FORESIGHT

forging common futures in a multi-polar world

# Beyond exceptionalism?

## The United States in a multi-polar world

ELENA JURADO & PRIYA SHANKAR

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# Abstract

By announcing their intention to "reset" relations with Russia and hold direct talks with Iran and North Korea, the Obama administration has actively sought to embrace multilateralism. Around the world, this new willingness to engage has been welcomed with enthusiasm, especially following the unilateralist policies of the Bush years. However, as this paper argues, tensions between multilateralism and unilateralism in US foreign policy continue to exist under the Obama administration. This is evident across three policy areas that have been utmost priority for the US government: the global financial crisis, the security threats in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and the existential challenges of climate change and non-proliferation. The United States approaches each of these issues with a sense of its own unique exceptionalism, which has historically provided the framework for US engagement with the rest of the world. As different powers rise and the world becomes multi-polar, a policy of engagement shaped around exceptionalism will become more difficult to sustain.

## About FORESIGHT

Foresight is a new international programme of investigation and debate structured around the challenge of forging common futures in a multi-polar world. The last decade has seen a major shift in the distribution of power away from the OECD towards other regions of the world. Organised the Alfred Herrhausen Society, the international forum of the Deutsche Bank, in partnership with Policy Network, Foresight aims to ensure a smooth transition by encouraging better multilateral understanding and promoting a fairer and more functional international order.

## About the authors

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# Beyond exceptionalism? The United States in a multi-polar world

## Introduction

In 2006, headlines describing the United States as "the biggest global peace threat" splashed across newspapers in many parts of the world.[1] In the eyes of many observers, even amongst America's closest allies, US operations in Iraq were exacerbating global insecurity. From unilateral military action to the failure to seriously engage with the climate change challenge, the years under the Bush administration had witnessed an unprecedented decline of the international standing of the United States. In the run-up to the 2008 presidential elections there was widespread relief that, whatever the outcome, at least there would be a change in the presidency and the Bush years would be over. However, in historical perspective, it is evident that US foreign policy under Bush was not an aberration. It only represented one extreme of the tensions in US foreign-policy-making and these tensions continue to persist.

Protected from the rest of the world by two oceans and with a disdain for old world power politics, the United States pursued a largely isolationist foreign policy until the 20th century, avoiding conflicts that did not have much impact on the Americas. The model was that of the "city on a hill", which was to be a beacon separate from, yet watched by, the rest of the world.[2] Not until World War I did the United States get embroiled in global affairs, and it was the philosophy of Woodrow Wilson that embodied American exceptionalism and came to shape the terms of America's engagement with the rest of the world. The rationale for the United States to enter the conflict was to make "the world safe for democracy", making it the mission of the United States to propagate its ideals. However, at the heart of this discourse was an inherent contradiction: the United States had a duty to spread freedom because American values were both superior and universally applicable.

It was this vision that formed the basis for US-led multilateralism, at first, unsuccessfully with the League of Nations, and then again during World War II under Franklin Roosevelt. The United States staked its claim to international leadership on the basis of its altruism and the rationale that what was good for America would be good for the world. Although there has been much debate about the extent to which reality deviated from rhetoric, US foreign policy, whatever its actual impact, continued to be articulated

1. Based on polls by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, ICM and other polling agencies
2. The phrase, "City on a hill" comes from the Gospel of Mathew. It was used in the American context in 1630 in a sermon by John Winthrop.

in these terms during the Cold War period. Therefore, US-led multilateralism was based on the idea of advancing a common good rather than as a method of negotiating between divergent interests. As a result, when multilateral institutions were not perceived to serve the common good, the United States could exempt itself to preserve its unique nature and continue to act as a beacon for the rest of the world. It is this exceptionalism-exemptionalism paradigm that has led to continuing tensions between multilateralism and unilateralism in US foreign policy. [3]

As different powers rise, each with their own sense of exceptionalism, this could usher in a period of chaos and instability

After the unilateralist extreme of the Bush years, the election of President Obama has seen the pendulum swing in the other direction. Prior to the election, Obama outlined his vision for renewing US leadership based on alliances, partnerships and institutions, the premise of which would be multilateral cooperation.[4] And the world greeted Obama's message with extraordinary hope and enthusiasm. His personal story symbolised the American dream, and his election inspired millions all over the world, restoring faith in the ability of American democracy to bring about change. However, as President Obama embarks on a new era of multilateral engagement, he confronts a world order that is rapidly changing. Globalisation is making the world increasingly interdependent. At the same time, the world is becoming increasingly multi-polar. As different powers rise, each with their own sense of exceptionalism, this could usher in a period of chaos and instability unless each of these powers has a stake in a shared international order. Both of these processes, increasing multipolarity and increasing interdependence, make the need for multilateral cooperation greater than ever.

