National Security Strategies: Security from What, for Whom, and by What Means

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Abstract

This article argues that a fundamental change is taking place in how countries view, approach, and implement strategies to protect their 'national security.' In the past, strategies underlying national security narrowly focused on threats that could be addressed by military and/or diplomatic means. Now, however, 'national security' is viewed in a much broader context, with the focus on preserving that which makes a country unique, and that includes the intangibles of its culture as well as what physically lies within its borders. The result is that countries are revising existing national security strategies (including those covering homeland security or domestic security) or crafting entirely new ones to address this much broader view of that which is to be protected. Drawing on recent literature and documents addressing diverse national security strategies, this article discusses the following areas: (1) the definition of national security, (2) the purpose of a national security strategy, (3) how a national security strategy is evaluated, and (4) implications for *The National Security Strategy of the United States* and *The National Strategy for Homeland Security* as a new Administration governs.

A fundamental change is taking place in how countries view, approach, and implement strategies to protect their "national security." Strategy, according to Bryson (2004, p. 46) is "a pattern of purposes, policies, programs, actions, decisions, or resource allocations that define what an organization is, what it does, and why it does it." More explicitly focusing on national security, Yarger (2008, p. 4) writes that strategy can be described as "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, socio-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects and set conditions that protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or circumstances" In the past, strategies -- these patterns or development and use of powers in line with policy guidance -- underlying national security narrowly focused on threats that could be addressed by military and/or diplomatic means. Now, however, "national security" is viewed in a much broader context, especially in an era of global interdependence. The focus appears to be on the preservation of that which makes a country unique, and that includes the intangibles of its culture as well as what physically lies within its borders. The result is that countries are revising existing national security strategies (including those covering homeland security or domestic security) or crafting entirely new ones to address this much broader view of that which is to be protected. The implications for policy choices – and their costs – are major.

For example, in the Australian Homeland Security Research Centre offered a 2007 election guide so voters could evaluate the proposed national security policies of the contending political parties. The guide asked a series of questions so that each individual voter could evaluate (1) each political party's description and ordering of national security threats and how that might compare to the voter's view of the threats and their relative importance, (2) whether each party's promised policies actually would reduce threats to national security and increase security, and (3) whether each party actually would implement those policies and how they might respond to new, unexpected threats. Sundelius (2005) writes that European countries are reconsidering what is meant by security, what should be secured, what is important enough to be secured, what is important enough to safeguard with national and international resources, and just whose security (the state, civil society, and/or individual citizens) should be addressed.

The trend is toward a broadened approach to "national security." Documents reflecting strategic choices in United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, Finland, and the Netherlands demonstrate that these countries have widened their identification of and approach to threats. These countries are uniting national military defense and domestic/homeland security strategies into one strategy designed to protect the security of that country's society as a whole. This is an approach advocated by Seiple (2002) in criticizing the United States' more

traditional approach of separating foreign and domestic security policy. Seiple, believing that more attention should be given to defining what is meant by security in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, argues that if homeland security is to be successful, it must be a component of a larger, cohesive national security that anticipates threats to society, whether domestic or foreign. This is the view gaining traction in international circles, and it has much to recommend it.

Drawing on recent literature and documents addressing diverse national security strategies, this article discusses the following areas: (1) the definition of national security, (2) the purpose of a national security strategy, (3) how a national security strategy is evaluated, and (4) implications for *The National Security Strategy of the United States* and *The National Strategy for Homeland Security* as a new Administration governs.

Defining National Security

In simpler times, national security was defined as a matter of protecting against traditional, external military threats. Today, how is national security to be defined? The answer to this question is a matter of some complexity. It requires consideration of changes in the national security landscape – threats to physical and cultural security, the blurring of traditional and non-traditional perspectives on security, and factors unique to each country.

Drivers of Changes to the Concept(s) of Security

The post-Cold War period, marked by new dynamics in global interdependencies, has re-defined the scope and importance of threats to national security. Dillon (2005) writes that contemporary global security has a much different face than that of the past because of three factors – circulation, complexity, and contingency.

In the context of security, "circulation" is the movement and interaction of the trappings of civilization: people, energy, finance and capital, food and water, drugs, and disease. This movement of societal elements crosses internal and external affairs, mandating a public policy agenda that must encompass internal homeland security and external defense. The second factor, "complexity," describes the challenge in understanding the impact of the circulating society elements on, within, and across operations and management. Finally, "contingency" means the need to deal with the heightened risk that results when there is more circulation of societal elements that creates more complexity. More contingency planning simply must take place to expect the unexpected, and to

have operations and management prepared to respond successfully when contingencies arise.

