

Russia-Ukraine War in 10 Charts




Photo: Fabio Murgia/CSIS, Getty Images

Commentary by **Seth G. Jones, Riley McCabe, Yasir Atalan, Benjamin Jensen, Romina Bandura, Emma Curtis, Caitlin Welsh, Otto Svendsen, Max Bergmann, Mark F. Cancian, and Chris H. Park**

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Four years ago, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, resulting in the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II. Initially conceived as a rapid operation to overthrow Kyiv, the conflict has evolved into a prolonged, high-intensity war that is reshaping European security. Despite substantial human and economic costs, Ukraine has maintained its defense with sustained Western support, while Russia has mobilized its economy and society for an extended confrontation. Although the war remains unresolved and significant uncertainties persist, its fourth anniversary provides a moment to reflect on its profound impacts on regional security, transatlantic cohesion, military technology, and the global balance of power.

1. Russian GDP Growth Is Stagnating




Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update; "Real GDP Growth (Annual Percent Change)," International Monetary Fund, 2026 • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

The Russian economy has held up better than some expected following Western economic sanctions, which the United States and other Western countries imposed after Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. But Russia's economy is increasingly showing signs of strain, and long-term productivity looks bleak. The country receives limited foreign investment and is unable to borrow on international markets. To finance the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin has borrowed at home and raised taxes. It spends roughly half its budget on the armed forces, the military-industrial complex, domestic security, and debt servicing. While the war sustains jobs and industrial activity, it produces few lasting assets or productivity gains. Russia is falling further behind advanced economies in such areas as AI and emerging technology; no Russian companies appear in the list of the top 100 technology companies in the world. Overall, Russia's nominal GDP is closer to Canada or Italy—not the United States, China, or even Germany or Japan. Adjusted for purchasing power parity, Russia remains far smaller than top-tier economic powers like the United States or China; it has a GDP five and a half times smaller than the United States and four times smaller than China.

- [Seth G. Jones](#), *Defense and Security Department President and Harold Brown Chair and Riley McCabe*, *Associate Fellow, Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program*

2. Russia Is Advancing at Historically Slow Rates

Average daily rates of advance for select combined arms offensives




Source: CSIS analysis from various sources. • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

Despite being on the offensive in most areas since January 2024, Russian forces moved forward on the battlefield at historically slow rates of advance. In one of its most prominent recent campaigns, Russian troops advanced just under 50 kilometers from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk from February 2024 to January 2026, an average pace of about 70 meters per day. That is slower than Allied forces in the notoriously bloody Battle of the Somme in World War I. Russia’s offensives around Kupiansk and Chasiv Yar have been even less efficient, moving at mere fractions of the pace of historical campaigns.

- [Seth G. Jones](#), Defense and Security Department President and Harold Brown Chair and [Riley McCabe](#), Associate Fellow, Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program

3. Russia Has Suffered an Unprecedented Number of Fatalities

Estimated fatalities in select Soviet and Russian wars



Source: CSIS analysis drawn from various sources. • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

Assessing casualties and fatalities in wartime is difficult and imprecise, and various sides have incentives to inflate or shrink the numbers for political purposes. According to CSIS estimates, Russian forces suffered nearly 1.2 million battlefield casualties, which includes killed, wounded, and missing, between February 2022 and December 2025. In addition, Russia suffered between 275,000 and 325,000 fatalities over the same time period. To put these numbers into historical perspective, Russia has suffered more casualties and fatalities than any other major power in any war since World War II. Russian battlefield casualties and fatalities are significantly greater than Ukrainian casualties and fatalities—with a ratio of between 2.5:1 and 2:1. Ukrainian forces likely suffered somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 casualties over the same period, including killed, wounded, and missing, and between 100,000 and 140,000 fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025. Total combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026 at current rates of attrition.

- *Seth G. Jones*, Defense and Security Department President and Harold Brown Chair and *Riley McCabe*, Associate Fellow, Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program

4. Russia Seized ~20% of Ukraine's Territory Since 2014




Source: CSIS analysis • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

Russian forces have seized around 75,000 square kilometers (approximately 12 percent of Ukraine) since the 2022 invasion and control about 120,000 square kilometers (approximately 20 percent of Ukraine and an area roughly the size of Pennsylvania), including territory seized before 2022 such as Crimea and parts of Donbas. These gains fall well short of Moscow's goal to militarily conquer Ukraine. Over the past two years, Russia's territorial gains have been particularly limited. In 2024, Russian forces seized approximately 3,604 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, or about 0.6 percent of Ukraine. In 2025, Russian forces made marginally larger gains, seizing approximately 4,831 square kilometers (about 0.8 percent of Ukraine) and retaking approximately 473 square kilometers in Russia's Kursk Oblast.

- Seth G. Jones, *Defense and Security Department President and Harold Brown Chair and Riley McCabe*, *Associate Fellow, Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program*

5. Russian Drone Launches Have Surged Since September 2024



Source: CSIS Futures Lab Analysis of Ukraine Force Data • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

Starting in September 2024, Russia sharply increased its use of Shahed-type one-way attack drones. Weekly launches rose from an average of about 75 to roughly 900 within six months, showing rapid expansion of both production and launch capacity. The buildup continued through 2025, with more than 50,000 Shahed drones launched, about five times the number used during the same period the previous year. Although Ukraine intercepts many drones through air defenses and electronic warfare, the sustained volume reflects a deliberate attrition strategy. Weekly successful hits climbed to around 160 in 2025, nearly three times higher than the previous year's average, increasing overall damage despite defensive efforts.