How the United States will respond to this changing world order and what role other key powers expect it to play formed the basis of the discussions at the Foresight USA symposium, organised in partnership with the Brookings Institution, that took place in Washington DC on 18-19 June. Six months into the tenure of the new administration, the symposium brought together senior US officials with participants from all over the world to discuss and debate the role of the United States in the changing world order. This was analysed through the prism of three international challenges that have been a priority for the Obama administration. The first two were immediate challenges – the financial crisis and the security challenge in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The third explored the more long-term but equally significant existential challenges of climate change and non-proliferation.

A closer look at American positions in each of these areas suggests that, despite the global enthusiasm that has greeted the Obama administration and its embrace of multilateralism, the historic tensions in US foreign-policy making are likely to persist.

3. See M. Ignatieff ed. American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, Princeton University Press, 2005 for an elaboration of the concepts of American exceptionalism and exemptionalism.

4. B. Obama, 'Renewing American Leadership', Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007

# The fallout of the global financial crisis

Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the financial and economic crisis has dominated the global agenda. The way in which the crisis unfolded visibly demonstrated how the international order is changing. From São Paulo to Singapore, no part of the world was left unaffected, indicating the interdependence of the global economy. At the same time, advanced economies, on the whole, suffered more than the emerging economies, signifying a shift in economic power away from the US and OECD to other parts of the world. This shift represents a significant change from the 1990's when American-style laissez-faire capitalism emerged as the dominant economic model following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Through the Washington Consensus, it was the American vision and model that shaped the existing global financial and economic system. This is in sharp contrast to the situation today, where many see the United States as responsible for the crisis and openly critique the American system.

Indeed, the global extent and spread of the crisis highlights the need for international cooperation in order to tackle the financial and economic imbalances which provoked the downturn. At one level, the new US administration recognises the new reality and the change in approach it requires. Its support and involvement in the G20 process, with the hosting of the recent summit in Pittsburgh, is an indicator that it realises the importance of international negotiations and that there are new major players that need to be involved in decision-making processes. Indeed, there have been calls by the United States for coordinated international responses and exit strategies, indicating a commitment to economic multilateralism.

Yet, from the discussion at the symposium, it seemed that the primary focus for the American government was on domestic US recovery with less attention given to the global economy. A series of American interventions emphasised that the utmost priority was "getting our own house in order". From fiscal stimuli to bank recapitalisation to regulatory reform, the US government has been trying to intervene with strong policy measures that to some extent have been successful. While the economy is doing much better than expected, many risks remain and the recovery is likely to be slow and "anaemic".

While it is only natural for the administration to concentrate on the recovery of the US economy, the crisis has larger, underlying implications which will need to be addressed as the path to recovery starts. The way the US-China economic relationship is managed will be crucial in this process. The culture of easy money in the US that, in part, led to the crisis, was fuelled by Chinese savings and production, which catered and allowed for excessive American consumption. Indeed, with two trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves,

and as the largest foreign owner of US government debt, the role of China will be crucial. While this is being recognised by US policymakers as they launch a new strategic and economic dialogue with China, the long-term strategies still remain unclear.

The centres of gravity of the global economic order are shifting as a result of the current crisis and this is still underestimated by many in the US

The centres of gravity of the global economic order are shifting as a result of the current crisis and this is still underestimated by many in the US. This is evident in two key areas of tension which raise questions about US commitment to multilateralism when it is not seen to serve the immediate interests of the American economy. The first area of tension is around the issue of currency and inflation. Amidst concerns by many about the US dollar losing its value, US officials are clear that for the American economy, inflation is less of a worry than deflation and stagnation. This has been of particular concern to China, which holds massive foreign exchange reserves in dollars and US Treasury bonds, and has strong interests in seeing the dollar maintain its value.