Against this backdrop, certain factors have been identified as the drivers of changes to the concept(s) of security. As identified by Biscop (2004), Brown (2003), Edwards (2007a, 2007b), European Union (2003), Herd and Lofgren (2001), and Kearns and Gude (2008), a long list of drivers emerge:

1. the diffusion of power within and among nation-states, marked by the rise of population-rich China and India and the increased importance of energy-rich states and regions;
2. the growth in the power of non-state actors such as terrorist groups and organized, transnational crime networks;
3. the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
4. catastrophic natural disasters;
5. espionage;
6. population-caused stress arising from differences in the population growth rates of rich and poor societies, illegal immigration, migration that dilutes societal identities, and the spiraling growth of mega-cities in poor countries;
7. energy-caused stress, most importantly the increasing scarcity of conventional oil;
8. the threat of pandemics;
9. stress caused by environmental or ecological factors that worsen damage to land, water, forests, and fisheries;
10. climate change that causes food and water shortages and pressure on plans for economic growth;
11. economic stress resulting from instabilities in the global economic system or economic integration, such as membership in the European Union;
12. weaknesses in democratic institutions and an international legal order that is perceived to be ineffective;
13. weaknesses in respect for and protection of human rights;
14. socio-economic vulnerability resulting from business practices, such as just-in-time delivery of goods and manufacturing components;
15. increased reliance on critical infrastructures that are vulnerable and have little spare capacity, and
16. global poverty and ever-widening income gaps between the rich and the poor.

Each of these drivers translates into threats to security, whether individually or collectively. The trend is to slot them into categories to provide a more useful framework for policy-making. The Canada Privy Council Office

(2006) and the Finland Government (2006) generally categorize individual drivers into threats to (1) the security of each individual person, (2) national security, or (3) global or international security, with some overlap. For example, personal security is undermined by problems with economic security and/or the safety of food or water. Weapons of mass destruction threaten national security as a whole. Both individual personal security and national security can be threatened by organized crime or natural and man-made disasters. Similarly, global poverty undermines global or international security. Organized, transnational entry of non-citizens and terrorism imperils international as well as national security.

"Traditional" and "Non-Traditional" Security Perspectives

The identification of specific drivers of change in the way policymakers think about security is just part of a long-running discussion of what is meant by "security" issues in the post-Cold War period. As indicated above, the definition and scope of "national" security have changed substantially in recent years, moving from an exclusive or predominating focus on "traditional" threats imperiling the physical integrity of the state like military conflicts to clearly non-traditional threats like the influenza pandemic.

Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1997) observe that studies of traditional security efforts in the past tended to view all military affairs as matters of security. For example, Biscop (2004) noted that during the Cold War, Europe's security was essentially defined in broad politico-military terms in which the goal was to avoid the direct military danger presented by a clearly identified enemy. Describing the work of security scholars in the 1990s, Wibben (2008) writes that few considered how the security of individuals might be a continuation of "national" security and challenged those in the field of security studies to rethink the issue.

In joining these and other authors in urging that thinking about security be broadened to embrace non-traditional threats, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1997) write that sovereignty also may be threatened by anything questioning the recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority of the state. Moreover, the economic and societal sectors face threats independent of those traditionally thought to challenge state and military affairs. Evans (2007) writes that national security encompasses threats and risks not easily pigeon-holed: they are both direct and indirect, both part of a pattern and random, both deliberate and accidental, both focused and distributed, and set in motion by both competing nation-states and the loosely-affiliated. Like other authors, Evans argues that national security must reflect clear linkages between factors such as human agency and deliberate and distributed threats and risks.

Some go further. Hoogensen and Rottem (2004) would expand the definition of security to include matters of individual identity, such as gender, ethnicity, and race. They point to the United Nations' definition of human security, which broadly included freedom from fear and want and categorized these freedoms as embracing economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. In the view of Hoogesen and Rottem, security and securitization, traditionally understood as the top of the state hierarchy and involving state interests and actions, should include and be linked to an individual approach, even though there might be ways in which they conflict.

However, Wilkinson (2007) observes that the concept of security remains a controversial one, particularly when the focus is on the role and position of culture and identity in security, which conflicts with the traditional view that security is uniquely a military matter. Noting that some researchers, such as those at the Copenhagen School, advocate the redefinition of security and security analysis to include new issues such as migration, transnational crime, and intrastate conflict, Wilkinson cautions that a universal understanding of security cannot occur until differences in opinion about underlying concepts – society, identity, and the state – are eliminated.

Consistently, Krause and Williams (1996) and others write that the broadening and deepening of security studies would recognize that safeguarding a state's core values from military threats coming from outside its borders would not lead to understanding what or who is to be secured, from what threats, and by what means. Their view of broadening is to include a wider range of potential threats, ranging from economic and environmental issues to human rights and migration. They view deepening of security studies as moving down to the level of the individual or human security and moving up to the level of international or global security. Thus, it might be said that individual security becomes as important as global security. Liotta (2002) observes that the divisions between the traditional and the non-traditional understanding of security are artificial and not discrete. He believes that foreign and domestic policy concerns will blur because there is less concern about state protection relying on military action and state-to-state power relationships and more concern about individual citizen security.

