility of the government. Such evidence is reinforced when people are asked to choose their priorities for extra government spending from a long list of policy areas. Mass public services, health and education, consistently head the list by a large margin. In contrast, areas such as roads, defence, help for industry and overseas aid receive little priority for extra expenditure.

British Social Attitudes surveys also indicate that the proportion of people supporting increased taxes to pay for spending in health, education and social benefits began to rise steeply in the 1980s, from around one third to more than half, and remained above that level until 2003 when support for tax rises began to fall, with 2007 being the first year since the mid-1980s that the number of respondents advocating an increase in tax and spending fell below those wanting tax and spending to remain at the same level. At the same time, there is clearly very little support for cuts in taxes and services, which have been supported by less than 10 per cent of respondents since the survey began in 1983.

The economic crisis and the recession of 2008–2009 have raised questions about the ability of any of the political parties to maintain current levels of public expenditure, and while there is little evidence of any impact so far upon public opinion, figures such as these suggest that there would be relatively little public support for Conservative policies designed to roll back state provision or to cut taxes and presumably services. However, British Social Attitudes surveys suggest that since 1997 there has been a hardening of public attitudes towards welfare recipients, and ideas about the role of government in the redistribution of wealth. The latest surveys have suggested a steep decline in support for welfare values, with people becoming less supportive of the redistribution of income from the better off to the less well off, less sympathetic to the recipients of welfare and more critical of welfare dependency.[5] Curtice has argued that in shifting public attitudes to the right Labour has achieved something the Conservatives failed to do during the Thatcher and Major years. He illustrates this with reference to shifts to the right in opinion on redistribution and attitudes towards benefits levels since 1997, which he attributes to changes in the attitudes of Labour supporters, while the views of Conservative supporters have changed little. The result is a significant narrowing of some of the differences

Table 1: Public attitudes to state versus personal responsibility, 1998–2003

	1998				2003			
	Health	Retirement	Sickness	Unemployment	Health	Retirement	Sickness	Unemployment
Percentage saying that the responsibility should be ...								
mainly the government's	82	56	80	85	83	58	83	81
mainly the person's employer's	9	9	9	3	7	11	8	3
mainly the person's and their family's	6	33	10	10	7	29	7	14

Sources: Roger Jowell et al., eds, *British Social Attitudes: Who Shares New Labour Values?*, London, Ashgate, 1999; Alison Park et al., eds., *British Social Attitudes: The 21st Report*, London, Sage.

between Labour and Conservative supporters, and the emergence of an important electoral battleground in the centre of British politics.[6]

The rightward shift in public opinion, coupled with Cameron's attempt to position the Conservatives on the centre-ground on social issues, does suggest a growing convergence between Conservative and public attitudes. However, in general terms in relation to welfare, public attitudes continue to be somewhat closer to, and in some respects to the left of, Labour. In addition, data such as that presented by Curtice and others indicates that public attitudes hardened during a period of economic prosperity, but also suggests that in times of economic hardship, such as during the recession of the 1980s, public support for more generous state provision increases. If that is the case, then support for Conservative policies designed to reduce the role of the state is far from guaranteed. While Cameron's attempts to emphasise the Conservatives' commitment to social justice may have moved the party closer to public opinion than at any point since the 1980s, any hardening of the Conservative approach risks shifting them off the centre ground currently occupied by the public, and indeed by Labour.

Conservative policies and Parliament

Of course, should the Conservatives win the general election, like all governments they will be faced with the reality of implementing policies and getting legislation through Parliament. One of the fundamental problems facing John Major's Conservative government was that the parliamentary Conservative party, which had so often in the past been characterised by its pragmatism and unity, was fundamentally divided. If Cameron is to enjoy more success, then he must be able to present a united parliamentary party to the electorate prior to the 2010 general election, and persuade those newly elected Conservative MPs to support his policies in the years following the election.

Moreover, a Cameron government would face a parliamentary barrier to his legislative programme with which previous Conservative leaders have not had to contend. Whereas the existence of a large number of hereditary Peers had meant that previous Conservative governments were able to rely upon an in-built majority in the House of Lords, following Labour's reforms, governments of whatever political hue are now likely to have to spend considerable time and effort navigating legislation through an Upper House where no party holds an overall majority.