Indeed, China's demands for an international reserve currency seem to indicate that it is no longer content with its holdings in US dollars. First raised in a paper by Zhou Xiaochuan, the Governor of China's Central Bank, and then again reiterated by state councillor, Dai Bingguo, at the G-8 summit in L'Aquila, these proposals appear to be acquiring greater influence, with even Nicholas Sarkozy saying that the world may require a "multi-monetary system."[5] Although there are no signs of any immediate moves towards an international currency, inflation may further erode faith in the US dollar, and the potential international repercussions of any domestic policy option need to be kept in mind.

Another key area of tension, is regarding demand and trade, and how to address global imbalances. There has been much debate about where the demand required for economic revival would come from. While surplus countries need to boost domestic demand, open trade flows will be necessary in ensuring future growth. Many outside observers, especially from developing countries, still remain uncertain of the United States' commitment to open trade. As the recent disputes over proposed US duties on Chinese tyre imports indicate, at a time of increased economic vulnerability, small measures can have enhanced symbolic significance.

This incident also captures the heart of the dilemma facing the new US administration as it seeks a new era of multilateral engagement. It was the US steelworkers union that brought the case forward, complaining that more than 5,000 jobs had been lost due to a surge in Chinese tyre imports since 2004. While such measures may have garnered domestic political support, they are inimical to the interests of other countries and may hinder the prospects of sustaining and improving the international trade regime.

5. China airs FX view but no big stir at G8 summit", Reuters, 10 July, 2009

# Afghanistan and Pakistan: towards an integrated security policy

Following the experience of the Bush years, it is not surprising that Obama made change in US national security policy a critical part of his election campaign. In his 2007 Foreign Affairs article, he spoke about replacing the outgoing administration's narrow approach with an "integrated" security strategy. This would acknowledge the inter-related nature of security challenges across issue-areas and international borders. It would draw on the full range of American power, fusing hard power (the power to coerce) with soft power (the power to attract) such as diplomacy or foreign assistance. An integrated approach would also depend on America's ability to rebuild international alliances and partnerships in order to confront common threats and pursue common security in an increasingly interdependent world.

One of the most visible attempts to redefine America's national security policy along these lines has taken place in relation to US efforts to stabilise Afghanistan, which President Obama has indicated as his top military priority. In addition to vastly increasing its military presence in Afghanistan, the US administration has broadened the focus of the conflict to include Pakistan rather than just Afghanistan; it has made a concerted effort to integrate the mission's military and civilian dimensions and strengthen the role of the Afghan military in the counter-insurgency effort; and it has acknowledged the need to safeguard civil liberties in the fight against terrorism, demonstrating renewed understanding of the importance of America's reputation abroad.

An integrated approach would also depend on America's ability to rebuild international alliances and partnerships in order to confront common threats

At the forefront of the new strategy has been an attempt to increase the involvement of other major powers in the military and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. On the one hand, the new administration has invested considerable capital in improving the commitment of its NATO allies to the military effort in Afghanistan (with mixed success so far). On the other hand, the administration has endeavoured to broaden support for the NATO-led mission by reaching out to other powers with a stake in the region. One of President Obama's most lauded initiatives has been the creation of a new "contact group for Afghanistan and Pakistan" which brings high-level representatives from 27 countries and international organisations, including Russia, India and China, together to discuss and coordinate their positions on the

stabilisation effort.

These US overtures have, on the whole, been positively received by the emerging powers in the region, who share an interest in stemming Islamic fundamentalism, drug trafficking and refugees pouring across Afghanistan's borders. Although they have stopped short of contributing troops to the war effort, Russia, China and India have contributed in different ways to the stabilisation mission – either by lifting objections to the transport of military supplies to Kabul; providing assistance to the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts; or simply by acquiescing to the build-up of America's military presence in the area. The US depends on the support of its NATO allies, and the Afghan military, for the success of its military strategy in Afghanistan. It also depends on the capacity and willingness of Afghanistan's neighbours to provide stability for the region as a whole, without which any military success in Afghanistan would be short-lived.

the recent record of US-led multilateralism...too readily assumed a convergence of interests between the players

However, any shared transnational threats exist alongside deeper geopolitical interests which continue to divide the major powers. These differences have surfaced on a number of occasions, underlining the fragility of the international partnerships which the United States is forging in central Asia. Thus, Russia is ready to cooperate with the US mission in Afghanistan but only if its historical influence in central Asia is recognised, as indicated in the pressure it has put on Kyrgyzstan to evict US troops from its soil. China's acquiescence to US presence in the region is likewise predicated on the strengthening of its commercial interests in the region, a trend which the United States is monitoring carefully, lest it complicate US diplomacy in the region.[6] India in turn has not disguised its concern about discussions taking place in the US to attempt reconciliation with elements of the Taliban.