The consensus now appears to be a re-thinking of the scope of national security and a blurring and uniting of traditional and non-traditional security perspectives. Herd and Lofgren (2001) describe the result of the unification as recognizing that "societal security" must encompass threats to individual and community membership and shared identities because these matters ultimately determine the survival of a society.

Under this broadened view, Sundelius (2005) identifies several threats that should be considered. One is actor-focused threats – defined to include an armed

or other type of attack, such as an economic assault by another state, and an armed or other type of attack by another individual or group, such as terrorists. A second category encompasses structural threats rooted in a neighboring system that happen, but without harmful intent, such as an accident at a nuclear plant, energy shortfalls, or epidemics. Structural threats also include those from a domestic source, such as a natural disaster or infrastructure collapses that require severe crisis management efforts. Categorization of threats as actor-focused or structural illustrates the shift from a focus on the physical security of the territory to a focus on the security of critical functions of society, such as a working government, maintenance of critical infrastructures, and the preservation of basic cultural values.

Discussions about the breadth and depth of national security are, of course, part of the debate over how a country is to develop a national security policy. For example, Evans (2007) writes that those considering the doctrine for the Australian defense strategy have been slow to adjust to the challenges of a new, globalized security environment. One school advocates a traditional strategy based on regional and geographic lines while another focuses on a globalized, networked society. The two factions differ on strategic priorities, force structure, capability acquisitions, and the role of land forces. In addition, Evans questions if a globalized strategy can be met through Australia's Department of Defence, arguing that a globalized security environment cannot be mastered by a single government department. He relies on the work of others who call for the creation of a "whole of government" national security strategy.

The Australian Homeland Security Research Centre (2007, 2008) reasons that maintenance of Australia's survival no longer depends solely on military and diplomatic actions to counter traditional, external threats, such as major state conflicts, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, espionage, and trans-national crime. Instead, consideration of these threats must be joined by consideration of internal threats that threaten Australia's quality of life, such as resource security, uncontrolled mass migration, pressures from the condition of fragile states, economic shocks, pandemics, social disharmony, and food and energy security.

Meantime, the Switzerland Forward Planning Staff (2007) observes that the traditional European approach to defense in international conflicts is less important as security issues become more complex. In its view, it is impossible to distinguish between the preservation of internal security and the preservation of external security. Instead, a nation's security now involves national and international policies and partners, and civilian and military actions.

Other Considerations

The melding of traditional and non-traditional security perspectives does not mean that countries will adopt a homogenous approach to national security.

One consideration is each state's unique perspective. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1997) underscore that individual countries apply different thresholds in defining a threat. Sundelius (2005) writes that European countries are re-assessing what kinds of threats and risks must be countered. While Nordic governments take an all-hazards approach to threat assessment, the United States defines transnational terrorism as its central national security threat. Biscop (2004), writing about the European Union's philosophy of national security, states that in the absence of a major military threat, other factors that might be the underlying causes of terrorism or of armed conflict between or within third states, or those affecting values and interests, have emerged, such as organized crime and ecological problems. The key to these observations is the absence of a major military threat. It can be anticipated that if there is one, non-traditional perspectives could quickly fade in importance, if only temporarily.

Another consideration in the individual formulation of a national security policy is the power and influence of other states. This may define how a state or group of states perceive the scope of a security policy, whether traditional or non-traditional. Biscop (2004) writes that European security policy during the Cold War reflected American leadership and was essentially limited to defense considerations. Non-military security dimensions and developments in other parts of the world were considered much less important or even vulnerable to domination by the defense policy.

A third consideration is the priority given to assessing and addressing threats. Fuerth (2006) observes that problems in foreseeing and responding to increasingly complex and networked threats are more likely to be approximately equal in magnitude, meaning that attention cannot be diverted from any one of them for long. For example, Edwards (2007a), writing about the security challenges facing the United Kingdom's government, described a growing concern that the government is too focused on international terrorism to the detriment of other threats and hazards.

Fourth is the dependence on other actors. Kearns and Gude (2008) write that the new drivers of change result in conditions where the power to control the security environment is no longer the purview of governments acting alone. Security is a shared matter in that policy failures and the lack of security of one becomes the problem of others. The implications are, first, that the formulation of security policy must broaden its concern from external military attacks to include other threats and risks, a wider range of actors, and more analytical levels from the global to the local because in the modern era, front lines exist locally, as well

as overseas.   Second, Kearns and Gude believe that rethinking of the overall strategic approach is necessary, including adopting the notion of integrated power and working in partnership with others within and between states and public and private sectors.