The House of Commons

For much of the period prior to the 1997 general election the Labour party was deeply divided, and the party owed its subsequent success in part to its ability to present an image of unity. However, this outward presentation of unity did not survive long into government, with significant divisions within the parliamentary Labour party on a range of topics, including social policy issues. In contrast, Cowley predicts that a future Cameron government will enjoy a 'decent honeymoon from his MPs' and that 'the prospects of dissent will be limited early on'.[7] This conclusion is due in part to an assessment of the voting behaviour of current Conservative MPs, who have been more prepared to vote with the leadership than their opposite numbers on the Labour backbenches, and indeed than backbench Labour MPs prior to the 1997 general election. In addition, an incoming Conservative government would bring with it a large number of new MPs, many of whom would have sought their seats and been selected under Cameron's leadership, and many

of them, although not all, might therefore be expected to share some of his views and policy objectives.

While the Conservatives under Cameron appear to be somewhat more united than they were under Major, research on MPs' attitudes to welfare reveals that there remain fundamental divisions within the parliamentary parties on issues related to social policy. Although there is now a much greater degree of cross party consensus with some convergence in MPs' attitudes to welfare on a middle ground defined by financial restraint and the mixed provision of services, a desire to eliminate poverty, particularly amongst children and older people, and the desirability of moving people off welfare and into work, there remain fundamental differences over how such objectives should be delivered and there is considerably less unity within each of the main parties than there was in the 1980s.[8]

In the case of the Conservatives, while there are clearly a substantial proportion of Conservative MPs who favour only a minimal role for the government in social policy, there has been a movement towards the centre in terms of their views on the role of the state in relation to the provision of welfare (Table 2). Indeed, among those Conservatives who supported a more active role for the state in improving people's lives, there were many who came close to New Labour's views, referring, for example, to government having a role in building communities and in improving people's life chances, and a number who emphasised the importance of tackling poverty, particularly amongst children and older people.

However, in relation to attitudes towards responsibility for the provision of welfare services, Conservative MPs' views were spread fairly evenly from a Thatcherite emphasis on private provision to more centrist positions around partnership between the public and private sectors and/or the voluntary and not-for-profit sectors. Several Conservatives referred to a new appreciation that the market will not always provide, the limitations of private provision and the need for other providers to pick up where

Table 2: MPs' views on the role of the state in welfare, 2004–2006 (percentage of valid responses by group)

	Labour	Conservative	Liberal Democrat	Total
Safety-net only for those in most need	0	36	0	11
To support the extension of private provision	0	18	0	5
Beyond a safety-net to work with individuals and the private and voluntary sectors to improve lives in a range of sectors	0	45	0	14
Beyond a safety-net to provide a mechanism to enable others to lift themselves out of poverty/into work	49	0	43	30
High national minimum level of services/universal provision	31	0	50	28
Redistribution of wealth	20	0	7	12
Number	35	22	14	76

the market has failed. Significantly, whereas many Labour MPs stressed the need for public–private partnership, Conservative MPs emphasised the need to involve the voluntary and not-for-profit sectors, rather than the state.

In contrast to the Thatcher years, relatively few Conservative MPs advocated cuts in taxes and services, with many clearly aware that calls for spending restraint would leave them vulnerable to accusations of seeking to cut public services. Nevertheless, some had forthright opinions on the need to rein in spending. One prominent backbencher spoke about 'open warfare' within the party over Cameron's commitment not to cut taxes, and there was by no means universal support within the party in the House of Commons for Cameron's position on social issues. A significant proportion of Conservative MPs continue to believe that the state should provide nothing more than a safety-net for those in most need, and there were powerful arguments about the disincentive nature of state provision and several calls for increased charging or fundamental cuts in services.

In addition, Margaret Thatcher remains a talismanic influence for many Conservative MPs, and particularly newer MPs. In interviews, those first elected in 2005 referred to Thatcher as an influence much more than those who had actually served in the Thatcher governments, perhaps because the latter were more likely to have achieved political maturity and first entered Parliament under an earlier leader. Perhaps as a result, those first elected in 2005 were more likely to express the view that the state should provide only a minimal safety-net than more experienced Conservative MPs who were more inclined to state that their attitudes had changed somewhat since the 1980s. Whether this characterisation will apply to the 2010 intake of Conservative MPs, or whether MPs selected under Cameron's leadership will be more centrist, is of course unclear.