In view of this complex geopolitical reality, there are already doubts about whether the United States will be able or willing to take on board the often conflicting interests of the regional powers in its efforts to "multilateralise" the stabilisation mission in Afghanistan. Thus, many have been critical of the recent record of US-led multilateralism which too readily assumed a convergence of interests between the players, overlooking or ignoring the conflicting preferences which resulted from the region's complex historical legacies. Instead, what is needed is a genuine multilateralism founded on a willingness to show restraint and seek compromise where necessary, rather than the single-minded pursuit of presumed common interests.

There is an interesting duality in current American approaches to Afghanistan and Pakistan, torn between universalising tendencies and a new appreciation for the cultural and geopolitical complexities of central Asia. The former was echoed in the symposium by a member of the US administration, who commented

6. The impact of China's economic and security interests in Continental Asia on the United States, Hearing before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, June 2009, p. v.

that, "for the first time since partition, India, Pakistan and the United States have a common threat, a common challenge and a common goal" – a comment which seemed out of touch with the much more complicated realities on the ground. At the same time, however, a new awareness of the limitations of American power is perceptible in new US policies, which highlight the importance of mobilising ordinary Afghans to help with the reconstruction effort.

Where this duality will lead to is unclear. As rising casualties and evidence of electoral fraud in Afghanistan lead to disenchantment with the war in the United States, the need for strengthened international engagement in Afghanistan is becoming more pressing than ever. Yet, in many ways, the new American administration is walking a difficult tightrope in Afghanistan. While it remains the only power willing to strengthen its military commitment in the region, its every step is being monitored by Afghanistan and Pakistan's powerful neighbours, lest it result in a shift in the regional balance of power in a direction unfavourable to any of them.

# Climate change and non-proliferation: the existential challenges

Climate change and nuclear proliferation present two of the gravest dangers imaginable to humankind. The risks presented by global warming from flooding to drought to natural disasters, which could lead to massive human displacements and refugee problems, have become increasingly evident over the last few years. Efforts to move towards low-carbon forms of energy have increased the appeal of nuclear energy, and yet, this carries its own risks, increasing dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation and raising issues of how to manage waste. While nuclear proliferation has always presented a danger, this threat has been exacerbated due to the rise of non-state actors and the danger that nuclear arsenal may fall into the hands of extremist groups, as well as the perceived breakdown of the non-proliferation regime. These are the existential challenges which threaten our very existence.

Due to their transnational and existential nature, no country, however powerful, is in a position to guard against these challenges. International cooperation and regulation will be key in any attempt to protect against the risks presented by these two existential threats. Yet, the process of achieving any international consensus on what form such regulation could take is being complicated by rising multi-polarity as different countries assert their own interests.

In the field of climate change and emissions reduction, the United States was involved in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol, but was the only country to have signed and not ratified the treaty. The Senate rejected ratification on the basis that the treaty was flawed as it differentiated between developed and developing countries and did not include binding obligations for emissions reduction from developing countries. As the Copenhagen Climate Conference approaches, these issues will be critical in achieving agreement on a post-Kyoto regime. Historically, the United States has been the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and its rates of per capita emission far surpass those of even other advanced economies.[7] Many emerging powers view it as the historical obligation and responsibility of the US and other advanced economies to make greater commitments and sacrifices.

Yet, carbon-use has been embedded in the American way of life. A large house in sprawling suburbs, pick-up trucks and minivans are all considered part of the American dream. Although the Obama administration

7. In 2006, the US emitted 19 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide per capita with France, Germany and the UK each emitting less than 10 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide per capita. Data based on Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, US Department of Energy

has made remarkable progress in advancing the climate change agenda, building domestic support for an international agreement on carbon reductions is likely to be an uphill struggle. A new vision for the American dream that moves beyond the "second garage model" will need to be defined.