Finally is the concern about what the broadening and deepening of security issues and responses mean for policy development and sustainability. In the view of Liotta (2002), broadening the understanding and definition of security means it will become so wide that it will mean all things to all people or nothing to no one.

Contemporary Definitions of National Security

That all said, a contemporary definition of national security should respond to the post-Cold War environment of global interdependencies and known and unknown traditional and non-traditional threats and their consequences.

Discussing the definition for the United Kingdom, Fitz-Gerald (2008) observes that the definition of national security differs from country to country and even from institution to institution. Canvassing countries' various strategies, she says that all definitions address the importance of specific national interests to be safeguarded against threats and contingencies. Her point is that the articulation of a set of national interests – derived from core national values reflected in constitutional sources or pre-existing strategic policy papers – provides the objectives for strategic and policy planning.

This point is illustrated by the Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (undated), which defined national security in the context of the Netherlands' national security strategy. The focus is on the prevention of and response to the social disruption that could occur should one or more of the Netherlands' vital interests be jeopardized. These vital interests are (1) territorial security: the undisturbed operation of the Netherlands as an independent state in the broadest sense, or its territorial integrity in narrowest sense; (2) financial security: the undisturbed operation of the Netherlands as an effective and efficient economy; (3) ecological security: the living environment's possession of sufficient self-restorative capacity in the event of damage; (4) physical safety: the undisturbed operation of mankind in its living environment within the Netherlands; and (5) social and political stability: the undisturbed existence of a social climate in which groups of people are able to get along amicably with one another within the confines of a democratic state under the rule of law, while observing joint values.

These country definitions are consistent with Evans (2007, p. 123), who writes that "national security entails the pursuit of psychological and physical safety, which is largely the responsibility of national governments, to prevent both

direct and indirect threats and risks primarily from abroad from endangering the survival of these regimes, their citizenry, or their ways of life." In his view, this definition protects the social contract between people and government and the safety and survival of both state and society. The definition, therefore, provides a broad framework for the formulation of the unified approach to national security, starting with the purpose of a national strategy.

The Purpose of National Strategy

What is the purpose of a national security strategy?

Up to this point, this article has surveyed the overarching landscape of national security, including how it is defined and drivers for change in the identification of threats. But the specifics of a national security strategy are of most importance to policymakers. The discussion of the broadening and deepening of national security issues and threats should provide what Evans (2007) identifies as the conceptual basis for a national security strategy. Central to that is an understanding of the purpose of a national security strategy.

It seems obvious, but what should guide the development of a national security strategy is a firm understanding of its purpose. This is crucial, as confirmed by Snider and Nagl (2001), who observe that the preparation and content of eight national security strategies demonstrated the lack of an operative consensus on the appropriate grand national security strategy. In the view of Fitz-Gerald (2008) a firm purpose leads to a grand design of a national strategy that in turn provides, among other things, powerful, strategically-led principles necessary to cut across separate departmental objectives and goals and separate cultures to create a cross-government effort. For example, shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government Accountability Office, 2001c) advised Congress that the United States needed a national strategy specifically to ensure homeland security. Without such a strategy, GAO cautioned, efforts might be fragmented and cause confusion, duplication of effort, and a mismatch between resources and strategic goals.

The development of current national security strategies underscores the importance of a clear purpose. Discussing the development of the United Kingdom's national security strategy, Edwards (2007b) observes that the strategy articulates a vision of the operational environment, offers scope for a political assessment of risk and the prioritization and allocation of funding and resources, provides integration and consistency with international organization strategies, instills public confidence in the government's approach to national security, and influences the way government manages national security resources. Similarly, Sauter and Carafano (2005) point out that national strategies consider the economic, political, diplomatic, military, and informational instruments that

promote a nation's interest or secure a state from its enemies. These strategies guide the implementation of plans, programs, campaigns, and other activities. Moreover, publicly available strategies also may have a political purpose by appealing to certain constituencies, influencing public opinion, or intimidating an enemy. Yarger (undated) notes that the U.S. Army War College defines a national security strategy as "the art and science of developing, applying and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security." (p. 2).

Discussing conditions before the development of the Netherlands national security strategy, the Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (undated) says that earlier efforts addressed only pieces of national security, such as terrorism, flooding, disruption in energy supplies, and pandemics. In the Ministry's view, a national strategy framework would provide the overall context for all initiatives. It also would provide a system more adaptable to evolving threats and the perception of threats and give the government the means to communicate clearly its ability (or inability) to safeguard national security. In the absence of a national security strategy, the Ministry concluded that the existing system in the Netherlands did not provide sufficient scope for a sound political assessment of risks to permit the prioritization and allocation of scarce resources.