The House of Lords

If Cameron faces significant potential opposition from Conservative MPs, he would face a new situation for the Conservative party in the House of Lords. Labour's reform of the House of Lords involved the removal of the bulk of the hereditary Peers, and with them the Conservatives' in-built majority in the Upper House. Whilst it might be acceptable for a new Conservative government to create a number of new Peers to enable them to be the largest party in the Lords, Cameron would need to appoint around 100 Conservative Peers simply to have a majority over Labour and the Liberal Democrats, let alone the Crossbenchers and others. In reality, the convention that no party should have a majority has become established and, notwithstanding further reform, it is unlikely that a future Conservative government will enjoy an overall majority in the House of Lords.

The Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major, and the Labour governments of Blair and Brown, have faced significant opposition, including defeats on major social policy legislation, in the House of Lords, and have been forced to modify proposals. Moreover, since 1999, the Upper House has arguably become more prepared to challenge the government. Research on voting behaviour in the Lords, and the attitudes of Peers, has revealed that the removal of the bulk of the hereditary Peers has enhanced the House's belief in its own legitimacy and as a result it has become more assertive.[9] Research by Russell and Sciara has shown that around two-thirds of amendments introduced in the Lords are not reversed when bills are returned to the House of Commons.[10] Moreover, the continued operation of the Salisbury Convention, whereby the Lords does not try to vote down at second or third reading a

government bill foreshadowed in an election manifesto, has been questioned in recent years by some Conservative and Liberal Democrat Peers. A failure to be clear about legislative proposals, particularly over controversial policies or in the event of a small majority in the House of Commons, might make a Cameron government vulnerable to defeat in the Lords; this might be even more likely should the Lords feel that their views chime with public opinion.

The challenge facing a Cameron government in navigating social policy legislation through the Lords is made more complex by the range of Peers' attitudes to welfare, which is potentially much more significant given the lack of a party majority in the House. In broad terms, there is much less cross-party consensus when compared to the position in the Commons. This suggests that Cameron could face significant opposition from all sides in the Upper House. In general, the attitudes of Conservative Peers appear to be somewhat to the right of those of Conservative MPs, with many who served in the Thatcher and Major governments appearing to remain convinced of the value of the party's approach to social policy in the 1980s and 1990s, and being somewhat dismissive of the idea that the party needs to change direction. Labour and Liberal Democrat Peers appear to be somewhat to the left of their MPs, and consequently at some distance even from a more socially liberal agenda Cameron might bring forward (Table 3).

While there were considerable divisions across parties, there were a considerable number of Peers from across the House whose views coincided around the idea of an active welfare state helping people into work, and providing support for those who cannot. This included a group of Conservative Peers whose commitment to social justice stems from ideas about 'one-nation' Conservatism that

Table 3: Peers' views on the role of the state in welfare, 2007–2008 (percentage of valid responses by group)

	Labour	Conservative	Liberal Democrat	Cross-bench	Total
Safety-net only for those in most need	0	47	0	14	15
To support the extension of private provision	0	18	0	0	4
Beyond a safety-net to work with individuals and the private and voluntary sectors to improve lives in a range of sectors	0	24	10	29	15
Beyond a safety-net to provide a mechanism to enable others to lift themselves out of poverty/into work	30	0	30	19	20
High national minimum level of services/universal provision	39	12	40	33	31
Redistribution of wealth	30	0	20	5	14
Number	23	17	10	21	71

pre-date Thatcher, but also closely resembles the statements about social justice made by Conservative frontbenchers since.

There was among both Labour and Liberal Democrat Peers considerable support for universal provision and indeed for a redistributive role for the state. Moreover, in the past it was often argued that most Crossbenchers tended to sympathise with the Conservatives. However, the evidence suggests that in recent years the Crossbenchers have become a more diverse group, particularly since the creation of the House of Lords Appointments Commission. In interviews, Crossbenchers appointed through HOLAC expressed views that ranged widely from support for a limited safety-net, similar to that expressed by many Conservatives, to a rigorous redistribution of wealth, closer to the views expressed by some Labour Peers.