- Yasir Atalan, *Deputy Director and Data Fellow, Futures Lab and Benjamin Jensen*, *Director, Futures Lab and Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department*

6. Ukraine Faces Staggering Damage and Immense Reconstruction Needs

Estimated cost of damage and needs across Ukraine over the next 10 years

Ukraine GDP in 2024

\$190.7B

Damage

\$195.1B

Needs

\$587.7B


Source: Fifth Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5); The World Bank • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

As Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine, now entering its fifth year, the country is facing staggering levels of damage and immense reconstruction needs. New estimates indicate that Ukraine will require \$588 billion for recovery and reconstruction over the next 10 years, approximately 3 times Ukraine's GDP in 2024. This figure accounts for repair, restoration, and reconstruction costs, including premiums for improvements for energy efficiency, modernization, and sustainability standards, as well as inflation, surge pricing due to volume of construction, and higher insurance. Although the eastern part of the country will have the greatest needs, 2025 has been marked by heavy strikes across Ukraine. Beyond the immense human suffering, sectors such housing, transport, and energy have been among the most affected since the full-scale invasion began.

- *Romina Bandura, Senior Fellow, Project on Prosperity and Development*

7. Ukraine's Centralized Energy System Is Vulnerable

Ukraine's energy supply in 2023



Source: IEA • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

Among the most hard-hit sectors is Ukraine's energy infrastructure. The centralized nature of Ukraine's energy system is vulnerable to large-scale disruptions, including grid failures or attacks, which can lead to widespread blackouts. Moving forward, Ukraine has a unique opportunity not only to rebuild this sector, but transform its energy system into a decentralized, secure, and sustainable model. Such a transition would not only strengthen the resilience of its infrastructure against future Russian threats but also accelerate its integration into the Western energy market, advancing both Ukraine's energy independence and U.S. strategic and economic interests in the region.

- *Romina Bandura*, Senior Fellow, Project on Prosperity and Development

8. Demining Is Critical to Ukraine's Agricultural Recovery

Estimated farmland still potentially contaminated with mines and UXOs compared to farmland cleared in 2025



Source: Ministry of Economy, Environment, and Agriculture of Ukraine, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

While substantial progress has been made to clear Ukraine's farmland of landmines and explosive remnants of war, the scale of potential mine contamination remains a pervasive challenge for Ukraine's farmers and the Ukrainian government, its allies, and the global mine action community. Ukraine has successfully cleared significant amounts of farmland and restored it to productivity by adapting domestic programs, mobilizing international support, and employing innovative solutions—but understanding of the full scale of contamination and resources needed to restore farmland will remain elusive until the war's end. Clearance of landmines and explosive remnants of war is critical to Ukraine's agricultural recovery, which will provide revenue to support Ukraine's economy, reducing Ukraine's reliance on international aid, including from the United States.

– *Emma Curtis*, Research Associate, Global Food and Water Security Program and *Caitlin Welsh*, Director, Global Food and Water Security Program

9. The Financial Burden of Supporting Ukraine Militarily Has Shifted

Military aid by quarter (USD, billions)

	From the U.S.	From Europe
2022	1.4	1.9
Q2	6.1	6.6
Q3	9.2	2.8
Q4	5	4.4
2023	11.1	9.1
Q2	8.3	5.8
Q3	4.1	4.9
Q4	1.5	4.3
2024		7
Q2	8.6	6.3
Q3	7.5	3.2
Q4	5.3	5.2
2025		10.5
Q2		14.2
Q3		5.2
Q4		7.8

Allocations are defined as aid which has been delivered or specified for delivery. Europe includes EU, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.


Source: Kiel Institut; European Central Bank • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

The financial burden of supporting Ukraine militarily has shifted dramatically in the last year. U.S. military aid allocations to Ukraine peaked in 2022 and 2023 and effectively ceased in early 2025 as the Biden administration departed, with nearly all of America's \$68 billion now committed. European allocations, while totaling a higher \$99 billion in aggregate, have followed a more consistent cadence—reflecting the deep political commitment across most of Europe to keeping Ukraine's armed forces in the fight. The divergence in early 2025 marks a critical inflection point: new U.S. allocations petered out as the Trump administration ramped up its efforts to reach a peace agreement, largely sidelining Europe in the process. With no new U.S. funding authorized and most Biden-era allocations already delivered, flows of appropriated U.S. military aid will decline gradually in 2027 and diminish sharply by early 2028. As a result, Ukraine will soon become reliant on Europe asserting itself as Kyiv's principal security backer.

- Otto Svendsen, Associate Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and Max Bergmann, Director, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and Stuart Center

10. U.S. Military Aid Deliveries Continue—With NATO Addition

Delivery timeline of U.S. military aid to Ukraine



Source: Authors' calculations based on releases from the Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, NATO, and Ukrainian government. • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

Military equipment contracted for under the Biden administration through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) continues to flow to Ukraine at the rate of about \$1 billion per month as it comes out of U.S. factories. While military aid designated for transfer under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) has all been delivered, the second Trump administration introduced a new weapons delivery vehicle, the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL). Created by a U.S.-NATO agreement in July 2025, it provides a mechanism for European countries to purchase U.S. equipment to send to Ukraine. Following the first PURL package of \$578 million, subsequent commitments have added up to more than \$4.8 billion. Air defense munitions make up a large part of the purchased equipment, as this remains Ukraine's greatest need. Russian missiles continue to inflict significant damage and contribute to the harsh winter in Ukraine. President Zelensky stated that Ukraine

needs \$15 billion of PURL equipment in 2026 – nearly \$600 million of which has been committed as of February.

- *Mark F. Cancian, Senior Adviser, Defense and Security Department and Chris H. Park, Research Associate, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy*

Editorial support by: [Fabio Murgia](#), [Bridget Corna](#), and [Phillip Meylan](#)

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