These sources and others (Dale (2008), Edwards (2007b), Fitz-Gerald (2008), GAO (2001b), and Snider and Nagl (2001)), suggest purposes that a successful national security strategy might serve:

1. communicate a detailed strategic vision of the current and future security environment to help inform public audiences both at home and abroad about national intent;
2. communicate the nation's values in the 21st Century;
3. present a comprehensive national security threat and risk assessment to define and prioritize requirements for the full range of threats to the homeland;
4. bring together the plethora of departmental white papers, policies, and strategies covering national security;
5. offer explicit prioritized, quantitative and measurable goals and objectives with timelines;
6. identify what domestic and international factors, such as comparative capabilities, issues and trends, that will affect achieving security goals and objectives;
7. develop a framework for collaboration across government on national security policy, roles and missions, and identify policy areas where

departments and agencies can be more efficient and effective in working together;

8. indicate which elements of national power (ways and means) are to be used to meet goals and to guide other governmental department and agency processes for budgeting, planning and executing, and organizing, training, and equipping personnel, and

9. clearly link goals and the approaches designed to meet them to provide a tool for requesting resources.

This discussion presumes there is a bonafide desire for a national strategy which can achieve multiple objectives. However, situations may exist where there is no real purpose in developing a national strategy: it is not seen as necessary. For example, Freilich (2006) describes the environment for Israeli national security decision-making, where there is broad national consensus of extreme external threats; a perception of a limited range of military or diplomatic options to meet those threats; the impact of regional and global interests and concerns; and extraordinary volatility in the level of uncertainty, ranging from peace processes to rapid cabinet turnover. Governance is one of personal policy preferences and constant coalition management across many political parties and a focus on political futures.

As a result, Freilich believes that Israel's national security decision-making process is a reactive one that poses ad hoc solutions to immediate problems. Government leaders have highly circumscribed formal sources of power. National-level policy formulating bodies are weak and strategies do not benefit from systematic analysis. The Israeli defense establishment, Freilich claims, is the most influential player in national security decision-making. In his view, Israel has been successful in its national security efforts because of crucial factors, such as small, tightly-knit national security establishment, the ability to rapidly and flexibly respond to threats, a pragmatic approach to decision-making, the integration of military and civilian life, the openness of the Israel efforts to the international community, and centers of operational excellence within the defense and intelligence areas.

Biscop (2004) also observes that the absence of an explicit strategy need not be a problem if all those involved in policy-making share the same basic views and thus can easily reach a consensus on policies that fit within these general guidelines, even if they are not explicitly written down. However, no consensus exists to create a common strategic vision, such as for the European Union's external action, then action will lack direction, determination, and consistency. Without a clear strategy of its own, the European Union will be reactive to the initiatives of those, such as the United States, which does have an explicit strategy. Thus, the EU cannot escape the American framework of thought and promote its own policy priorities in terms of both objectives and instruments.

Evaluating a National Strategy

How is a national security strategy to be evaluated?

Certainly a starting point for evaluating a national security strategy is simply its content – its words. The GAO has written extensively on national strategy content, particularly that directed at combating terrorism and achieving homeland security. For example, GAO (2001a, 2002) advised that a national security strategy should contain a clear vision statement that defines what the nation hopes to achieve through programs that combat terrorism. Content should include information on the roles and responsibilities of all levels of government, establish prioritized goals and objectives with milestones and performance measures, recognize partnerships necessary with the private sector, and the most appropriate tools of government such as grants, regulations, tax preferences, and partnership to implement the national strategy and achieve national goals. GAO expected that a national strategy should be one way to ensure the integration and focus of all national effort elements to combat terrorism.

In 2004, GAO identified and defined the characteristics of an effective national strategy. GAO believes that federal agencies and other stakeholders might use strategies with certain desirable characteristics to shape policies, programs, priorities, resource allocations, and standards. GAO's characteristics are: (1) a statement of purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; (3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; (4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and implementation. Drawing on the GAO work and the discussion above of scope and purpose, Table 1 identifies possible characteristics and examples of key elements for each characteristic.

Table 1. National Security Strategy Desirable Characteristics

Characteristics	**Description/(Example Key Elements)**
Purpose, Scope, and Methodology	**Why the strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the process by which it was developed**. *(broad or narrow purpose statement; comparison/contrast with other national and international strategies; major functions, mission areas, and activity coverage; process producing strategy; key term definitions)*
Problem Definition and Threat Assessment	**The particular national and international short- and long-term problems and threats to which the strategy is directed**. *(discussion/definition of immediate and longer-term problems, their causes, strategic environment; threat assessment and scope)*