The diverse and arguably more polarised attitudes of Peers towards social policy issues raises potentially significant questions about the likely ability of a Conservative government to successfully navigate its social policy legislation through the House of Lords. Any attempt to make significant cuts to state provision, whilst likely to attract strong support from some Conservative Peers, will be opposed by the majority of Labour and Liberal Democrat Peers and some Crossbenchers. Moreover, even if Cameron attempted to introduce more socially liberal legislation on the basis of some cross-party consensus in the House of Commons, there is no guarantee that this will gain support in the Lords, and might well meet opposition from a combination of right-wing Conservative Peers, left-wing Labour and Liberal Democrat Peers and Crossbench Peers from either end of the political spectrum. To further complicate matters for the Conservatives, Cowley, and Bochel and Defty, found evidence that the Labour government's difficulties in each chamber were effectively reinfor-

cing each other, with opponents of legislation cooperating across chambers, and at the same time the perceived legitimacy of opposition also being increased by its existence in both Houses.[11] With no in-built Conservative majority in the Lords there would appear to be no reason why such a phenomenon should not be repeated in the future.

Conclusions

While it remains unclear what the social policies of the Conservatives will look like at the general election, under Cameron there has been a significant shift in rhetoric and a greater interest in social issues, as well as a recognition that there is a role for the state in responding to social problems, and in that sense the Conservatives do appear to have shifted away from Thatcherism. Yet, while this may serve to make the Conservative party more palatable to the electorate, and bring them more into line with public opinion, which has itself hardened in some respects, policies based upon such approaches would be likely to be much less attractive to Thatcherites, who still constitute a considerable bloc within the parliamentary party, both in the Commons and the Lords.

If a Conservative government is elected in 2010, it may be able to command quite high levels of support among its MPs, particularly given the inevitably high proportion who will have been selected under Cameron's leadership, and who would to some extent 'owe' their election to him. However, there will be also be the continued presence of a group of Thatcherite MPs, including a number elected since Thatcher left office, who may find considerable resonance for their ideas in the Conservative party both in Parliament and the country. This could provide significant pressure for more radical right-wing policies, and, in the event of a hung Parliament, a small overall majority, or a decline in public support for the

Conservatives, could prove to be a major irritant for a Cameron government.

An even more intriguing question relates to the activity of the House of Lords. Recent years have seen arguments about whether the 'transitional' House of Lords has become more assertive, or whether its apparently increasing willingness to challenge and even to defeat government legislation have been a result of Labour's weakness. A Cameron government, and particularly one that sought to implement radical or significantly rightward change, particularly in relation to the reform of public services, would test these views. Such policies could generate opposition within the Conservative party, but particularly from the opposition parties, and the lack of a majority in the Lords could, in such circumstances, prove a major challenge for the government.

Notes

1 David Cameron, 'A radical passion', *The Guardian*, 7 August 2007; David Cameron, 'What makes me Conservative', *Daily Telegraph*, 8 September 2007.
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5 Peter Taylor-Gooby and Rose Martin, 'Trends in sympathy for the poor', in A. Park et al., eds, *British Social Attitudes: The 24th Report*, London, Sage, 2008, pp. 229–57; A. Park, ed., *British Social Attitudes: The 25th Report*, London, Sage.
6 John Curtice, 'Back in contention? The Conservatives' electoral prospects', *Political Quarterly*, vol. 80, 2009, pp. 172–83.
7 Phil Cowley, 'The parliamentary party', *Political Quarterly*, vol. 80, 2009, pp. 214–21.
8 Hugh Bochel, *Parliament and Welfare Policy*, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1992; Hugh Bochel and Andrew Defty, *Welfare Policy under New Labour*, Bristol, Policy Press, 2007.
9 Meg Russell and Maria Sciara, *The House of Lords in 2005: A More Representative and More Assertive Chamber?*, London, UCL Constitution Unit, 2006; Bochel and Defty, *Welfare Policy under New Labour*.
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11 Phil Cowley, *The Rebels*, London, Politico's, 2005; Bochel and Defty, *Welfare Policy under New Labour*.