As the United States goes forward in its mission to combat climate change, the US government has also indicated an increasing acceptance of its international obligations. In setting up the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, which includes both advanced and emerging economies, the US seems to be recognising the global shifts in power. Even the notion of 'differentiated responsibilities', which was one of the defining principles of the Kyoto Protocol, is gradually gaining more acceptance amongst US policy circles.

The idea that the United States can maintain and impose its own standards for appropriate climate action.... indicates lingering tendencies towards unilateralism

This greater commitment is visible in the climate change bill that aims to reduce carbon emissions, which passed through the House of Representatives in June and marked a big achievement for the Obama administration (although it is yet to pass through the Senate). However, this bill contains a provision to impose tariffs on imports from countries that are seen as not doing enough to limit global warming. Although this provision would not come into effect until 2020, the question of who decides which countries are doing enough is not explored. The idea that the United States can maintain and impose its own standards for appropriate climate change action on other countries indicates lingering tendencies towards unilateralism.

These tendencies can also be seen in the field of non-proliferation. For several decades, the United States was in a position to ignore the build-up of resentment at the unfair application of the non-proliferation treaty, which came into force in 1968. At the heart of the NPT was a grand bargain, whereby non-nuclear weapons states would not attempt to acquire nuclear weapons while nuclear weapons states would pursue the long-term goal of disarmament. However, the nuclear-weapons states, including the US, failed to keep their end of the bargain. As a result, the NPT divided the world into nuclear- and non-nuclear weapons states, with different rules and standards for those who were allowed to possess nuclear weapons and those who were not. Other elements of the status, power and clout that went with being part of the 'nuclear club' were also not easily accessible for other states, including a seat in the UN Security Council.

The history of exemptionalism extends to other elements of the non-proliferation regime. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which aims to ban all nuclear explosions, was signed by the United States in 1996 but the Senate rejected ratification. The United States' approach has contributed, in part, to the stalemate which hangs over the future of the non-proliferation regime, also visible in the failure of the 2005 NPT review conference to produce an agreed outcome document. Indeed, with the IAEA's failure to stop the uranium-enrichment programmes in Iran and North Korea, many people now talk about the breakdown of the non-proliferation regime.

With the Obama administration, there has been a big shift in the US approach and non-proliferation has become a priority on its foreign policy agenda. At his speech in Prague this spring, the President even spoke of moving towards a "nuclear-free world", and the recent agreement with Russia on a new arms reduction treaty is a big step forward. There has also been change in policy towards outlier countries such as Iran and North Korea, with the United States now following a strategy of engagement, including direct talks. As was seen following the North Korean nuclear test earlier this year, cooperation with Russia and China in responding to the challenges presented by these states has been increasingly significant.

many countries are no longer willing to accept an international regime that they percieve as inimical to their interests

And yet, there remain huge obstacles in the way of reaching a joint position on non-proliferation. There is continuing frustration among the "nuclear have-nots". Some have even greeted US proposals for an international fuel bank for providing nuclear fuel to the non-nuclear world with skepticism, unclear about whether it would remain under the control of the advanced nuclear states.[8] Going forward with a more legitimate non-proliferation regime, simply cutting nuclear arsenals will not be enough and whole-scale delegitimisation of nuclear weapons will be required.

With major upcoming international negotiations, the future of both the climate change and non-proliferation regimes remains unclear. Many countries are no longer willing to accept an international regime that they perceive as inimical to their interests and the process of achieving consensus in these two policy areas will require difficult compromises.

8. "Reviving Nuclear Disarmament", speech by Mohamed El Baradei, 26th February, 2008

# Conclusion

Last week's visit by Barack Obama to the United Nations, where he delivered an address to the General Assembly, chaired a special session of the Security Council and hosted meetings on a swathe of other global issues, was highly symbolic. It sent a clear message to the rest of the world that America is now taking multilateralism seriously, placing the Bush era of UN-bashing decisively behind him. Indeed, during his UN General Assembly speech, Obama outlined a decisive change in approach, admitting "—America has [in the recent past] acted unilaterally, without regard for the interests of others. And this has fed an almost reflexive anti-Americanism, which too often has served as an excuse for collective inaction."