Characteristics	Description/(Example Key Elements)
Goals, Subordinate Objectives, Activities, and Performance Measures	**What the strategy is trying to achieve in terms of scope, capabilities and steps to achieve those results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results.** *(national values and interests, overall national and international outcomes and specific results desired; hierarchy of strategic goals and subordinate objectives; specific means and strategies to achieve results; priorities, milestones, and performance measures; process for monitoring and reporting on progress)*
Resources, Investments, and Threat Management	**What national and international resources and partnerships are needed to address threats and how they will be allocated to address goals and objectives.** *(resource sources and amounts, partnership identification and needs, sources of resources; resource allocation mechanisms)*
Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination	**Who will implement the strategy, what their roles will be compared to others, and mechanisms for them to collaborate and coordinate their efforts.** *(specific roles and responsibilities all actors; lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities; processes for coordination and collaboration)*
Integration and Implementation	**How a national strategy relates to other national and international strategies' goals, objectives, and activities, and to subordinate levels of government and their plans to implement the strategy.** *(vertical and horizontal integration; details on specific international, federal, state, local, or private strategies and plans)*

Derived from GAO, 2004, Table 4, pages 30-31.

On paper, a nation might have developed a national strategy that is comprehensive and reflects all of these characteristics. Now the attention should move to implementation and whether it is effective, or even great. Sauter and Carafano (2005) provide some thoughts on the most influential strategies – those that they say mobilize the country. In large part, they believe that such strategies are those that provide clear guidelines and make hard choices about allocating scarce resources, setting clear goals, or establishing priorities. Their evaluation criteria include sufficiency and capacity. Sufficiency asks if a national strategy contains adequate guidance for direction of national policies and programs. Capacity asks if the strategies can meet threats identified in the strategy. Davis, Johnson, Long, and Gompert (2008) also recommend that comparing alternative

strategies should integrate expectations about effectiveness, risks and resource implications.

Evaluation of greatness also may consider periods in the life of a national strategy. Initially, greatness might be evaluated with the development and issuance of a national strategy. In this time period, evaluation might ask to what extent the strategy clearly identifies stakeholders and their interests, the strategy's breadth and depth, alternative outcome choices, selection criteria for what should or should not be included, and its levels of detail – from a statement of principles to detailed action plans. According to Doyle (2007), a nation might question if it has the "right" national security strategy by examining the process by which it was derived: if the process for producing the strategy is flawed, the national security strategy will be flawed.

Because implementation of a national strategy occurs over a period of time, evaluation may consider what means and strategies have been put in place and what goals and objectives have been achieved, in what time frame, and with what outcomes. Here, Doyle (2007) might ask if the financial resources needed to make a strategy work are requested and if the strategy meets its goals and objectives on a global basis. Liotta (2002) cautions that grand strategies should focus on the means and mechanisms of the strategy, such as the size of military forces, compliance with international rules, or membership in international institutions, that are best suited to achieve security. Finally, as the national strategy outcomes emerge, evaluation can consider the strength of learning and updating, the sustainability of proven means, and the flexibility to respond to new threats.

Implications for United States Security Strategies

With the trend toward broadening of threats to be considered in a national security strategy, what are the implications for the strategies of the United States? This is especially important as a new Administration becomes responsible for national security strategies and action.

National security strategies have a long-standing history in the United States. Like other countries, the United States has crafted national strategies to address national security issues (Sauter and Carafano, 2005). As of September 2008, the United States had 17 national strategies, most of them addressing some aspect of national security. For example, national strategy topics include national defense, drug control, aviation, terrorism information sharing, and cyberspace. The overarching national security strategy documents are the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* and the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. In the years since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States updated the *National Security Strategy* and created and then updated the

National Strategy for Homeland Security. These two national security documents have been crafted as two separate, but complementary documents that make a distinction between the security of the nation and the security of the homeland.

Drawing on this article's earlier points and cautions from Cornish (2008), who poses several cautions about the United Kingdom's new national security strategy, the United States' approach to security could be improved in several ways.

Uniting the National Strategies

First, the two strategies should be united to meld traditional and non-traditional means and strategies. According to Dale (2008), the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and subsequent homeland security legislation has not established a formal requirement for a homeland security strategy similar to a legislative requirement for a national security strategy. The Homeland Security Council is broadly tasked to advise the President on the United States' homeland security objectives, commitments, and risks. The Council is to provide oversight over federal security policies, also as part of advising the President. Legislative changes in 2007 (P.L. 107-295) mandated a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), modeled on the Defense Quadrennial Defense Review.

In initial position documents, the Obama Administration has generally emphasized the perspectives and goals of the existing two strategies and placed them in two separate categories as well. For example, homeland security has emphasized defeating terrorism worldwide, prevent nuclear terrorism, and protecting critical infrastructure. National security plans included proposals, for example, defeating al Qaeda and the Taliban, reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation, and developing military capabilities for the 21st Century. (Obama and Biden, 2008a, 2008b). However, in assessing the White House organization for homeland security and counter-terrorism, the President has clearly stated that he views "Homeland Security as indistinguishable from National Security – conceptually and functionally, they should be thought of together rather than separately. Instead of separating these issues, we must create an integrated, effective, and efficient approach to enhance the national security of the United States" (Presidential Study Directive – 1, 2009, pp. 1-2). At present, this concept is being applied to the White House organization.

While there might be an overlap in assessing threats and strategic approaches, it appears a high likelihood that at least in the short term, there still will be two separate national strategies – one for national security and one for homeland security. As discussed above, the trend in other countries – and what appears to be a much stronger strategic approach – is to merge strategies into one security strategy to address both traditional and non-traditional threats.

Here, however, Cornish (2008) might recommend that such a strategy lay out specific threats and hazards. He might question whether man-made threats and natural hazards may be identifiable and interconnected. In addition, the large number of other national strategies cover specific topics that often overlap or nest partially or wholly within each other, with actions varying widely from the strategic to operational levels. They are also characterized by different lead/co-lead organizations (if named at all). The end outcome is likely creating gaps, duplications, or conflicts, complicated by different times of issuance. The proliferation of national strategies – a strategy for whatever is identified as the current messy problem – also overuses and devalues a tool that can direct and focus national visibility and related interagency partnerships.

Expanding Substance

Second, the current United States' primary security strategies require considerably more substance to communicate a vision of security and to provide direction to efforts to implement the strategies. Currently, the strategies vary widely in their content and direction. Appendix A summarizes the general content of the United States' strategies. Considering desired characteristics that should mark a successful framework for a national strategy, the current strategies vary in purpose and content. The *National Security Strategy of the United States* basically is a statement of principles and very general goals. There is little substance about specific goals and objectives, resource needs, and measurement of outcomes. The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* contains more substance, but clearly emphasizes addressing a terrorism threat. For both, organization-specific strategic and operational plans must provide further direction and guidance to those tasked with implementation and funding. For example, Cornish (2008) criticized the United Kingdom's new strategy as not being a strategy document. He assessed it as primarily describing security challenges and government action, but not priorities, objectives, and performance benchmarks. Appendix B provides examples of content from two recently released national security strategies – those of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands – that illustrate how the substance of the United States' strategies might be strengthened.

Leadership and Accountability

Third, it is unclear who is to ensure that implementation occurs and there is accountability for results. The national strategies are not legal documents with mandates and sanctions. Their goals and actions cut across levels of government and sectors, and involve a large number of organizations and entities, including

international and nongovernmental, each with their own priorities – planned or mandated. The authority and capacity of public and private organizations to direct, implement, and be held accountable for the strategies varies: Who is in charge? Who should be? Who should pay? Under what authority? With what partners? In the United States' system of government and arrangement of public and private spheres, no one central entity or process has "control" of implementation, accountability, oversight, and coordination. Cornish (2008) might argue, however, that a national strategy should not be a policy blueprint to replace senior leadership experience and judgment. Moreover, a national strategy clearly means cross-governmental action that could run counter to departmental independence.

Implementation and Sustainability Issues

Fourth, there are numerous implementation and sustainability issues. Currently, there is no consistent process to update the strategies. Unless mandated by Congress as part of the quadrennial reviews, national strategy importance and commitment may end with the Administration that created it. Moreover, strategies may not drive new, innovative programs, but provide cover for pre-existing interagency programs and policies that have been in place for years, regardless of fit or performance.

Some goals and actors have not been de-conflicted across and within the primary security strategies and the other national strategies covering security topics. For example, commenting on the initial national security strategy, Daalder, Lindsay, and Steinburg (2002) note that one goal is to promote global freedom, but priority is placed on a counterterrorism policy requiring support from countries that may not share the value of freedom. Cornish (2008) believes the United Kingdom's national strategy relied heavily on multilateralism and the use of rules in international affairs, without addressing obstructions such as international vetoes or unenforced or conflicting rules. Even if there are willing partners, achieving national goals without incentives for partner action may mean the national strategies revert to primarily a federal responsibility.

Implicit and Explicit Strategy

Finally, it is clear that a national security strategy often will not be the strategy in practice. Doyle (2007), discussing a national security strategy, says that there is both an implicit or explicit strategy. Explicit strategy reflects a nation's official, authoritative declarations about what it intends to achieve in formal documents, such as a national security strategy. Implicit strategy is what a nation actually puts in play as it acts within a security environment and responds to threats.

Doyle makes the point that implicit strategy is likely to be much more complex than explicit strategy, given day-to-day implementation and adaptation to conditions.