The enthusiastic reception Obama received on this occasion reflected the enormous hope engendered by the change in the US administration. However, our review of US foreign policy suggests that the enthusiasm evoked by Obama's arrival at the White House should be tempered with a dose of realism. There is no doubt that there has been a huge change in attitude, as seen in the administration's support for and involvement in the G20 process, its setting up of an international support group on Afghanistan and Pakistan and its acceptance of international obligations in respect of climate change. However, one of the most significant patterns which emerges is the continuing presence of the exceptionalism-exemptionalism paradigm that has characterised the American approach over the years. As the US embarks on a new era of international engagement, it is important to bear in mind three structural factors that are likely to influence the tone and content of America's relations with the rest of the world.

the US is a domestic polity that is intensely proud of its hard-won liberty and suspicious of governance at any level, let alone global governance

First, the United States is a domestic polity that is intensely proud of its hard-won liberty and suspicious of governance at any level, let alone global governance. As a result, the new administration will often need to proceed stealthily with its multilateralist policies, a pattern which may cause some confusion. A White House official joked about this at the Foresight USA symposium, in reference to America's active involvement in the G8 and G20. While American politicians shy away from the term "global governance", he noted wryly that, if you drop the numbers, the G8 and G20 become the GG, "which is just a secret code for global governance."

Secondly, there is a tendency to articulate US foreign policy not in terms of American interests, but in

terms of advancing a common or global good that benefits people all over the world. This propensity to universalise American values and objectives explains why US policy-makers so frequently attempt to prescribe the rules by which multilateral cooperation will take place, whether this be in relation to deciding on 'legitimate' emissions reduction targets or the terms of implementing the non-proliferation regime.

Finally, American foreign policy does not take place in a vacuum. The actions and reactions of other powers will influence the speed and timing of the American pendulum. In recent years, there have been numerous examples of foot-dragging on the part of other major powers, resentful at what they see as American domination of the global agenda but reluctant to take on more responsibility themselves. However, this trend may be changing as indicated by China's recent proposal for an international reserve currency and European initiatives in the field of climate change.

The challenge lies in developing rationale that moves beyond exceptionalism and reinterprets American identity to meet the new international reality

As the world watches on, and the Obama administration attempts to manage expectations, it is clear that the stakes have never been higher. America's decision to abandon plans for a missile defence shield in Europe may represent a turning-point, indicating a new appreciation for the security concerns of another power and a willingness to compromise. However, the backlash it has created among opponents highlights how difficult it will be for the president to sell the new approach back home. Although the process of international cooperation is likely to be difficult, the administration will need to demonstrate that this process is beneficial for the American people, and how some compromises might be necessary to serve long-term and wider interests. The challenge lies in developing a rationale that moves beyond exceptionalism and reinterprets American identity to meet the new international reality.

# Annex

## Foresight USA Symposium
## Washington DC, June 18/19 2009

### Speakers:

**Anatoly Adamishin,** former Deputy Foreign Minister, Russian Federation
**William Antholis**, Managing Director, The Brookings Institution
**Marcel Biato**, Foreign Policy Adviser to the Brazilian Presidency
**Luis Cuesta Civís**, Spanish Secretary General for Defence Policy
**Derek Chollet**, Principal Deputy Director, Policy Planning, US State Department
**Richard Holbrooke**, US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
**Wu Jianmin,** President, China Foreign Affairs University and former Chinese Ambassador to the UN
**Sergei Karaganov**, Chairman, Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy
**Roger Liddle**, Chairman, Policy Network
**David Lipton**, National Economic Council, The White House
**Peter Mandelson**, First Secretary of State, Lord President of the Council, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, and President of Policy Network, UK
**Pratap Bhanu Mehta**, President, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
**Friedrich Merz**, former Chairman of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic Union party, Germany
**Bernd Mützelburg**, German Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan
**G. Parthasarthy**, former Indian Ambassador to Pakistan
**Carlos Pascual**, US Ambassador to Mexico
**James Purnell,** Labour Member of Parliament, UK
**Teresa Ribera**, Spanish State Secretary for Climate Change
**Simon Schama**, Professor of History, Columbia University
**José Serra,** Governor of the State of São Paolo
**Meera Shankar,** Indian Ambassador to the US
**Hani Shukrallah**, Editor of Al-Ahram weekly, Cairo
**Philip Stephens**, Associate Editor, The Financial Times, London
**Lawrence Summers**, Director, National Economic Council
**Strobe Talbott**, President, The Brookings Institution
**Yao Yang**, Deputy Director, China Center for Economic Research, Beijing