Conclusions

This article's primary assumption is that national security strategies are valuable and certainly can be improved in addressing security from what, for whom, and by what means. It has argued that national security should be viewed in a broader context considering a wide range of threats from those posed by nation-states to global poverty and the growing income gaps.   These threats should not be compartmentalized and boxed into traditional and non-traditional perspectives and actions. Each country will need to consider these as they craft their definition of national security and approach to national security. It has argued that the "for whom" now includes the security of individuals to the security of the international community. The article also has posed the many purposes a national strategy might serve and goes on to provide an evaluative framework for both content and effectiveness.   Lastly, the article provides several recommendations for the current United States security strategies – national security and homeland security. The strategies should be united into one strategy, contain much more substance to provide direction for security actions, provide clarity regarding leadership and accountability, and address implementation and sustainability issues.

Appendix A. United States' National Strategies for Homeland Security and National Security

Characteristics	*National Security (March 2006)*	*Homeland Security (March 2006)*
Purpose and Scope	Protect the security of the American people Pillars: (1) promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity—working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies; (2) confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies.	Guide, organize, and unify our nation's homeland security efforts (protect and defend the homeland)
Tasks/Goals	Champion aspirations for human dignity Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends Work with others to defuse regional conflicts Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power Transform American's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization	Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success (creating and transforming homeland security principles, systems structures, and institutions)

Appendix B: United Kingdom and the Netherlands Strategy Content Examples

Area	*United Kingdom (March 2008)*	*Netherlands (May 2007)*
Purpose	Set out how the UK will address and manage the interconnected set of security challenges and underlying drivers, both immediately and in the long term	Goal is to protect the vital interests include territorial security (threatened through breach of territorial integrity), economic security (undisrupted trade), ecological security (living environment), physical security (public health), and social and political stability (e.g., respect for core values such as freedom of expression)
Scope	Broadened from the view that national security dealt with the protection of the state and its vital interests from attacks by other states to include threats to individual citizens and to our way of life, and to the integrity and interests of the state	Mainly deals with internal security policy and not international security policy; National security encompasses both breach of security by intentional human actions (security) and breach due to disasters, system or process faults, human failure or natural anomalies such as extreme weather (safety).
Security Challenges or Threats and Government Response	Terrorism *Response: Counter-terrorism strategy to pursue, protect, prepare, prevent*	Terrorism (catastrophic terrorism, radicalization)
	Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction *Response: Strategy to dissuade, detect, deny, defend*	Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (distribution of CBRN weapons)
	Trans-national organized crime *Response: Strategy of national policing capability, cross-border cooperation, building capacity overseas, better resource focus*	International organized crime (increasing connection between the legitimate and the criminal world, worldwide trade in drugs)
	Global instability and conflict, and failed and fragile states *Response: Strategy of political, economic, and security support*	Breaches of international peace and security (failing states, risk countries)
	Civil emergencies *Response: Strategy of horizon-scanning and effective risk assessment, improve UK resilience to all types of risks*	Social vulnerability (increasing inter-ethnic tensions and decreasing sense of citizenship, radicalization) Outbreak of infectious diseases

Area	United Kingdom (March 2008)	Netherlands (May 2007)
		and animal diseases (pandemics of known human diseases, viruses which can be transmitted from animals to humans)
	State-led threats to the UK *Response: Strategy of strong bilateral defense and security relationships, maintain strong national capabilities, intelligence, independent nuclear deterrent*	
Drivers of Insecurity	Challenges to the rules-based international system (changing interests, groupings, and relationships) *Response: Strategy to strengthen and reform the international system*	
	Climate change *Response: Strategy to tackle climate change through defensive measures and technological and behavioral change to a low-carbon economy*	Climate change and natural disasters (increasing risk of flooding, increasing risk of extreme drought/heat), plague organisms
	Competition for energy *Response: Strategy to ensure secure and reliable energy supplies, reduce vulnerability to security shocks elsewhere, not contribute to energy tensions, tackle climate change*	Economic lack of security (extreme scarcity of energy carriers and raw materials)
	Poverty, inequality, and poor governance *Response: Strategy to increase overseas development budget, support international trade reforms, targeting to key regions, countries, and provinces at risk of instability or state failure, fight corruption*	
	Global trends (economic, technological, demographic) *Response: Strategy to act early, scan for possible future threats, work with partners, multilateral, rules-based approach*	
Implementation	Publish a national-level risk register that will be regularly updated	Government-wide analysis of threats and assessments of risks (what is coming the Netherlands' way)
	Improve ways to work more effectively across government	Strategic planning (does the Netherlands have the requisite capabilities)

Area	*United Kingdom (March 2008)*	*Netherlands (May 2007)*
	Strengthen capacity for horizon-scanning, forward-planning, and early warning	Follow-up (how and where will national security be reinforced0
	Seek greater integration and responsiveness at the operational level	Evaluation of the national security method
	Dialogue with experts, stakeholders, and the public to build a shared understanding of security challenges and response	
	Publish annual update on challenges and progress on implementing this strategy	

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